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Abstract 
A fundamental process in many important research foci in information systems is the 
appropriation of IT artifacts in creative ways by users. The objective of this thesis is to develop a 
theoretical explanation of that process.  
An embedded multiple-case study of incidents in which users, in a variety of field settings, 
developed creative ways to apply IT artifacts, was conducted. Employing theoretical lenses 
drawn from cognitive science (dual-process theory, distributed cognition), and Markus and 
Silver’s (2008) variant of adaptive structuration theory, a novel theoretical framework was 
developed to analyze the data. This framework – Affordance Field Theory – was used to abstract 
away the context-specific details of each case, so that the events in each could be compared and 
analyzed using a common conceptual vocabulary. 
Applying critical realist assumptions, the initial retroductive analysis was done with narrative 
networks, then the cases were re-analyzed using framework matrices. The complementary 
logical forms (processual and thematic, respectively) of the analytic tools helped to provide 
empirical corroboration of the findings. A set of cognitive mechanisms was identified that 
describe the information-processing operations involved in creative user appropriation. Using 
assumptions from distributed cognition, it was demonstrated that these mechanisms can 
describe those operations at the individual and collective levels. An integrative model which 
shows how the mechanisms explain user creativity at the individual level was then developed. It 
is called the Information Cycle Model of creativity. 
This thesis makes several contributions to knowledge. It develops a theoretical framework for 
analyzing interactions between users and systems that is designed to represent the cycles of 
ideation and enactment through which creative appropriation moves are developed. It also 
presents a model of the cognitive mechanisms involved in the discovery of novel appropriation 
moves. The thesis also contributes to current debates within IS about representational 
metaphors for user interaction with IT. 
 
Keywords: Affordance Field Theory, Case Study Methodology, Creativity, Distributed 
Cognition, Dual-Process Theory, Information Cycle Model, IT Innovation 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The secret to creativity is knowing how to hide your sources 
Einstein (allegedly) 
 
Where is the research on creativity in the Information Systems (IS) discipline? 
Creativity is a widely-cited topic of interest in the management disciplines in general (Kern, 2010), and IS 
in particular (Couger, 1988; Nambisan, Agarwal, & Tanniru, 1999). Nearly all of the papers in IS that look 
at creativity comment on the understudied nature of the topic (Aaen, 2008; Couger, Higgins, & McIntyre, 
1993; Seidel, Müller-Wienbergen, & Becker, 2010), and the need for more research on creativity in the 
discipline. Yet, the volume of those papers, both comparatively and absolutely, is vanishingly small. One 
comprehensive review of the topic in the “basket of eight” highest-ranked IS journals between 1977 and 
2009 found 27 papers, less than 0.5% of the total number of articles in the period (Seidel et al., 2010). 
Further, creativity is one of those interdisciplinary topics in which the IS discipline — one would think — 
is well-positioned to make substantial contributions. Yet, most IS researchers don’t seem to even make 
the attempt. Why?  
These questions must be asked before embarking on a study of creativity in an IS context because it does 
appear anomalous that creativity has for so long escaped substantial theoretical scrutiny in the discipline. 
Explaining why so there is so little IS research, on what would seem like an important topic, may offer 
clues about what needs to be done. This is especially so in the case of this current study, which aims to 
understand and explain one particular type of IS-related creativity: how end users find and develop 
creative ways to modify, repurpose, combine, utilize — to appropriate — Information Technology (IT) 
systems. This is an important topic for its potential to maximize the returns that users and organizations 
that invest in IT are able to earn from those investments. IS researchers have pointed out that this 
application of user creativity can be an important source of competitive advantage (Hsieh & Zmud, 2006, 
p. 2), and can often lead to the users of IT systems unlocking more value than the developers of those 
systems realized were possible (Dutton & Thomas, 1984). It is therefore an area in which the answers to 
theoretical questions about behavior may lead to matters of immediate relevance to the practice 
community and the broader business world. 
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How great is the potential for generating excess value that can be unlocked through user creativity? Let us 
consider two real-life, illustrative vignettes: 
1.1.1 Vignette I 
In October 2006, a group of developers launched an HTML-based micro-blogging service, intended as a 
simple way for friends to send short messages to each other, à la SMS, over the internet. The developers 
saw the micro-blogging tool as “not that useful, but a fun thing for family and friends when they are not 
in the same place”. They named the service ‘Twitter’ after the definition: ‘a short burst of inconsequential 
information’. Users of the service could ‘follow’ other users and automatically see their tweets 
(messages), but anyone could see or search for any other user’s messages.  
In 2007, a consultant named Chris Messina had an idea: perhaps groups could be formed on Twitter by 
creating a group name and preceding the name with a pound sign (#) in the message. That would mean 
that anyone who was interested in the group could simply search for #group_name and see all 
messages regarding the group. The proposal, which Twitter co-founder Evan Williams dismissed as “too 
nerdy” to work, was implemented. This fundamentally changed the way the service could be used: 
instead of being able simply to follow people, users could now also follow topics. The Twitter micro-
blogging service has gone on to become one of the most influential social networking companies on the 
internet. In 2008 alone it grew over 750 percent in unique visitors. Its availability has been named as a 
significant factor in the organizing of mass political protests, coordinating disaster relief and social 
marketing. In 2013 its market value soared to almost 25 billion USD.  
One of the reasons for Twitter’s success is certainly the invention of the hash tag, which was done, not by 
the creators, developers and implementers of Twitter, but by an end user. 
(Bice, 2013; C. C. Miller, 2010; Ostrow, 2009; Popelka, 2013) 
1.1.2 Vignette II 
In Kenya, mobile phones were first introduced in the mid-1990s. By 2008, the penetration of cell phones 
had swelled to approximately 17 million, and cell phones had eclipsed landlines (use of which declined 
by 17% over the same period) as the primary means of telecommunication. Mobile phone companies 
introduced a feature that let people purchase air time with prepaid cards and transfer this to other 
users. This was originally intended as a convenience, so that people in urban areas who were close to 
shops could buy air time for their rural-based families, for instance. However, users began to use this 
feature as a proxy for money, exchanging air time with local brokers for both cash and goods.  
In 2007, Safaricom, the largest mobile phone company in Kenya, started a service that formalized this 
informal transfer system and created a mobile financial service that allowed people to deposit, transfer 
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and withdraw funds from accounts with the service using their cell phones. The service spread rapidly 
and is now the largest and most successful mobile banking product in the world. The service, called M-
Pesa (“M” for “mobile”, “Pesa” is Kiswahili for “money”), is used by about 40 % of Kenya’s population 
and has about 25% of the country’s GDP flow through it. It has been copied by mobile companies in a 
number of other countries.  
All of this started, not with an idea by the mobile phone company itself, but with the repurposing of a 
feature by end users. 
(Jack & Suri, 2010; McKemey et al., 2003) 
One common feature of the above accounts is that the innovations described, innovation which have led 
to substantial benefits for users and immense profits for the businesses which owned the platforms that 
were part of the innovations, emerged from ideas which did not originate in those businesses. Rather, 
they emerged from ideas which originated with end users. The phenomenon of the users of products 
finding innovative and valuable ways to apply those products has been well noted in earlier research in a 
number of contexts (Flowers, von Hippel, de Jong, & Sinozic, 2010; Oliveira & von Hippel, 2011; Von 
Hippel, 1976, 1986, 2005). In a number of domains users have developed novel, useful and valuable ways 
to repurpose — with or without modification — existing products in ways that extend their functionality. 
Often, these user innovations have been subsequently adopted by the companies that developed the base 
products, leading to new market opportunities.  
The type of innovation being described involves users finding ways to use systems that are novel, useful, 
and appropriate for a purpose; that is, they meet several widely-accepted definitions of creativity 
(Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, 1999b; Hennessey & Amabile, 1998; Stein, 1953). Creativity has 
been widely explored in a number of the management and behavioral sciences (Wehner, 
Csikszentmihalyi, & Magyari-Beck, 1991), but very little has been done within IS. Further, the work that 
has been done in IS has focused largely on creativity on the part of system developers and implementers, 
as well as the creative performance of the users of system features designed to support ideation, rather 
than the discovery of creative ways of using the system.  
This thesis is aimed at filling that gap in the literature by exploring the creative process by which users 
discover new and useful ways to use systems. 
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1.2 Research Approach 
There are several existing theories which describe both the processes and antecedents of creative action. 
One of those theories – the Componential Theory of Creativity proposed by Amabile (Amabile, 1988, 
1996) – will be used to form an initial conceptual model for this study. I will make the case that the 
behavior being studied — the reuse or repurposing of an existing IS in order to use it in a creative way – is 
best described as an appropriation process, as defined by (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Poole & DeSanctis, 
1989). The method for building theory from case study research developed by Eisenhardt (1989) will then 
be applied to explain creative appropriation. One initial question that should be addressed is that of why a 
theory to explain creative appropriation is necessary. If there are several existing theories for explaining 
creative behavior, why not apply one? Or test several and find which one provides a “best fit” for the 
phenomenon? 
I propose that developing a theory to explain creative appropriation is necessary for two reasons. One is 
the unique nature of theory in the information systems discipline. Gregor (2006) points out that the 
domain of interest of a theory can be expected to influence its nature. The domain of Information Systems 
(IS) is unique in that it is concerned with the use of a special class of tool by users in human-machine 
systems and the emergent phenomena that emerge as a consequence of that use. It follows that a theory of 
creativity that describes how people use IT systems creatively may be ontologically distinct from theories 
of creativity that have been developed to describe creative behavior in other domains (Dreyfus, 2009).  
The second reason why a theory of creative appropriation should be developed is related to the first and 
has to do with the motivation and goals of the creative actor. There are a number of existing theories that 
describe the creative process, the factors that influence creativity, or both. For example: 
 Wallas (1926) proposed four stages: Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, and Verification 
 C. M. Ford (1996) proposed a theory of individual creativity incorporating: Sensemaking, 
Motivation, and Knowledge and Ability 
 Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin (1993) proposed that individual creativity is a function of: 
Antecedent Conditions, Personality Factors, Cognitive Factors, Motivation, Social Influences and 
Relevant Knowledge  
 Amabile (1983) proposed that, at the individual level, the factors of Domain-Related Skills, 
Creativity-Related Skills and Task Motivation influence creativity through the stages of Problem 
Presentation, Preparation, Response Generation and Response Validation 
A common feature of these theories is that the outcome – the creative product, response or action – and 
the goal of the creative actor are one and the same. The literature on rationality distinguishes primary 
goals and derived goals (Stanovich, 1999, p. 16). In most existing models of creativity, the creative process 
is analyzed where the creative output is the primary goal of the creative actor. In contrast, the creative 
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appropriation of an information system is typically a derived goal. For example, a ‘creative’ painter paints 
in order to produce creative paintings. Her motivation is to maximize the creativity of the output 
produced by the process of painting. The use of an IT system, in contrast, is a goal-seeking behavior 
(Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006). The goal of a user creatively appropriating an IT system is (typically) not 
to develop a creative way to use the system, but accomplish a task; and developing a creative way to use 
the system is a means to complete that task, rather than an end in itself. The user of an IT system will 
typically be “employing one or more features of a system to perform a task” (Burton-Jones & Straub, 
2006, p. 231). Her motivation will typically be related to the task being performed rather than the 
interaction with the system. One possible exception to this rule – interaction with hedonic systems such 
as games – is outside the scope of this present project. It is possible that a system may be used creatively 
as a stage in the production of an outcome or response which is not, itself, creative. The creative 
appropriation of an existing IT artifact relates to creativity in a goal-seeking behavior, rather than the 
creativity of the goal-state outcome. This is particularly worthy of exploration given the central role of 
motivation in creative performance postulated by Amabile (1996, pp. 107, 115).  
An exploratory theory-building approach will therefore be used in this research. The approach used will 
be the method for building theory from case study research proposed by Eisenhardt (1989a). Below, I 
introduce the two fundamental concepts that underlie the topic being studied: creativity and 
appropriation.  
1.2.1 Creativity: Open Questions 
An unusual type of creativity is still a type of creativity. While creative appropriation may differ 
structurally in some ways from the more common contexts in which creativity is studied, it does still relate 
to some of the deep questions about creativity that have long been debated.  
One of the longest-standing questions about creativity has to do with its locus: is it best seen as an 
individual trait, or something which emerges from the environment? The view with which this question is 
approached has tended to change over time. In 1950, Guilford (1950, p. 444), in his inaugural address as 
president of the American Psychological Association said “In its narrow sense, creativity refers to the 
abilities that are most characteristic of creative people”. This reflects the approach that holds that 
individual qualities are the cause of the creativity, and creativity research should proceed by attempting to 
measure those qualities. However more recent research has strongly supported the hypothesis that 
creativity emerges from certain contextual conditions, particularly group and network effects (R. K. 
Sawyer, 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). Where does the source of creativity lie? 
One of the ways to address this question is to look at the phenomenon of multiple creative discoveries or 
products being made simultaneously by unconnected individuals. If creativity is primarily dependent on 
individual traits, we would expect such occurrences to be rare. If, however, creativity is primarily 
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influenced by environment, we would expect that there would be several instances where different 
individuals exposed to similar environments would generate similar creative products. There is evidence 
for the latter case on one well-documented area of creativity: that of scientific discovery. The phenomenon 
of the same discovery being made within the same timeframe by different scientists is surprisingly 
common. Merton (1961) famously discussed this pattern, labeling discoveries that were made by a single 
individual scientist as “singletons” and discoveries by more than one scientist simultaneously as 
“multiples”. He proposed the hypothesis that “all scientific discoveries are in principle multiples, 
including those that on the surface appear to be singletons.” Merton (1961) also notes that Ogburn and 
Thomas (1922) pointed out this pattern early in the century. Merton also pointed out that the principle of 
multiple discovery has itself been discovered multiple times, citing over 18 occasions when the principle 
was ‘re-discovered’ in recent history, often by several individuals at once. This phenomenon, has been 
noted in a number of contexts and disciplines (D. H. Ford, 1987), and has been extensively cited in 
debates on how intellectual property rights should be protected (Lemley, 2011). 
It seems unlikely that such a pattern could exist unless the source of creativity is independent of the 
individual. Obviously there must be some environmental explanation to account for multiple, 
unconnected individuals making the same discovery at the same time. However, the story is more 
complex than it may appear at first. While there may be incidents of multiple discovery, there is also a 
parallel observation that must be made. There are individuals in history who have been associated with 
significant creative achievements multiple times in their lives: persons like da Vinci, Edison, Tesla, as well 
as more contemporary figures like Jobs and Musk. If the sources of creativity lie in the environment, why 
is it that some individuals are able to be “creative”, even in different environments and contexts across 
their lives? To put it bluntly, these people are good at something, what is it?  
Modern creativity researchers are increasingly accepting of the fact that there can be no single answer to 
the question of “what causes creativity?” Creativity appears to emerge from a combination of inputs at 
different levels (Runco, 2004). But what are these inputs? How are they combined? Is it even meaningful 
to treat “creativity” as a single thing across diverse domains? Most pertinently for this study: do these 
things differ in their nature, their effects, and their implications, between incidents of creativity where the 
actors involved are pursuing primary or derived goals?  
These are, largely, open questions which are still matters of debate in the creativity literature. This thesis 
may not settle them, but it will take a position and contribute to that debate. 
1.2.2 IT Appropriation 
One of the most fundamental processes in IS is the interaction of human actors with IT systems (Gregor, 
2006). This interaction often takes the form of a human interacting with a system, or systems, in order to 
pursue a goal (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006). IT systems are artifacts: they are constructed by humans, 
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and they typically are constructed in a particular way — designed — in order to perform some function. 
The design of IT artifacts often begins with a mental picture of a particular user’s goals, and the artifact is 
designed to meet those goals. However, in the real world, there are often gaps between the modeled goals 
of designers and the actual goals of users. How can users make use of systems if those systems do not fully 
or accurately reflect their use intentions? 
In order to explore this question in the context of systems for facilitating group decision-making 
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) used the concept of Appropriation. Appropriation was developed in the work 
of Marx and Hegel (Poole & DeSanctis, 1989), and is described as the mutually constitutive process by 
which use of a tool could define both the user and the tool. The concept was applied to Group Decision 
Support Systems (GDSS) because of the variety of ways in which the same features of a GDSS could lead 
to different outcomes, depending on how those features were used. Appropriation can also apply to many 
modern systems which are multifunctional and can be applied in different ways. A typical modern mobile 
phone may be capable of being used as a camera, GPS unit, calendar, email client, news portal, etc. Its 
identity — what it is — is largely decided by the way in which a particular user decides to use its 
capabilities. The same phone, with the same installed features and software, may be, in the hands of one 
user, a mobile telephone; and in the hands of another user be something completely different.  
In this study, the appropriation concept will be used to describe the process by which users find ways to 
use systems that are both novel and useful, that is, creative.  
1.3 Research Objectives 
This study aims to develop a theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of end users discovering or 
developing novel and useful ways to use IT systems.  
In this section, I will define some of the key terms that I will be applying throughout the thesis. I will then 
specifically lay out the goals of the research and state my research question.  
1.3.1 Definitions 
This study aims to theoretically describe the creative process by which users repurpose, recombine or 
reconfigure information systems in ways which are novel and useful: ways which would probably surprise 
the developers of those systems. It is worthwhile at this point to provide a few definitions for some key 
terms which will be used in the study.  
Users 
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Users are social actors who employ IT systems in a task (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006). Unless specified, 
for this thesis the general concept of user can be applied to either individuals or collectives (Markus & 
Silver, 2008). 
IT Systems 
IT systems are defined here as artifacts which provide representations of task domains (Burton-Jones & 
Straub, 2006). They can be regarded, in part, as instantiations of mental models of task domains on the 
part of designers (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). However, they are also shaped by interaction 
effects, chance, and the choices of users (Germonprez, Hovorka, & Gal, 2011), and so are never complete 
reflections of any single mental model. 
Creative  
There are a number of definitions of creativity. In this thesis I will apply a product definition, in which 
“creativity” is judged by a rating of its output (Rhodes, 1961). A product is considered creative if it is novel, 
useful and appropriate for a purpose (Amabile, 1996; Stein, 1953). 
Tasks 
Tasks are goal-directed activities performed by users. For this thesis, I will concentrate solely on tasks 
which are business-process related, rather than hedonic (Van der Heijden, 2004). 
Use 
For the initial discussion, I will follow Burton-Jones and Straub (2006, p. 231) and define “use” as a 
“user’s employment of a system to perform a task”. Later in the thesis, I will adopt a more appropriate 
lens for discussing the specific type of use in which systems are repurposed creatively — that of 
appropriation.  
Some further discussion of two of the above definitions is warranted. The definitions above refer to 
“users” and “designers” of IT systems. It has been proposed that the distinction between users and 
designers of systems must be reconsidered, and that users should more accurately be considered as co-
creators of systems when their use choices help to define and redefine what those systems are. For 
example, in the vignettes considered earlier in this chapter, the actions of the “users” were an integral part 
of the creation of the current form of the systems that they “used”. Is there any reason why they should 
not be recognized as designers? This question has been considered in the work of IS theorists such as 
Germonprez et al. (2011), and in contexts beyond IS (Von Hippel, 1986, 2005). 
There is little support for a hard-and-fast distinction between users and designers. In many contexts, 
users can usefully be seen as co-designers. Also, designers of one system will often be users of another, 
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and vice versa. However, within the context of any single study, there are likely to be persons who interact 
with IT systems in different roles. One role might be to develop a model of a task domain and build a 
technological artifact that models that task domain in a way that enables goal-seeking interactions. We 
may consider persons in that role to be designers, in the context of that study. Another role might be to 
appropriate (or use) a technological artifact in order to accomplish a task-oriented goal. We may consider 
persons in that role to be users, in the context of that study. There is therefore an argument for a context-
specific distinction between users and designers based on role, rather than identity.  
As such, in this study, “users” and “designers” will be identified by role. Any person who employs an IT 
system to perform a task (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006), whether or not that person is an IT professional, 
will be considered a “user” of that system in the context of this study. Where a user appropriates a system 
in a manner that is creative, the result may sometimes be seen as a new “system”, further blurring the 
distinction between users and designers. For this study, therefore, the designation of “designer” will be 
used for the person who builds the base system – i.e., the system being appropriated – rather than the 
system resulting from the act of appropriation.  
1.3.2 Research Goals 
The goal of this project is to provide a theoretical explanation of how users find novel and useful ways — 
ways that are rated as “creative” — to use systems. As will be described in the following chapter, there has 
been little study of creativity as a topic in the information systems discipline. What little study has been 
done has tended to look at creativity on the part of system developers, implementers, and the users of 
creativity-facilitation systems (see Seidel et al., 2010). There has been little focus on the creativity of users 
in finding novel and useful ways to use systems.  
The goal of the thesis is explanation. Explanation is a common goal for certain types of theoretical studies 
(Gregor, 2006), but has seldom been discussed in depth in the IS literature (Hovorka, Germonprez, & 
Larsen, 2008). I will develop a mechanism-based explanation of the phenomena of creative user 
appropriation (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). This type of explanation is fundamentally causal, it details the 
“cogs and wheels” of the causal process by which the phenomenon of interest came to be (Hedström & 
Ylikoski, 2010, p. 50). 
There are numerous hypotheses regarding the determinants of creativity. Attempts to explain creativity 
have looked at a range of factors, from neurological processes within the brain (Takeuchi et al., 2011) to 
societal-level mechanisms (Hirschman, 1967). In order to scope the thesis, I will limit my goal to the 
explanation of user creativity in the appropriation of information systems at the individual level. An 
explanation of creativity limited to the individual level is somewhat artificial: people and their contexts 
interact to produce behaviors and actions. As such, the theory developed in this thesis will only tell part of 
the story. Within the web of environmental influences, contextual conditions and social interactions that 
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are part of a typical creative incident, there will be individual actors. The theory developed in this thesis 
will explain – at an appropriate level of abstraction – the actions of those individual actors. 
It must be noted that while the theory being developed seeks to explain creativity at the individual level, it 
is impossible to describe and analyze individual behavior without consideration of the context within 
which that behavior takes place. I will therefore need to have a conceptual language which can describe 
that context. The development of this conceptual language is one of the contributions of this thesis and it 
will be described in Chapter 6.  
1.3.3 Research Question 
This thesis will describe an embedded multiple-case study that was conducted in ten companies across 
three cities in New Zealand between May 2012 and July 2013. This study followed the “roadmap” for 
inductively developing theory from data developed by Eisenhardt (1989a). In this roadmap, initial 
definition of constructs to be measured, and initial research questions, are important, but also tentative 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 536). Research questions, initial constructs, and even research focus, often need to 
be modified in response to preliminary findings that emerge during data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 
536), and the framework is designed to accommodate such modifications. In this study, several 
modifications were made in response to emerging findings during data collection. The most important of 
these was a change in explanatory strategy, which prompted a change in the form of theory being 
developed, and the adoption of new metatheoretical assumptions. These led to a significant 
transformation of the research questions.   
Initially, constructs were drawn from the work of Amabile (1982, 1983, 1988, 1996). The initial research 
goal was to find a set of factors which were related to end user creativity, observe how these factors 
contributed to the creative process, and construct a synthetic variance model (Langley, 1999), adapting 
the strategy followed by Amabile in her own work on creativity. Early findings in the data showed 
weaknesses in the explanatory power of this strategy. The form of the theoretic explanation being 
constructed was therefore changed from a synthetic variance model to a mechanism-based strategy. 
Mechanism-based explanations are common in the physical and biological sciences (Bechtel, 2005), and 
are gaining popularity in the social and behavioral sciences (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010) as well as 
integrative disciplines such as IS (Avgerou, 2013). Mechanisms expose the “cogs and wheels” (Hedström 
& Ylikoski, 2010, p. 50) of the causal processes behind observed phenomena, and are a suitable form of 
theory for explaining creative processes (Boden, 2004).  
Along with the adoption of the mechanism-based strategy, I adopted critical realist assumptions. Critical 
realism is a philosophy of science which is commonly attributed to the writings of Bhaskar (1975), but has 
also been significantly developed by authors such as Sayer (1992, 2000) and Danermark, Ekstrom, 
Jakobsen, and Karlsson (2002). It has been explicitly recommended by a number of IS theorists as being a 
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particularly appropriate perspective for the investigation of phenomena in the discipline (Dobson, 2001; 
Markus & Silver, 2008; Mingers, 2004b; Morton, 2006). Critical realism was chosen because it provides a 
strong ontological foundation for research, and because it has the mechanism-based perspective at its 
core.  
One implication of critical realism, especially in case-based explanatory research, is that a particular form 
of research question is required (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 804). Research questions that investigate a 
phenomenon must take the form “What caused the events associated with the phenomenon to occur?” 
(Easton, 2010, p. 122); or more formally “What mechanism must exist for the observed event to occur?” 
(Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 799). Critical realism holds that mechanisms are typically not directly 
observable, and so the core of a critical realist analysis is to analyze observed reality in order to 
abductively derive the mechanisms which explain what was observed. Critical realism is more fully 
explored in a later chapter.  
In keeping with the critical realist assumptions being applied in the research, the initial set of research 
questions were dropped, and a single research question introduced in their place. It is: 
What are the mechanisms that explain end user creativity in the appropriation of Information Systems 
at the individual level? 
1.4 The Rest of This Document 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.  
In Chapter 2, I will review the literature on the use of systems in the IS discipline. In the course of doing 
so, I will propose an explanation for the dearth of research on creativity within the discipline. I will then 
go on to review the literature on creativity, looking at how it has been conceptualized in prior research, 
and laying a foundation for the approach that will be followed in the thesis. I will then review the 
literature on cognitive science, which will provide a number of critical theoretical lenses for the research.  
In Chapter 3, I will review the literature on critical realism, and discuss the rationale for choosing this 
metatheoretical perspective for the research. 
In Chapter 4, I will provide an overview of the design of the research project, and describe how 
unexpected findings in early data collection helped to shape the final approach that was taken. 
In Chapter 5, I will describe the case studies that provided the data which was analyzed in this project. I 
will also describe the initial observations in the data which led to the adoption of modifications to the 
research design.  
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In Chapter 6, I will describe the data analysis which was conducted. This falls into two parts: the 
development of a theoretical framework for analyzing the data, and the retroductive and corroborative 
analysis of the data, using that framework. 
In Chapter 7, I describe the cognitive mechanisms that were identified and described through the analysis 
of the data. I show how they are supported by the data, and the cognitive literature. 
In Chapter 8, I discuss the implications of the identified mechanisms for current and future research. I 
show how they integrate with existing knowledge in the domains that they draw on, and suggest areas of 
inquiry for future work that they open up. 
In Chapter 9, I review the thesis as a whole. I look at how the findings address some of the long-standing 
questions identified in this chapter, and list the contributions and limitations of the work, as well as the 
possibilities for future work opened up by the theory. 
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Chapter 2. Research Background 
2.1 Introduction 
A recurring theme in reviews of the literature on creativity in IS is the dearth of research on creativity in 
IS, and the fact that what research there is on creativity tends to be lacking in theoretical depth (Couger et 
al., 1993; Seidel et al., 2010). Surveys of C-level executives in major firms have identified creativity as the 
number-one quality they desire in their organizations (Kern, 2010; Lavalle, Hopkins, Lesser, Shockley, & 
Kruschwitz, 2010). This is also a priority for Information Systems (hereafter, IS) practitioners. In a Delphi 
study of IS Directors, Couger (1988) found that “Emphasize creativity and innovation” was one of the top 
ten human resource issues on their list of concerns. However, despite sporadic calls for further creativity 
research in the literature over the intervening decades, little actual creativity work has been done (Seidel 
et al., 2010). A fundamental question, and one which, ideally, should be addressed in any serious project 
to look at creativity in an IS context, is why this is so. There has been a great deal of creativity research 
done in several of the reference disciplines which IS draws on (Wehner et al., 1991), many calls have been 
made for more research on creativity in the discipline (Couger et al., 1993), it has been emphasized that 
contemporary research on system use in IS must enhance understanding of how users can apply systems 
creatively (Hsieh & Zmud, 2006); yet the state of creativity research in IS remains, as it was put by Couger 
et al. (1993): “embryonic”. Why? 
In this chapter I will explore, and propose an answer, to this question. I will begin by looking at the 
history of the IS discipline, with a particular focus on the history of research into the appropriation of 
information systems by end users for utilitarian purposes: what has been referred to in the literature 
using terms such as “utilization”, “use”, “appropriation”, “imbrication”, and others. I will look at the 
history of research into how systems are used, and at how this research parallels developments in the 
metatheoretical assumptions used in IS. I will propose an answer to the “why” question above that is 
rooted in the assumptions that are part of the discipline’s history.  
I will then go on to look more deeply at the topic of creativity itself. Creativity research has a long and rich 
history, some of which intersects with some of the same issues in the philosophy of science that have 
shaped IS research. I will briefly explore the history creativity research, and will take a closer look at some 
of the contemporary approaches to the conceptualization and measurement of creativity that will have a 
direct influence on this thesis. I will then look at the discipline of cognitive science, the interdisciplinary 
study of the working of the mind, which will provide several key theoretical lenses and perspectives that 
will be applied in this study.  
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Having reviewed the literature in these three areas, I will discuss the implications of the different 
perspectives for the current project. I will list and explain the major theoretical lenses that have been 
selected for this project. These selections took place at different points in the unfolding of the project. For 
example, it was necessary to begin the project with a priori definitions of utilization and creativity. 
However, as will be described in the chapter on research design, the emergence of cognitive science as an 
appropriate lens for explaining user creativity emerged only after initial rounds of data collection and 
analysis. However, all the key literature will be reviewed in this chapter. 
I therefore begin with a look at how people interact with information technology systems for the purpose 
of completing utilitarian tasks. 
2.2 IS and System Utilization 
System use is one of the most venerable constructs in the IS discipline (Barkin Gary & Stephen, 1977; 
McLean, 1979; Schewe, 1976), and high levels of it is one of the most widely accepted proxies for IT 
implementation success (DeLone & McLean, 1992, 2003). It is one of the most commonly-measured 
variables in  quantitative IS research (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006), and its effective measurement has 
been proposed as the ‘missing link’ in attempts to model the effects of IT on firm performance (Beaudry & 
Pinsonneault, 2005; Kohli & Devaraj, 2003). Moreover, it is a commonly-cited fact that information 
systems cannot generate value unless they are used (Collan & Tetard, 2007; Furneaux & Wade, 2011; 
Orlikowski, 2000, p. 425). The use of IT artifacts is a fundamental focus of IS research (Gregor, 2006, p. 
613), and so, almost all empirical and conceptual IS research has the utilization of IT systems at its core. 
Olbrich, Muller, and Niederman (2011) call IS “an integration discipline at the intersection of social and 
technological phenomena” (2011, p. 6), an intersection that is nowhere more explicit than when users use 
systems.  
One question which ought to be addressed early is what is meant by “systems”. There are now a large 
number of artifacts which have attributes once exclusively associated with computers — such as 
microprocessors and programmability — but also have features and functionality long associated with 
objects other than computers. Microprocessor-equipped cars, watches, clothing, cooking devices and 
wearable accessories have blurred the boundaries between computational and “other” devices. I will adopt 
a definition from Pentland and Feldman (2007) which provides the following characteristics for 
identifying an “IS” for the purposes of this study: 
 Modular - they consist of small modules or components which can be decomposed (see also 
Markus & Silver, 2008) 
 Recombinable - “Substitution and recombinations multiply the possible storylines for 
accomplishing tasks” (Pentland & Feldman, 2007, p. 784). Being modular they can often be 
recombined in different ways 
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 Distributed - Refers to the fact that ICTs can allow people, tools and tasks to be separated by both 
time and space. A fundamental difference between ICTs and other classes of tools.  
 Communicative - ICTs are naturally in the domain of semiotic engineering. Even an office 
productivity system, which may not have explicit communication features, can be used as a 
communication tool by being employed as a shared symbol system 
 Memory - “inscription”, all but the simplest can store and retrieve information.   
Burton-Jones (2005) notes the diversity of forms that measures of system use have taken in prior 
research: forms such as indicators (e.g. use/nonuse (F. D. Davis, 1989)), frequencies (S. Taylor & Todd, 
1995a), assessments (Boudreau & Seligman, 2003) and evaluations (Auer, 1998). However, he also notes 
an anomaly: system use itself, while frequently measured as an outcome or proxy, for a long time evaded 
serious scrutiny as a theoretical construct (Burton-Jones, 2005, p. 2). For example, Trice and Treacy 
(1988) found only 17 articles examining ‘utilization’ over the period 1975-1985. In the past few years, 
however, there has been a surge of interest in system use as a research topic. There has been a robust 
debate about what it means, how it should be conceptualized, and how it should be measured and 
interpreted (see for example, (Barki, Titah, & Boffo, 2007; Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006; McLean, Sedera, 
& Tan, 2011; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008)). While there are a number of competing positions on each of 
those dimensions, it is useful to consider the drivers behind the debate: why is it that authors have been 
expending so much time and energy on utilization? Why have so many scholars been developing or 
proposing novel methods of representing utilization in research? And, given the very modest response to 
calls for such research in the past, why now? 
In part, it may be because of the repeated calls for a deeper consideration of how utilization is 
conceptualized and measured (DeLone & McLean, 1992; Seddon, 1997; Straub, Limayem, & Karahanna-
Evaristo, 1995). However, I contend that there is another driver, as well. IS emerged as a recognizable 
discipline in the late 1950s to mid-1960s (G. B. Davis, 2000; Hirschheim & Klein, 2012). Its actual genesis 
point may be ambiguous, but it has been posited to be the article by Leavitt and Whisler (1958), in which 
they coined the term “information technology” (see (Culnan, 1986; Markus & Robey, 1988)). When the 
field was in its infancy, the main function of an IT system in a business context was “the automation of 
clerical tasks” (Hirschheim & Klein, 2012, p. 203). While the nature and role of IS utilization has 
expanded greatly in the intervening years, until very recently the implicit conceptualizations of system use 
applied in extensive quantitative research have been better suited to the measurement of clerical output — 
frequencies, amounts, use/nonuse dichotomies, durations, etc. — than the much richer meanings of 
utilization that are now appropriate (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006, p. 229). In intensive research, 
meanwhile, research has focused on rich explication of the context and nature of use, but has often done 
so in a manner which does not facilitate cross-study assimilation and accumulation of knowledge 
(Benbasat & Zmud, 1999). The challenges created by this state of affairs have not gone unnoticed in past 
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IS research, but it appears to have reached the point where it is precipitating a fundamental shift in the 
discipline.  
Perhaps the most well-known of the current wave of treatments of utilization has been that of  Burton-
Jones and Straub (2006), who looked at the ontological structure of the system use construct and 
proposed a definition and measurement procedure based on that structure. However, there have been a 
number of other notable contributions to the literature on system use in recent years, including (Burton-
Jones & Gallivan, 2007; Burton-Jones & Grange, 2012; Burton-Jones & Hubona, 2005; Gerpott, 2011; 
Grgecic & Rosenkranz, 2010, 2011; McLean et al., 2011; Sedera & Chian, 2007). In addition to the 
increasing interest in system use as a construct, there have also been a number of papers which propose 
new metaphors for representing the interaction between end users and information technology artifacts, 
such as behavioral design (Germonprez et al., 2011), sociomateriality (Orlikowski, 2007), and imbrication 
(Leonardi, 2011). One possible source of the many and diverse conceptualizations of use in the literature 
is the etymological complexity of the term. The word ‘use’ originated in the early 13 century from the Latin 
words usus (noun form), meaning “use, custom, skill, habit”, and usare (verb form), meaning “use, 
employ, practice” (Harper, 2011). According to the Merriam-Webster College Dictionary, the word “use” 
may take any of eight meanings, four as a noun and four as a verb, and has multiple synonyms (Merriam-
Webster, 2003). It is little wonder that the concept of “use” in IS research has been called “deceptively 
simple” (Zigurs, 1993). This deceptive simplicity has inevitably led to problems of specification in 
discussions of use in previous studies.  As an example, DeLone and McLean (1992)’s paper on IS success 
makes the concept “IS Use” central to their model of IS Success. However Seddon (1997) pointed out that 
there are multiple possible meanings of the phrase “IS Use” in the DeLone-McLean model, and thus 
multiple possible meanings of the model.  
I will attempt to avoid ambiguity by starting this section with definitions of the key concepts I will be 
applying in it (Webster & Watson, 2002). The review will look at how IS researchers conceptualize and 
measure the ways in which end users use IT systems. However, the term “system use” has been frequently 
used when discussing the system use construct in nomothetic quantitative research (Burton-Jones & 
Straub, 2006; Delone & McLean, 2003; McLean et al., 2011). Because this review will look at different 
types of conceptualizations of use,  I will use another term which was common in older research but is 
now applied less frequently: system utilization (see (Barkin & Stephen, 1977; Trice & Treacy, 1988)). The 
term “system use” will be reserved for speaking about the use construct in quantitative research. Also, like 
Hirschheim and Klein (2012), I use the terms discipline and field interchangeably: to describe a defined, 
named academic domain which has a recognized identity.  
Given the centrality of the utilization of IS to the major domains of interest within the discipline (Gregor, 
2006), there is very little research in the field that is not somehow related to the topic. A review of the 
study of system utilization in IS must therefore be very specifically scoped. If not, it could easily become a 
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review of the history of the IS discipline itself. This would be redundant, given the fact that the history of 
the IS discipline has been well reviewed by Dickson (1981), and Hirschheim and Klein (2012). In this 
section, therefore, I will focus on the aspect of IS utilization that is of primary importance to this thesis: 
the dominant methods of conceptualization and measurement that have been applied in IS, and the way 
they have enabled and constrained the exploration of some research domains in the discipline.  
2.2.1 Background 
The way in which phenomena are conceptualized, operationalized, and measured within a discipline are 
highly dependent on the metatheoretical assumptions which prevail in that discipline. For much of the 
history of IS, a single metatheoretical position was so dominant in the field that discussion about 
metatheory was limited, or nonexistent (Hirschheim & Klein, 2012, p. 204). In the current state of the 
field multiple metatheoretical approaches are accepted, and debate about the merits of different positions 
is common. There are two current mainstream metatheoretic positions in IS research: the positivist and 
interpretivist positions. While there are a number of competing positions (and this thesis will adopt one 
of them), these two positions represent the vast majority of the published research in IS’s most influential 
journals over the past 40+ years. Positivist and interpretivist approaches have substantially different 
ontological, epistemological, methodological and axiological assumptions (Fitzgerald & Howcroft, 1998). 
In many ways, they inhabit opposing ends on a number of continua in terms of basic beliefs. The merits of 
each of these positions and the suitability of each for use in the addressing of different problems in IS has 
been extensively debated (W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; A. S. Lee, 1991; Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997; 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Walsham, 1995a). This section will not attempt to argue for either position, 
but will rather attempt to explain the way that each has influenced debates in IS about research and how it 
should be conducted. 
Before beginning this discussion, however, it is important to acknowledge that the terms in which this 
discussion is being framed — positivism vs. interpretivism — are inherently flawed. Moldoveanu and 
Baum (2002) have argued that positivism ceased to be a coherent philosophical position with Berlin’s 
refutation of Ayer (1936) and Church’s refutation of Ayer (1959) (see Hacking, 1975 for a fuller 
discussion). Manicas (1987) lists a series of 11 events that occurred in the twentieth century which 
together mark the overturning of the classical positivist view of reality. Despite this, many scientists, 
including many within IS, continue to identify themselves as positivist. Moldoveanu and Baum (2002) 
argue that this is because they misattribute their own assumptions as positivist, when in fact they are 
metaphysical realists and methodological empiricists (Moldoveanu & Baum, 2002, p. 737). They propose 
that most, if not all, active scientists who self-identify as positivists are, in fact, realists of some sort. As for 
interpretivism, it is widely acknowledged that interpretivism is not one thing, and that there are many 
related-but-distinct philosophies which coexist under the label of “interpretivism” (H. K. Klein, 2004; 
Mingers, 2006; Walsham, 1995a). Indeed, the constructionist assumptions the underlie interpretivism 
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would seem to imply that there can never be a single version of interpretivism (Moldoveanu & Baum, 
2002). However, these terms — positivist and interpretivist — are widely used in the IS literature (A. S. 
Lee, 1991; Walsham, 1995a; R. Weber, 2004), and there is a broad shared understanding of the research 
traditions that they represent within the field. These common understandings will be drawn on to frame 
the discussion.  
Identifying the different positions occupied by various researchers and identified by different studies can 
be challenging — at times, even for the researchers themselves. For example, Eisenhardt (1989a), 
discussing the roadmap that she developed for inductively developing theories from case studies, refers to 
it as “positivist” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 546). However, elsewhere, she refers to her work on decision-
making in high velocity organizations — during which she developed her roadmap — as “interpretive” 
(Bourgeois III & Eisenhardt, 1988b, p. 820). I will be guided by the very influential framework for 
classifying studies proposed by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), which has been widely adopted in 
subsequent work (see (W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Walsham, 1995a)). 
2.2.1.1 Positivism/Empiricism 
The metatheoretical approach known as “positivism” is a philosophy of science that is a subtype of 
empiricism — a philosophical position that holds that all scientific knowledge should be based solely on 
value-free empirical observation (Mingers, 2006). Positivism is realist, in that it posits the existence of a 
reality that is external to the researcher and would exist whether it was perceived or not. Positivism also 
holds that researchers are able to observe and measure this reality objectively and reliably. Positivism also 
holds that events in the world occur in regular patterns which can be observed and measured by 
researchers. Observation of these patterns enable researchers to derive general laws about the nature of 
reality, laws that enable them to make predictions about future events. It is important to note that these 
laws can be probabilistic in nature. The fundamental purpose of science, for positivists, is the discovery 
and description of these causal laws — typically in the language of mathematics or formal logic — in such 
a way as to enable the accurate prediction of future events. This is done using methodologies based on 
foundations such as Hempel (1965)’s deductive-nomological model (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 7). 
Positivist approaches are normally associated with deterministic assumptions, the variance form of theory 
(Mohr, 1982), cross-sectional designs, and the use of quantitative data and analysis. Whereas most 
reviewers within IS have found that positivist research tends to fit this typical profile (see, for example, 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991), it should also be noted that intensive (Dubé & Paré, 2003) and process 
(Abbott, 1992) approaches are also compatible with positivist assumptions (Sabherwal & Robey, 1995). 
Positivist approaches to research are reflected in concepts such as Danermark et al. (2002)’s 
Foundationalism; Mingers (2006)’s Empiricism; and Orlikowski and Scott (2008)’s Research Stream I. 
Modern positivism has its roots in the work of a group of philosophers at the University of Vienna in the 
1920s. The so -called “Vienna Circle” developed a perspective that they defined as logical positivism (or 
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logical empiricism), largely in response to, and in repudiation of, the then-dominant metaphysical 
approaches to studying reality. According to Mingers (2006), logical positivism held to three basic tenets 
about the nature of scientific knowledge.  
 Science (in order to be recognizable as “genuine” science) must be based on what can be 
empirically experienced. 
 Knowledge about the world should be expressible in the language of mathematics 
 All knowledge about both the natural and social domains should be acquired using common 
principles and expressible using a common symbol system.  
In context, the positions of the logical positivists should be seen as, in part, a reaction against 
metaphysics, as much as an attempt to develop a set of epistemological principles for research (see 
(Neurath, 1931), (Goulding, 2002)). These principles, and the underlying assumptions on which they were 
based, did not go for very long before being challenged, and, ultimately, rejected. Psychologists, 
sociologists and philosophers refuted the assumption that there could be such a thing as objective, 
unbiased observation by social scientists, demonstrating that all observation was theory-dependent 
(Mingers, 2006, pp. 15-16). Interestingly, findings in the natural sciences had led to similar conclusions in 
the non-social domain (Heisenberg, 1927). Manicas points out that, in the social sciences, every key tenet 
of positivism — as so defined by the Vienna philosophers — has been discredited, and rejected (Manicas, 
1987, p. 243).  
This does not, however, mean that positivism has ceased to be a central model for the conduct of research. 
In IS research, for example, many surveys of the literature have established that positivism is the 
dominant form of metatheory that underlies much published research, both contemporary and historical 
(Hirschheim & Klein, 2012; Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). The question may 
be asked, how does positivism remain the dominant metatheoretical model despite the fact that its 
fundamental assumptions have been empirically disproved? The answer, according to Manicas (1987, p. 
244), is that although logical positivism as a whole has been thoroughly rejected — to the point where 
virtually no serious practicing scientist holds to Vienna Circle logical positivism — it is easy to pick and 
choose among its elements. Various schools of positivism now exist in which the basic empiricist 
principles of the original version of positivism form part of the foundation, but specific weaknesses or 
criticisms of the position are taken into account or compensated for. These reformulated versions of 
positivism, in which the basic realist and epistemological assumptions of positivism are tempered, but 
kept intact, are collectively labeled “post-positivist” (H. K. Klein, 2004). Modern research that is labeled 
as “positivist” almost invariably is actually post-positivist in orientation. However, these post-positivist 
orientations have been critiqued as offering a “weak empiricist” position that leads to an “impoverished” 
view of realist ontology and causality (Mingers, 2004c, p. 88). 
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2.2.1.2 Interpretivism/Constructivism 
There are, however, other metatheoretical positions that offer other views of the world that are distinct 
from the empiricist view. Perhaps the most influential of these — particularly in IS and social research — 
is the interpretivist perspective. The label of “interpretivism” covers a wide range of approaches (Mingers, 
2004a, p. 150), which share a number of common features. Interpretivism is fundamentally relativist: 
that is, it holds that all knowledge is subject-dependent – that is, relative – to the observer. It holds that 
knowledge of reality is a social construction, driven by the preconceptions, biases, and orientations of the 
knower. Therefore, it is impossible to have value-free knowledge. Further, since the researcher must 
interact with research subjects in order to gain knowledge, the process of research itself affects the 
perceptions of both researcher and participant. This means that “objective” observation, in which the 
researcher passively accumulates knowledge about the world, is not possible. Again, it may be noted that 
parallel insights have been made about subject-dependence and the impossibility of purely objective 
observation in the natural world (Heisenberg, 1949; Monod, 2004). Interpretive research is commonly 
associated with nondeterministic assumptions, the process form of theory, and the use of qualitative data 
and analytical techniques. 
Although it is common to speak of interpretivism as if it represented a single metatheoretical position, 
interpretivism is actually a set of several belief systems. Ontologically, interpretive researchers commonly 
take one of two positions: internal realism — in which reality is seen as an inter-subjective construction 
that is shared between individuals, and subjective idealism — in which reality is seen as a personal 
construction of single individuals (Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997).  Interpretive perspectives can be divided 
into “weak” and “strong” forms. Weak interpretive positions hold that the true state of the world cannot 
be known. This implies that knowledge of reality is inaccessible, and therefore must always be treated as 
mediated by the subjective understanding of observers. Strong forms of interpretivism hold that since 
knowledge of reality is a social construction, “Reality” in the sense of a separate domain of existence apart 
from the observer, does not exist (Rorty & Williams, 1980). Strong forms of interpretivism have been 
strongly criticized for undermining the basic principles of rationality (Mingers, 2006).  
Interpretivism has become an important perspective in IS research (Walsham, 1995a). However, this was 
not always the case. In the early days of IS there was no significant discussion about metatheoretical 
orientation and methods. Positivist assumptions, and the methods that are supported by positivist 
assumptions, were ubiquitous in the field (Hirschheim & Klein, 2012, p. 204). This state of affairs 
continued well into the mid-80s. Walsham (1995a, p. 381), making a larger point about the acceptance of 
interpretivism in IS, cites the following quote: 
A paper in the Theory and Research category should satisfy the traditional criteria for 
high quality scholarly research. It should be based on a set of well-defined hypotheses, 
unbiased and reproducible procedures for collecting evidence that supports or refutes the 
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hypotheses, and sound analytical procedures for drawing appropriate conclusions from 
the evidence. 
(Emery, 1989) 
This quote, from the (then) editor of the principal journal in IS — MIS Quarterly — demonstrates the 
implicit assumption that research should use the forms and assumptions associated with positivist 
research exclusively. The transformation of the IS discipline that led to the broader adoption of 
interpretive methods began in 1984, when researchers began to express concern over the ability of 
traditional research methods in IS to meet the needs of the discipline. This led to the organizing of a 
colloquium by the IFIP TC8 Working Group to critically examine then-current research approaches in IS 
and discuss the need for new approaches (Hirschheim & Klein, 2012, p. 207). This colloquium provided a 
forum for the expression of concerns about issues such as the exclusive use of research methods that were 
drawn from the natural sciences. The colloquium itself was recognized as a milestone in the acceptance of 
new approaches to research in the field.  
However, it was not the end of the story. It will, for example, be recognized that the editorial cited above, 
(Emery, 1989) which stated the expectations of the editor of the most prestigious journal in the field, was 
produced in 1989, five years after the colloquium. Changing the fundamental metatheoretical 
assumptions of a field is always a process, never an event, and the duration of the process can often be 
years. The colloquium was obviously a step toward the opening of IS to a number of different 
perspectives, but it did not mean that the overall approach of the field was suddenly changed. That took 
time, there was a significant amount of debate and dispute within the field, and there is considerable 
evidence that the debates were quite contentious at times (R. Weber, 2004). Another milestone appears to 
have occurred in 1991, when three respected scholars within the discipline produced two influential 
papers: (A. S. Lee, 1991), and (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991), calling for the integration of interpretive 
research into the field’s body of research. 
2.2.1.3 Pluralism 
Eventually, a fundamental transformation in the definition of “high-quality research” in the discipline did 
occur. An incoming editor of MISQ in 1993, wrote a Theory and Methods editorial that explicitly stated 
that the journal welcomed high-quality research from both positivist and interpretive perspectives 
(DeSanctis, 1993). Papers establishing methodological standards for interpretive research started to be 
published by the field’s top journals (H. K. Klein & Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995a, 1995b). Interpretivist 
research became an accepted mode of enquiry within IS. It is to be noted that this does not mean that the 
positivist metatheoretical position was eliminated from the field (on the contrary, most reviews of 
scholarly output in the field indicate that it continues to be the most commonly-used approach (W. Chen 
& Hirschheim, 2004; Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997)). It also does not mean that the field became 
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positivist-interpretivist. On the contrary, I contend that the transformation that the field underwent at 
this time is that from having a single metatheoretical model to multiple metatheoretical models. By the 
2000s, there were three common models being applied in IS research: positivism, interpretivism and 
critical research (H. K. Klein, 2004). New approaches are now commonly proposed in papers in the 
discipline’s key journals and conferences (Mingers, 2004b) and discussion of metatheories (which are 
commonly referred to in the IS literature as “paradigms”) is now a common topic of scholarly debate 
within the field. This represents a revolutionary change within the discipline from the earlier position, in 
which positivism was the only commonly accepted model for research. 
The IS field originally adopted positivist assumptions and methods from its reference disciplines in the 
late 1950s to early 1960s. At that time empiricist assumptions closely associated with the behaviorist 
movement in psychology (which will be discussed below) were a dominant perspective in the behavioral 
sciences, and positivist/empiricist assumptions became the default position in IS. Approximately 30 years 
later, possibly triggered by the strong challenges to positivist assumptions that were sweeping through the 
reference disciplines, a reevaluation of metatheoretical approaches in IS took place. A breakdown in the 
confidence that many IS practitioners had in the positivist position eventually led to the adoption of a new 
approach: one that made space for multiple metatheoretical models within IS. One of the first of these 
alternate approaches was interpretivism, but it was not to be the last. Critical (H. K. Klein, 2004), critical 
realist (Mingers, 2004c), integrative (A. S. Lee, 1991; Newman & Robey, 1992), and other positions are 
being adopted within the field.  
It might be expected that the adoption of a pluralistic approach to methodology would be accompanied by 
a rethinking of, and perhaps a revolution in, the representational strategies for system utilization in IS 
research. In the next section, I will review the literature on system utilization in the field, and attempt to 
explain what actually happened, and propose a possible explanation.  
2.2.2 System Utilization in IS Research 
The IS discipline emerged approximately five decades ago from computer science, organizational studies, 
management studies and the behavioral sciences; and has developed, over time, its own distinct subject 
matter and schools of thought (Gregor, 2006). While it was once noted for its reliance on its source 
disciplines for both theories and exemplars of research methods (Keen, 1980), scholars have more 
recently declared that IS has matured, developing its own research perspectives, and is now in a position 
to act as a reference discipline itself (Baskerville & Myers, 2002). Some support for this position can be 
seen in the divergence of IS research from that in a closely-related sister discipline that is also focused on 
the use of information technology by humans — the discipline of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). 
The principal methodologies for research in HCI and in IS, have been steadily diverging (Carroll, 2003; 
W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). IS is, to a large extent, going its own way in terms of research norms. One 
of those norms, as noted earlier, embraces some heterogeneity of metatheoretical positions; but there are 
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some positions, and methodologies, which are dominant, heterogeneity notwithstanding. I will now look 
at these norms with regard to one central issue, the conceptualization and measurement of system 
utilization. 
There are a number of major categories into which IS research has been divided. While most have relied 
on ontological approach and research methods for classification (Hovorka et al., 2008), IS research can be 
categorized using metatheoretical assumptions, research methods, level of abstraction, type of theory, etc. 
In this section, I will look at utilization research using two categories which were used by Mingers 
(2003b): nomothetic and ideographic. Nomothetic research looks at large samples, is typically 
quantitative, typically uses positivist assumptions, and is usually concerned with finding patterns within a 
sample that can be generalized to a wider population, consistent with the positivist goal of finding general 
causal laws (in behavioral research, such laws typically are probabilistic). Idiographic research looks at a 
(relatively) small number of participants - often within a single or limited research context, it is typically 
qualitative, typically uses interpretive or critical metatheoretical assumptions, and is usually concerned 
with getting a deep understanding of a particular event or phenomenon within a specific context. It is to 
be noted that the above generalizations obviously have significant exceptions, but they do represent the 
general trends concerning the respective research categories. 
Most quantitative research in IS is positivist in orientation (Straub, Gefen, & Boudreau, 2004), despite the 
fact that, in theory, quantitative methods may also be used by interpretive researchers, who may then use 
interpretive assumptions to understand the results (Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997). However ideographic 
research is frequently applied using either — or both — positivist and/or interpretive assumptions 
(Walsham, 1995a). The distinction between the two types of studies is not always clear, even when authors 
explicitly align themselves with one position (Walsham, 1995a, p. 384). One widely-cited model for 
classifying studies as interpretive or  positivist is the criteria used by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), 
which has, in turn, been widely adapted and adopted by subsequent authors, including Walsham (1995a) 
and W. Chen and Hirschheim (2004). Their approach will be relied on for the analysis below. 
A note about how critical studies will be treated in this project. Critical studies are commonly considered 
the third of the major ontological positions within IS research, along with positivist and interpretive 
studies (H. K. Klein, 2004). However, in most, if not all, of the major reviews that have looked at the 
mainstream publication outlets, actual published examples of critical studies have been rare, or 
nonexistent, e.g., (W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991). Furthermore, the ambiguity problem that sometimes occurs when trying to classify studies that 
claim to be interpretive but seem to apply positivist assumptions, is even more acute when trying to 
separate interpretive from critical studies. For example, (Walsham, 1995a) — an explicitly interpretive 
account of the emergence of interpretive research in IS — is quite explicit about its goal of transforming 
the restrictive social conditions which alienate interpretive researchers from the mainstream (Walsham, 
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1995a, p. 392). The interpretive focus on taking the participants’ perspective makes it likely that this 
inherent advocacy will be a feature of many interpretive studies.  
The implication of this is that the number of unambiguously critical studies that are part of the 
mainstream discourse in IS is likely small. Indeed, for reasons that I will proffer later in this section, there 
has been less adoption of non-positivist research designs in general in IS than one would expect, given the 
vibrant discussions which have taken place in the discipline on alternate and integrative approaches. The 
intention in this part of the review is to identify and analyze the dominant metatheoretical approaches 
that have operated in IS over the past several years, and look at the effect of those dominant approaches 
on the way that system utilization is generally approached in the discipline. While critical studies are 
certainly a valid and accepted approach within IS, the evidence does not suggest that the critical approach 
constitutes a dominant approach. As such, in this section, I will focus on the interpretive and positivist 
approaches. 
It should be noted that the way some pieces of research — or even research programs — are classified, is, 
to some extent, an arbitrary decision that may vary from analyst to analyst. For example, work applying 
Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994) is noted in Pozzebon and Pinsonneault 
(2001, p. 207) to largely apply positivist assumptions. However, Orlikowski and Scott (2008) place AST 
within their Research Stream II, which has less typically “positivist”-style assumptions than Research 
Stream I (see (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008, p. 438)). Since my intention in this section is to discuss the 
dominant paradigms that explain certain overarching trends in the IS literature, I will acknowledge that 
there may be some level of subjectivity to the way that I classify and interpret some of the work that is 
cited. However, I believe the evidence for the underlying trends I cite does, in aggregate, exist. 
2.2.2.1 Nomothetic Approaches 
The management sciences in general, and IS in particular, have long been dominated by empiricist 
assumptions, and positivist methods that are based on those assumptions (W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; 
Mingers, 2005, p. 202; Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). These assumptions 
and methods have had a significant role in shaping previous IS research, and are still a powerful force in 
the discipline today (Hirschheim & Klein, 2012). Cross-sectional studies using nomothetic designs, survey 
methods, and quantitative analysis are the most common type of research done in IS (Ahmad, Lyytinen, & 
Newman, 2011; Cheon, Groven, & Sabherwal, 1993; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). In this research 
tradition, IS phenomena are investigated by the construction and testing of theoretical models which 
describe the causal relationships between independent and dependent variables. These hypothesized 
relationships are tested using statistical measures of association, and large, systematically-selected 
samples are necessary to ensure confidence in the findings (Sabherwal & Robey, 1995, p. 304). 
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In this research stream, system use has been acknowledged as one of the most important research areas. 
Despite this fact, there has been surprisingly scant theoretical research on the concept of system use itself 
for much of the history of the IS discipline (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006). While there have been several 
calls for such research in the past (DeLone & McLean, 1992; Straub et al., 1995), there has only recently 
been a surge of interest in system use as a research topic (Barki et al., 2007; Elie-Dit-Cosaque & Straub, 
2010; Fidock & Carroll, 2009; Gerpott, 2011; Grgecic & Rosenkranz, 2011; Guinea & Markus, 2009; 
Kjærgaard & Jensen, 2008; McLean et al., 2011; H. Sun & Fricke, 2009; Tate & Evermann, 2009). It 
should be noted that not all of the studies in the preceding list represent classical nomothetic studies. 
Some, such as (Guinea & Markus, 2009) are conceptual, and some, such as (Kjærgaard & Jensen, 2008), 
use an intensive approach. However all of them have in common the goal of getting a deeper 
understanding of how systems are used, and finding ways to operationalize that understanding by 
creating better measures of utilization. The search for “better” measures of use is, in a way, an implicit 
critique of the way that utilization has been conceptualized and measured in many prior studies. That has 
been heavily influenced by the success of one of the most influential streams of research in the discipline. 
One of the most extensively-researched topics in IS research over the past two decades is technology 
adoption. How to predict whether users will use technological systems has become a central question in IS 
and has shaped a number of related streams of research. It is widely accepted that one of the main drivers 
of technology adoption research has been the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), which was 
introduced by (F. D. Davis, 1989; F. D. Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). The TAM has the distinction of 
being one of the few theories that was developed in IS (Tams, 2010), which has been widely applied in 
other disciplines (see (Bagozzi, 1990; Bagozzi, Davis, & Warshaw, 1992; Dabholkar & Bagozzi, 2002)). 
First proposed in Davis’ doctoral dissertation (F. D. Davis, 1986), in its most basic version TAM provided 
a simplified operationalization of the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), based on 
Rogers (2003)’s diffusion of innovations model, for measuring a user’s intention to use an IT system 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). It was comprised of two variables: Perceived Usefulness (distinct from another 
construct of the same name coined in 1986 by Franz and Robey (1986)), and Perceived Ease of Use; 
proxies for Rogers (2003)’s Relative Advantage, and Complexity factors, respectively (Karahanna, Straub, 
& Chervany, 1999). TAM provided, essentially, a parsimonious variance model for measuring user 
perceptions and intentions in order to make a single prediction: would the user accept (use) or reject (not 
use) the system? The emphasis on prediction is an indicator of the positivist/empiricist assumptions that 
were a foundation for the model. It was originally developed with two aims: to further the understanding 
of the determinants of the use/not use decision, and to form a theoretically rigorous basis for acceptance 
testing of systems (F. D. Davis, 1986). However, the papers that introduced it to the field: (F. D. Davis, 
1989; F. D. Davis et al., 1989), became two of the most highly-cited papers in IS (over 28,000 combined 
citations up to January 2014, according to Google Scholar), and inspired an extensive stream of research. 
The body of literature inspired by TAM and the resulting surge of interest in the topic of adoption has 
dominated the IS field. Wade (2011) reported the findings from a survey of 1,000 IS lifecycle articles in 7 
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leading IS journals over the past 20 years, and the categories of “Acceptance” (13%) and “Adoption” (67%) 
accounted for a total of 80% of the articles. 
TAM was used widely by researchers both within  IS and in fields outside the discipline such as marketing 
(Bagozzi, 1990; Dabholkar & Bagozzi, 2002). There is a large literature on TAM, reflected both in the 
number of citations of its initial studies, and in the several reviews and critiques it has generated (Legris, 
Ingham, & Collerette, 2003). TAM has spawned a huge number of studies, and there are many different 
ways of analyzing the literature that has been spawned from it. Some of the streams of research produced 
by researchers using, critiquing or extending TAM include: 
1. Reviews and replications of, and commentaries on, TAM research, e.g., (Adams, Nelson, & Todd, 
1992; Benbasat & Barki, 2007; Hendrickson & Collins, 1996; Hu, Chau, Sheng, & Tam, 1999; 
Lederer, Maupin, Sena, & Zhuang, 2000; Y. Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003; Legris et al., 2003; 
Morris & Dillon, 1997; Straub & Burton-Jones, 2007; Szajna, 1994) 
2. Extensions to, and integrations of other models and constructs into, TAM, e.g., (Ritu Agarwal & 
Prasad, 1999; Bajaj & Nidumolu, 1998; Chau, 1996; Angelika Dimoka & Davis, 2008; Dishaw & 
Strong, 1999; Hubona & Cheney, 1994; Igbaria, Guimaraes, & Davis, 1995; Igbaria, Zinatelli, 
Cragg, & Cavaye, 1997; Jackson, Chow, & Leitch, 1997; Karahanna et al., 1999; R. Thompson, 
1998; Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 1996; Venkatesh & Davis, 
2000) 
3. Alternative models for exploring technology acceptance and use beside TAM, e.g., (Moore & 
Benbasat, 1991, 1996; Sykes, Venkatesh, & Gosain, 2009; H. H. Teo, Wei, & Benbasat, 2003; R. L. 
Thompson, Higgins, & Howell, 1991; Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003; E. V. Wilson, Mao, 
& Lankton, 2010) 
4. Comparisons of TAM with alternate models, e.g., (Bagozzi et al., 1992; Burton-Jones & Hubona, 
2006; F. D. Davis et al., 1989; Haynes & Thies, 1991; Matheison, 1991; S. Taylor & Todd, 1995b) 
5. Effects of hedonic factors on acceptance and use, e.g., (T. S. Teo, Lim, & Lai, 1999; Van der 
Heijden, 2004) 
6. Research on the impact of gender and culture on the effects of TAM variables, e.g., (Gefen & 
Straub, 1997; Straub, 1994; Venkatesh & Morris, 2000) 
7. Comparison of perceived usefulness vs. perceived ease of use, (Keil, Beranek, & Konsynski, 1995) 
8. Comparisons of intention to use (commonly measured as a proxy for actual use in acceptance 
studies) with actual use e.g., (Pentland, 1989; Straub et al., 1995; Szajna, 1996) 
9. Commentaries and prescriptive articles on method variance in quantitative IS research (Burton-
Jones, 2009; Tate & Evermann, 2009; Tate & Evermann, 2012) 
It seems fair to say that a great deal of research in IS, particularly nomothetic research applying positivist 
assumptions, has been aimed at TAM. The observation that TAM has a dominant role in IS is not new — 
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the same observation has been made in recent critiques of TAM and its effects such as (Benbasat & Barki, 
2007). However, what is significant — and less commonly recognized — is the role that the timing of the 
emergence of TAM, and its influence in IS, has played in the way that system utilization is conceptualized 
in the field. When TAM was introduced, in 1989, IS was undergoing a paradigm shift, from positivist to 
multi-metatheoretic. In concert with that change, one could have expected that there would 
simultaneously be a transformation in the way that system use is defined as a construct. The 
“quantification” measures that were appropriate for the “clerical automation” contexts that defined the 
early days of the field (Hirschheim & Klein, 2012), would seem to be obviously unsuited to the richer and 
changing contexts that were emerging as IS became more and more a core business tool for 
communication and decision support. That this did not happen, and that system use has been 
conceptualized and measured in largely the same way it had always been until very recently (Burton-
Jones, 2005; Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006), seems to be a little-remarked but real consequence of the 
rise TAM as a dominant model.  
The effect of TAM has been felt beyond the specific streams of research that have directly used the TAM 
model to investigate particular phenomena. Several streams of IS research which are not directly 
concerned with IT acceptance or adoption have adopted cross-sectional study designs and quantitative 
instruments for investigation that have similarities to F. D. Davis (1989)’s approach, despite the fact that 
such instruments are not an obvious fit for the topics of those research streams. Examples include the 
Service Quality stream, which has been dominated by the use of a survey-type instrument — 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry (1988)’s SERVQUAL scales — despite well-known concerns about the 
reliability of the instrument, and conceptual problems with applying it in many IS service domains (Tate 
& Evermann, 2010).   
Nowhere is this attachment to TAM-style research methods more vivid than in the recent literature on 
post-adoptive IS use. In response to recent critiques of the preponderance of technology acceptance and 
adoption research (see (Bagozzi, 2007; Benbasat & Barki, 2007; Straub & Burton-Jones, 2007), many 
researchers have adopted a new focus — understanding the phenomena that emerge after the adoption of 
IT: post-adoption (Jasperson, Carter, & Zmud, 2005). The goal of this research stream is to enhance 
understanding of how users decide to maintain, increase, enhance, decrease or discontinue their use of 
systems and system features after the adoption decision is made. Both conceptual and empirical work has 
been done on developing better understandings of how use patterns develop over time. This work is 
fundamentally quite different from the work on adoption. Whereas adoption studies have at their center 
an event: the user decides to use / not use the system; work on post-adoption or continuing use almost 
invariably describes a process: how the user’s utilization of the system evolves over time. Despite this, 
much of the empirical research in this area has taken the form of cross-sectional quantitative studies 
utilizing variance theory, sometimes using intention as a proxy for actual use (Thatcher, McKnight, Baker, 
Arsal, & Roberts, 2009). While in some ways this could be seen as a response to Benbasat and Barki 
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(2007)’s comments on the restrictive nature of TAM research (Benbasat & Barki, 2007, p. 213), in other 
ways it seems reflective of the very limited conceptual tool set that is often brought to bear on diverse 
research problems in IS.  This is especially so in light of the fact that the “rational-choice” models of 
human decision-making that form the foundations of TAM (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), have been 
extensively critiqued and are now widely rejected within the reference discipline in which it was 
developed (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This problem of 
insufficient attention to developments in the reference disciplines with regard to theories in IS which are 
developed from them has been noted by several researchers (Guinea & Markus, 2009; Tate & Evermann, 
2012). 
The influence of TAM and TAM-inspired research may be a factor in the dominance of quantitative 
positivist methods — particularly the survey method — in IS, but it was not the initiator of such research 
in the field. Straub, Ang, and Evaristo (1994) cite Hamilton and Ives (1982), Ives and Olson (1984), and 
Farhoomand (1987) — all of whom published before TAM was introduced to the discipline in 1989 — as 
expressing concern about the indiscriminate application of the survey method to various research areas 
without consideration of its suitability. The perspective that that state of the field reflects, it must be 
noted, is consistent with the positivist assumptions that were then the dominant metatheoretical position 
in the field. My contention is that the success of the TAM model, and the wide application of TAM in a 
number of domains after its introduction, had the effect of suppressing deep reconsideration of the way 
that system utilization was commonly represented in IS.  
The IS field was in a transitional period in the late 1980s, with an opening up of the metatheoretical 
assumptions of the discipline to other perspectives. Under normal circumstances, this might have tended 
to lead the field to open up as well to a wider range of methods for conceptualizing what system utilization 
actually is, and how it ought to be measured. I contend that the success of TAM — and the accompanying 
opportunities for researchers to pursue rewarding puzzle-solving work within the “paradigm” of TAM — 
suppressed this tendency. While IS as a field might have philosophically acknowledged the limitations of a 
positivist-only orientation for research; in practice, it continued to use a reductive and restrictive view of 
use — “system use defined as an amount or frequency” (Benbasat & Barki, 2007, p. 213) — to guide 
research. New IS researchers tended to be taught to use survey methods and do TAM — or TAM-style — 
studies. The effects of this on publication patterns in the discipline may also have been exacerbated by the 
career dynamics of IS junior researchers (see Applegate & King, 1999; W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004, p. 
224), making it more difficult for researchers to apply “non-standard” methods. This is the essence of 
Benbasat and Barki (2007)’s criticism of the effect that TAM has had on IS research.  
However, while nomothetic research, primarily using survey methods, has been the dominant type of 
research in IS through much of its history, it has not been the only type. There has also been a tradition of 
idiographic research. I will look at this in the following section. 
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2.2.2.2 Idiographic Approaches 
The largely positivist-only perspective within IS (Emery, 1989) that prevailed the in the late 1980s – early 
1990s did not preclude the use of idiographic methods. Even before the rise of interpretive and other 
alternate metatheoretical models, papers were published on idiographic methods utilizing positivist 
assumptions (A. S. Lee, 1989b). However, idiographic methods came into their own with the widespread 
adoption in the field of interpretivist assumptions. With interpretivism’s focus on analyzing the subjective 
understandings and individual perspectives of research participants, idiographic qualitative methods can 
seem a natural fit for that metatheoretical approach, and articles about case study methodology 
(Walsham, 1995b), ethnographic methods (Myers, 1999), and, ultimately, a two-volume special issue on 
intensive methods in the field’s premier journal (Markus & Lee, 1999, 2000), established idiographic 
methods as an ascendant approach to research in the discipline. It is important to emphasize, however, 
that idiographic research does not necessarily employ constructivist assumptions. For example, 
idiographic methods are often used with process theories (Mohr, 1982; Pentland, 1999), and process 
theories often have goals of prediction based on analysis of patterns of events, goals which may be seen as 
inherently empiricist (Ahmad et al., 2011). Indeed, Sabherwal and Robey (1995) note that variance and 
process strategies share the epistemological assumptions that the social world is objective and observable 
— realist assumptions. Even declarations by the authors that their papers use interpretive assumptions 
can be somewhat ambiguous, or even misleading. Walsham (1995a), for example, shows that the meaning 
of “interpretive” research can be interpreted by different researchers in different ways, making it difficult 
to classify some studies (Walsham, 1995a, pp. 384, 385). 
Within the category of ideographic research, therefore, there are at least two major schools of 
metatheoretic thought: interpretive/constructivist, and positivist/empiricist. They can typically be 
identified by the design of the study, the nature of the research questions and the type of assumptions 
applied by the researchers. Identifying the metatheoretical assumptions of the researchers by the research 
method is often impractical because some methods can be applied using different metatheoretical 
positions. For example, there are guidelines in IS for conducting both positivist (Dubé & Paré, 2003) and 
interpretive (Walsham, 1995b) case studies. Other methods, such as grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1968; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), are said to be “paradigmatically neutral” (Butler & O’Reilly, 2010; 
Urquhart, Lehmann, & Myers, 2010), meaning they can be applied using any metatheoretical approach. 
This can lead to some confusion about the link between methods and metatheory. For example, Urquhart 
et al. (2010) notes that grounded theory has been called positivist, interpretivist, and critical. In intensive 
idiographic studies, both interpretive and positivist studies have in common the goal of intensively 
understanding a phenomenon within a given context. However, the assumptions that go along with the 
metatheoretic positions that are held by researchers in each tradition lead to there being different critical 
issues surrounding each type of study. I will look at each in turn, beginning with positivist intensive 
studies.  
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One of the most hotly-debated topics surrounding positivist idiographic studies is generalizability. When 
conducting research consisting of statistical analysis of relationships within a sample (Hovorka et al., 
2008), drawn from a defined population, well-defined algorithmic procedures govern how those analyses 
should be conducted. When the analyses are complete, well-defined rules govern how findings from those 
analyses can be generalized to the populations from which they were drawn. Such well-defined rules do 
not exist for qualitative data. The result has been a vibrant debate within the field, first about how to 
conduct “scientific” analysis of qualitative data (A. S. Lee, 1989a, 1989b; A. S. Lee & Hubona, 2009), and 
then about how findings from such analyses can be generalized, and to which populations (A. S. Lee & 
Baskerville, 2003; Tsang, 2013a, 2013b; Tsang & Willliams, 2012). It can be observed that much of this 
debate has focused on case studies, the most commonly-applied qualitative positivist research method 
(W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). It is safe to say that quantitative positivist researchers — who can simply 
report that they have followed well-defined and commonly accepted procedures in order to validate their 
analyses — have an advantage over qualitative researchers, who must prove they have met less well-
defined standards for analytic rigor. The professional consequences of the more time-consuming 
procedures and greater difficulty in validating work for publication, may be one reason why qualitative 
work has lagged in adoption by researchers, despite numerous calls for methodological pluralism within 
the field (W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). 
Interpretive assumptions are often considered somewhat synonymous with idiographic research, given 
interpretivism’s concern with understanding the individual’s interpretation of the world. Nandhakumar 
and Jones (1997) point out that this is misleading: interpretivist researchers can use the quantitative tools 
of nomothetic research just as positivists can use ideographic tools. However, the output of those tools 
will be interpreted using interpretive assumptions. In fact, Nandhakumar and Jones (1997, p. 117) found 
from a review of studies published in three of IS’s top journals that interpretive researchers use methods 
which involve “low engagement” with participants more often that one would expect, given the 
assumptions of interpretivism. Nonetheless, interpretive research in IS has been more often associated 
with qualitative intensive designs than the quantitative and nomothetic designs that are also available to 
interpretive researchers. Interpretive researchers seek to access the subjective meanings assigned to 
phenomena from the perspective of participants. The concept of “generalizing” to a population that is a 
foundation of positivist contributions to knowledge does not apply in interpretive studies. The ultimate 
goal of an interpretive analysis depends on the “stream” of interpretivism that a researcher follows. 
Interpretivism is not one perspective, and can be seen as having “weak” and “strong” forms. Weak 
interpretive approaches use internal realist assumptions and aim to access the intersubjective 
construction of reality shared by participants. Strong interpretive approaches see all representations of 
reality as personal constructions that cannot be shared (Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997, p. 110). Several 
scholars have pointed out the fact that subjective idealist assumptions pose basic problems for the 
practice of scientific research (Mingers, 2006; R. Weber, 2003). 
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2.2.2.3 Norms and Anomalies 
The nomothetic and idiographic approaches outlined above each are associated with certain norms 
concerning how system utilization is conceptualized and measured. These norms have direct effects on the 
way that system utilization has been studied in each research stream. The effects of these norms have also 
led to anomalies within each stream that have been the subject of concern by prior researchers. 
Calls for a serious reconsideration of the norms for conceptualizing and measuring use in the nomothetic 
tradition have been being made for some time (Straub et al., 1994). Those calls have been bolstered by 
findings which indicate that commonly-accepted proxies used in measuring use are, in fact, problematic. 
For example, the use of self-report and intentional measures has continued to be a primary method of 
measuring dependent variables in studies of acceptance, use, and even continuing use, despite a growing 
body of research suggesting significant validity problems with such measures (Gerpott, 2011; Straub et al., 
1995; Szajna, 1993, 1996). 
Some of the problems which have been pointed out go even further, questioning the commonly-accepted 
norms for applying statistical methods in IS. The nomothetic research tradition in IS is highly dependent 
on statistical modeling as a research method. Mingers (2003a) has critiqued the way that statistical 
modeling is generally performed in IS research, integrating a number of criticisms that have been pointed 
out by prior authors (Mingers, 2003a, p. 5). Among the anomalies he points out are: 
 A reductionist view of causation that only looks at associations between variables (i.e., a Humean 
view), ignoring causal mechanisms  
 An unsubstantiated assumption of event regularities (inherent in the Humean view) 
 Explanations that lack ontological depth, since quantitative models must generally include 
variables that occur at the same level of aggregation 
 Unsupportable assumptions about both extrinsic and intrinsic closure in causal models 
 Unsupportable assumptions about stability in the relationships found in the data 
 The dependence of real-world modeling on ad-hoc judgments and tacit knowledge on the part of 
researchers. This undermines the positivist assumption of “objectivity” in making inferences  
 The atheoretic nature of real-world modeling 
 The reliance of significance testing on unrealistic assumptions  
 The fact that many models simply do not demonstrate useful levels of predictive validity 
The last point is particularly significant. The major goal of research conducted using positivist 
assumptions is the generation of reliable, accurate predictions about future states of the world. Yet few 
models demonstrate the ability to generate useful predictions, both within IS and beyond (Sherden, 
1998). Further, those which do, often demonstrate an ability to make predictions which are relatively 
obvious. For example, E. V. Wilson et al. (2010) state “Researchers have been highly successful in 
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predicting and explaining IT use in conditions where there is frequent need for the technology.” This 
brings to mind the comment of Weick (1989) that theorists often construct theories that are trivial 
because they are focused on the tractability (as per Mingers, 2003a, p. 7), rather than the usefulness of 
their theories. Indeed, it has been noted that the most successful theory produced by this tradition of 
research — F. D. Davis (1989)’s TAM model — tells us little about why the measured relationships exist 
and thus contributes less to knowledge than might be supposed. Straub and Burton-Jones (2007) go even 
further, pointing out that common method variance cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the 
measured effects of TAM. These anomalies have long been recognized, but, for the most part, nomothetic 
quantitative positivist research in IS has continued without seriously addressing them.  
Idiographic research includes examples of both positivist and interpretivist approaches. In positivist 
idiographic research, there has been a vibrant discussion surrounding the issue of generalizability (A. S. 
Lee & Baskerville, 2003; A. S. Lee & Baskerville, 2012; Tsang & Willliams, 2012). Underlying this 
discussion is the fact that the rules for generalizing from idiographic qualitative research are much less 
developed, and not nearly as universally accepted, as the rules for generalizing findings from samples to 
populations in quantitative research. In addition, in positivist research, qualitative research is often 
treated as only appropriate for research in areas that lack well-developed theoretical models (Daft & Why, 
1985). Integrative frameworks for combining both qualitative and quantitative methods are rare (see 
Gable, 1994 for one example). In this tradition, case studies have often been approached as a means to 
isolate the contextual factors that influence outcomes (Gregor, 2006, p. 622). They have also been 
promoted as a method for generating theoretical explanations in IS through mechanism-based strategies 
(Avgerou, 2013). However, generalizing from such studies is hindered by the lack of universal construct 
definitions (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999).  
The second area in which ideographic approaches are commonly used is in interpretive ideographic 
studies. Interpretive and constructivist approaches grew, in large part, out of critiques of positivism 
(Mingers, 2006, p. 17). They address many of the fundamental critiques of positivist assumptions; 
however, they have been criticized for doing so by disregarding, or in the case of “strong interpretivist” 
approaches, abandoning, the notion of the external world (Mingers, 2006, p. 19). The existence of the 
external world is regarded by philosophers as impossible to prove, but it has been noted that most people, 
including interpretivists, tend to act as if they believe it exists (R. Weber, 2004). Further, from a realist 
perspective, it is difficult to see how epistemic relativity can be defended without undermining basic 
principles of science (Mingers, 2006, pp. 17-19).  
It should be noted that in both streams of ideographic research – positivist and interpretive – there is a 
lack of a universal model for conceptualizing and describing system utilization. In positivist ideographic 
research there has been a lively debate between researchers who believe that the lack of universal 
construct definitions hinders IS from developing a cumulative tradition of knowledge (Benbasat & Zmud, 
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1999), and those who believe that universal definitions and cumulative traditions are inappropriate for IS 
(Davenport & Markus, 1999).  
2.2.2.4 Emerging Perspectives 
While there have been acknowledgements and challenges to the anomalies in the representation and 
measurement of system utilization in IS over the past several years, there has recently been a surge of 
interest in this issue in the research literature, and novel proposals have been made for new methods to 
represent the interaction of users and systems. Indications of a new interest in this area may be seen in 
the work on system use in (Burton-Jones, 2005), and the subsequent (Burton-Jones & Gallivan, 2007; 
Burton-Jones & Grange, 2012; Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006). Critiques of the current models of 
measurement of use — along with some proposals for corrections — have come from (McLean et al., 2011; 
Tate & Evermann, 2012). Extensions of the current conceptualizations of use have come from (Barki et al., 
2007), (Elie-Dit-Cosaque & Straub, 2010).  
In addition, there have been a number of new metaphors being proposed for ways to represent the 
interaction between users and systems in research. These include the Sociomaterial perspective 
(Orlikowski, 2007, 2009; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008); Secondary design (Germonprez et al., 2011); 
Imbrication (Leonardi, 2011); and “third wave” IS research (Seidel & Berente, 2013). Some of these 
perspectives are not entirely new (e.g., Germonprez et al. (2011) echoes ideas that go back to McLean 
(1979)), but taken as a whole they suggest that IS as a field is evolving in the way that it represents 
perhaps the central phenomenon that it investigates: the way that people use IT systems.  
2.2.3 Discussion 
It should be mentioned at the outset that the above perspectives on system utilization do not exhaust the 
scope of research that has been done in IS over the past 40+ years. Some of this work has looked 
specifically at phenomena which are conceptually related to the utilization of IT artifacts in novel and 
useful ways. The notion that end users may also function as “developers” if given access to the tools and 
techniques needed to modify the systems they use was discussed in the 1970s by McLean (1979). Other 
work – some of it rooted in Rogers (1995)’s theory of the diffusion of innovations – has discussed the 
adaptation and reinvention of IT by adopters, rather than designers (Griffith, 1999; Orlikowski, Yates, 
Okamura, & Fujimoto, 1995; Schmitz, Webb, & Teng, 2010). Some have proposed that this adaptation 
tends to be driven by misalignments between user tasks and technology features (Lassila & Brancheau, 
1999; Leonard-Barton, 1988; Majchrzak, Rice, Malhotra, King, & Ba, 2000; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994) and 
have proposed ways of measuring and understanding the dimensions of such misalignments (Goodhue, 
1995a, 1995b; Goodhue & Thompson, 1995). There has been work on stage theories of IS implementation, 
which propose that novel use patterns emerge from higher-order ‘experimental’ use behaviors which 
emerge late in the implementation cycle (Jasperson et al., 2005; Kwon & Zmud, 1987; Saga & Zmud, 
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1993; Zmud & Apple, 1992), and critiques of stage theories (Benbasat, Dexter, Drury, & Goldstein, 1984; 
Mohr, 1987; Sabherwal & Robey, 1995). There have been extensions to the literature on adoption that 
have looked at emergent use patterns as a feature of certain adoption types (Klonglan & Coward Jr, 1970; 
Nah, Tan, & Teh, 2004; Wang & Hsieh, 2006), and conceptual definitions for looking at the factors – at 
both the individual and collective levels that drive innovative user behaviors (R. Agarwal & Prasad, 1998; 
Ahuja & Thatcher, 2005; Gallivan, 2001; Nambisan et al., 1999; Swanson & Ramiller, 2004).  There have 
also been acknowledgements of the limitations of the dominant models for exploring utilization in IS, and 
proposals for new models, such as those proposed by (Jain & Kanungo, 2005; Singletary, Akbulut, & 
Houston, 2002; Heshan Sun, 2012).  
This considerable existing literature demonstrates that the basic issue of needing to develop a deeper 
understanding of how systems are used and how users’ interactions with systems result in novel 
appropriations of technology is recognized in IS as an important research domain. However, little of this 
research has drawn on the wider extant literature on creativity, which is odd, given that the common 
thread which ties all the disparate streams of research referenced above together is that they concern end 
users – whether continuing users or adopters – developing or discovering new ways to use technology 
that are self-directed, unanticipated, novel, useful, and appropriate for a purpose. Even if the emergent 
utilization processes are not formally measured and certified as ‘creative’, the relevance of a literature 
which looks at ideation processes, and how novel ideas are generated, implemented, and understood, to 
many of the above research domains would seem apparent. Its relative absence from the body of work on 
this type of behavior in IS seems odd.  
One clue about why this may be can be gleaned from a closer look at the methodological approaches used 
in many of the above studies. Many (e.g., (R. Agarwal & Prasad, 1998; Ahuja & Thatcher, 2005; Goodhue, 
1995a; Goodhue & Thompson, 1995; Jain & Kanungo, 2005; Nah et al., 2004; Nambisan et al., 1999; 
Singletary et al., 2002; Heshan Sun, 2012; Thatcher et al., 2009; Wang & Hsieh, 2006)) are wholly or 
partially survey-based studies that seem aimed at finding a “dependent variable” (DeLone & McLean, 
1992), a model that can that can “explain” innovative user behaviors, in much the way that TAM 
“explains” user adoption behaviors. However there is little in the current findings from this body of 
research to confirm that such an approach is ideal to understanding how users apply their creative 
abilities to the appropriation of systems. Put another way, it is unclear that such a variable exists, and if it 
does, it is unclear that we understand user appropriation well enough to define it. 
The IS discipline has a number of varied and multifaceted research communities (Burton-Jones & 
Grange, 2012; A. Dimoka, Pavlou, & Davis, 2010; Tan & Hunter, 2002). However, even those, including 
this researcher, who feel that one strength of the IS discipline is its openness to a variety of perspectives, 
would concede that there are some types of research which clearly dominate scholarly output in the field, 
and in its top journals. It has consistently been found that there is a single set of dominant philosophical 
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assumptions in the discipline (Iivari, Hirschheim, & Klein, 1998, p. 165). The empirical evidence from a 
number of reviews and studies of both research content and publication patterns in the discipline is clear: 
certain methods constitute the bulk of the output in IS, while other promising perspectives, such as 
narrative positivism (Abbott, 1992; Pentland, 1999), constitute a much smaller share of the published 
work in the most influential outlets commonly available to IS researchers. It has been a long-stated 
priority for journals in IS to publish a variety of types of research (DeSanctis, 1993; Webster & Watson, 
2002), and yet actual attempts to do so have yielded surprisingly modest results, when tested empirically 
(W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004).  
One possible reason that has been proposed for this tendency in IS is the real challenges involved in 
introducing a new metatheoretical perspective into a scientific discipline. To focus on the specific example 
of the IS discipline and the shift from positivism to interpretivism, the shift in attitude among senior 
researchers that resulted in the intention to accept interpretivist perspectives appears to have occurred 
somewhere between the colloquium by the IFIP TC8 Working Group in 1984 (Hirschheim & Klein, 2012) 
and the MISQ editorial by DeSanctis in 1993 (DeSanctis, 1993). However, at that point, there would have 
been few researchers in the field who were familiar with interpretive research and able to assess it. IS 
graduate programs would have to hire academics who could teach interpretive research. Those academics 
would have to train IS students to use the methodological tools that are appropriate for interpretive 
research. Editors and reviewers at IS journals would have to learn how to assess interpretive papers 
without applying inappropriate standards for quality, a problem alluded to in (R. Weber, 2004). In 
context, it is not surprising that W. Chen and Hirschheim (2004) found that there was still a remarkably 
small portion of interpretive research being published in IS more than 10 years after the call in 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).  
The reason for the focus on high-level trends in this review is that it has attempted to make one over-
arching point: that research in IS has been enabled, shaped, and, to some extent, disabled, by a dominant 
set of assumptions. The single approach based on positivist assumptions dominated the field from its 
inception until the mid-1980s. From the mid-80s to the early 1990s the field underwent a shift in terms of 
the way that it defines and evaluates standards of acceptable research. Interpretive approaches and 
assumptions became an “acceptable” form of research in IS. For reasons that have to do with the 
structural dynamics at work in the careers of IS researchers (Applegate & King, 1999; W. Chen & 
Hirschheim, 2004), this did not (and still has not) resulted in a parity between positivist and interpretive 
research in terms of volume of output in the field’s top journals. However, the norms have certainly 
changed (DeSanctis, 1993). 
There was, however, another development during the shift from a positivist-only to a multi-metatheory 
perspective within the field that also had an impact on the way that it developed. The development of a 
theoretical model that appeared able to fulfill the promise of the positivist approach: the Technology 
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Acceptance Model (TAM) (F. D. Davis, 1989). The TAM was powerful (for a predictive model in the 
behavioral sciences), parsimonious and useful. It appeared to validate and vindicate the classical positivist 
empiricist quantitative approach at just the moment when it was being challenged by new approaches and 
assumptions. The result was a strange stalemate: a strong quantitative positivist stream of research, 
largely aimed at findings new ways to apply, extend, or compete with TAM; and a growing, but more 
modest in output, stream of interpretive research. These interpretive studies were largely idiographic and 
focused on intensive, context-specific investigations. 
Subsequent examination of the corpus of research generated by TAM has provoked some reconsideration 
of the extent of its contributions. TAM makes somewhat obvious predictions, and the degree to which its 
measured effects may be attributed to method variance is unclear (Benbasat & Barki, 2007; Straub & 
Burton-Jones, 2007). However, there seems to be a larger movement going on in the field that is 
coinciding with the reconsideration of TAM. A number of studies are coming out which are proposing new 
ways to look at the way system use is measured (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006; McLean et al., 2011), and 
completely new metaphors for how the interaction between users and systems is conceptualized 
(Germonprez et al., 2011; Leonardi, 2011; Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Seidel & Berente, 
2013). Taken together, these developments seem to point to an emerging shift taking place in the IS 
discipline at this time. Unlike the earlier shift, this revolution is not about the metatheoretical 
assumptions that underlie IS research, but rather about representational strategies for conceptualizing 
how users interact with IT artifacts. In some ways, this could be viewed as a continuation of the earlier 
transformation that began in the mid-80s, which was “interrupted” by the emergence of TAM.  
This hypothesized shift has significant implications for this thesis and its topic. I will discuss some of 
these implications in the following section. Before doing so, I will generally introduce the topic of 
creativity, and review some of the ways in which the determinants of creativity have been conceptualized 
in prior research. I will then review what creativity research has been done in IS, and show how the corpus 
of such research in the discipline, in addition to being quite modest in volume, is also somewhat narrow in 
scope. I will then discuss how the historical developments that have been reviewed in this section may 
help to explain the limited amount and scope of the creativity research in IS up to this point. 
2.3 Creativity 
There have been many attempts — both in the popular and scientific literature — to define the concept of 
creativity. These have approached the problem from a number of perspectives. The questions of how 
creativity should be defined, whether and how it can be measured, and whether and how it can be 
scientifically explained, has occupied psychologists, historians, philosophers of science, musicologists, 
aestheticians and lay persons throughout human history (Boden, 1996; Glück, Ernst, & Unger, 2002). The 
challenge of defining creativity is captured in a paradox proposed in (Hausman, 1984) as quoted by Finke, 
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Ward, and Smith (1992): “How is it ever possible to conceive of a truly creative idea? If you could 
anticipate the idea, it would be determined and not creative. If you could not anticipate it, how could you 
generate the idea?”  
The operating definition that one chooses to use for creativity is in many ways determined by some 
fundamental assumptions one makes about the concept. Assumptions about the underlying nature of 
creativity determine, in turn, how it is defined, recognized, measured and explained empirically. Any 
attempt to define creativity, then, involves a process of selection. In order to fully appreciate how such 
selections may be made, it is useful to look at the background of creativity research. 
2.3.1 Background 
The systematic investigation of human creativity has been a subject of study for many years. M. Becker 
(1995), in a survey of the historical literature on creativity research, found that 19th century authors 
tended to focus on five basic questions: 
 What is creativity? 
 Who has creativity? 
 What are the characteristics of creative people? 
 Who should benefit from creativity? 
 Can creativity be increased through conscious effort? 
Interestingly, similar issues have occupied creativity researchers well into the current century. However, 
while it is true that scholars throughout recorded history have enquired into the nature of creativity, it is 
also true that the period from the latter half of the 20th century to the present has seen a significant 
escalation in interest in creativity. Amabile (1982) cites a surge of interest in the topic of creativity in the 
psychology literature between 1950 (less than 0.2% of the listings in Psychology Abstracts) and 1980 
(more than 1% of the listings in Psychology Abstracts). This growing interest in the topic in the psychology 
research community is paralleled by a swelling of interest in the topic in the general literature. The Google 
Ngram tool shows the following trend in the relative frequency of the word ‘creativity’ in the corpus of 
books digitized by Google, published between 1800 and 2000: 
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Frequency of Occurrence of the word “Creativity” in published literature from 1800-2000 
 
Figure 1: Mentions of “Creativity” in published works, 1800-2000 
Source: (Google, 2014), retrieved 01-16-2014 
The surge in apparent interest in the topic of creativity between 1940 and 1960 corresponds with some 
important developments in the study of creativity itself. To contextualize these developments, it is useful 
to look at the history of creativity as a concept, and as an object of scholarly research.  
While creativity research has always been a multidisciplinary pursuit, the most influential discipline in the 
field (and, in fact, a key reference discipline for many of the other fields that engage in creativity research) 
has been the discipline of psychology. From the 1920s to the 1950s, the dominant paradigm in psychology 
was behaviorism. A key tenet of behaviorism was that scientists should not study anything that was not 
directly observable: they should confine scientific enquiry to those areas that can be directly observed and 
measured. This can be recognized as an empiricist axiological assumption (based on logical positivism), 
and that reflects the dominant thinking of the era. The major challenge to behaviorism early in the 
century came from Freudian psychoanalysis, which saw creative impulses as being reflections sexual 
frustration and neurosis (Freud, 1916). Research in psychology was limited to topics that were well suited 
to the dominant paradigm, such as the well-known studies of conditioning by Pavlov (1927). There was 
little scholarly exploration of creativity in psychology up to the 1940s. 
It is widely accepted that the turning point of this lacuna in the literature was the inaugural address of J. 
P. Guilford as president of the American Psychological Association in 1950 (Guilford, 1950). Guilford used 
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his address to call for more scholarly research on creativity in psychology, and the surge of interest in 
creativity among researchers at the time has been attributed to that call (Amabile, 1982). However, there 
is reason to believe that there are a number of influences which came together at that time in order to 
facilitate the growth of creativity studies as an area of research. As R.K. Sawyer (2012) notes, 1950 was 
also the date of the beginning of the National Science Foundation in the United States, creating a 
streamlined system for funding researchers who were pursuing high-priority research. At the same time, 
creativity research became a very high priority, since it began to be seen as both a potential source of 
advantage in the Cold War, and an antidote for the perceived lack of innovation at large, stable American 
corporations (R.K. Sawyer, 2012, p. 17). A number of research psychologists who had experience 
developing evaluation techniques for the military during World War Two (including Guilford), now 
turned their attention to the creation of research institutes for the assessment and development of general 
aptitudes. Then there was the devastating review of (Skinner, 1957) by Chomsky (1959), which is widely 
viewed as a milestone in the paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviorism and toward what came 
to be known as cognitivism. These converging trends all had the effect of making creativity an attractive 
topic for researchers, and resulted in a sharp increase in the number of papers being produced in the field.  
The major goal of creativity research during this period was to accomplish something similar to what had 
been accomplished in the field of intelligence: the development of a test, or battery of tests, that would 
reliably measure creative ability and predict creative potential. This would enable the selection of suitable 
candidates for appropriate training that would prepare the way for optimizing creative output within the 
society. In this, it is safe to say that this phase of creativity research was a failure. Creativity tests were 
created by several researchers, including Guilford, and many of them were enfolded into the Torrance 
Tests of Creative Function (Torrance & Scholastic Testing, 1974). However the measures developed in this 
phase of research displayed suspect psychometric characteristics, have had their validity challenged, and 
never did attain the kind of widespread acceptance that was enjoyed by popular measures of intelligence 
(Amabile, 1996, pp. 26-28). R.K. Sawyer (2012) notes that, in the early days of creativity research, 
creativity and intelligence were thought to be closely related, with many authors considering creativity to 
be an artifact of intelligence. More recent research has supported a “threshold theory”, which holds that 
creativity is associated with intelligence, up to a certain threshold value of intelligence; beyond which 
increases in intelligence are uncorrelated with increases in creativity. Moreover, declarative memory (for 
facts) and procedural memory (for how to do things) may have different — and sometimes opposing  — 
effects on the improvisational process (Moorman & Miner, 1998). 
There have also been a number of studies which use the tools of cognitive neuroscience to study creativity. 
The case has been made for using brain-imaging tools to explore creative processes in the brain (Abraham 
& Windmann, 2007). A number of studies have reported on correlates between mental events in creative 
processes and patterns of activation in the brain (Abraham et al., 2012; Takeuchi et al., 2011; Vandervert, 
Schimpf, & Liu, 2007), and addressed long-standing questions, such as the relationship between creativity 
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and certain forms of mental pathology (Abraham & Windmann, 2008). However, the findings of these 
studies must be accepted with caution. R. K. Sawyer (2011), in a critical review of the cognitive 
neuroscience research on creativity, pointed out several challenges associated with making inferences 
about real-world creativity based on brain-imaging studies. Perhaps the most serious of these is the fact 
that the neurological correlates of creative processes are simply that: correlates. There is no way — given 
the limits of current instrumentation — to demonstrate that the areas of increased activation (all neurons 
are constantly firing, so there is no part of the brain that “lights up” only during creativity) are directly 
involved in the creative process. This is an area of concern for making inferences from brain imaging 
studies in general. For example, judgments of Perceived Usefulness (PU) have been associated with 
activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Angelika Dimoka & Davis, 2008), but without a clear 
understanding of the function of the ACC, that tells us little about PU (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). 
Measurement challenges also mean that brain imaging studies must be conducted in highly controlled 
artificial environments (R. K. Sawyer, 2011, p. 141), creating concerns about the generalizability of their 
findings to real-world contexts. Overall, R. K. Sawyer (2011) concludes that cognitive neuroscience is a 
useful tool with a lot of promise for the study of creativity. However, its greatest contributions to date 
have tended to confirm the findings from previous experimental studies, rather than break new ground. 
In the early days of scientific creativity research, creativity was commonly seen as an individual trait 
(Guilford, 1950; Isaksen & Dorval, 1993). However, more recent work has made it clear that social and 
group processes and influences may also play a key role in the generation of creative responses. Hargadon 
and Bechky (2006) propose a view that moments of creative insight emerge from interactions between 
individuals, rather than being the outcome of purely individual cognition. Meisenzahl and Mokyr (2011) 
demonstrate that, in order to make the leap from an original idea to a usable creative product, a network 
of microinventors (or ‘tweakers’ as per ((Meisenzahl & Mokyr, 2011, p. 5)) is often necessary, to refine and 
complete the idea. R. K. Sawyer (2007) proposes that most significant innovations emerge from a 
collaborative web: a network of actors who share information about, and contribute to, the domain of the 
creative product. He demonstrates that successful creative products often succeed on the basis of being 
able to generate rich collaborative webs, rather than the brilliance of a single inventor. This led him to 
conclude “collaborative webs are more important than creative people” (R. K. Sawyer, 2007, p. 185).  
Uzzi and Spiro (2005) explored the effects of density of connection in social networks on creative 
production. They applied Milgram (1967)’s ‘Small World’ hypothesis to a highly creative group (the 
creators of all Broadway shows between 1945 and 1989) and found that network effects of social systems 
have an effect on creativity: increasing density of social networks lead to increasing levels of creativity. 
However the effect was parabolic: up to a point, increasing network densities have a positive effect on 
levels of creativity; beyond that point, this positive effect reverses: higher social network densities lead to 
decreasing levels of creativity. Uzzi & Spiro suggest that this effect is a result of the fact that members of 
groups can bring novel resources that are unfamiliar to other members of the group and can serve as 
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resources for the creative process within the group (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005, p. 47). However, as groups 
become more connected, the likelihood increases that the information that each member brings to the 
creative process will already be known to other members of the group, reducing the value of the 
contribution of each member. R. K. Sawyer (2007) proposes another mechanism by which group 
heterogeneity may stimulate creativity that may be undermined by excessive group cohesiveness. The 
process of communicating information between group members that have different backgrounds and 
conceptual systems may necessitate creating analogies which facilitate set-breaking and start the creative 
process. As groups become more closely connected, they develop shared understandings which reduce the 
need to deconstruct information in order to communicate. 
The goal of a standardized measure of creativity remains elusive, but the past several decades of research 
have led to the development of a significant corpus of knowledge about creativity. More recent work has 
both drawn on, and extended, this body of knowledge. Current evidence suggests that creativity is a 
“network” phenomenon, that emerges from a complex mix of factors such as access to resources, social 
network access, and environmental factors (R. K. Sawyer, 2007; A. Taylor & Greve, 2006; Uzzi & Spiro, 
2005). This makes it more unlikely that the original goal of a simple “I. Q.”-style standardized measure for 
creativity will ever be feasible.  
Rather than a single dominant paradigm for the study of creativity, there are now several different 
approaches that are used by different researchers in different domains. In the sub-sections of this section, 
I will look at different families of approaches that have been used to attempt to understand creativity and 
the creative process. I will look at Finke et al. (1992)’s cognitive approaches which have been used in 
experimental work to understand creative processes in the individual mind at the individual level. I will 
then look at the Csikszentmihalyi (1999a)’s system approach, which has been used to analyze creativity at 
the collective level. I will then look at one of the approaches that has attempted to achieve synthesis by 
analyzing creativity at both the individual and collective levels, while providing concepts for 
understanding how each level influences the other, that is, Amabile (1983)’s componential model.  
2.3.2 Definition 
Creative appropriation is distinguished by the quality of being creative. In order to address the nature of 
creative appropriation it is first necessary to speak to the nature of the concept of creativity. What is 
creativity? Is it the generation of anything new, or does a creative act need to meet certain criteria in order 
to be recognized as ‘creative’? How can creativity be recognized? How can it be measured? These 
questions outline the essence of the ‘criterion problem’ in creativity research (Amabile, 1982, 1996): 
without a clear and unambiguous definition of creativity, we run the risk of losing track of what we are 
studying. In order to explore creativity, we must first define it.  
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Sternberg and Lubart (1993) define creativity as the ability to produce work that is both novel and 
appropriate. It is worth mentioning that the definition of ‘work’ in this context is any creative output such 
as a physical object (a painting), an idea (a theory) or a script (a method of attaining a goal). Boden (1996) 
defines it as the ability to create ideas or combinations of ideas that are “new and interesting”. Kneller 
(1965) called creativity the discovery and expression of something that is both new to the creator and an 
achievement in its own right. The plethora of available definitions for creativity creates a fundamental 
problem for creativity researchers. As has been noted by (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999) in the context of IS 
research, in order to develop a cumulative body of knowledge about a phenomenon it is helpful to have a 
common definition of what it actually is. Creativity researchers have been repeatedly criticized for ‘not  
knowing what they are talking about’ (Amabile, 1996), and the proliferation of similar – but slightly 
different – definitions of creativity in different streams of research has lead to the development of 
independent bodies of literature with little integration.  
While there are many competing definitions of creativity in the scientific literature, they all tend to share 
the characteristics of novelty and appropriateness-for-purpose (Amabile, 1983). For example, (Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1993) define creativity as the ability to produce work that is both novel and appropriate. It is 
worth mentioning that the definition of ‘work’ in this context is any creative output such as a physical 
object (a painting), an idea (a theory) or a script (a method of attaining a goal). Boden (1996) defines it as 
the ability to create ideas or combinations of ideas that are “new and interesting”. (Kneller, 1965) called 
creativity the discovery and expression of something that is both new to the creator and an achievement in 
its own right. These definitions share two important characteristics: 
 Novelty: The output of the creative process must in some way be new. 
 Appropriateness: While it is often trivial to make or do something differently from its precursor, 
the label of ‘creative’ assumes that the outcome is appropriate for some purpose 
There is also another quality, which Boden (1996), for example, labels “surprising”. While most people do 
things on a regular basis which are novel to them, and those things may be appropriate for some purpose, 
not all novel things are creative. Creative products or actions have a particular quality which can be 
recognized, by persons familiar with the domain, as creative (Amabile, 1982). 
Stein (1953) defined creativity as “that process which results in a novel work that is accepted as tenable 
or useful or satisfying by a group at some point in time”. This definition incorporates a number of 
elements which can form a foundation for developing a conceptual definition of creativity. Some of the 
more important elements are: 
1. Creativity as a process, rather than an event – creativity is sometimes represented as a flash of 
insight, or a “Eureka!” moment. Though the phenomenon of moments of insight is an important 
part of many accounts of creative discovery, research indicates that creativity is more likely to be 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
43 
 
the result of sustained effort on the part of the creative actor (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 
1993). Even ‘spur of the moment’ ideas typically occur to those who have been prepared for them 
by considerable information-accumulation in the domain of the idea (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, 
1999b; Fisher & Amabile, 2009).  
2. Creativity can be recognized by its output – one of the perennial difficulties of the study of 
creativity is the isolation and identification of the phenomenon of interest (Amabile, 1996). 
Though significant work has been done on the cognitive and neurobiological processes involved in 
creativity (A. B. Kaufman, Kornilov, Bristol, Tan, & Grigorenko, 2010a; T. B. Ward, Smith, & 
Finke, 1999), it is not yet possible to recognize ‘creative’ processes in the brain by their 
physiological characteristics. Some theorists, such as Barron and Harrington (1981), argue that 
some definitions of creativity assume creativity itself to be valuable. As such, under those 
definitions, dreams, unexpressed thoughts or imaginativeness may be seen as creative. While this 
may be so, it remains a fact that the limitations of current methodologies mean that such creative 
acts must be expressed or demonstrated before they can be recognized and empirically studied – 
and the expression of them does meet the definition of ‘product’ as it is used in the literature. The 
most commonly accepted method for recognizing creative processes, therefore, is the 
retrospective observation that the process has produced a ‘work’ (Stein, 1953) that is creative. 
3. Creative output must be novel – there are numerous examples of creative discoveries or 
achievements being attained simultaneously by non-collaborating individuals (Merton, 1961). 
While for historical and legal purposes the order of those inventions or discoveries may be 
significant, each of them may provide some insight into the creative process. However, by 
definition, the domain of creativity is concerned with the generation of output that is new; if not 
to the world, at least to the individual (Boden, 1996). 
4. Creative output must meet some threshold of appropriateness and quality in order to qualify as 
creative – it is also a part of the definition of creativity that the creative product cannot simply be 
new – it must also meet some standard of quality in order to be accepted as truly creative 
5. The appropriateness and quality of creative output is assessed by a group – there is, at this time, 
no comprehensive set of objective criteria that can be applied to all products in all domains in 
order to assess them for creativity (Amabile, 1996). Although the qualities of ‘novelty’ and 
‘appropriateness’ are widely accepted in the literature, they are not sufficiently specific to be 
usefully applied to real-world products. In order to apply them, is necessary to develop a set of 
criteria for the product that defines the nature of novelty and appropriateness in its domain. That 
process, to be objectively done, depends on social consensus 
6. Creativity is contextually and temporally specific – when a group makes a determination about 
the novelty and appropriateness of a creative product, they do so using a set of values and criteria 
that are specific to their circumstances. For example, Csikszentmihalyi (1997) cites the example of 
van Gogh, who died alone and penniless, and whose work was considered by many of his 
contemporaries to be the valueless scribblings of a madman – and thus, by the criteria of 
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appropriateness and quality – uncreative. After his death, other individuals judged his work to be 
highly valuable and of great quality – thus rendering them ‘creative’. There are numerous other 
examples in history of products being rated as highly valuable in one context or era, but 
reevaluated as being of little value in another, or vice versa. 
Different creativity theorists have attempted to deal with the ‘criterion problem’ in different ways. 
Simonton (1989) used computerized content analysis of the output of musicians to test a theory of late-
lifespan creativity. He used an algorithmic approach to statistically analyze the final works of several 
composers for such qualities as melodic originality and melodic variation. While this method holds the 
promise of applying a truly objective test of creativity, it has two important caveats that limit its 
usefulness in general creativity research. The first is that many domains in which creativity can be 
exercised do not have dimensions which can be expressed mathematically without a corresponding loss of 
information which reduces the ability of a rater to evaluate the quality of the work. The second – and 
related – problem with Simonton (1989)’s method is that it is incapable of differentiating – without the 
intervention a human rater – between the truly original, and the simply bizarre (Amabile, 1996). In the 
case of Simonton’s work, his sample consisted of classical composers whose work had already been 
assessed as both novel and appropriate for the domain of classical music. However, there does not exist, 
at this time, an algorithmic approach that could have reliably made that assessment without human 
judgment.  
To further examine the conceptual issues that exist in the definition of creativity, I will consider examples 
from three different research streams. One stream approaches creativity by looking at the individual 
characteristics of, and cognitive processes in the minds of, individuals involved in creative tasks. Another 
stream looks at the interaction of different social structures within knowledge domains to explain the 
processes that result in creative production within those domains. The third looks at creativity as an 
outcome of the interaction of different components at both the individual and collective levels. 
2.3.2.1 An Individual Approach 
This approach holds that the properties of creative individuals are primarily responsible for their creative 
outputs. In this case, “properties” is being used broadly, to represent both the characteristics of 
individuals, and the actions of those individuals. Under the assumptions of this stream, differences in 
creative outputs are largely due to differences in the properties of the individuals generating those 
outputs.  
The element of the individual stream that focuses on individual differences is largely modeled on the work 
on intelligence which grew out of selection testing methods developed in World War II. The goal of this 
stream of research was largely to develop a suite of tests which — like IQ tests — easily identify the most 
“creative” members of a given group. The adoption of this perspective implies that creativity is best 
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explored by discovering the unique characteristics that enable people to generate creative output. This 
lead to the development of creativity tests (Torrance & Scholastic Testing, 1974), biographical inventories 
(C. W. Taylor & Ellison, 1968) and personality tests (Gough & Heilbrun, 1983), aimed at measuring 
creative ability. However, efforts to measure creativity using these tools have generated unsatisfactory 
results (Hocevar, Bachelor, Glover, Ronning, & Reynolds, 1989). They have failed to demonstrate 
concurrent and predictive validity as well as well as failed to show convergent validity when considered 
together (Amabile, 1996). Also, despite seeming to offer an objective view of innate creative ability, they 
do not avoid the view that analyzing creative products represents the best way to investigate creativity as 
performance on a creativity test is a ‘product’, and the scoring of many tests is, ultimately, subjective.  
Another type of research within the individual stream looks at cognitive activity, rather than individual 
characteristics. This type of research assumes that understating mental operations within the mind of an 
individual while they are carrying out creative tasks is the key to understanding creativity. This type of 
research is exemplified by the Geneplore model developed by (Finke et al., 1992; T. B. Ward et al., 1999).  
The Geneplore Model 
 
Figure 2: The Geneplore Model 
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This is a model of the actual cognitive process of developing a creative idea.  
In the first phase (the Generative phase) the creative actor generates mental models known as 
preinventive structures. The generative process involves 
 Generative processes include  
o Memory retrieval 
o Association 
o Mental synthesis 
o Mental transformation 
o Analogical transfer 
o Categorical reduction 
These structures generated have certain characteristics, such as 
 Novel patterns 
 Object forms 
 Mental blends 
 Category exemplars 
 Mental models 
 Verbal combinations 
Preinventive structures share qualities such as novelty, ambiguity and implicit meaningfulness.  
The second phase of the creative process as modeled by the Geneplore model is the Exploratory phase. In 
this phase the preinventive structures that were generated are evaluated using a set of processes such as  
 Attribute finding 
 Conceptual interpretation 
 Functional inference 
 Contextual shifting 
 Hypothesis testing 
 Limitation searching 
This process of preinventive exploration and interpretation feeds back into the generation of new and 
more appropriate preinventive structures. Both these processes are moderated by the constraints allowed 
on the end product of the creative process.  
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It will be noted that the processes listed are largely individual mental processes.  
Preinventive structures are internal representations and may be largely uninterpreted at the time they are 
constructed. Properties of preinventive that are exploited in creative search and exploration include:  
o Novelty 
o Ambiguity 
o Implicit meaningfulness 
o Emergence 
o Incongruity 
o Divergence 
People may engage in creative cognition that generates preinventive structures that exhibit these 
properties, or noncreative cognitions that do not. Cognitions that display more of these properties, or 
display them to a greater extent, are “more creative” than others. There is no explicit criterion which 
defines ‘creative’ v. noncreative cognitions. They lie on a continuum. For Finke et al. (1992), the 
‘creativeness’ of the cognition is separate from that of the idea produced – that is, they do not use a 
product definition. This is necessary in their model because a ‘creative’ idea could be arrived at 
resourcefully or accidentally. They therefore observe a process definition.  
They do, however, talk about evaluating creative products. Some of the important properties of creative 
products are 
 Originality 
 Practicality 
 Sensibility 
 Productivity 
 Flexibility 
 Inclusiveness 
 Insightfulness 
They state their goal as finding ways in which to help people think in ways which are more likely to result 
in creative outcomes, rather than attempting to predict creativity. They contrast this with work on 
problem-solving, which tends to focus on finding procedures or algorithms which guarantee a correct 
solution. 
Individual approaches to creativity have contributed significantly to understanding of the processes 
involved in individual ideation. However the definitions of creativity commonly applied in lab studies can 
appear to have little applicability to real-world contexts (Gopnik, 2013). They do, however, tell a part of 
the story. 
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2.3.2.2 A Systems Approach 
Csikszentmihalyi (1999b) defines creativity as a system phenomenon rather than an individual behavior. 
According to Csikszentmihalyi, creativity is a phenomenon that emerges through the interaction of three 
elements: 
 A domain – a symbol system containing information that comprises a corpus of knowledge about 
an area of endeavor. The domain contains both information that represents the current state of 
the art within the area, and rules for the evaluation of possible contributions to the domain. The 
domain is part of the culture: the body of knowledge within the wider society. 
 An individual – a human actor that learns the information contained in the domain, then extends 
or alters that information by proposing or making changes to the contents of the domain – 
thereby generating a novel product within the confines of the domain. The individual’s capability 
and motivation to generate novelty is determined, in part, by her personal background. 
 A field – a social system that uses the rules of the domain to evaluate products generated by the 
individual for appropriateness for inclusion in the domain. If the field approves the product, then 
the product becomes part of the domain and becomes – according to the definition – ‘creative’. 
The field is a social community within the society.  
In this model creativity is a complex outcome – a syndrome (Runco, 2004) – that occurs through the 
interaction of each of these elements. It can be represented as: 
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Csikszentmihalyi’s Systems Model 
 
Figure 3: The Systems Model 
 
This definition incorporates the myriad social, political and interpersonal factors and processes that may 
be involved in the recognition and attribution of creativity, apart from the appropriateness and novelty of 
the product. A vivid illustration of the effect of these processes can be seen in the story of Douglas Prasher 
(Benderly, 2009). In 2008, the Nobel Prize for Chemistry was awarded to three scientists for the 
development of Green Fluorescent Protein, a marker molecule that is used to let biochemists ‘watch’ 
intracellular processes. The molecule in question was actually developed by Prasher, who gave the gene 
sequence to the Nobel laureates. However, he subsequently lost his job as a scientist and was working as a 
bus driver at the time that the Nobel committee was considering the list of potential awardees. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, since Nobel laureates are expected to “have distinguished careers,” and “continue to have 
distinguished careers” (Benderly, 2009); Prasher’s work was not recognized by the committee1. Schaffer 
(1994) and Stigler (1980) have noted that the phenomenon of historical attribution of creativity is often 
fraught with error and misattribution. This implies that ‘creative’ outcomes must be seen as the result of a 
complex set of processes, rather than a purely individual achievement.  
A creative act, using this definition, is one that is generated by the person, who, having internalized the 
symbols and rules of the domain, changes them, and then has that act accepted for addition to the domain 
                                                             
1 Prasher was given credit for the discovery by his former colleagues and today is a working scientist. 
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by the field. This definition stands in contrast to the definition used by scientists looking at cognitive 
process models of creativity (A. B. Kaufman, Kornilov, Bristol, Tan, & Grigorenko, 2010b), who tend to 
use performance on generative tasks or tests of creativity such as the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
(TTCT) (Torrance & Scholastic Testing, 1974) to measure the concept. In part, this reflects the 
methodological constraints of such research. It is not practically possible to take continuous fMRI 
measurements of a scholar or scientist engaged in an innovative project that may take decades to come to 
completion. However, the deeper question is whether creativity is more correctly seen as a social system 
phenomenon – an outcome that results from the interaction of various social structures and the 
individual; or a cognitive act – a particular expression of a cognitive process which is influenced to some 
degree by external factors.  
A closer look at the experimental research, however, reveals that even this class of creativity exploration 
cannot be seen as completely independent of the dynamics of domain and field. If creativity is to be 
measured by observing brain activity during a creative act, the determination must be made that that act 
is creative. If this is done using a test of creative thinking such as the TTCT, why do we assume that what 
the test measures is actually creativity? The answer is that the theory behind the tests was developed by a 
researcher (person) whose published results were subjected to peer review (field). When the theoretical 
foundation of the tests was accepted, the results of the tests became accepted as measures of the concept 
(domain) of creativity. Even at the level of the individual participant in the study: a participant’s (person) 
performance on the test is evaluated by experts in reading the test results (field) and ranked using the 
rules of TTCT test (domain).  
2.3.2.3 Componential Approach 
Amabile (Amabile, 1982, 1983, 1988, 1996; Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Amabile & 
Gryskiewicz, 1987; Fisher & Amabile, 2009; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010) proposed an influential model 
of creativity based on components. Those components are abstract, and they explain creativity at both the 
individual and collective (organizational) levels.  
The overarching finding of Amabile’s research is that creativity, at all levels, results from the intersection 
of three components: Resources, Techniques, and Motivation (Amabile, 1988).  
 
  
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
51 
 
Amabile’s Componential Model 
 
Figure 4: The Componential Model 
Adapted from (Amabile, 1988) 
 
Figure 4.1 outlines the central elements of the componential theory of creativity, as described in (Amabile, 
1988). It is a comprehensive theoretical model that seeks to explain both the intrapersonal and 
environmental influences on creativity. According to Amabile, there are three general components to 
creativity at both the individual and organizational levels. However, at each of those levels, the specific 
components differ. The three components, and their specific instantiations at the individual and 
organizational levels, are:  
 Resources, which represent the raw material required for creativity in a domain.  
o At the individual level, resources are represented by the component: Domain-Relevant 
Skills such as factual knowledge about the domain, necessary technical skills and special 
talents that are relevant to the domain 
o At the organizational level, resources are represented by the component Resources in the 
Task Domain: everything that the organization has available to aid work in the task 
domain. This can include providing adequate resources for employees, and creating 
conditions in which employees will have realistic amounts of workload pressure 
 Techniques, which represent the skills necessary to perform creative work in a domain.  
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o At the individual level, techniques are represented by Creativity-Relevant Skills, 
including a cognitive style that is conducive to creativity, the ability to apply heuristics for 
generating ideas, and a work style conducive to creativity 
o At the organizational level, techniques are represented by Management Practices; such 
practices as allowing an appropriate balance between freedom and constraint, setting 
employee tasks which are well matched to levels of ability – thereby giving the right level 
of challenge to employees, encouraging employee creativity, and creating a work 
environment conducive to creativity 
 Motivation, which represents the drive to innovate which is the catalyst for creativity.  
o At the individual level, motivation is represented by Task Motivation: attitude toward the 
task, and perception of one’s own motivation to perform the task – whether one perceives 
oneself to be motivated to innovate by external reward, or an inner positive affective 
response to the task 
o At the organizational level, motivation is represented by Motivation to Innovate: the 
basic motivation of the organization to innovate as matter of policy, including supporting 
creative action by employees, and removing impediments to creativity such as 
inappropriate reward structures  
Of the three components to creativity, the most important is motivation (Amabile, 1988, 1996). For an 
individual, one’s level of resources will determine if one is able to be creative in a domain, one’s available 
techniques how one is able to be creative, but one’s level of motivation whether or not one makes the 
attempt. Amabile (1996) emphasizes the importance of the social environment in determining one’s level 
of motivation. Therefore, elements of the components of creativity at both the individual and 
organizational levels will be used to generate a set of a priori constructs for this study (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
These initial constructs are listed in Appendix 1.  
2.3.2.4 Creative Appropriation: A Definition 
One of the perennial difficulties encountered in field studies of creativity is the criterion problem – the 
difficulties encountered in defining whether an idea or product is ‘creative’ (Amabile, 1996, p. 19). No 
standardized method for assessing creativity across all domains currently exists, and individuals are 
notoriously unreliable judges of the  creativity of their own ideas (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Further, 
different individuals may have different assessments of creativity in a domain, depending on their level of 
understanding of the criteria for assessing creativity in a particular domain. The most common definitions 
of creativity in current use draw on a consensual assessment of the creative product by independent, 
appropriate observers. The most commonly-cited technique for applying this consensual judgment is the 
Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT), commonly attributed to Amabile (1982), (see (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010)), although R.K. Sawyer (2012, p. 41) attributes it to Csikszentmihalyi (1965). It proposes 
that since it has proven impractical to develop domain-general objective criteria for rating creative 
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products, creativity should be recognized based on consensus judgment: an idea or product is creative to 
the extent that appropriate observers agree it is creative. The CAT has been widely used in studies in a 
number of domains (S. Lee, Lee, & Youn, 2005), and will be adopted here. 
In light of the preceding, the operational definition of creative appropriation which will be applied in this 
study is 
An instance of individual-level creative appropriation is an incident in which a user 
appropriates a system in novel way to perform a task, where such method of 
appropriation is independently judged creative by appropriate observers. 
Amabile acknowledges the role of communication as a critical part of the ‘Response Validation’ step at the 
end of the creative process (Amabile, 1996, p. 114). However, more recent work has made it clear that in 
real-world creativity, social and group processes and influences may also play a key role in the generation 
of creative responses at multiple stages (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006; R. K. Sawyer, 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 
2005). Also, a creative idea about how to use a system may originate with a user who does not have the 
technical skills to complete its implementation without collaboration. This implies that in order to 
understand the creative appropriation process, it will be necessary to understand collective-level 
processes in the accounts of appropriation studied. While it is beyond the scope of the thesis to fully 
explain these collective-level processes that are external to the individual, it is impossible to explain 
individual level appropriation without including collective level processes in the account. This 
requirement will be addressed during research design. 
Miles and Huberman (1999) state that an initial conceptual framework can form an important initial 
component of a study by identifying the main things to be studied, outlining key factors, constructs and 
variables, and identifying the presumed relationships among them. As such, the definition from Amabile 
(1982) will form a foundation for the work, and will not only assist in identifying the object of the study, 
but provide a framework for its measurement. 
2.3.3 Creativity Research in IS 
Both creativity and IT appropriation have received attention in the prior IS literature. IT appropriation, 
with various labels such as “system use” and “system utilization”, has received substantial attention; 
creativity, much less. However, authors addressing each concept have suggested that universally 
applicable ‘covering law’ type theories which address every real-world instance of the phenomenon are 
not a realistic goal for field research in either domain. Burton-Jones and Straub (2006) state that system 
use cannot have a single conceptualization across contexts and that diverse conceptualizations are 
desirable, a conclusion echoed by McLean et al. (2011). For creativity, Dreyfus (2009) argues that 
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unconstrained research on creativity in general appears to be too unfocused to useful, and it is generally 
accepted that individual creative ability tends to be domain specific (S. B. Kaufman, 2009).  
Couger et al. (1993), calling creativity a “neglected area” in IS research, and the current level of such 
research in the field “embryonic”, conducted six case studies in which creativity techniques were brought 
to bear on problems within an IS framework in organizations. The case studies demonstrated the 
beneficial effects of formal techniques for fostering creativity on IS operations. Couger et al. (1993) also 
report several other instances of success using such formal creativity techniques in successfully in other IS 
contexts. These findings suggest that a greater emphasis on creativity may be of benefit to the IS function 
in organizations. However, Couger (1990) also may suggest some issues which may be salient in 
attempting to evaluate the IS-related creativity literature and assess the current role of the concept of 
creativity in the IS field. These are a somewhat narrowly defined scope for the application of creativity 
within IS, and a need for a broader conceptualization of creativity in order to recognize more levers of 
creativity within the IS function. One notable feature of the case studies reported in (Couger et al., 1993) is 
that all the listed examples of the exercise of creativity occur in the problem-solving context. In fact, 
several of the techniques listed: abstraction, interrogatories (who-what-when-where-why and how), use of 
analogy/metaphor, etc. are commonly accepted as problem-solving techniques. Creativity is often 
recognized as an aspect of problem-solving, but most definitions of creativity conceptualize it more 
broadly. Creativity studies in IS, however, have tended to look at creativity in limited contexts. 
Seidel et al. (2010) conducted a comprehensive review of research on creativity in the IS discipline over 
the period 1977-2009. They performed a search for the term ‘creativity’ in the title, abstract and keywords 
of all the articles in the eight leading journals in the field of Information Systems. This search retrieved 27 
relevant hits out of 5,459 articles, or 0.49% (Seidel et al., 2010). An analysis of the topics covered in the 
papers found in this review follows: 
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Table 1: Articles on Creativity in IS Literature 
Article Main Topic Summary System 
Development 
Creativity 
Support 
Systems 
(Aaen, 2008) Facilitating creativity and innovation in software 
development.  
   
(Avital & Te'eni, 
2009) 
How IT-based systems can be designed to facilitate 
generative capacity in users  
   
(Cooper, 2000) IT-enabled organizational reengineering strategies   
(Couger et al., 
1993) 
Techniques for improving creativity that can be applied in 
the IS field 
  
(Datta, 2007) A model for the use of agents as mediators in knowledge 
management 
  
(Dean, Hender, 
Rodgers, & 
Santanen, 2006) 
Developing scales for evaluating the quality of creative 
ideas 
  
(Dennis, Daniels Jr, 
Hayes, & 
Nunamaker Jr, 
1993) 
Case study of an application of a BPR modeling tool    
(Easton, George, 
Nunamaker Jr, & 
Pendergast, 1990) 
Comparison of the performance of two Electronic 
Meeting System (EMS) software packages 
   
(Elam & Mead, 
1990) 
Exploration on the effect of a DSS designed to enhance 
creativity on creative output 
   
(Garfield, Taylor, 
Dennis, & 
Satzinger, 2001) 
Evaluation of how groupware-based creativity techniques 
influence types of ideas generated  
   
(Hender, Dean, 
Rodgers, & 
Nunamaker Jr, 
2002) 
Evaluation of how groupware-based creativity techniques 
influence types of ideas generated 
   
(H. Lee & Choi, 
2003) 
Testing the effect of knowledge management strategies   
(Lee-Partridge, 
Teo, & Lim, 2000) 
Case study of the use of IT in the Port of Singapore 
Authority 
  
(Lilley, 1992) Exploration of the effects of EIS on executive creativity     
(Massetti, 1996) Test of the effectiveness of two popular Creativity Support 
Systems 
   
(Massetti, 1998) A response to a methodological critique of the Massetti 
(1996) study 
   
(Nagasundaram & 
Bostrom, 1994) 
A framework for evaluating the idea generation 
performance of Group Support Systems (GSS) 
   
(Nunamaker Jr, 
Applegate, & 
Konsynski, 1987) 
Exploration of the effect of GDSS on group creativity     
(Ocker, Hiltz, 
Turoff, & 
A comparison of the effects of asynchronous computer 
conferencing vs. face-to-face communication on the 
    
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Fjermestad, 1995) creativity of software development teams 
(Ocker, Fjermestad, 
Hiltz, & Johnson, 
1998) 
A comparison of the effects of four different modes of 
communication on the creativity of software development 
teams 
    
(Santanen, Briggs, 
& Vreede, 2004) 
A test of the efficacy of the cognitive network model 
(CNM) on creativity output 
  
(Satzinger, 
Garfield, & 
Nagasundaram, 
1999) 
An exploration of the effect of group memory as encoded 
in a Group Support System influences the type of ideas 
generated by the group 
   
(Schenk, Vitalari, & 
Davis, 1998) 
An analysis of the differences in how novice and expert 
system analysts approach requirements analysis 
   
(Shepherd, Briggs, 
Reinig, Yen, & 
Nunamaker Jr, 
1995) 
A study of electronic brainstorming (EBS) tools and 
techniques 
   
(Tiwana & McLean, 
2003) 
A study of how integration of individually held expertise 
leads to team creativity in information systems 
development (ISD) teams 
   
(E. S. Weber, 1986) A paper on how decision support system design ought to 
facilitate creativity 
   
(Wierenga & van 
Bruggen, 1998) 
A methodological critique of (Massetti, 1996)   
 
Of the 27 studies found by Seidel et al. (2010), six concerned issues related to software or system 
development, and creativity on the part of systems designers and implementers. Fifteen looked at user 
creativity while using creativity-facilitation systems, such as Decision Support Systems (DSS) or Creativity 
Support Systems (CSS). Overall, 19 of the 27 studies found by Seidel et al. could be classified as addressing 
one or both of those problem domains (two of the studies could be classified as addressing both domains). 
If we eliminate the study which was a methodological critique of another study (Wierenga & van Bruggen, 
1998), and the paper which was a response to that critique (Massetti, 1998), we find that Seidel et al. 
(2010) found only six studies related to creativity in the IS field which did not address system 
development or CSS use over a period of 32 years.  
It is possible that the findings of Seidel et al. (2010) may, in part, reflect IS researchers’ studying 
creativity-related topics using terms other than “creat---”. Wehner et al. (1991) found in a review of 
dissertations in economics, sociology, psychology, education, business, history, history of science, political 
science and other fields, that scholars in different disciplines tended to use different terms – and focus on 
different aspects – of the same basic phenomenon of creativity. The IS discipline makes extensive use of 
concepts and theories from various reference disciplines (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003), and it is possible that 
that the chosen methodology may have resulted in some under sampling of the IS-related creativity 
literature. It is also true that IS-related research may be published in non-IS journals (see (Te'eni, 1989)). 
Yet there is more evidence that the topic of creativity is under-researched in IS. Couger et al. (1993) found 
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only six papers in IS which discussed creativity at any length, compared to over 4,000 publications in 
engineering, science, education, architecture and psychology.  
From their review of the creativity literature in IS, Seidel et al. (2010) made several findings and 
recommendations for the future of creativity research within the field. Among their findings, they found 
that the Person and Press perspectives from the (Rhodes, 1961) model were underrepresented in IS 
studies. This is notable in light of the fact that these perspectives have been shown to be highly relevant in 
determining creative output (Amabile, 1983; Csikszentmihalyi, 1999a). They also found that few studies 
looked at the organizational level of analysis and no studies considered the market level of analysis. They 
found that, according to Orlikowski and Iacono (2001)’s conceptualization of the five ‘views’ of the IT 
artifact, only the tool, ensemble and nominal views appeared in the research. The proxy and 
computational views were not represented. They also found a prevalence of variance theories, reflecting a 
possible reductionist approach to the complex phenomenon of creativity.  
Among their recommendations for future research on creativity in IS were a richer conceptualization of 
the IT artifact, rather than the ‘black box’ conceptualization common in the studies they review. They also 
recommend an exploration of the impact of perceptual, cognitive, and affective responses to the IT artifact 
on individual creative processes. They also call for more qualitative in-depth research into IS and 
creativity that can lead to a deeper understanding of the socio-technical contexts within which IS interacts 
with and enables creative processes. 
From the limited number of studies available, some general trends in the treatment of creativity in IS can 
be gleaned. First, creativity studies in IS tend to focus on the exercise of creativity by system designers 
(e.g. (Aaen, 2008)), the performance and effectiveness of creativity-support systems (e.g. (Garfield, 
2008)) or both (e.g., (Ocker et al., 1995)). The role of creativity in the interaction of users with systems 
outside of the contexts in which facilitating user ideation is an explicit goal of the interaction seems 
under-researched. Second, the Rhodes (1961) 4-Ps classification model is possibly the most widely-cited 
theoretical model of creativity in IS studies, though some of the classes are underutilized. Thirdly, the 
conceptualization of creativity in IS research does not seem to have been explored in as great depth as 
examinations of creativity in other fields. For example, creativity in IS articles is usually portrayed as a 
desirable goal. However, creativity on the part of users can have negative implications in terms of IT risk 
(Westerman & Hunter, 2007), and the ethical side of creativity is an area of active debate in other fields 
(Cropley, Cropley, & Kaufman, 2010).  
2.3.4 Implications for IS 
Creativity is a vibrant area of research in many fields, with research interest focusing both on its nature 
and structure as well as its antecedents and effects. However in IS, relatively few studies have addressed 
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the topic of creativity, despite repeated calls for more research on subject, and despite the fact that 
creative action is an element of many other topics which have received more attention in the literature.   
The question being addressed in this section is, why should this gap in the literature exist? There have 
been repeated calls for more focus on creativity, and the IS discipline seems ideally positioned to do the 
kind of integrative multidisciplinary research that has been called for in the area of creativity research. 
Why has this call not been heeded?  
Based on the review of literature conducted in the previous sections, I will suggest one possible 
explanation.  
As I noted in the earlier section of this review that focused on system utilization, there are two major 
streams of research that can be distinguished in the IS discipline. There is a nomothetic stream that is 
dominated by extensive studies that utilize statistical modeling, in which use is often represented using 
standardized constructs which are efficient at representing general measures of utilization as a quantity, 
but reductionist in terms of the information they capture about the nature of that utilization. There is also 
an idiographic stream that is efficient about capturing rich information about the nature of utilization 
within a specific context, but weak in terms of generalizability across contexts, making it difficult to 
accumulate knowledge across studies and contexts (Moore & Benbasat, 1991). This means that creativity 
— particularly user creativity in the sense of developing new and unexpected ways to apply systems — is 
not well suited to being represented by either of the two major representational schemes that are 
dominant in IS. Viewing utilization as a quantity does not capture details of how and why users change 
their use patterns. However, as noted by Moore and Benbasat (1991), without common constructs and 
measures it is difficult to explore the common elements of user behaviors that may be involved in 
developing new appropriation patterns. End user creativity appears to fall into a gap in the 
representational strategies provided by the major paradigms of IS. 
The way in which people use IT systems in the modern world is rapidly changing. The methods provided 
by the dominant approaches have been very efficient at enabling IS researchers to accumulate knowledge 
about systems which essentially automate recurring processes, while providing a way to investigate 
“interesting cases” through intensive, contextually-specific means. With the changing nature of IT and the 
fact that it is now becoming more and more integral to the way people live and work, these metaphors are 
becoming insufficient. It is becoming necessary to represent users’ detailed interactions with IT, as well as 
the cognitive and social processes that are intrinsic to those actions. This is what is driving the current 
surge of interest in new ways to represent IT interactions, and it likely what explains why, despite the 
apparent value of the topic, little work on creativity has occurred in the IS discipline up to this point.  
In the next section, I will review an area within the behavioral sciences which will provide key lenses that 
will be used in this study to understand human creativity. 
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2.4 Cognitive Science 
Cognitive science has been defined as “the interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence, embracing 
philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology” (Thagard, 
2012). It is, as the definition suggests, an exceptionally broad field, with a domain of content spanning the 
biological mechanics of brain operations, through to the philosophical issues of the nature of mind, 
thought, and being.  
Philosophical enquiry into the nature of mind has a history that extends back to the Greek philosophers 
and beyond. Metacognition — thinking about thinking — is a perennial topic in both the scholarly and 
popular literature. However, the field of cognitive science is understood as having its origins in the mid-
to-late 1950s. While the field is very broad, it has at its center a set of common metaphors and 
conceptualizations. Conceptually, cognitive scientists approach the mind as a machine (Boden, 2006). 
Specifically, they use a computational metaphor to represent the operations of the mind at an abstract 
level. The implications of the breadth of cognitive science are sometimes not appreciated. For example, 
cognitive science is sometimes criticized for neglecting the role of emotion in thinking (see Thagard, 
2012). However, cognitive science actually deals with all mental processes: cognition, motivation, 
emotion, social interaction, and behavior, which is, in effect, the actuation of the motor system by 
cognitive processes (Boden, 2006, p. 10). Furthermore, the basic metaphors of cognitive science have 
been extended to describe the actions of collective groups, as well as the tools and processes which extend 
behavioral and cognitive processes (Hutchins, 1995).  
In this section, I will introduce the history, philosophy and basic metaphors of cognitive science. I will 
then look more closely at two areas of cognitive science which will be used as important theoretical lenses 
in this project. One of these is dual-process theory from cognitive psychology. The other is distributed 
cognition. I will then briefly discuss the existing corpus of work within IS which uses an approach based 
on cognitive science. 
2.4.1 Background 
The philosophical foundations of cognitive science rest on an analogical association between human 
information processing  and the information processing done by computers (Holyoak, Gentner, & 
Kokinov, 2001). Just as human thought can be used as a model for the design of machines capable of 
abstract information processing (see Newell & Simon, 1956), so the operations of the human mind can be 
modeled as a computational process. At the most abstract level, the “central hypothesis” of cognitive 
science is that cognition is best understood as an information processing activity which consists of 
representations — mental structures in which information is held — and transformations — 
computational activities which operate on those structures (M. Perry, 2003; Thagard, 2012). The nature 
of these representations and transformations becomes more contentious as the level of abstraction is 
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reduced. However, there is broad agreement that representations reflect information structures that 
represent objects in the external world (Leslie, 1987), and are analogous to computer data structures. 
Representations are also hypothesized to contain structures such as logical propositions, rules, concepts, 
images, and analogies. The transformations that those representations undergo are analogous to 
computational algorithms, and include such procedures as search, matching, retrieval, rotation, and 
deduction (Thagard, 2012). The computational metaphor has acknowledged limits (Carello, Turvey, 
Kugler, & Shaw, 1984), but it forms a useful “common language” for the field of cognitive science as a 
whole, and enables the different research traditions and sub-disciplines to communicate and integrate 
knowledge. 
The discipline of cognitive science arose out of a series of developments in the behavioral sciences that 
date back to the 1950s. Both Simon (1980) and Newell and Simon (1972) date the changes as beginning 
around 1956, and state that it was marked by the publication of several seminal papers such as (G. A. 
Miller, 1956), and (Newell & Simon, 1956). The study of the workings of the mind had been a focus of 
inquiry by philosophers going back to Plato and Aristotle (Thagard, 2012), but in 1879 Wilhelm Wundt 
founded the first institute for experimental psychology at Leipzig (A. Kim, 2014), and the study of the 
mind became more systematic. However, the study of mind soon came to be dominated, along with the 
discipline of psychology, by a philosophy that was influential during much of the 20th century: 
behaviorism. Behaviorism was a doctrine concerning the appropriate scope of scientific enquiry into 
human activity that influenced both what kinds of questions were deemed appropriate for scientists, and 
what kinds of methods could be used to conduct those enquiries. According to Graham (2010), the 
principal tenets of behaviorism were: 
1. Psychology is the science of behavior, and not the science of mind 
2. Behavior can be fully explained without making reference to mental events or psychological 
processes. All sources of behavior are external to the individual, and therefore part of the 
environment; not internal, and part of the mind  
3. If mental terms or concepts are deployed in theory development in psychology, they should be 
eliminated and replaced by behavioral terms or translated into behavioral concepts 
The correspondence of the tenets of behaviorism with the themes of empiricism and positivism is not a 
coincidence. The historical roots of behaviorism lie in the influence of the British empiricist philosophers 
such as Locke and Hume, and the logical positivists (Graham, 2010). Classical associationism, an idea 
associated with Locke, Hume, and other empiricist philosophers, became the intellectual foundation of 
several of the most influential programs of research during the early to mid-twentieth century, such as 
that on classical conditioning (Pavlov, 1927). Classical associationism proposed that mental states 
followed the assumptions of classical process theories: that is, that each mental state is associated with its 
successor states. It was also assumed that mental states that resulted in behaviors were the result of 
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external stimuli, and that internal, unobservable states, were not required in order to explain behavior. 
That implies that all behavior can be explained by understanding the environmental precursors of those 
behaviors, rendering non-observable mental states irrelevant to scientific investigation (Skinner, 1953, p. 
35). At the same time, any and all research into non-observable mental structures and events was 
suppressed and marginalized.  
The demise of behaviorism as a dominant philosophy in the behavioral sciences began sometime around 
the mid-1950s. The publications cited by Newell and Simon (1972) were a reflection of a growing 
perspective among scientists that models were needed to understand how the mind internally represented 
and processed information, and that the emerging discipline of computer science offered useful 
metaphors and templates for developing that understanding. The breakdown in confidence among 
scientists in the behaviorist paradigm led to the rise of a number of critics of behaviorist assumptions in 
the sciences, some of whom drew a direct line between the increasing rejection of empiricist principles 
and the untenability of behaviorist assumptions (Nelson, 1969). One of the most effective of these critics 
was Noam Chomsky (Boden, 2006; Thagard, 2012). Many regard Chomsky’s devastating review of 
(Skinner, 1957) — in which he, in essence, demonstrated that the associationist principles of behaviorism 
could not account for human language acquisition (Chomsky, 1959) — as being a, if not the, critical event 
in the demise of behaviorism, and the rise of cognitive science. Behaviorist assumptions did not simply die 
out as fade away, as the scientific community lost interest in them. Some prominent behaviorists 
remained committed to their beliefs, but they were increasingly marginalized by the new paradigm 
(Skinner, 1977, 1987). As behaviorism was rejected, the new perspective, which posited that mental states 
exist and must be part of scientific inquiry into behavior, came to be known as cognitivism (Carruthers, 
2009b; Introna & Ilharco, 2004; Lancy, 2010; Leslie, 1987; Searle, 1990).  
The successor to behavioral psychology — and one of the most important fields in cognitive science — is 
cognitive psychology: the sub-discipline of psychology that is devoted to the study of internal mental 
states. Another foundation of cognitive psychology is conceptual work on the information processing 
structures of the mind, as in the work of Bechtel (2008), and the work on mental metarepresentational 
structures by Leslie (1987). Some of the most important work done using the computational metaphor in 
the early days of the cognitivist paradigm was in the field of visual perception (Marr & Poggio, 1979). 
Recently, there has been an increasing integration of the work in cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience, a development that Thagard (2012) suggests supports the mind-brain identity theory. This 
theory holds that the human “mind” is emergent from entirely physical processes: that is, that states and 
processes of the mind are identical to states and processes within the brain (Smart, 2012), rejecting the 
notion that some mental processes have non-physical, psychical elements which are not reducible to 
physical brain processes. Thagard (2012) also notes that some philosophers object to the mind-brain 
theory on the grounds that minds are embodied and extend into the world. He argues that the idea of 
embodied minds is not inconsistent with mind-brain identity because minds have modes of operation that 
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enable them to interact with the world. This idea will be further explored in the section below on 
distributed cognition.  
Before exploring how the mind interacts with the world, however, I will begin by looking at an emerging 
literature that explains how the human reasoning system operates that has been gaining influence both in 
cognitive psychology, and in fields as diverse as economics, marketing, ethics, and geology — dual-process 
theory. 
2.4.2 Dual-Process Theory 
Dual-Process theory is the name that has been given to the study of the structure of the human reasoning 
system in cognitive psychology (Evans, 2003). The term has previously been used more loosely, for 
example, in research on stimulus response plasticity (see Groves & Thompson, 1970), but it is now widely 
accepted as the term describing the sub-field in psychology that looks at the structure of the mind. The 
label “dual-process” is something of a misnomer: different theories regarding the structure of mind posit 
different numbers of basic structures (see (Osman, 2004) for an overview), and there are numerous 
questions about the existence and nature of those structures that are still the subject of ongoing research 
(Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010). In light of this, the label “dual-process” should be taken more as an 
indication of what the mind is not — a single system — than what it is (Gilbert, 1999). 
The notion that the human mind is composed of two parallel but distinct modes of information processing 
has a long history. The idea of two modes of processing was discussed by Freud (1916, 1953), James 
(1896), Piaget (1959), and others. More recent work in cognitive psychology has proposed several possible 
models of the structure of the human reasoning system based on aggregated empirical evidence. Several 
possible models of the reasoning system have been proposed (Osman, 2004), but the currently dominant 
view in the literature is a two-system model (Evans, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2000). Current work on the 
structure of the reasoning system is often cited as having its genesis in (Sloman, 1996), however cognitive 
scientists — not only in cognitive psychology, but in other sub-fields — have long posited that the mind is 
composed of two systems with distinct characteristics. Stanovich (2011) lists 30 different terms for the 
two systems that have been used by different researchers in work going back over 30 years. It has been 
proposed that these two systems can be distinguished by their computational and activational 
characteristics, with one acting associatively and reflexively and the other being rule-based, logical 
hierarchical and causal-mechanical (Sloman, 1996). 
The evidence for the existence of two reasoning systems is varied, and some of it is open to multiple 
interpretations (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Osman, 2004, p. 1006). However, the conclusion that the mind 
is composed of many subsystems that those systems form part of a superordinate dual-system model has 
recurred in conceptualizations in many disciplines (Stanovich, 2011). A comprehensive  review of this 
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evidence is beyond the scope of this section (see (Evans, 2008) for a more thorough review), but I will 
present some examples to contextualize the following discussion.  
The Müller-Lyer illusion (Judd, 1905) is a well-known tool from Gestalt theory. An example of it is 
presented below: 
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The Müller-Lyer Illusion 
 
Figure 5: The Müller-Lyer Illusion 
 
Readers familiar with this this illusion will know that the two parallel horizontal lines are exactly the same 
length. It is possible to test this by measuring the two lines (they are, in fact, exactly the same length). 
However, when observing the diagram, the knowledge that the two lines are of equal length does not 
eliminate the perception that they are of different lengths. This implies that knowing and perceiving are 
the work of two separate systems, which are capable of generating different responses to the same 
stimulus under some conditions. Sloman (1996, p. 11) presented this as partial evidence for the existence 
of two systems, and called conditions under which they generate different stimulus responses Criterion S 
conditions. Further evidence that visual perception involves more than one system can be seen in studies 
of subitizing - the ability to quantify small numbers of objects (typically 3-4) by a recognition-based 
process that is distinct from counting (E. L. Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949). For example, 
Dehaene and Cohen (1994) conducted a study of brain-lesioned patients who were suffering from 
simultanagnosia, a condition which impairs counting ability. They showed evidence not only that different 
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systems for subtilizing and counting exist, but also that they are separate: that is, that one can be 
damaged without impairing the other.  
Perhaps the most relevant evidence for dual-process theory that intersects with the study of creativity is 
the evidence that two processes exist for reasoning. There is extensive evidence that this is the case 
(Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). One of the best known is the 
famous “Linda” problem, posed in a set of experiments in Tversky and Kahneman (1983a). Participants 
were given the following description: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983a, p. 297) 
Participants were asked to rank eight statements about Linda in order of probability. Two of the 
statements they were asked to rank were: 
A. Linda is a bank teller 
B. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement 
It does not take a great deal of statistical training to realize that it is impossible for statement B to have a 
higher probability than statement A (statement B is a conjunction, and cannot have a higher probability 
than one of its constituents). However, in experiments, more than 80% of the time statement B was 
ranked higher than statement A. Of course, the profile of Linda is written to resemble that of someone 
who would be active in the feminist movement. Tversky and Kahneman (1983a) used “Linda” — and other 
similarly-constructed fictitious profiles — to test the judgment of both statistically sophisticated and 
unsophisticated participants. They found that both sophisticated and unsophisticated participants tended 
to make the conjunction error. Further, they found that sophisticated participants were just as likely to 
make the error as unsophisticated. Medical students also made conjunction errors when presented with 
artificial medical problems that matched the structure of the Linda problem. This strongly suggests that 
there is a separate system for making decisions that does not rely on logical inference, but on recognition 
of similarity to preexisting schemas. It also implies that even highly intelligent individuals can make 
decisions based on this system, even when it leads to illogical results. This finding is consistent with other 
research that has found that cognitive biases are not attenuated by cognitive sophistication (West, 
Meserve, & Stanovich, 2012). There seem to be different systems for knowing and intuiting, and the 
intuiting system appears able to drive decision-making even in circumstances where it conflicts with the 
knowing system.  
Stanovich and West (2000) proposed a label for the two processing modes: System 1 and System 2. 
System 1 is a non-conscious automatic system, while System 2 is a conscious volitional system. System 1 is 
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primarily characterized by its automaticity: it is reflexively triggered whenever salient stimuli are 
encountered and it cannot be turned off. System 2 is rule-based, conscious, and under volitional control. 
System 2 is primarily characterized by a tendency for effort minimization, or laziness (Kahneman, 2011). 
The two systems overlap to some extent in terms of the range of stimuli to which they can each generate a 
response, however the activational characteristics of the two systems influence which response prevails: 
i.e., which one results in observable behavior. If a stimulus is encountered that triggers System 1, its 
response must be actively suppressed if a response generated by System 2 is to prevail over that response. 
In the following sections I will introduce the main features of System 1 and System 2 in basic detail. I 
acknowledge here that there are different views on the precise structure of the reasoning system (see 
(Osman, 2004) and (Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010)). In this section I will attempt to provide 
information based on the most widely accepted current conceptualizations.  
2.4.2.1 System 1 Characteristics 
System 1 is an automatic, autonomous, non-conscious system that forms part of the reasoning mechanism 
in the mind. It is not available to conscious awareness and is not under volitional control. System 1 is 
autonomous: it generates a response to any stimulus that it can be triggered by every time that stimulus is 
presented, and cannot be turned off. System 1 processes execute rapidly, with little effort, and do not 
require access to working memory. They are highly modular and can execute in parallel without 
interfering with each other, or with System 2 processes; this gives System 1 a high capacity for stimulus 
response. It is fundamentally associative in nature and can be trained by experiences, such as statistical 
and temporal regularities and patterns in the environment. The performance of System 1 processes 
exhibit very little variability across individuals (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Morewedge & 
Kahneman, 2010; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2011).  
System 1 processes are responsible for a number of basic brain functions, including the preprocessing of 
sensory stimuli, physical coordination, and memory operations such as encoding and fetching data to and 
from long term memory. System 1 processes are capable of learning and taking over the performance of 
quite complex physical and mental operations that are originally implemented by System 2, when those 
operations are implicitly encoded into System 1 through repetition. Such tasks become part of the Tightly 
Compiled Learned Information (TCLI) knowledge base of System 1; which is distinct from the Encoded 
kNowledge Base (ENB) which is “built in” to the system (Stanovich, 2011). It is also responsible for some 
routine elements of cognitive activity such as the direction of attention and determining the salience of 
different stimuli in complex environments. System 1 processes also include emotional reactions and value 
judgments. It is capable of performing simple mathematical computations (such as visual quantity 
comparison and subitizing) but is generally not capable of multivariate calculation or complex explicit 
information processing. 
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System 1 is generally thought to be composed of elements of the cognitive system that are evolutionarily 
old and shared with other animals. It is non-heritable and independent of general intelligence, and tends 
to perform at the same level across individuals. In debates on rationality, it has been hypothesized that 
System 1 processes tend to optimize for evolutionary fitness (Stanovich, 2011).  
2.4.2.2 System 2 Characteristics 
System 2 is a conscious, reflective system that forms part of the reasoning mechanism of the mind. System 
2 is self-aware and capable of metacognition; it is the part of the mind that persons are referring to when 
they use the referential term “I”. It is capable of opting to respond — or not to respond — to a stimulus. 
System 2 processes are relatively slow (compared to System 1 processes) and computationally expensive. 
Measurable physiological arousal accompanies the activation of System 2 processes. They tend to execute 
serially, and interfere with each other — that is, performance on any System 2 task falls rapidly if it is 
forced to be performed in parallel with another System 2 task. The capacity of System 2 processes are 
limited by working memory capacity and the efficiency of the system can be affected by the use of 
strategies to complete cognitive tasks. System 2 spends much of its time in a low-power state of activation 
that taps only a fraction of its capacity, and forcing it to perform tasks which engage its full capacity is 
highly aversive and leads to rapid fatigue (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Morewedge & 
Kahneman, 2010; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2011). 
System 2 is fundamentally rule-based in its operations (Anderson, 1993; Satzinger et al., 1999, p. 148), 
and it is capable of learning through explicit training and information processing. One of the most 
important functions of System 2 is to inhibit System 1; that is, to suppress System 1 responses to stimuli in 
conditions when the implicit responses of System 1 are less than optimal strategies for responding to a 
stimulus. When this is done, System 2 must both suppress the System 1 response and generate a response 
to the stimulus. This process is computationally expensive and aversive for System 2. System 2 processes 
are necessary for complex mental operations such as multivariate calculation, abstract thought, and fully 
understanding language. System 1 processes are capable of responding to such stimuli, but lack the 
capacity for complex information processing that are part of System 2.  
System 2 is generally thought to be composed of elements of the cognitive system that are evolutionarily 
recent and uniquely human. They are heritable, and their performance varies significantly between 
individuals. The individual differences in System 2 performance are related to scores on tests of 
intelligence, but the meaning of intelligence test scores remains an area of active debate (Stanovich, 
2009). In debates on rationality, it has been hypothesized that System 2 processes tend to optimize for 
individual goal-seeking (Stanovich, 2011).  
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2.4.2.3 The Two Systems 
According to Sloman (2002), the relationship between the two systems of reasoning is interactive and 
complementary. The degree to which each is active in any given problem situation may vary with the 
individual, dependent on variables such as skill, knowledge, intelligence and experience. Neither system 
has any exclusive problem domain (though it must be noted that this is only true for the reasoning 
functions of System 1 and System 2. Some physical functions, such as visual perception, appear to have 
dedicated automatic processes assigned to certain tasks (Treisman & Gelade, 1980)).  
One implication of the two systems can be realized by contemplating the essential nature of each. System 
1 is above all automatic: generating a response to every stimulus it is presented with that it is capable of 
responding to. System 2 is above all an effort minimizer. It avoids responding to any stimulus that it can. 
It stands to reason that the emergent behavior of the two systems will be highly driven by System 1. 
However the conscious mind, the “I”, unable to perceive System 1, confabulates explanations for behavior 
that omit the role of System 1 (Carruthers, 2009a). The implications of this are profound: most definitions 
of “consciousness” attribute qualities such as awareness and volitional control to that state. If most 
human behavior is largely controlled by a non-conscious, automatic system of reasoning, of which we 
cannot be aware, then to what extent can humans truly be said to be conscious beings (Evans, 2009)? 
2.4.2.4 Discussion 
The concept of System 1 and System 2 have been described as useful for introducing the two-systems 
hypothesis of brain function (commonly dual-process theory (Osman, 2004)) to non-specialist audiences 
(Kahneman, 2011; V. A. Thompson, 2009). However, the reification of System 1 and System 2 has been 
criticized by some cognitive scientists. Describing two reasoning systems has been incorrectly construed 
to imply that they map to two different biological systems within the brain, something that dual-process 
theory does not actually support. Also, the conceptualization of two separate systems tends to obscure one 
of the defining characteristics of System 1: its modularity and capacity for parallel processing. There is 
increasing evidence that System 1 and System 2 may consist, not only of different processes, but of 
different types of processes, so that conceptualizing them as “two systems” may raise issues of construct 
validity when interpreting experimental data.  
Altogether the current model of dual-process theory — like the most current work in many fields — should 
be seen as a work-in-progress rather than a definitive view of the structure of the reasoning system. The 
most respected writers on dual-process theory are unanimous in asserting that further work will enhance 
our understanding of a number of issues in regard to understanding how the mind processes information 
(Evans, 2008; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Stanovich, 2011). Indeed, the current consensus among 
some of the leading authors in the field seems to be trending toward a three-process model: one that 
acknowledges the multiplicity of types of processes that constitute System 1, but collates them on the basis 
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of automaticity and lack of volitional control (Evans, 2008); and bifurcates System 2 into a computational 
engine and an executive function (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich, 2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2013).   
For these and other reasons, Stanovich - who created the nomenclature of System 1 and 2 (Stanovich, 
1999), no longer uses the terms. He has adopted the terminology of Type 1 and Type 2 processes 
(Stanovich, 2011). However the terms System 1 and System 2 have come to be widely accepted and 
commonly used in the literature (Evans, 2008; V. A. Thompson, 2009), and can be viewed as structural 
mechanisms which are emergent from lower-level processes (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Therefore, in 
this thesis, the concepts of System 1 and System 2 will be used for the two primary reasoning systems in 
the mind.  
2.4.3 Distributed Cognition 
The fundamental assumption of cognitive science is that human cognition is, essentially, a computational 
activity. The basic metaphors used to describe this activity is that of cognitive representations, mental 
models of things in the external world; and transformations, computational processes which manipulate 
representations. Hutchins (1995) demonstrated that these computational processes are not necessarily 
contained within the minds of single individuals. He showed — in an ethnographic investigation of the 
process of navigation aboard a U.S. Navy ship — that the computationally intensive process of navigating 
the ship was broken into a variety of computationally non-intensive sub-tasks that were distributed across 
a range of individuals, objects (tools), and coordinating procedures. This meant that while the overall task 
of ‘navigation’ was being done, there was no single individual or tool which could be accurately said to be 
‘navigating’. Although no single individual or tool was ‘doing’ the navigation task in its entirety, the task 
was being done by the entire system through the coordinated activity of each node. Hutchins’ landmark 
study is commonly recognized as marking the beginning of the field of Distributed Cognition (DC).   
DC draws its theoretical and analytical foundations from cognitive science (M. J. Perry & Macredie, 
2005). It proposes that distributed cognitive systems form representations of the world, in much the same 
way that individual minds do. It focuses on the media which encode those representations, the 
transformation of those representations, and the actors who coordinate those transformations. The major 
difference between DC and many other disciplines within cognitive science is that it holds, and focuses 
attention on, the fact that representations may be held in both neuronal and non-neuronal media (e.g., 
paper, spreadsheets, physical models, etc.) and may be shared across individuals. The fact that 
representations may be shared and transformed across a number of individuals working in coordination 
makes DC a powerful tool for analyzing collective activities. It does so by focusing on the information 
content of events in the world, and abstracting those events into information-processing events (M. J. 
Perry & Macredie, 2005, p. 1). 
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Much of the work in DC has focused on relatively structured tasks within well-ordered groups. For 
example, DC has been used as a lens to understand collaboration in software development teams (Flor & 
Hutchins, 1992), and in airliner cockpits (Hutchins & Klausen, 1996). However DC has also been 
proposed as a tool for understanding work in organizations (Perry 2003; Perry and Macredie 2005). In 
addition, Thagard (2010) has looked at the fact that distinguished commentators have attributed the 
behavior of collective organizations such as banks and governments to human qualities such as beliefs, 
desires and emotions. He concludes that such attributions of cognitions to collective groups in economics 
constitute metaphorical pointers to a set of underlying psychological and social mechanisms which 
explain emergent collective behaviors; mechanisms which work at multiple levels (Thagard, 2010, pp. 
271-273). While he rejects the notion that banks and governments have actual mental representations 
such as exist in human minds (because human representations in minds require the neuronal architecture 
of brains to exist); he holds that such metaphors are useful pointers to the underlying complex 
mechanisms.  
In similar fashion, the fact that DC extends metaphors from cognitive science to real-world teams – and 
even organizations – does not mean that it proposes that groups and organizations are analogues to the 
human mind. DC systems have different architectures from mental systems, and will behave differently. 
However, individual and collective cognitive systems have to perform the same basic tasks: processing 
information, and solving problems (Perry and Macredie 2005); in performing those tasks, both 
individuals and collectives have to compete, collaborate, make decisions and evaluate outcomes. It makes 
sense that, at an appropriate level of abstraction, some underlying mechanisms which operate in one type 
of system may operate in the other. This notion is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Walsham 
(1995b), citing Archer (1988), speaks of the philosophical position of “internal realism”, which holds that 
individual perceptions of reality are an intersubjective product of the “shared human cognitive apparatus” 
(Walsham, 1995b, p. 75). The idea that the “mind” extends beyond the brain into the physical world has 
also been explored by (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Dror & Harnad, 2008). 
Distributed cognition will therefore be utilized as a lens for this thesis. 
2.4.4 Cognitive Research in IS 
An assessment of the state of cognitive research in IS is made simpler by a recent series of articles in the 
Journal of the Association of Information Systems. Davern, Shaft, and Te'eni (2012a) conducted a topical 
review of the history cognitive research in IS. They focused on three areas: software development, 
decision support, and human computer interaction. Browne and Parsons (2012) published a critique of 
their article, proposing further streams of cognitive research in IS that they felt were insufficiently covered 
by (Davern et al., 2012a), with a focus on systems analysis and design. Davern, Shaft, and Te'eni (2012b) 
then replied to Browne and Parsons (2012). The resulting exchange provides a broad, though not 
completely comprehensive (Davern et al., 2012b, p. 1013) overview of the history and current state of 
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cognitive research in the IS discipline. While a restatement of the substance of the articles would be 
redundant, a few general comments can be made.  
Cognitive research is an established theoretical perspective within the IS discipline. The history of 
cognitive research in different domains of IS goes back to the 1970s, investigating a slate of topics that 
have evolved over time. Early studies made limited use of psychological theories, which were in an early 
stage of development at the time, but theories of cognition have been increasingly integrated into IS 
research as theory development in broader cognitive science has advanced. One theme that emerges from 
Davern et al. (2012a) is the critical role of theory development in the advancement of work in each 
research stream that they reviewed. For each stream they note how critical the development of theoretical 
frameworks were to the advancement of work in IS within the field. They also find the concept of 
Affordances, from the work of Gibson (1979) to be one of the fundamental concepts necessary to examine 
how users interact with IT.  
For the future, Davern et al. (2012a) note that future research in IS will require a shift away from 
exclusively experimental methods of exploring cognition; to the incorporation of field work, such as the 
cognitive anthropological work of Hutchins and Lintern (1995). They see distributed cognition as the 
foundation for cognitive IS research that can investigate rich, contextual environments and develop useful 
real-world theories (Davern et al., 2012a, p. 302). However, a critical theoretical lacuna emerges over the 
course of the (Browne & Parsons, 2012; Davern et al., 2012a, 2012b) discourse: a surprising lack of 
mention of dual process theories of cognition. While both Davern et al. (2012a) and Browne and Parsons 
(2012) look at areas which have been explained in terms of dual process theories, it does not appear that 
dual process perspectives have become a significant part of the discourse in what Davern et al. (2012a) 
call Cognitive IS. Indeed, while Davern et al. (2012a) state their goal as primarily one of historical review, 
Browne and Parsons (2012) delve deeply into the heuristics and biases literature, raising issues that have 
been a focus of explanatory models based on dual-process theories (Kahneman, 2011). In fact, though 
dual-process theories of cognition have seldom been mentioned in the IS literature (see Avgerou, 2013; 
Zhang, 2013), a number of emerging topics in the literature would benefit greatly from the application of 
existing dual-process perspectives (Guinea & Markus, 2009; S. S. Kim, Malhotra, & Narasimhan, 2005; 
Polites & Karahanna, 2013; E. V. Wilson et al., 2010). Dual-process accounts of the structure of the 
reasoning system have been brought into a number of behavioral fields with promising results (see Haidt, 
2001, 2007), and promises to contribute greatly to an understanding of how people relate to information 
systems. 
In this thesis, I will address a number of the issues that can be gleaned from a review of the prior research 
in cognition in IS. I will apply and extend existing theory, both from the reference disciplines and from IS. 
As recommended by Davern et al. (2012a, p. 302), this thesis will incorporate field investigations of rich 
real-world contexts using distributed cognition as a lens. In so doing, I will draw on the work of Gibson 
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(1979) and propose another method for applying the affordance concept and insights from cognitive 
science in an IS investigation of how users use IT. Perhaps most significantly, however, I will demonstrate 
how dual-process theory can be harnessed to make sense of user interactions with IT systems and explain 
real-world behaviors. 
2.4.5 Discussion 
Despite its wide influence, the computer metaphor for the working of the mind has not been universally 
accepted. A number of challenges have been raised showing that the phenomenon of “mind” cannot be 
fully explained using the design principles of physical machines (Penrose, 1999), and challenging the 
fundamental concept of  mind-as-computer. However, many of those challenges are, in fact, challenges to 
“Strong AI”. Strong AI, at its simplest, can be viewed as the assumption that there is some algorithm — 
not currently known — which, if implemented on a universal Turing machine, would result in intelligence 
and consciousness. An assumption that is often linked with Strong AI is that the brain is a universal 
Turing machine, and the mind is an algorithm that runs on the brain (see Searle, 1990). Strong AI is 
“strong” in contrast to “Weak AI”, which simply holds that some operations of the mind can represented 
algorithmically. Although many critics of cognitivism have based their criticism on undermining the 
foundations of Strong AI, few, if any, working cognitive scientists actually hold this view. Strong AI can be 
regarded as a useful thought experiment for asking certain questions about the nature of mind, but in 
practice it seems to serve more often as a straw man for critics of cognitive science (see Searle, 1990).  
While there may be problems mapping conceptual mental representations to physical events and 
processes within the neuronal structures of the brain, representations themselves are abstract. For 
example, the number two can be represented in many ways, including  
Arabic base 10 2 
Binary 10 
Roman II 
A rule  1+1 
Another rule 3-1 
Each of the above are representations of the exact same thing — the number two. The specific mechanics 
of how it is represented do not change its essential nature. In order to make use of the mind-computer 
analogy it is not necessary to believe that the mind operates exactly like a computer, or that a suitably-
written computer program can duplicate a mind. 
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Marr (1982) proposed a series of levels at which one can describe a complex information-processing 
system. They are: 
 Computational Theory — The most abstract level. Describe what the system does, and the 
logic of the strategy it uses to do them 
 Representation and Algorithm — Describe the representation for the inputs and outputs to 
the system. Describe the algorithm that is used to transform input to output 
 Hardware Implementation — Describe how the system is physically implemented. Describe 
how the representation and algorithm are implemented on a physical level (whether biological or 
mechanical) 
Marr was addressing a specific problem in visual perception: attempts to understand how “seeing” worked 
in humans, and could be simulated by machines, were hampered by the lack of an understanding of the 
top-level workings of the visual system: the computational theory level. Without a theoretical 
understanding of the process of seeing and perceiving, the substantial (then-) existing corpus of research 
on the basic mechanics of perception did not add up to a useful explanation of the phenomenon. Marr 
points out that understanding the computational theory level of the system is a critical first step to 
understanding, since without a solid understanding at that level, one is unlikely to be able to get useful 
information from observations at the second and third levels (Marr, 1982, p. 27).  
Marr (1982)’s principle can be abstracted to the study of creativity. There is a great deal of existing 
research on creativity which looks at aspects of the phenomenon, but, with some significant exceptions 
(Amabile, 1996; Dunbar, 1997; R.K. Sawyer, 2012), much of the creativity research has focused on a single 
level, making it difficult to apply findings from such research at other levels. That is, is difficult to apply 
findings from brain-imaging studies (Abraham, 2007; Abraham & Windmann, 2008) and lab 
experiments (Silvia, Winterstein, Willse, Barona, & Cram, 2008; T. B. Ward et al., 1999) in field settings, 
for example, without an overarching theory at what Marr (1982) described as the computational theory 
level. The strategy of using conceptual levels of organization to integrate knowledge at different levels has 
been widely used in cognitive science (Bechtel, 2008), and provides useful clues about how this problem 
may be approached in studying creative appropriation.  
2.5 Discussion 
There have been a number of engagements in IS research with topics which are conceptually similar to 
creative appropriation. These include Reinvention (B. Johnson & Rice, 1984; Nevo & Nevo, 2011; Rice & 
Rogers, 1980), Innovation (Aaen, 2008; R. Agarwal & Prasad, 1998; Tuomi, 2002), and Adaptation 
(Beaudry & Pinsonneault, 2005; Elie-Dit-Cosaque & Straub, 2010; Heshan Sun, 2012). Stage theories of 
IT implementation and use have posited stages of exploratory use patterns which result in the discovery of 
novel ways of using systems (Jasperson et al., 2005). In a sense, it can be said that all of these phenomena 
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have user creativity at their core: they all study phenomena that emerge when users implement novel and 
useful ways of using systems. As such, it can be said that user creativity is a common thread running 
through several research domains in IS. There can be some overlap in the definitions of these phenomena 
and some definitions of creativity. For example, when using a product definition of creativity (Rhodes, 
1961), there is considerable overlap with many definitions of innovation – a process that results in the 
creation of a novel and useful product. However, innovation research tends to focus on the output of the 
process, though the output must be preceded by ideation. Creativity research tends to focus on the 
generation of creative ideas that are inputs to the process, though the “creativity” of the ideas is validated 
by the qualities of the output. Creativity research has its own body of literature, and its own research 
traditions. However, that body of knowledge is seldom applied in IS, although the basic phenomenon that 
it describes – the generation and implementation of creative ideas – is highly relevant to number of active 
research domains in the field. It is now possible to propose a possible explanation for this anomaly.  
 The discipline of information systems emerged from the behavioral and computer sciences sometime 
between the late 1950s and early 1960s. It apparently emerged just in time to miss the major debates that 
were beginning to reshape the sciences in general, and the behavioral sciences in particular. For decades 
the behavioral sciences had been dominated by the Behaviorist paradigm, and from that paradigm IS 
inherited a number of assumptions about the “human” and “social” side of an information system: 
associationist, determinist, empiricist assumptions that shaped its approach to studying behavior. This 
continued to shape the way IS conducted research for two decades.  
In the 1980s, IS underwent a transformation in its metatheoretical assumptions. It came to accept 
interpretivist ideas about the subjective nature of knowledge, the stochastic nature of measurement and 
the fact that the world was complex in ways that classical positivist models could not explain. It accepted 
ideas about interpretivism, and its major journals published guidance on how to conduct interpretive 
research. Then something strange happened: very little. Yes, there was some interpretive work done, but 
overall, reviews of the literature have found that “positivist” research, particularly survey-based 
quantitative work, continued to dominate the research output of the field, and the proportions of 
interpretive work, as well as intensive idiographic work as a whole, did grow, but not as much as it might 
have been expected. A number of possible reasons for this have been proposed, including the structural 
advantages of positivist research for early-career academics (W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Walsham, 
1995a). These factors did explain some of what was going on, but there was something else as well. 
In the late 1980s, just as the shift in metatheoretical assumptions was taking place in IS, the most 
successful positivist model that the field had ever produced emerged. The Technology Acceptance Model 
— parsimonious, reliable, and widely-accepted — became a shot in the arm for researchers in IS who 
practiced questionnaire-based survey research. The result was a strange deadlock. The IS discipline 
became open and multi-metatheoretical in principle, but its research camps remained highly segregated 
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in practice, and its methods were much less transformed by the change than one might expect. In 
particular, the ways in which the use of IT was conceptualized and measured in IS research remained 
largely unchanged. This lasted another two decades. The IS discipline now seems to be in the midst of a 
new transformation, one in which these representational strategies are being challenged, and potential 
new strategies are being proposed. Much like the transformation in metatheory, it seems likely that this 
will result, not in a single dominant model, but in a kind of pluralism.  
And what of creativity? Feldman and Pentland (2003) adapted Latour (1986)’s concept of there being 
ostensive and performative dimensions to routines, showing that routines have both recognizable general 
and particular individual aspects. Creativity is very similar, in that it has an ostensive dimension (a 
creative incident is recognizable as “creative”), but also a performative dimension (each creative act is 
novel). This is exactly the kind of phenomenon that one would expect to be understudied under a 
condition where there are general constructs to iterate repetitive actions (as in the automation of clerical 
tasks) and specific representations of idiographic phenomena, but little way of representing phenomena 
with both an ostensive and a performative aspect. I propose that this, as much as any other factor, 
explains the remarkable lack of creativity research in IS over the past 40 years.  
The lag in creativity research in IS would therefore be related to the fact that IS did not take part in the 
cognitivist revolution in the behavioral sciences that occurred in the mid-1950s to early 1960s, as 
indicated by the surge of important papers in that tradition during that period (G. A. Miller, 1956; Newell 
& Simon, 1956; Simon, 1956). The view that the empiricist and associationist assumptions of behaviorism 
inhibit the study of creativity is supported by the fact that the formal study of creativity took off during the 
decade of the sixties — just as cognitivism was supplanting behaviorism (Google, 2014). One of the results 
of that revolution was the emergence of the discipline of cognitive science, and with it, the sub-discipline 
of cognitive psychology. It is possible that IS should look to cognitive science, which, after all, was born 
out of the same challenge that IS faces many years after it began: to adjust its perspectives and 
conceptualizations to meet the challenges of a move away from purely positivist assumptions. For 
example, dual-process theory has been used in other fields to look at creativity, for example, by Dreyfus 
(2009).  
In this thesis, I will utilize the basic assumptions of cognitive science and lenses drawn from cognitive 
psychology. I will use them to develop a theoretical model of the mechanisms involved in the creative 
appropriation of IT by users. In doing so, I will apply neither positivist nor interpretive assumptions, but 
rather, critical realist. I will introduce critical realism in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3.  Theoretical Framing 
3.1 Philosophy and Methods 
In the previous chapter I introduced the debate between positivism and interpretivism that has had a 
significant impact on the way that theorizing is done in IS over the past several decades. I also showed 
how this debate has been a reflection of wider philosophical debates in both IS reference disciplines and 
the philosophy of science as a whole. However, the wider debates have not been limited to the 
positivist/interpretivist positions. Around the late 1950s to the 1960s, at about the same time that 
cognitivism was supplanting behaviorism as the dominant paradigm in the behavioral sciences, a number 
of philosophers were offering new metatheoretical frameworks. These included Bunge, Giddens, Bhaskar, 
and Harre (Bhaskar’s dissertation advisor). While their philosophies were distinct, several of them shared 
a number of features, such as the notion of structure (though, as I will discuss, the meaning of the concept 
varied), a stratified model of reality, and the notion of explanation via mechanism.  
One of these philosophers — Anthony Giddens — has had a substantial impact on theorizing in IS 
(Giddens, 1984). This began largely through the work of DeSanctis and Poole (1994), but has expanded to 
a significant body of work based on Giddens’ structuration theory (see (Jones & Karsten, 2008; Poole & 
DeSanctis, 2004)), on which I will comment further in a later section. However, in this thesis, I will be 
applying another metatheoretical model which has been gaining a great deal of attention in IS research: 
the Critical Realist model, proposed by Bhaskar (1975). In this chapter, I will briefly discuss the 
philosophical issues that have led to this choice of metatheoretical framing. I will then introduce critical 
realism and outline the assumptions and methodological principles that will be followed in this study. I 
will then briefly review some existing critical realist research in IS, and discuss how the critical realist 
model may influence future work in the discipline.  
3.2 Causality and Explanation 
The goal of this thesis is to explain user creativity. Arguments about explanation often actually arguments 
about causality: that is, to explain something is often equivalent to describing its cause (Gregor, 2006, p. 
617). Both explanation and causality are deceptively simple concepts, which require careful examination 
and definition in a study which seeks to develop a theoretical explanation of a real-world phenomenon. 
Critical realist researchers frequently claim that the approach they advocate generates stronger 
explanations for observed phenomena than other approaches (Mingers, 2004c; Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
Before evaluating this claim, some basic questions need to be considered.  
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The first, and perhaps most fundamental, of these is how I will describe cause. Assume that a change of 
state (Markus & Robey, 1988, p. 590) occurs in the world. We will call this state change an event, and 
assign it the label B. B is observed to occur, and it is suspected that another event A caused B, how should 
the relationship between A and B be conceptualized, expressed and tested?  
Outside of purely symbolic domains such as mathematics, causal statements can typically not be proved in 
an absolute sense, and so must be proposed as conjectural statements and supported from evidence until 
they inspire a degree of confidence. That means that causal explanations are theories. There are generally 
accepted to be two forms of theory: variance theory and process theory (Mohr, 1982). Variance theory 
reflects Humean assumptions about causal relations (Mingers, 2003a). In a variance theory in which A 
causes B, there would be a system of variables which represent A and B. A statement (or theory) 
explaining how A causes B would state the values of the variables representing A that will force B to occur. 
These values of A will, ceteris paribus, always cause B, and a variance theory is not required to state a 
mechanism by which A exercises this power on B, and A is assumed to be both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the occurrence of B (Abbott, 1990, 1992; Markus & Robey, 1988).  
In a process theory in which A causes B, a temporally ordered series of necessary events by which the 
direct consequences of A lead through a sequence of actions to B is described. The sequence of events 
contains necessary conditions for A to lead to B: if the causal chain includes event X, then A will not lead 
to B if X is not present. However the role of random occurrences in events means that the necessary 
conditions do not guarantee that event A will invariably lead to event B. The process theory therefore 
states what is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain B. Critically, a process theory will not only state that 
A causes B, but will also indicate how A leads to B, and why (Markus & Robey, 1988).  
Because of the requirement to observe intervening states, rather than simply conjunctions between 
antecedents and outcomes, process theories are more resource-intensive to create than variance theories 
(Abbott, 1992). Also, the assumptions of variance theory allow researchers to use powerful mathematical 
techniques to discover relationships between antecedent and consequent variables (Abbott, 1990, p. 376). 
This is reflected in the fact that studies employing variance approaches have consistently outnumbered 
process-type studies (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991), though recent reviews show the number of process-
type studies increasing (W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004).  
Another kind of theoretical explanation which has been used extensively in the physical and biological 
sciences, and which is now gaining popularity in the social sciences, is explanation via mechanism 
(Bechtel, 2005; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). A mechanism-based 
explanation of how A causes B will show a series steps by which the direct consequences of A lead to B 
through the actions of intervening structures. These are the kinds of explanations that critical realist 
theories develop. Critical realist (hereafter, CR) explanations are based around the description of 
mechanisms: explanations that “detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the 
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outcome to be explained was brought about” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, p. 50). Mechanism-based 
theories based on critical realist assumptions have been described as a kind of explanatory process theory 
(Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007, p. 835), however, this is somewhat misleading. CR theories do not 
necessarily make the claim to necessary temporal ordering of event chains that is integral to classical 
process theory. The focus is not on identifying the sequence of events that is critical to an outcome, but 
rather identifying the mechanisms that are causally relevant to the outcome; and showing how the 
antecedent conditions to the event enabled those mechanisms to have the observed effect. Avgerou (2013) 
has noted that mechanisms can be seen as processes in their own right, which can concatenate into larger 
process theories. However CR explanations are based on a set of ontological assumptions and 
epistemological principles that make them distinct from both variance and narrative positivist 
explanations (Abbott, 1992).  
3.3 Critical Realism 
Critical realism (CR) was popularized by Bhaskar (1975). It posits that there is a difference between the 
ontological world (external reality, which exists independent of the individual) and the epistemological 
world (human knowledge structures which represent the ontological world within the human mind). 
More specifically, it takes a position which is: 
 Ontologically realist: It assumes that external reality exists independent of its social construction. 
There are natural structures, mechanisms and actualities which have properties that are, and are 
not socially constructed or subjective in nature. 
 Epistemologically relativist: It assumes that our knowledge of the ontological world is limited, 
subjective and socially constructed. This means that the representations of reality within the mind 
are inherently partial and imperfect, but that these partial and imperfect understandings do 
approximate, with varying degrees of specificity and faithfulness, some actual external 
phenomenon. 
In taking this view of the world and its representation in the mind, critical realism attempts to avoid the 
epistemic fallacy – in which statements about being are interpreted as statements about knowledge, and 
the ontic fallacy – in which the cognitive and social processes involved in knowledge creation are ignored, 
leading to the interpretation of knowledge structures as unfiltered objective reality (Irwin, 1997). H. K. 
Klein (2004), citing (Mingers, 2001), has labeled CR “a type of ontology with secondary epistemological 
consequences.” Klein’s description was meant as part of a critique of the CR position, but it provides an 
effective way of thinking about how CR is different from the more commonly-applied metatheoretical 
positions of positivism and interpretivism. Critical realism emerged from critiques of both those 
philosophies (see Danermark et al., 2002), and its development is commonly attributed to the work of 
(Bhaskar, 1975, 2008). However, a number of philosophers have contributed to critical realism (see 
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(Danermark et al., 2002; Dobson, 2001; Dobson, Myles, & Jackson, 2007; Irwin, 1997; Mingers, 2004b, 
2004c; Mingers, Mutch, & Willcocks, 2011; Sayer, 1992, 2000)), and it continues to be developed today 
(K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011). The key assumption of CR is that reality is stratified, and that observations, 
transient events, and underlying structures, exist at different strata of reality.  
Walsham (1995a, p. 381) notes that when metatheoretical positions become well established — to the 
point of being “tacit knowledge” in a field — they no longer have to be discussed or defended by 
researchers applying them. For example, positivist researchers conducting surveys do not have to defend 
the acceptability of survey methodology. CR has not yet reached that point, despite strong signs of 
acceptance within the field. I will therefore discuss CR, and defend the decision to use it as the underlying 
philosophical position of this project. I will begin by looking at the basic ontological and epistemological 
assumptions on which critical realism is based. I will then look at how these assumptions shape the 
methodological principles followed in critical realist research. In this effort, I will be guided by the 
methodological principles laid out by Wynn and Williams (2012), who synthesized a number of 
methodological models into a set of recommended principles for researchers applying critical realism in 
IS case studies. I will then look at critical realist research specifically from an IS context. 
3.3.1 Fundamental Assumptions  
The ontological assumptions of critical realism are summarized by Wynn and Williams (2012) as follows: 
 Independent Reality – The entities which make up the world have existence which is independent 
of human perceptions of those entities. Specifically, the entities in the world exist in an 
intransitive domain, and human perceptions of those entities – while having real existence – 
occupy a parallel transitive domain and cannot be equated to the intransitive entities which they 
represent 
 Stratified Ontology – Reality is stratified into the nested domains of the Real, Actual and 
Empirical. This contrasts with the ‘flat’ ontologies which conceive of the world as a set of 
conjunctions of cause and effect; as well as some of the constructivist ontologies which conceive of 
the world as a social construction.  
 Emergence – The properties of entities that exist in reality are independent from, and cannot be 
reduced to, the properties of their component parts (Easton, 2010). This means, for example, that 
the properties of groups cannot be understood simply by understanding the properties of 
members of those groups. Entities have their own existence and properties. It also means that 
phenomena which occur at a certain level must be analyzed at that level. For example, memory 
emerges from the biological level, but it has emergent properties as a thing unto itself that cannot 
be explained solely at that level (Mutch, 2010, p. 509). 
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 Open Systems Perspective – Reality is an open system which cannot be controlled directly by 
humans. This means that the outcomes of the operation of the various causal mechanisms within 
the domain of the Real can never be fully predicted, since other mechanisms which also have 
causal effects may also affect those outcomes. In some circumstances, such as in experiments in 
the natural and physical sciences, systems may be artificially ‘closed’ in order to observe predicted 
effects. However, in social systems, such closure is unlikely to ever occur (Tsoukas, 1989). This 
implies that the critical realist, instead of trying to make predictions of outcomes based on causal 
factors, will rather focus on explaining observed outcomes through description of the causal 
mechanisms which generated them. 
3.3.2 Ontology 
Critical realism takes an ontologically realist position that accepts the existence of an intransitive reality 
that is independent of human observers. It thus rejects the position of some of the stronger forms of 
interpretivism that objective reality does not exist and that the world is a social construction of human 
actors (Rorty & Williams, 1980). However, it at the same time takes an epistemologically relativist 
position: it rejects the view that objective reality can be fully and unproblematically measured - and thus 
understood - by humans. For critical realists, human knowledge is fallible and transitive. The key to 
understanding these two positions is one of the foundations of critical realism: a stratified ontology.  
In the critical realist model, reality is divided into three levels, or domains. There is a domain of events 
which are experienced by human observers. However, observation can often prove problematic. 
Observation itself can involve learned skills, and preparation — for example, scientific training — which is 
not available to all observers (Mingers, 2004b, p. 381). Special equipment is sometimes necessary to 
enable accurate observations to be made (Danermark et al., 2002). Despite the fact that observation is not 
always possible, evidence exists that events which are not observed do indeed occur. This suggests the 
existence of another domain consisting of all events which may occur, including those which do occur and 
are not observed. Further, observations may suggest that there are relationships between some events and 
other events, such that one event somehow forces or causes the other event to occur (Abbott, 1992). Often, 
the exact nature of the mechanism by one event causes the other may not be visible. That suggests the 
existence of a third domain, one in which entities which explain the connections between events reside. In 
CR, these three domains are termed the Empirical, Actual and Real, respectively.  
The evidence for the ontological model of the world posited by CR can be illustrated using a thought 
experiment, adapted from (Gopnik, 2013).  
Imagine you are in a room with a light switch that can be switched to one of two positions, and a light 
bulb. You observe that if the light switch is flipped to one position, the light bulb turns on, if it is switched 
to the other position, the bulb turns off. You can observe the pattern of events that occur, and recognize 
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that there appears to be a relationship between the event of moving the light switch, and the event of the 
light bulb turning on or off. This is evidence for the existence of the domain of the Empirical — the 
domain of observations.  
You then observe that when you come into the room, the light bulb is either on or off, despite the fact that 
you have not seen the switch moved. Sometimes when you are leaving the room, you see the switch turned 
off, but when you later enter the room, the switch is turned on, even though you did not see it turned on. 
This is evidence for the existence of the domain in which all events occur, a domain which includes, but is 
a superset of, the events which are observed. This is evidence for the existence of the domain of the Actual 
— the domain of events.  
However, with further observation, you may realize some anomalies. You may observe that on some 
occasions (such as during a power outage) moving the switch does not have the previously observed effect 
on the light bulb. You may also find there is another room in which there is a light bulb, but no switch. 
The bulb in that room operates despite the absence of a visible switch. It becomes clear that there is an 
underlying mechanism by which the switch is linked to the bulb. A simple rule: “flip switch = bulb turn 
on; and vice versa”; can not explain the link between the bulb and the switch. It is necessary to explain the 
underlying mechanism so that all the events that are observed can be explained. This is evidence for the 
existence of the domain of the Real — the domain of the underlying mechanisms.  
A number of ontological concepts are fundamental to CR and the model of the world that it represents. 
They include: 
 Structures – are a “set of internally related objects or practices” (Sayer, 1992, p. 92). They 
constitute the entities that that are the objects of knowledge (Danermark et al., 2002), and can be 
material, social or conceptual in nature. Structures may contain component structures, and may 
themselves be part of a larger structure (Easton, 2010). Social structures have several 
characteristics that distinguish them from the structures that are typically studied in the natural 
sciences: unlike physical structures they do not exist independent of the agents that constitute 
them, and they both enable and constrain social action by those agents. 
 Mechanisms – are capacities for action that are inherent to certain structures. Bhaskar (1975) 
describes them as “ways of acting of things”. Mechanisms exist in the domain of the real, and thus 
exist whether they are enacted or not. A gun has the power to shoot whether or not it is fired. 
Mechanisms’ capacity for action may be expressed either as powers or tendencies. Powers are the 
ensemble of capabilities that are present within an entity. Tendencies are the actions that are 
typical of a given entity: “All men (living in certain kinds of societies) possess the power to steal; 
kleptomaniacs possess the tendency to do so” (Bhaskar, 1975). 
 Events – are the specific actions which result as a consequence of the activation of one or more 
mechanisms. In CR, events are ontologically distinct from the mechanisms that generate them 
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(Danermark et al. (2002) citing (Bhaskar, 1975)). Events can be shaped by the capacity for 
mechanisms to counteract, cancel or accentuate the effects of other mechanisms, leading to the 
possibility of both multifinality and equifinality in terms of the action of mechanisms and their 
outcome in events.  
 Experiences – are that subset of events which are directly observed by human actors, either 
through sensory perceptions or via sensory-enhancing instruments. Some events may not be 
directly perceptible, but may be indirectly discerned through observation of subsequent 
perceptible events generated by them. Alternately, they made be made perceptible by the design 
of scientific experiments to ‘close the open system’ of reality so that the enactment of a 
mechanism leads to an observable outcome event. However, in the real world (particularly in the 
realm of social structures) such closure is rare, and direct observation of unobservable structures 
is rarely possible (Bhaskar, 1975; Danermark et al., 2002). 
The goal of Critical Realist research is to use observations of experiences in the Empirical domain to probe 
events in the Actual domain, in order to, ultimately, understand the mechanisms operating in the domain 
of the Real. This goal is enacted by observing an overarching set of ontological and epistemological 
principles which inform CR research. Those principles will be explicated in the following sections. 
3.3.3 Epistemology 
The ontological assumptions of critical realism lead to a set of epistemological principles which lay out the 
principles for accepting evidences for truth, given CR assumptions.  
The following are the epistemological assumptions which emerge from CR principles according to Wynn 
and Williams (2012): 
 Mediated Knowledge - CR posits that scientific knowledge exists in two domains: an intransitive 
domain, which contains the elements of the world which the scientist seeks to explain, and a 
transitive domain, which contains observations, theories, and scientists’ conclusions about the 
world. CR acknowledges that there is likely to be some mismatch between the contents of the two 
domains — i.e., that human knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is fallible. However, CR 
does posit that scientific knowledge will become ‘less fallible’ over time, and explicitly rejects the 
notions of some philosophers that no type of knowledge can lay claim to greater validity than 
other types of knowledge (Danermark et al., 2002). For example, at one point in human history, it 
was commonly believed that the world was flat. At a later point in history, it was believed that the 
world was spherical. Both of those beliefs were wrong (the earth is an oblate spheroid (Williams, 
2014)), but critical realists would accept that one is more wrong than the other. 
 Explanation, Rather Than Prediction – Because of the possibility that mechanisms will interact, 
causing different outcomes at different points in time, critical realism eschews the common 
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positivist goal of predicting that events will occur given a set of precedent factors. Also, because 
CR assumes that there is a reality independent of the human observer, CR studies do not give first 
priority to understanding the subjective meanings of events from the observer’s point of view. 
Rather, CR studies seek to explain what happened in a particular research context by describing 
the causal mechanisms that led to the outcome. It is notable that CR does allow for the possible 
occurrence of regular outcomes via the operation of mechanisms, which are known in CR as 
demi-regularities or demi-regs (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011; Mingers, 2003a). However, observing 
demi-regs is never sufficient explanation for a phenomenon in CR, an explanation must describe 
the causal mechanism that is linked to the phenomenon (Tsoukas, 1989). Also, it may be possible 
to make sound predictions through an understanding of the underlying mechanisms which are 
explained in research, but the first goal of a CR study will be explanation, which may then lead to 
those other outcomes. 
 Explanation Via Mechanisms — The concept of the use of mechanisms as an explanatory strategy 
for describing phenomena — especially phenomena that deal with causal relationships — is well 
established in the sciences (Abbott, 2007; Avgerou, 2013; Bechtel, 2008; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
2005; Boden, 2004; Bunge, 1997; Angelika Dimoka & Davis, 2008; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; 
Nambisan et al., 1999; Piaget & Seagrim, 1969). Critical realism is only one way of applying the 
mechanism-based perspective (see Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010), but the notion is central to CR. 
The explanatory approach, however, is common in the physical sciences. For example, “Biologists 
explain why by explaining how” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). A CR study aims to explain an 
event or set of events by describing the mechanism or set of mechanisms that will explain those 
events. The CR researcher attempts to answer the following question “What must reality be like in 
order for this event to have occurred?” (Wynn & Williams, 2012). The study will therefore aim to 
describe the mechanism, describe the effect of antecedent factors on the mechanism, and show 
how the mechanism as described led to the event(s) that are the focus of study. 
 Unobservability of Mechanisms — Causal mechanisms may be directly observable, but often they 
are not (Bhaskar, 1975; Easton, 2010). The fact that mechanisms may not be perceptible or 
measurable with human senses or available instrumentation means that their existence must 
often be inferred from their effects rather than directly observed or measured. 
 Multiple Possible Explanations — Because causal mechanisms are often not directly observable, 
there will sometimes be more than one possible mechanism that could be responsible for causing 
an observed outcome. In such a case, CR researchers employ judgment rationality – comparing 
different possible explanations and selecting the one with the greatest explanatory power. 
The epistemological principle of multiple possible explanations is an indicator of a fundamental issue in 
CR — that of multifinality and equifinality. In an open system, it is possible for more than one 
mechanism to lead to the same outcome, and it is also possible — because mechanisms can interfere with 
each other — for the same mechanism to lead to different outcomes. This disjunction between 
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mechanisms and outcomes means that mere statistical correlation is never sufficient to prove causality or 
evidence of a mechanism (Sayer, 1992; Tsoukas, 1989). 
3.3.4 Methodology 
Wynn and Williams (2012) have recommended five methodological principles for conducting CR 
research. These principles are based on prior research and emerge from the aforementioned ontological 
and epistemological assumptions. It is important to note that they are not steps – intended to be applied 
linearly in a single analytical process. Rather they are interdependent and interlinked, and are applied 
through parallel processes throughout the project.  
 Explication of Events — The process of CR analysis begins with a comprehensive description of 
the events which led to the phenomenon, happening or outcome under investigation (Wynn & 
Williams, 2012, p. 79). This step can include thick descriptions of the events, sequence of actions, 
aggregation of actions, reinterpretation to expose structural elements or causal factors, and 
reframing through the lens of existing theory. The goal of this step is to develop a framework, 
through the detailed account of the events under study, for fulfilling the other methodological 
principles. 
 Explication of Structure and Context — While in the Explication of Events element of the analysis 
we seek to expose the structural elements or causal factors which led to a sequence of events, in 
the Explication of Structure and Context we attempt to identify and resolve those elements of 
structure that are causally relevant to the outcome under investigation. This can involve analytical 
decomposition of higher-level structures, probing causal linkages between structures and events, 
and abstracting component parts of structure in light of existing theories to provide leverage for 
potential explanations. It is to be noted that a full description of all the elements of structure 
present in any real-world research context is unlikely to be possible within the scope of any 
practical study. A part of the researcher’s role is to decide which elements of structure are most 
relevant to the study, given the research questions and goals of the project. 
 Retroduction — The central goal of a critical realist study is to describe the – often unobservable 
– causal mechanism/s which have led to the outcome under investigation. Retroduction is an 
abductive logic that proposes the existence of mechanisms which, if they existed, would explain 
the observed outcome, given the contextual conditions. It seeks to answer the question “What 
must reality be like for [phenomenon of interest] to have happened?” (Danermark et al., 2002). 
The researcher addresses this question by conducting multiple thought trials (Weick, 1989), and 
using multiple analytical strategies. This process may produce multiple possible sets of 
mechanisms which may have led to the observed outcome. The goal of the study is to identify that 
set of explanations (system of mechanisms) which offer the most complete and logically 
compelling explanation for what occurred (Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
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 Empirical Corroboration — The mechanisms proposed through the retroductive process are 
hypotheses. They are necessarily tentative in nature. Empirical corroboration is the process of 
comparing the hypothesized mechanism/s with data to verify their causal depth and explanatory 
power. It is also the process through which possible alternate explanations for observed outcomes 
are tested and the most logically compelling explanation identified. One of the logical tests that 
may be used to test explanations (i.e., mechanisms or sets of mechanisms) is their ability to 
provide consistent causal explanations for outcomes across multiple events or cases. This test is 
similar to the logic of pattern matching proposed by Yin (2009) or the concept of summative 
validity proposed by A. S. Lee and Hubona (2009). However, unlike the case in the MPMT logic 
proposed by A. S. Lee and Hubona (2009), a single case of the proposed mechanism failing to 
produce the expected outcome would not automatically disprove the existence of the mechanism, 
given the CR Open Systems ontological perspective.  
 Triangulation/Multimethods — A basic implication of the critical realist model of reality is that 
the social world is made up of a variety of types of structures (conceptual, social, cognitive, 
physical, etc.), which have a variety of powers and tendencies, operating at a number of levels 
(individual, group, societal, etc.). Many of these structures are inherently unobservable and 
cannot be experienced except through their effects. It stands to reason from this that in order to 
understand the causal mechanisms formed by these structures, it is useful to engage a number of 
different modes of observation. This practice is useful because relevant evidence about structures 
that is difficult to apprehend with one method may be easier to collect with another. It also has 
the benefit of reducing the effects of bias. The use of a variety of data types, analytical methods 
and investigators is therefore recommended in CR studies. 
Wynn and Williams (2012) note that there are three aspects of case study research that distinguish CR 
studies from positivist (e.g., Yin, 2009) or interpretivist (e.g., Walsham, 1995b) studies. The first concerns 
the research questions, which must be of the form “What caused the event associated with the 
phenomenon to occur?” This requires addressing how and why questions which fit well with the focus of 
this study. The third distinguishing feature of CR studies concerns the issue of generalizability. CR studies 
are not concerned with statistically generalizing from samples to populations, but are exclusively 
concerned with discovering and explaining causal mechanisms which are hypothesized to have generated 
the observed outcomes in a case. These mechanisms may then be retrodictively applied to other situations 
in which they may be causally active (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 799). This means that CR studies are 
concerned with theoretical generalization (Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Yin, 2009). 
The second distinguishing characteristic identified by Wynn and Williams (2012) deserves attention. They 
assert that in case selection, CR studies are concerned with identifying the unique set of specific 
influences which resulted in the generation of a specific set of outcomes. This means that CR case studies 
will typically focus on idiographic studies of single structures (e.g., a single company) and will typically 
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focus on a single case, or a limited set of cases. This enables CR researchers to build detailed, context-
sensitive explanations of phenomena (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 804), but it also appears to suggest that 
CR researchers will rarely, if ever, employ theoretically sampled multiple-case research designs. This 
conclusion would, if so, seem at odds with the goal of science in general, and CR researchers in particular: 
to make general statements about the world and generate theories that are of practical use in multiple 
settings (Bhaskar, 1975; Danermark et al., 2002; Mingers, 2006). However, this assertion by Wynn and 
Williams (2012) must be addressed. The challenge that they allude to is a real one: to identify the unique 
set of structural influences that are held to be causally relevant can be challenging in even a single 
research context. To look at why this is, we can return to the earlier thought experiment regarding the 
light bulb and the switch. If we set out to investigate the causal mechanisms that explain the relationship 
between the light bulb and the switch, which mechanisms would we investigate? 
We could investigate mechanisms of electrical circuits and wiring, and trace the connections between the 
light bulb and the switch. Or we could investigate the mechanisms behind the construction of the building 
— mechanisms which include the actions of the architects, engineers, construction workers and electrical 
contractors who put the building together such that there is a relationship between bulb and switch. Or we 
could look at a completely different set of mechanisms concerning the way in which building codes and 
government regulations concerning the standards for electrical components in buildings have shaped the 
way this bulb and this switch have been designed. Or we could look at the historical story of the invention 
of the light bulb; or we could look at the way in which electrons move through circuits to provide power to 
light bulbs when switches are flipped. Or we could look at the design of the power grid, such that the 
circuit on which the bulb and switch are located is energized so that flipping the switch turns on the bulb. 
There are other ways in which we could investigate this as well, an almost infinite number of them.  
None of the approaches outlined above would be wrong in the strict sense. Each of them could form the 
basis for defining one type of relationship between the bulb and the switch. However, it is also obvious 
that addressing them all would be beyond the scope of a single study. Which set of mechanisms a 
particular set of researchers would find to be causally relevant in a particular study depends on a number 
of factors, including the theoretical orientation of the researchers (e.g., are they engineers or historians?), 
and the specific areas of focus of the study. This challenge is one of structural analysis, that Wynn and 
Williams (2012) identify as part of the  Explication of Structure and Context principle (Wynn & Williams, 
2012, p. 799). They note that a full accounting of all the powers and tendencies of various structures 
present in any research context would be so large as to be impractical. The question is, given the rigors of 
structural analysis, even in a single setting, how can a CR approach be applied in multiple case studies? 
The key to addressing this issue is alluded to by Wynn and Williams (2012, p. 799), as well as by 
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010): the use of existing theory to provide a framework for analyzing the data in 
each case context, so that the detailed events in each case can be abstracted away and the structures under 
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investigation can be observed in action. This is the approach that will be applied in this study. A 
theoretical framework for analyzing the appropriation of IT systems will be used to assist in the structural 
analysis of each case.  
3.4 Critical Realist Research in IS 
Critical realism has been recommended as a metatheoretical position for IS researchers by a wide range of 
theorists, including Mingers (2004c), Dobson (2001), and Markus and Silver (2008). A growing number 
of empirical studies have emerged which take an explicitly critical realist position, including (Bygstad, 
2010; Bygstad & Munkvold, 2011; Dobson et al., 2007; Faulkner & Runde, 2013; Henfridsson & Bygstad, 
2013; Morton, 2006; Volkoff & Strong, 2013; Volkoff et al., 2007). In addition, critical realism has been 
playing an important role in the development of theoretical approaches within IS.  
Frameworks for applying critical realist assumptions in IS research have been proliferating in the 
literature. They include (Dobson, 1999; Easton, 2000; Tsang, 2012, 2013a) on case study methodology, 
and Mingers (2003a) on statistical methods. Critical realism has also been proposed as a means for 
reframing and addressing long-standing theoretical debates within the discipline as a whole. This body of 
work includes Smith (2006) on theory-practice inconsistencies in IS research; Mutch (2013) on 
sociomateriality;  Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala (2013) on bridging the qualitative-quantitative divide; and 
Mingers (2003b) on the use of multiple methods. This critical attention works in both directions as IS 
researchers have proposed methods for extending critical realism by developing methods for testing 
critical realist theories (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011). In addition, critical realism has been getting 
significant attention from the field’s leading journals (Mingers et al., 2011); (Straub, 2011). 
One reason for this surge of interest is the apparent match between the methods of CR and the need of the 
IS field to investigate phenomena that occur at the intersection between material artifacts and human 
agents (Markus & Silver, 2008). Another is the significant existing theoretical literature (Bhaskar, 2008; 
Danermark et al., 2002; Sayer, 1992, 2000), and the broad tradition of applying critical realist 
assumptions in other applied fields (Faulkner & Runde, 2013; Fleetwood, 2005; Kwan & Tsang, 2001; 
Runde, 1998), as well as the — seldom acknowledged — critical realist foundations of popular 
methodological approaches in IS (Cook, Campbell, & Day, 1979; Miles & Huberman, 1999). Critical realist 
positions have also been taken on several prominent debates in the discipline, being the foundation for 
Mutch (2013)’s challenges to sociomateriality, Mingers (2003a)’s critique of statistical modeling in the 
field, and Tsang and Willliams (2012)’s challenges to accepted norms for generalization and induction. 
One of the most influential recent critiques of the norms for representing system use in IS research, 
Burton-Jones’ dissertation (Burton-Jones, 2005), and subsequent publications on the topic (Burton-
Jones & Gallivan, 2007; Burton-Jones & Grange, 2012; Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006), can actually be 
seen as an immanent critique of the representation of system use in the discipline.  
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There is also considerable evidence, suggested by Burton-Jones (2005, pp. 8-9), that many IS researchers 
who self-identify as positivist or interpretivist are actually using unacknowledged critical realist 
assumptions. The basic epistemological assumptions that the world is real, and that human knowledge of 
the world is socially constructed and imperfect, is implicit in much of the IS literature that does not carry 
the label “critical realist”.  
3.5 Discussion 
There have been many debates about the merits of CR in the literature. In IS,  early proponents of CR 
included (Dobson, 1999, 2001) and Mingers (2004b). Like any philosophical position, it was challenged. 
In IS, the same issue of the Information and Organization that introduced (Mingers, 2004c), also 
presented critiques of the approach by Monod (2004) and H. K. Klein (2004) (see (Robey, 2004)). 
Mingers (2004a) responded to these critiques, and there is little doubt that debates about the relative 
merits of different philosophical positions will continue to be a feature of academic discourse for some 
time. In this section, I will briefly contribute to this debate, and defend the choice of a critical realist 
perspective for the thesis. 
Some have challenged the CR perspective on the basis that some of its positions can be seen as similar to 
positions held by preexisting philosophical perspectives. One example is H. K. Klein (2004), who 
essentially challenges the ‘newness’ of the concepts in CR by showing that interpretivist assumptions can 
lead to some CR conclusions, and positivist assumptions can lead to others. However, in doing so, he 
seems to (perhaps inadvertently) support Mingers (2004a)’s claim that CR “does not … just dismiss 
competing philosophies but tries to incorporate within itself that which is valuable” (Mingers, 2004a, p. 
147). CR’s principal claim is not to the novelty and uniqueness of its positions, but rather the explanatory 
power of its ontological and epistemological assumptions when applied to real-world events. 
Monod’s critique of CR revolves around what he perceives as anomalies in CR’s claims regarding the 
possibility of objectivity, the nature of causality, and the distinction between natural and social sciences 
(Monod, 2004, p. 106). Regarding objectivity and causality, as elegant as arguments about the necessity of 
observers for the existence of phenomena may be (see (Monod, 2004, pp. 107-109)), any distracted 
pedestrian who has walked into traffic (and lived) can testify that objects in the world are capable of 
having effects on an observer who is not aware of the existence of the object a priori. This argues for a 
realist conceptualization of phenomena. For example, IT can have effects whether the affected are aware 
of it or not (Markus & Silver, 2008). More to the point (of this thesis) the process involved in generating a 
creative outcome can involve events and phenomena of which actors involved are not aware. I should 
comment that while making this point Monod states that CR conflates statistical probabilities with laws, 
which it does not (Monod, 2004, p. 109), perhaps due to a misreading of Mingers. 
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Monod criticizes CR for the fact that it proposes the existence of generative mechanisms whose existence 
can neither be validated nor invalidated. He says that this puts CR into a state of antimony — a term from 
Kant that means “when [rationality] ventures beyond the boundary of experience”. However, great swaths 
of knowledge in the sciences are in fact, based on conceptual structures which are not ‘validated’. For 
example, in physics, the Standard Model was accepted and used as a basis for theorizing for decades 
before the existence of the Higgs Boson was ‘validated’ by the Large Hadron Collider (Cho, 2012). To limit 
the domain of “knowledge” only to those things which can be completely validated is not a viable 
approach to science. To demonstrate this, I present a formulation of a common thought experiment: the 
“Brain in a Vat” conjecture; a modernized version of Plato’s Cave, or the Cartesian Demon.  
There are many versions of this conjecture, of which the most profound is indubitably (Patton, 1988). 
However, for this explanation a simpler version will suffice. It is as follows: 
Imagine that, while you slept, an evil scientist kidnapped you, extracted your brain, and 
put it into a vat of heated nutrient solution that will keep it alive. The evil scientist then 
connected your brain to a supercomputer which is programmed to replicate the signals 
which would normally be received by your brain during interaction with the external 
world (note that this formulation defeats Putnam (1981)’s refutation, see (Brueckner, 
2012)).  
The supercomputer has sufficient information about the real world to plausibly 
replicate all possible physical experiences within the world. How could you recognize or 
prove that you were actually just a brain in a vat? 
The short answer is that there is no apparent means by which one would be able to prove that one is a 
brain in a vat. Conversely, this means that it is not possible to prove that one is not currently a brain in a 
vat. If one cannot prove that one is not a brain in a vat, then one cannot prove that the external world 
exists (Dror & Harnad, 2008, p. 8). If one cannot prove that the external world exists, then one cannot 
prove that entities in the world exist. If one cannot prove that entities in the world exist, then one cannot 
prove that relationships between entities in the world exist. It is therefore impossible for any scientific 
theory describing entities or relationships, or any part of human knowledge, to be absolutely proved 
beyond all possible doubt. Since the existence of external reality cannot be validated or invalidated, it 
follows that no Knowledge can claim to be ‘validated’ in the sense that Monod refers to. Therefore the 
antimony test is not a useful one for testing knowledge claims — knowledge exists which cannot be 
‘validated’.  
The above suggests that in scientific research, since it is ultimately impossible to prove or disprove the 
existence of perceived objects (being), or perceived relationships between objects (causality), decisions 
about metatheoretical assumptions must ultimately be based on a researcher’s judgment. For the current 
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project, I have evaluated a number of possible positions, and must say I concur with the views expressed 
in (Easton, 2010, p. 128) regarding CR: I think it’s assumptions reflect how the world is; even if they do 
not, I think that I (and many scientists), behave as if they do; I think it makes stronger arguments than 
competing positions; and I think it gives a well thought through and relatively coherent position on the 
nature of the world. 
Critical realism will therefore be applied as the philosophical position of this project. 
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Chapter 4. Research Design 
4.1 Overview 
There are two approaches one can take to empirical studies of creativity, according to Policastro and 
Gardner (1999). There is the cumulative approach, in which one takes as a starting point existing work in 
an area and builds upon it; then there is the phenomenon approach, one begins with the clearest available 
instance of the phenomenon under investigation, and then seeks to construct a theoretical explanation for 
it. Given the lack of existing research in IS on the creative appropriation of systems by users, the 
phenomenon approach is more appropriate for this topic, and will be applied in this study. Dunbar (1997) 
also proposed two basic approaches to answering questions about creative thought: In Vitro studies in 
which subjects are brought into cognitive laboratories for controlled experiments, and In Vivo studies, in 
which creative action is investigated in ‘real world’ settings. In Vitro research can lead to insights into the 
basic psychological mechanisms underlying complex thinking processes, while In Vivo work can lead to 
insights into the basic cognitive mechanisms underlying creativity in real-world contexts (Dunbar, 1997, 
p. 2). Given the understudied nature of creative appropriation, I selected an In-Vivo phenomenon 
approach, which will use insights gained from prior (In-Vitro and In-Vivo) studies to identify cognitive 
mechanisms. The overall design and execution of the study will be guided by a well-established 
methodological framework: Eisenhardt (1989a)’s framework for building theory from case study research.  
As is common in qualitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1999), and consistent with the guidelines of the 
overarching research framework being followed (Eisenhardt, 1989a), the design of the study was 
emergent. The study was begun — as per Eisenhardt (1989a) — with a set of research questions, and an 
initial set of a priori constructs, but no pre-specified theory. The research questions and constructs 
evolved in response to findings in the data. Moreover, the metatheoretical assumptions underlying the 
study evolved, changing from classical positivist to critical realist, as has been done in previous research 
(Volkoff et al., 2007). As a critical realist approach was adopted during the study (this will be described in 
following sections), Eisenhardt (1989a)’s framework was integrated with Wynn and Williams (2012)’s 
principles for conducting critical realist case research. The research design will be described in this 
chapter. 
I will begin with a description of Eisenhardt (1989a)’s framework for inducting theory from case study 
research. I will state the design parameters of the project and give an overview of the case study protocol 
(see Yin, 2009) that was followed at each of the case sites. A key feature of Eisenhardt’s framework is the 
requirement that the conduct of the study be responsive to discoveries made during data collection. I will 
describe the findings in an early case that resulted in the modification of the research question, and the 
subsequent adoption of critical realist assumptions for the analysis of the data and to shape the form of 
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the emergent theory. I will then describe the key analytical techniques that were applied to the data, and 
show how the iterative steps of Eisenhardt (1989a)’s framework were integrated with those of Wynn and 
Williams (2012)’s principles for critical realist case research in order to provide a logical and coherent 
design for the study.  
4.2 Methodological Framework 
This research will employ an embedded multiple-case design (Yin, 2009, p. 46). This design has been 
selected for the following reasons. First, the study aims to identify mechanisms that are part of the human 
cognitive system. These should be identifiable in a variety of contexts. Testing that assumption requires 
that the mechanisms be identified in one context, and observed in another context outside the one in 
which they were developed, a theoretical replication (Yin, 2009, p. 54). A multiple-embedded design 
permits this. Second, while using replication logic in single-case designs has been demonstrated (Markus, 
1983), and has been defended as an acceptable and robust method for generating theory in IS research (A. 
S. Lee, 1989b), multiple-case designs can allow more control over theoretical sampling. Thirdly, multiple 
case designs have been described as generally preferable by some experts on case study methodology 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2009). An implication of this design is multiple embedded units of analysis 
(Markus, 1983). In this study, the main unit of analysis will be activity-based: an incident in which a user 
or users appropriate a system in a creative manner. However, like Bourgeois III and Eisenhardt (1988b), I 
will have two other units of analysis: the individual participants in each case, and the organization within 
which the incident takes place. 
The overarching framework that guided the conduct of this research project was the framework for 
inducting theory from case research developed by Eisenhardt (1989a). Eisenhardt’s framework grew out 
of her own work on strategic decision-making  (Bourgeois III & Eisenhardt, 1988a; Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Eisenhardt & Bourgeois III, 1988), and aimed to make two contributions: to provide a roadmap for 
building theories from case research, one which synthesizes and extends previous work on qualitative 
methods, specifically (Miles & Huberman, 1994) (1984 version), (Yin, 2009) (1981 version), and (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1968); and to position theory building from case studies within the larger context of social science 
methods (Eisenhardt, 1989a, pp. 532-533). Eisenhardt’s method can be regarded as one attempt to 
address a common problem in theory-building research: the fact that when theory-building is started 
from the foundation of a preexisting theory, that theory tends to bias the outcome of the theory-building 
exercise. To quote the common aphorism, when all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a 
nail. Eisenhardt’s roadmap attempts to address this problem by specifying precisely what elements of 
preexisting knowledge can be integrated into the study, and how, while eschewing the biasing effects of 
pre-specified theory. The major steps of Eisenhardt (1989a)’s framework are summarized below. 
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The framework proposes a set of steps which are carried out in roughly sequential fashion in order to go 
through the entire process, from preparing to conduct fieldwork to identifying the point at which the 
study is complete. The steps are “roughly” sequential in that some of them may be, and typically are, 
carried out iteratively (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 541). However, the project will typically follow the broad 
steps below. 
1. Getting Started — defining research questions and, possibly, a priori constructs. No hypotheses 
or “theory” specified at this point 
2. Selecting Cases — Should specify the research population, and employ theoretical sampling, as 
per (Yin, 2009) 
3. Crafting instruments and protocols — multiple data collection methods, data types, and 
investigators for triangulation purposes 
4. Entering the field — overlapping data collection and analysis. Opportunistic data collection 
methods 
5. Analyzing Data — within and cross-case analysis 
6. Shaping hypotheses — iterative tabulation of evidence; replication logic across cases; search 
for evidence of the “why” behind relationships 
7. Enfolding literature — comparison with convergent and divergent literature 
8. Reaching closure — sometimes dictated by pragmatic considerations, but ideally reached when 
theoretical saturation is attained 
(Adapted from Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
Eisenhardt (1989a) recommends that theory-building research is begun with clear research questions, 
and “as close as possible to the ideal of no theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 536), in order to avoid biasing or 
limiting the findings. However, she also acknowledges that it is impossible to achieve the ideal of a clean 
theoretical slate. This is particularly so in light of her parallel recommendation that a priori specification 
of constructs should be considered, in order to shape the initial design of the research, as well as permit 
more accurate measurement of those constructs than would otherwise be possible. Both the initial 
constructs and the research questions are regarded as tentative at the beginning of the research.  
The initial constructs applied in this project were drawn from the componential theory of creativity 
specified by Amabile (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Amabile et al., 1996) and later extended by Fisher and 
Amabile (2009). This theory was selected due to its extensive grounding in empirical work, and for the 
range of research domains in which it has been applied: from research labs (Amabile, 1983) to field 
research in R&D departments (Amabile & Gryskiewicz, 1987) and general organizational-level creativity 
research (Amabile, 1988). It has been developed and tested through rigorous experimental work, in-depth 
qualitative field studies and longitudinal quantitative survey research (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 
1994). The overarching finding of this program of research is that creativity, at all levels, results from the 
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intersection of three components (Amabile, 1988, 1996). The components, and their specific 
instantiations at both the individual and organizational levels, are listed in the Creativity section of the 
preceding chapter. 
The codes from (Amabile, 1988, 1996) formed the initial set of a priori constructs that were used to code 
the first set of data that were collected at the field sites. The set of codes applied in the initial part of the 
study are listed in Appendix 1. 
4.2.1 Case Selection and Protocols 
One recommendation from Yin (2009), echoed by Eisenhardt (1989a), is that a case study protocol be 
developed and implemented in the study. This is particularly important in multiple-case studies, as it 
controls variation in the data collected across case sites, and so permits the application of replication logic 
in cross-case analysis. For this study, a formal case study protocol was developed and followed. The 
protocol is summarized here.  
Case Selection 
In the type of case study research represented by (Eisenhardt, 1989a), one of the critical issues is that of 
determining the criteria to be used for case selection. This type of research employs theoretical sampling – 
the deliberate selection of cases to fill theoretical categories in order to provide illuminative explanations 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 537). A distinguishing characteristic of such case research is the application of 
replication logic (Yin, 2009).  Cases may be selected in order to replicate significant conditions – literal 
replication; or they may be chosen in order to systematically vary significant conditions in order to test 
the effects of such variation – analytical replication. In order to properly apply replication logic, 
Eisenhardt (1989a) recommends that case selection begin with the defining of an appropriate population, 
to control extraneous variation in the data, and to help define the limits for generalizing the findings. For 
this study, the defined population was users of non-hedonic systems for tasks in work-related contexts.  
In  each case site, a standard case study protocol was followed, as recommended by Yin (2009). The 
following procedures were followed at each case site. 
Case Elicitation  
When beginning to work on site, the first activity involved educating the investigator about the participant 
organization: the basic functions of the organization and target unit, unit structure, as well as the formal 
and informal norms that may assist in eliciting data from participants in the group. This process – known 
as bootstrapping (Crandall, Hoffman, & Shadbolt, 1998) — was accomplished through unstructured 
interviews with a key informant within the organization. The key informant was asked for basic 
information about the systems in use in the organization. Two major questions were asked of this 
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informant: “What is the most important thing that this organization does?” and “What IT systems are 
used to do it?” These questions are intended to identify the most strategically important systems in the 
organization. It was surmised that the systems that are used for core business-process tasks in each 
organization will generate the most interesting cases of creative appropriation. Strategically important 
systems used for a core business process were selected as the systems whose users would be selected as 
potential interviewees.  
Users of these systems were then asked to describe an incident they knew of in which themselves, or 
someone else, developed or discovered a novel way to use the system: one that “would probably surprise 
the developers of the system if they heard about it.” Stories about the discovery or development of novel 
ways of using the system were collected, and some of those stories were selected for deeper investigation. 
For those incidents selected for further investigation, the major participants in the incident were asked if 
they would consent to be interviewed. No incident was chosen for deeper analysis if two conditions were 
not met: 
1. At least one of the major participants in the incident had to be available for interview, and 
2. There had to be more than one data source for triangulation.  
For those incidents selected for deeper investigation, opportunistic collection of all available types of data 
was done (Eisenhardt, 1989a). However, the principal source of data in each case was semi-structured 
interviews with involved participants. The semi-structured interviews utilized cognitive task analysis 
techniques, as described below. 
4.2.2 Cognitive Task Analysis 
The primary data collection method used in the study was semi-structured interviews of users who have 
participated in an incident of creative appropriation. The interviews served to provide an understanding 
of the task domain within which the system was used, and the participant’s perspective of the story of how 
the novel way to use the system emerged.  
One approach to discovering the nature of task domains and eliciting the knowledge of individuals that 
function in those domains is cognitive task analysis (Crandall et al., 1998; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 
Cognitive task analysis has been applied in the elicitation, preservation and dissemination of expert 
knowledge and is widely used in the design of expert systems and knowledge bases. Although cognitive 
task analysis is sometimes referred to in the literature as though it were one technique (Chipman, 
Schraagen, & Shalin, 2000; Schraagen, Chipman, Shalin, & Shalin, 2000), the term actually refers to a 
family of distinct methods that are used for knowledge elicitation. These methods are commonly used to 
identify the cues and strategies that guide expert professionals as they perform in their domains of 
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expertise, even when such performance draws on tacit knowledge that it would be hard for the experts to 
articulate (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 516). 
After a review and consideration of several cognitive task analysis techniques, one was selected that was 
judged to be a good fit for the knowledge elicitation needs of this study. It is described below. 
4.2.3 The Critical Decision Method 
One of the methods used in cognitive task analysis is the Critical Decision Method (CDM) (Crandall et al., 
1998; G. A. Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989). The technique involves case-specific, multi-trial 
retrospection guided by probe questions. It was developed to capture the kinds of knowledge and 
expertise applied in real-world decision making and problem solving (Crandall et al., 1998, p. 255). The 
full CDM procedure typically takes two or more hours to complete. However, the method is designed to be 
flexible and adaptable to the requirements of the study in which it is applied. An adaptation of the CDM 
procedure was used to elicit the details of the incident in which the system was appropriated creatively, in 
a way that addresses the research questions of the study, without collecting extraneous information (Miles 
& Huberman, 1999). To increase the likelihood of successfully eliciting all relevant details during the 
interviews, the guidelines for conducting qualitative interviews proposed by Myers and Newman (2007) 
were followed. The adapted CDM interview protocol which was used in the interviews with participants is 
below: 
Table 2: Adapted Critical Decision Method Protocol 
# Question Rationale 
1 Can you tell me about your job and 
how you came to work here? 
Manages Entry by setting the stage. Beginning with this simple 
descriptive question allows the interviewer and interviewee to 
acclimatize to playing their roles. At the same time, this 
question collects some background information about the 
interviewee that may speak to their motivation and skills when 
combined with data gathered in later questions. 
2 How did you decide to be a <task 
role> and what kind of training did 
you do for it? 
This question continues to set the stage and let the actors ‘warm 
up’ for the main performance. At the same time, it elicits salient 
background information about the interviewee and enables 
some discovery of what background experiences and skills on 
the actor’s part may have shaped the incident. 
3 With regards to <creative 
appropriation incident>, can you 
walk me through how it happened, 
from beginning to end? 
First step from the Critical Decision Method (CDM): Incident 
Recall. The interviewer asks few, if any, questions and allows the 
interviewee to structure the account. 
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4 Interviewer tells the story back, 
matching as closely as possible the 
interviewee’s own phrasing and 
terminology 
Second step from the CDM: Incident Retelling. The interviewer 
tells the story, matching as closely as possible the interviewee’s 
own phrasing and terminology. The interviewee will typically 
offer additional details, clarifications and corrections during this 
process. This allows the interviewer and interviewee to arrive at 
a common understanding of the incident. 
5 The interviewer leads the 
interviewee back over the incident a 
third time, employing probe 
questions that focus attention on 
particular aspects of the incident. 
The third step from the CDM: Progressive Deepening. A 
selection of the probes that are specified as part of the CDM are 
used to further investigate details of the incident that are judged 
relevant to creative use. 
6 Is there anything else you feel I ought 
to know in order to understand 
<creative appropriation incident>? 
Elicits further insights that the interviewee may have about the 
incident under investigation. Sets the stage for the Exit phase of 
the interview 
 
The protocol followed in the interviews with participants was as follows. Each interview was begun with 
two simple descriptive questions to ‘break the ice’, to get the interaction between the researcher and 
interviewee started, as well as to elicit background information from the participant. There next followed 
three items adapted from the Critical Decision Method: Incident Recall, Incident Retelling, and 
Progressive Deepening. In the progressive deepening step, I used probe questions — as specified in the 
CDM — to elicit details that were salient to the research questions, if those details had not already 
emerged in the account of the incident. A full list of the probes specified with the CDM is listed in 
Appendix 2. The final question was designed to elicit any insights into the incident that the interviewee 
may have which was not covered in the interview, as well as to prepare for the Exit  stage of the interview-
as-drama (Myers & Newman, 2007).  
It must be emphasized that the above procedure elicits raw data for analysis, rather than direct answers to 
the research questions. Kahneman and Klein (2009) note that researchers cannot expect decision makers 
to accurately explain why they made decisions. Research indicates that there may be little or no direct 
introspective access to higher order cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Memory and reflective  
processes are subject to bias and error (Kahneman, 2011), and this becomes especially problematic in the 
mental attribution of creative processes (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; R. K. Sawyer, 2007). The Critical 
Decision Method, like other cognitive task analysis techniques, simply provides a basis for making 
inferences about judgment and decision processes.  
To support those inferences, a number of data sources, in addition to interviews with participants, were 
collected and analyzed. They include documentation, instructions and reference materials for the systems; 
training materials that may have influenced participants; online documentation, including release notes 
and changelogs; direct observation of use of the system and operations in the system context; and reviews 
of public information about the organizational and social contexts in which the creative actors operate. 
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The use of multiple types of data sources is an integral part of the case study method and was carried out 
using standardized techniques as suggested by (Miles & Huberman, 1999; Yin, 2009). 
4.2.4 Quasi-Experiments 
Controlled experiments conducted in laboratories are often considered the “gold standard” for 
establishing causal relationships in scientific research. In such experiments, treatment conditions are 
systematically varied by the researcher. Participants in experiments typically get exposed to different 
levels of the treatment, and differences in outcomes are observed. The key to controlled experimental 
design is that while the treatment is varied, all other variables are (as far as possible) held constant by the 
researchers, causally linking types or levels of outcome to levels of treatment. Lab experiments have high 
internal validity, but often purchase that at the cost of low external validity because of the artificial 
conditions in which they are conducted. This is of particular concern in a study concerning the 
mechanisms involved in creativity. For example, analogical thinking — which is regarded as an important 
element in many stories of creative discovery — is known to occur much more readily in naturalistic 
settings than it does under experimental conditions (Dunbar, 2001).  
However, Yin (2009) suggests that replication logic — the kind of reasoning which underlies the 
experimental method — can be used in circumstances where “natural experiments” occur: that is, where 
naturally occurring conditions allow the same kind of linking between treatments and outcomes that is 
done in full-fledged laboratory experiments. In these circumstances, some critical differences between the 
classic experiment and the naturalistic situation include the inability of the researcher to randomly assign 
participants to levels of the treatment condition, and the inability to control extraneous variables. This 
leads to lower internal validity, but has greater external validity because of the non-artificial context. This 
type of research design is known as a quasi-experiment (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Cook et al., 1979). Quasi-
experiments (or field experiments) trade some of the control in lab experiments for external validity, as 
they occur in field settings (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011, p. 150). While quasi-experimental designs can be 
used in situations where the treatment condition is varied by the researcher, quasi experimental logic can 
also be used where the treatment condition varies naturally across cases (Szulanski & Jensen, 2004). 
Using this kind of replication logic across cases is a well-accepted analytical technique in IS (A. S. Lee, 
1989b) and has been used in widely-cited studies in the discipline (Markus, 1983). 
In the case data, some naturally-occurring events were found that facilitated the use of experimental logic 
to analyze what happened (Yin, 2009, p. 12). This is not a central method designed into the study, but is 
used opportunistically, as recommended in the (Eisenhardt, 1989a) framework. The ability to 
accommodate such flexibility in mid-study is a key benefit of the case study strategy for theory-building 
research. In the current project, a circumstance was observed in one of the participant organizations 
which conformed to the design of a quasi-experiment. The circumstance was naturally-occurring and no 
manipulation by the researcher was involved. However, the situation was noted and quasi-experimental 
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logic was used to analyze the data. The results are used as a data point to support the overall findings of 
the study. 
4.3 Evolution of the Design 
As previously stated, this study initially followed the roadmap proposed by (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Eisenhardt’s framework follows a series of steps which take the researcher from defining the research 
questions through closure. However, it is also designed to accommodate changes during the research 
process, in response to such events as unexpected patterns in the data which require further exploration, 
or unanticipated opportunities which arise for collecting new data. The goal of building good theory 
means that understanding the case data in depth takes precedence over following a predefined research 
plan. Eisenhardt (1989a, p. 539) explicitly endorses making mid-course adjustments to the design in 
response to preliminary findings in the data. This “controlled opportunism” gives the flexibility to  make 
adjustments in order to improve the theory.  
During the investigation of the second case site visited during this study, an unexpected finding emerged 
that provided such an opportunity. In an organization that has been assigned the pseudonym “Theta” 
there were a number of characteristics which suggested that a great deal of creative appropriation would 
be found in the organization. Theta is a small and dynamic firm which is in a creative industry (they 
develop a certain type of software), and has a culture of innovation and experimentation. In my 
bootstrapping interview with the Chief Innovation Officer at Theta, he showed me several examples of 
products that they had developed which had no commercial application — just “to see if we could do it”. 
Developers at Theta are highly skilled and have great deal of autonomy in terms of how they work. Theta 
is a highly successful company, and has performed work for international industry leaders in their sector. 
They are also, within certain limits, free to choose the tools they feel most comfortable with. I expected, 
and so did the CIO, that there would be a significant number of interesting cases of novel appropriations 
of technology at Theta. The CIO and the rest of the management team checked, and found nothing. The 
managers were surprised by this result and re-surveyed the firm. They were unable to find any instances 
in which users within Theta had appropriated their tools in a non-standard manner. Given the fact that 
the Theta developers had Resources, such as technical skills and special talents; Techniques, such as work 
styles and management practices which were tailored to creativity; and Motivations for creative 
production such as creative drive (as reflected in their many successful projects) and reward structures 
that were aligned to creative action (Amabile, 1983, 1996); this finding was unexpected. 
I realized that a case like Theta — in which creative appropriation does not occur, despite the apparent 
presence of factors which may be expected to encourage creativity, could potentially explain a lot about 
creative appropriation. More importantly, it could also demonstrate, and help to explain, what ontological 
differences there might be between creative appropriation and other kinds of creativity. However, the 
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originally-planned approach — that of iteratively amassing lists of factors involved in successful cases of 
creative appropriation and integrating those factors into a synthetic variance model (Langley, 1999) — 
would not make adequate use of data from cases like Theta. In fact, if one is looking for factors which lead 
to creative appropriation, then where there is no case, there are no factors. Data from interesting 
situations like that at Theta would be lost.  
As a result of Theta, and other participant organizations at which there were unexpected results (the 
participant organizations and cases will be summarized in the next chapter), I decided to change the 
proposed form of the theory to be developed from synthetic variance (Langley, 1999) to mechanism-based 
(Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). A mechanism-based strategy can “detail the cogs and wheels of the causal 
process” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, p. 50), and can integrate different types of data from different types 
of outcomes. Mechanism-based theories can be built using a variety of philosophical assumptions, and the 
strategy is not dependent on critical realism (see Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 56-57). However critical 
realism does have the mechanism-based strategy at its heart (Wynn & Williams, 2012), and has been 
recommended as a suitable ontology for use in IS (Markus & Silver, 2008).  
Eisenhardt (1989a) acknowledges that her framework exhibits a positivist orientation. However, as I will 
demonstrate in the next section, the assumptions of her theory are, in fact, realist, and are compatible 
with CR. There are also examples in the literature of studies in which researchers have begun with one 
orientation or method, then changed to a critical realist perspective during analysis in order to take 
advantage of its rich models of causality, as Volkoff et al. (2007) – an exemplary critical realist study in IS 
(Wynn & Williams, 2012) – did when they used a critical realist lens to study data they had gathered using 
grounded theory as a method. I therefore decided to use a critical realist perspective to produce a 
mechanism-based explanation of creative appropriation. This led to the following adjustments to the 
study design. 
4.4 Integrating the Approaches  
As previously discussed, the (Eisenhardt, 1989a) roadmap posits eight steps, from the development of the 
initial research questions to the completion of the study. They are: 
1. Getting Started — defining research questions and, possibly, a priori constructs. No hypotheses 
or “theory” specified at this point 
2. Selecting Cases — Should specify the research population, and employ theoretical sampling, as 
per (Yin, 2009) 
3. Crafting instruments and protocols — multiple data collection methods, data types, and 
investigators for triangulation purposes 
4. Entering the field — overlapping data collection and analysis. Opportunistic data collection 
methods 
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5. Analyzing Data — within and cross-case analysis 
6. Shaping hypotheses — iterative tabulation of evidence; replication logic across cases; search 
for evidence of the “why” behind relationships 
7. Enfolding literature — comparison with convergent and divergent literature 
8. Reaching closure — sometimes dictated by pragmatic considerations, but ideally reached when 
theoretical saturation is attained 
Wynn and Williams (2012) in their framework for conducting critical realist case studies, lay out five 
‘principles’ for conducting such studies. They are: 
A. Explication of events — identify and abstract the events that are part of the phenomena being 
studied 
B. Explication of Structure and Context — Identify the structures (in the domain of the Real) 
that are part of the events being studied. Also identify relationships among the structures and 
elements of the environment which are relevant to the phenomenon being studied. Theoretically 
redescribe the events under analysis from the actors’ viewpoint to a theoretical perspective 
C. Retroduction — Identify and describe the powers and tendencies of the structures identified 
(i.e., the mechanisms), which may have generated the events that have been explicated and 
redescribed 
D. Empirical Corroboration — Ensure that the identified mechanisms have sufficient causal 
depth to form plausible explanations for the observed events. Also ensure that they provide better 
explanations than possible alternatives 
E. Triangulation and Multimethods — Employ multiple approaches, viewpoints, tools and 
perspectives in order to strengthen the causal explanations  
I set out to integrate both frameworks. Before examining them to see if they were structurally compatible, 
I first examined their underlying assumptions to see if they were epistemologically compatible. 
Eisenhardt (1989a) is explicit about the philosophical assumptions that underlie her framework: 
“… The process described here adopts a positivist view of research. That is, the process is 
directed toward the development of testable hypotheses and theory which are 
generalizable across settings.” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 546) 
She describes her approach as positivist, in that it is geared toward the development of theoretical 
representations which are testable and generalizable. A theory should be testable if it describes a property 
of external reality which is not merely a social construction of the researcher and can be examined from 
divergent perspectives. It should be generalizable if describes a property of the world which exists, and 
can have an effect in contexts other than the one in which it is initially observed. These are, at the core, 
realist assumptions. Eisenhardt (1989a) comes to them from a positivist position, and she emphatically 
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distinguishes her position from the constructivist perspective (see Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 28); 
however her basic assumptions are compatible with realist positions in general, and critical realism in 
particular. Further, I note that although her philosophical orientation is explicitly positivist, several of her 
recommendations, such as the use of multiple data types and multiple investigators (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 
538), demonstrate an implicit assumption of the subjective and fallible nature of human perception and 
measurement. This assumption has more in common with the critical realist assumption of 
epistemological relativity, than it does with classical positivist assumptions about measurement. This 
issue of epistemological misattributions, by practicing scientists who consider themselves positivist, but 
who hold assumptions more compatible with critical realist than classical positivist positions, has been 
discussed earlier in the thesis (Burton-Jones, 2005; Moldoveanu & Baum, 2002). There was therefore no 
epistemological reason why the frameworks should be incompatible.  
I therefore turned to an analysis of the structure of the two frameworks. Both describe case study 
research, encompassing the studying of phenomena in their natural environment, the use of multiple 
sources of evidence and analytical methods, an iterative process of investigation and the development of 
theoretically abstract explanations of phenomena. They differ in the form of theory that is developed: 
Eisenhardt (1989a) aims to develop theory that can be expressed in a series of theoretical statements such 
as research hypotheses. Critical realist case research aims to identify and describe mechanisms in the 
domain of the real that explain (or caused) the events under study. Another important dissimilarity is that 
Eisenhardt (1989a), like Yin (2009), recommends the use of multiple cases to increase confidence in the 
study findings, where possible. Wynn and Williams (2012) do not discourage the use of multiple cases, 
but they do suggest that because of the rigors of structural analysis, most critical realist case studies will 
have limited contexts. This will be discussed below.  
Eisenhardt (1989a) provides the overall framework for the empirical work that was performed. However, I 
discovered that Wynn and Williams (2012)’s principles for critical realist case research can integrate with 
the steps in Eisenhardt (1989a)’s roadmap for case research. Eisenhardt (1989a)’s first five steps, up to 
within-case analysis, all contain activities that can be subsumed under Wynn and Williams (2012)’s 
principle of Explication of Events: identifying what happened in each case. Eisenhardt (1989a)’s second 
activity within step five, cross-case analysis, can be subsumed under Wynn and Williams (2012)’s 
principle of Explication of Structure and Context: analyzing what underlying structures are common 
across cases, and theoretically redescribing events in the cases from a theoretical (structural) perspective. 
Eisenhardt (1989a)’s sixth step of Shaping Hypotheses can be subsumed under Wynn and Williams 
(2012)’s principle of Retroduction: the central analytical step in which the causal mechanisms (which are 
epistemologically similar to hypotheses) are identified and described. Finally, Eisenhardt (1989a)’s 
seventh and eighth steps can be subsumed under Wynn and Williams (2012)’s principle of Empirical 
Corroboration: rigorously comparing the mechanisms with the case evidence, as well as existing 
theoretical knowledge about the phenomenon under investigation, in order to ensure that the identified 
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mechanisms provide the best available explanation of the cases. Wynn and Williams (2012)’s fifth 
principle — Triangulation and Multimethods — can be applied at all steps of the project, and will be, in 
this study.  
The integrated model is summarized in table 3 below. 
Table 3: Integration of Eisenhardt with Wynn and Williams 
Integration of the Methods 
 Explication of Events 
o Getting Started 
o Selecting Cases 
o Crafting Instruments and Protocols 
o Entering the Field 
o Analyzing Data I: within-case analysis 
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 Explication of Structure and Context 
o Analyzing Data II: cross-case analysis 
 Retroduction 
o Shaping Hypotheses 
 Empirical Corroboration 
o Enfolding Literature 
o Reaching Closure 
 
One recommendation of both Eisenhardt (1989a) and Wynn and Williams (2012) that was not followed in 
this study is the recommendation that multiple investigators be involved in all aspects of the study. The 
recommendation that multiple perspectives and triangulation be applied has been followed. I have 
regularly consulted with my supervisors, and have conducted several presentations through the course of 
fieldwork and analysis to get feedback from colleagues and, in the later stages, partners in industry. 
However, because of the requirement that the work reported in this thesis be the candidate’s, all data 
collection, all data analysis and all major intellectual contributions in this thesis are my own. This is a 
limitation of the study, one that is likely common to most doctoral research.  
Wynn and Williams (2012) state that because critical realist case study research tends to focus on the 
specific structural entities involved in a given case, these studies will typically focus on a single, or limited 
context (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 804). This is an acceptable approach when the focus of the 
investigation — the thing to be explained — is the phenomenon that is observed. However, when the focus 
of the investigation is the mechanisms themselves, this strategy has obvious limitations. If a mechanism is 
observed in a single context, or observed to cause a single event, then the abductively derived 
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understanding of the (unobservable) mechanism will be limited to how it responds to the enabling, 
releasing and constraining conditions that were present that were present in that single context. A much 
richer picture of the mechanism and how it interacts with the environment would be gained if it were 
observed to operate in many dissimilar contexts. The arguments for the existence and operations of the 
mechanism would also be strengthened, which reflects the reasons why some case study methodologists 
tend to recommend the multi-case strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2009).  
Fortunately, both Wynn and Williams (2012) and Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) suggest a solution to the 
problem of structural analysis in multi-case designs where mechanisms are being derived: the use of 
theoretical knowledge about the phenomena being investigated to parse the case data. This strategy will 
be used in this study, and its application will be described in the next chapter. 
4.5 The New Design 
A critical realist investigation of a phenomenon involves making observations in the domain of the 
empirical, in order to abductively derive the existence of mechanisms in the domain of the real, which 
explain those observations. Wynn and Williams (2012) state that the research questions in a critical realist 
study must therefore seek to answer the question “What properties must exist for [the phenomenon of 
interest] to exist and to be what [it] is?” They also cite Danermark et al. (2002, p. 97)’s formulation: 
“What makes [the phenomenon of interest] possible?”. Mingers (2004c, p. 92) states that we ask what the 
world must be like in order for the phenomenon of interest to have occurred. The researcher must ask 
what mechanisms — what configuration of structures, powers and tendencies — must exist, in order to 
account for observed reality.  
For this study, having adopted a critical realist perspective, all earlier research questions were replaced 
with one single question: 
What mechanisms must exist in order to account for the observed instances of the 
creative appropriation of information systems? 
The new research question encapsulated the requirements for a critical realist explanation of the 
phenomenon of end user creativity. It required a description of the causal mechanisms that explain the 
phenomenon under investigation, that is, the creative appropriation of IT systems by end users. This 
question is primarily about existence — it requires that the researcher provide evidence that a mechanism 
or set of mechanisms exist, which explain the phenomenon. However, the question is also about 
description, it requires that the researcher describe the mechanisms and show how they can account for 
the instances of creative appropriation that have been observed. Those explanations must be contextually 
specific, each case is seen as a unique set of events and must be individually explained (Wynn & Williams, 
2012, p. 804), but the mechanisms themselves must be universal, in that they seek to provide a general 
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explanation of the phenomenon of creative user appropriation. This suggests that the structural analysis 
(Wynn & Williams, 2012) which identifies the mechanisms and their component structures should look at 
structures which are common to all incidents of creative appropriation, rather than contextually specific 
to any single incident.  
The identification of these mechanisms takes a particular form in critical realist research. It is not enough 
to simply identify that a mechanism is there, it must also be described. The description of a mechanism, 
according to Wynn and Williams (2012, p. 794) should include the conditions that encourage (enabling 
conditions), trigger (stimulus conditions) and remove impediments to (releasing conditions) the 
mechanisms, as well as showing how those conditions worked within the case context to cause the events 
that were observed. It must be restated for emphasis that critical realism assumes the social world to 
constitute an open system. The resulting multifinality and equifinality mean that the issue of 
generalizability takes on a specific meaning in critical realist research. Generalizing findings through 
statistical inference from a sample to a population is not an acceptable strategy for explanation in CR 
(Wynn & Williams, 2012), indeed, purely statistical explanations of phenomena are unacceptable in CR 
research (Tsoukas, 1989). Instead, descriptions of mechanisms must be comprehensive enough to explain 
how and why they led to an observed outcome, and, for example, how they might lead to a different 
outcome given a different set of conditions. The mechanisms must therefore demonstrate the kind of 
causal depth which supports sophisticated explanatory strategies, and are consistent with the observed 
evidence.  
It should be noted, however, that the revised research question at this point does not specify what type of 
mechanism must exist in order to explain the instances of creative appropriation. At this point in the 
study, the nature of the mechanisms had not yet been defined.  
In the following section, I will describe the analytical plan that was followed in order to identify and 
describe the mechanisms that are causally relevant in incidents of creative appropriation. 
4.6 Analytical Plan 
Like the philosophical assumptions being applied in the project, the analytical plan being followed in this 
research evolved over the course of the study. Initially, it involved a strategy of iteratively accumulating 
evidence in the form of propositional statements, following the strategies outlined by Eisenhardt (1989a), 
and testing those statements following the logic of A. S. Lee and Hubona (2009). For the reasons outlined 
above, the analytical plan of the study was adjusted.  
The actual plan which was finally adopted comprises seven steps, some of which are iterative. They are: 
1. First cycle coding of the case data using a priori constructs 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
106 
 
2. Construct narrative networks 
3. Code the narrative networks using AFT  
4. Retroductive Analysis 
5. Second cycle coding of the case data using mechanisms 
6. Construct framework matrices 
7. Describe the mechanisms using the aggregated evidence 
These steps fit into the framework for conducting critical realist research as per Wynn and Williams 
(2012). Each is described below. 
4.6.1 First Cycle Coding  
For each case, all available data, of whatever type, was collected, in keeping with the principles of 
Eisenhardt (1989a) and Yin (2009). However, in each non-negative case, the primary data source was 
semi-structured interviews utilizing the Critical Decision Method (G. A. Klein et al., 1989) instrument. 
These interviews were transcribed, and the transcript, along with an audio file of the actual interview, was 
imported into the NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis program. Also, if any of the supplementary data 
collected for the case was in a format that could be imported into NVivo (e.g., documentation files, 
presentations), I did so. For data sources which could not be imported (e.g., personal observations, 
software samples), I composed field notes, which were imported into NVivo.  
First cycle coding (Saldaña, 2009) of all the case data in NVivo was then carried out using the a priori 
constructs from (Amabile, 1996). 
4.6.2 Construct Narrative Networks 
The case data was then systematically reduced to narrative networks, following the principles of Pentland 
and Feldman (2007). Narrative networks are an analytical technique developed to identify and clarify the 
key story — the narrative — concealed in complex and voluminous case data. They isolate and describe the 
“series of events that make up the core story” (Pentland & Feldman, 2007, p. 782). Narrative networks are 
a versatile tool and can be used in many ways (Constantinides & Barrett, 2012; Goh, Gao, & Agarwal, 
2011; Yeow & Faraj, 2011). In this study, they are being used to reduce the data (Miles & Huberman, 
1999), and to isolate the key events that are part of the incidents of end user creativity.  
A more thorough explanation of narrative networks is included below.  
The construction of the narrative networks is a deeply analytical process. There are a large number of 
events involved in each case, but a relatively small number make up the “core”. The analysis of the overall 
case and teasing out of which events are key to the story constitute what Wynn and Williams (2012) call 
the “Explication of Events” principle. 
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4.6.3 Code the Narrative Networks using AFT 
The first step in the process of analysis in both Eisenhardt (1989a) and Wynn and Williams (2012) is the 
description of the events in the cases. Description of events includes details of actions, specific structural 
components, and importantly, the sequence of events (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 798). The importance 
of sequence justifies the use of the Narrative Network, which explicates sequence well. Narrative networks 
are explained in more detail below. According to Wynn and Williams (2012, p. 797), empirically observed 
experiences in the case data must be theoretically abstracted for analysis. The abstraction process in this 
study is done using Affordance Field Theory (AFT) constructs. 
AFT is a theoretical framework for describing the interaction between a (individual or collective) user and 
an IT system to perform a task (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006) that has been developed as a part of this 
study. AFT provides a set of conceptual objects, relationships between those objects, and actions, which 
together allow an abstract description of the actions that occur as users search for, identify and enact ways 
of using systems. The discovery and application of these abstract concepts constitute what Wynn and 
Williams (2012) describe as the Explication of Structure and Context. The nodes of the narrative network 
(i.e., the core events) are critically redescribed from an actor’s viewpoint into a theoretical perspective 
(Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 796) by coding the nodes of the narrative network with AFT constructs.  
The development of AFT is one of the major contributions of this thesis, and is described more fully in the 
next chapter. 
4.6.4 Retroductive Analysis 
Retroduction, the heart of a critical realist analysis, involves identifying the powers and tendencies of the 
identified structures that may have interacted to cause the observed events (Wynn & Williams, 2012). In 
other words, retroduction involves identifying and describing the mechanisms that are at the heart of the 
explanation developed in the study. This is done by asking a form of the question, “What mechanisms, if 
they existed, would account for the phenomenon to be explained?” (Mingers, 2004c; Wynn & Williams, 
2012). The coding of the narrative networks using AFT means that it will be possible to theoretically 
abstract away the contextual details of each specific case, and compare the information processing 
operations being conducted at a structural level. Retroduction is an abductive logic, and has the same 
logical form as retrodiction (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 799). However, retroduction involves identifying 
new mechanisms, while retrodiction involves using previously identified mechanisms to explain new 
outcomes. The retroductive process, in this study, will be complete when retrodictive logics are sufficient 
to describe all events in a given case. This will be discussed more fully in the section on closure. 
Although retroduction is the central principle involved in a critical realist analysis (Wynn & Williams, 
2012, p. 799), there is very little concrete guidance in the literature in term of specific steps, given the 
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intuitive and creative nature of the process (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 800). Retroductively deriving 
mechanisms is identical in logical structure to developing theory, a process for which there is precious 
little guidance in the published literature (Bourgeois III, 1979). Wynn and Williams recommend that a 
wide range of analytic approaches proposed by various authors working from various metatheoretical 
assumptions and methodological techniques be applied if helpful. In this study, I will apply the principles 
of theory construction proposed by Weick (1989). I will note the patterns of information processing that 
emerge from the case data, then conduct multiple thought trials (Weick, 1989, p. 522) to construct 
mechanisms which can explain those patterns. The underlying logic here is that when a mechanism is not 
perceptible, it can be identified, not by the ability be perceived, but an ability to do (Wynn & Williams, 
2012, p. 794). We can infer its existence from the observable experiences that we believe it has caused. As 
a check on the sufficiency and comprehensiveness of the set of mechanisms identified in the retroductive 
analysis, the nodes of the narrative networks will be recoded using the mechanisms as codes. If all the 
necessary mechanisms have been identified, all the nodes of the narrative network for each case (i.e., all 
the core events in each incident of creative appropriation) should be codable using the set of identified 
mechanisms.  
This step in the analysis will provide some empirical corroboration (Wynn & Williams, 2012) for the 
mechanisms, by demonstrating that they have the explanatory power to describe what is happening in 
each case. The mechanisms should be able to account for all the core events in each case.  
4.6.5 Second Cycle Coding  
Once a set of mechanisms has been identified and corroborated, the case data will undergo second cycle 
coding (Saldaña, 2009) using the mechanisms as codes. Each event that is analytically linked to the 
activation of a specific mechanism will be coded to that mechanism.  
It should be noted at this point that there is an inevitable stochastic element to this part of the analysis. 
Multifinality and equifinality mean that there will almost inevitably be multiple possible explanations for 
some events. This is an inevitable feature of any critical realist analysis. Wynn and Williams (2012) advise 
that in such situations, researchers must compare and contrast alternate possible explanations, and select 
the one that has the strongest explanatory power: a process they define as judgmental rationality (Wynn 
& Williams, 2012, p. 795). As explained by K. D. Miller and Tsang (2011, p. 148): “Even if a particular 
mechanism is not directly observable, the more observable effects that logically are attributable to the 
mechanism, the more compelling the case for its presence.” Given the fact that the mechanisms to be 
identified are cognitive information-processing mechanisms which, like many mechanisms in the domain 
of the real, are largely unobservable, judgment rationality will be applied in this study. 
The fact that, at some points in the analysis, it will be necessary to apply the researcher’s judgment to the 
question of which mechanism is active in a particular event is not as significant a limitation for this study 
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as it may appear on the surface. The goal of the study is to derive a set of mechanisms which can explain 
end user creativity in the appropriation process. The study aims to defend the existence of the 
mechanisms, rather than the facts of any specific case. I therefore submit that the most critical fact is 
whether or not the mechanisms can account for the observations in the case data.  
4.6.6 Construct Framework Matrices 
Narrative networks analyze the events which occur within a particular story, or narrative. They therefore 
serve the purpose of Eisenhardt (1989a)’s “within-case analysis” analytical step. However, a narrative 
network is a processual tool that is good at illuminating what effect a particular mechanism had on a 
particular event in a particular case, but is less optimal (given the way they are being constructed in this 
study) for cross-case analysis. To thematically analyze the effect of each mechanism across the cases, I will 
employ a tool developed by Ritchie and Spencer (2002), Framework Matrices. Since 2011, the 
Framework tools have been integrated into NVivo software. The second cycle coding of the data with the 
mechanisms will enable the automatic generation of framework matrices within NVivo from the case data. 
Further information on the Framework tools is given in a section below. 
The framework matrices will provide a thematic analysis of the activation of each mechanism across the 
different cases. This will add insight into the nature of each mechanism, and help to determine what 
contextual conditions interact with it and how; leading to a more comprehensive explanation and 
description of the mechanisms. It should be emphasized that there is no assumption of symmetry between 
the coding of the narrative networks and the framework matrices. The narrative networks represent an 
analytical reduction of the case data, while the framework matrices are run from the mechanism-coded 
raw data. The expectation is not that the framework matrices will reflect the narrative networks, but that 
each type of explanation will make sense. 
The logical forms of the narrative networks and the framework matrices — processual and thematic, 
respectively — are complementary, with each providing insights into a different aspect of the mechanisms. 
The two together provide further empirical corroboration of the set of mechanisms by demonstrating that 
they provide good explanations from either perspective. They also fulfill Wynn and Williams (2012)’s 
principle of triangulation and multimethods. By using multiple analytical and methodological techniques 
I increase the likelihood that the identified mechanisms represent the best possible explanation of the 
observed events. 
4.6.7 Describing the Mechanisms 
The evidence from the narrative networks and framework matrices will then be used to describe the 
mechanisms identified. The description of the mechanisms from the case evidence will be supplemented 
by descriptions of information processing mechanisms in the mind which conform to the patterns that the 
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mechanisms explain. Wynn and Williams (2012) provide guidelines on what elements are part of a 
description of a mechanism, and these will be followed.  
4.7 Analytical Tools 
In this section I will briefly discuss the most important analytical tools which will be applied in the study: 
narrative networks, and framework matrices. 
4.7.1 Narrative Networks 
Pentland and Feldman (2007) advocate the investigation of how technology is used in organizations by 
studying people going about their work, as they term it: “people using tools to do tasks” (emphasis theirs) 
((Pentland & Feldman, 2007, p. 781). This conceptualization is symmetrical with the definition of system 
use by Burton-Jones and Straub (2006), as a “user’s employment of one or more features of a system to 
perform a task” (emphasis mine) (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006, p. 231). This tripartite conceptualization 
of usage (of which appropriation is a type) suggests that each element must be examined in order to fully 
understand an incident of system utilization in context; a conclusion formalized in Burton-Jones and 
Straub (2006)’s concept of rich measures of usage.  
A tool developed by Pentland and Feldman (2007) for examining this interaction of users (people) and 
systems (tools) and tasks is narrative networks (Pentland & Feldman, 2007). A narrative network is a way 
of making visible the actions that make up a particular interaction of the elements of using a system. The 
term “narrative” in narrative networks is not meant in the sense of “rich description of contextual 
information”, but rather on eliciting the set of events that make up the “core story” in a perhaps complex 
incident (Pentland & Feldman, 2007, p. 782). The philosophical assumptions behind narrative networks 
borrow from a number of theoretical perspectives. From structuration theory, Pentland and Feldman 
(2007) borrow the principle that what a technological artifact is is enacted — determined by what is done 
with it — rather than inherent (Giddens, 1984; Orlikowski, 2000). From actor-network theory, they 
borrow the principle of translation — a technology is not what its designers or implementers intend it to 
be, but what its users enact it as. They also borrow the principle that actants can be both human and non-
human objects, and that those objects form networks which are defined by associations between actors 
(Latour, 1991). From the theory of organizational routines, they borrow the concept that the tasks for 
which IT systems are used tend to be embedded in organizational routines which define them, routines 
that have both ostensive and performative aspects. The ostensive aspects define the activity and provide a 
general script for the actions that constitute it. That is, they define the activity in principle (Latour, 1986). 
For example, “paying a phone bill online” could ostensively involve: logging on to the phone company’s 
website; checking the amount owning; clicking the “Pay Now” button; entering credit card details; 
confirming payment. On the other hand, the performative aspects include concrete, specific details of each 
performance of the routine; performances which, while exemplars of the ostensive process, may be both 
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improvisational and unique. That is, they define the activity in practice (Latour, 1986). For example, “me 
paying my phone bill online” could performatively involve: logging on to the phone company’s website; 
checking the amount owning; disagreeing with the amount shown on the site; checking my phone’s call 
records; calling the customer service line; etc. They also borrow the concept that there may be many 
perspectives to any story of a series of events, based on the perspective of each actant (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003). 
A narrative network is constructed by first, choosing a point of view from which to tell the “story”. The 
researcher then collects data on the things that happened in the incident, and assembles them into 
narrative fragments. Narrative fragments are pieces of narrative, each relatively short (Pentland & 
Feldman, 2007, p. 788), describing a single event. Each narrative fragment answers the question: what 
happened? A narrative fragment consists of at least two actants, and some kind of action that occurs with 
or between them. Fragments are considered the nodes of the network. The final part of constructing the 
narrative network is to arrange the nodes in sequence. The final sequence (the fully-constructed narrative 
network) answers the initial question “what happened?” at the beginning of the network, then answers the 
question “what happened next?” at each subsequent node until the termination of the network. In this 
study, I will use the researcher’s point of view: synthesizing all the available collected evidence into the 
best possible account of what actually took place in each case. Narrative networks reflect model time 
rather than clock time. 
Narrative networks are versatile tools, and have been used in a wide range of prior studies (Boos, Grote, & 
Lehtonen, 2009; Constantinides & Barrett, 2012; Hayes, Lee, & Dourish, 2011; Sammon, Nagle, & 
McAvoy, 2012; Yeow, 2009; Yeow & Faraj, 2011). They can be used to represent routines, potential 
actions, hypothetical actions, isolates (actions not connected to other nodes on the network), analyze 
frequencies of links, etc. (see Pentland & Feldman, 2007, pp. 791-792). In this project, not all the potential 
uses of the technique will be explored. The narrative networks constructed in this project will primarily be 
used as straightforward reductions of the case data. Multiple sources of data will be used to establish what 
happened and when, and this will be coded into narrative fragments, arranged by sequence, and complied 
into a narrative network. However, there may be times when different data sources offer conflicting 
accounts of the same event. In such cases, the narrative network will be constructed to show branching 
possible events, and each will be analyzed and coded using AFT, then the mechanisms. The test will be, 
not the absolute truth of each account of the event (which may not be provable), but the ability of the 
mechanisms to construct a plausible explanation for each possible narrative of the event.  
4.7.2 Framework Matrices 
The data collected in this project will be managed in a case study database as recommended by (Yin, 
2009). The case data will be managed in the NVivo software package and the project journals, interviews, 
and models generated during data collection, as well as any supplementary data or supporting 
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documentation that can be digitized, will be stored in the software. If hard copy documents or other 
physical artifacts are collected as part of the case data, they will be stored securely and records of them 
will be created in NVivo and stored in the case database using the guidelines proposed by Miles and 
Huberman (1999). All coding, transcription, modeling and analysis will be conducted in NVivo.  
The features of NVivo that facilitate framework analysis will be used to support the empirical 
corroboration of the mechanisms. Framework analysis, developed at the UK National Center for Social 
Research (NatCen) by Ritchie and Spencer (2002), is a comprehensive methodology for analyzing 
qualitative data, designed for  policy analysts. The entire framework analysis protocol will not be utilized, 
but a key tool  within that protocol — what Ritchie and Spencer (2002) term “charting” — which is 
supported by NVivo, will be used to thematically reanalyze the case data using the software. Charting is a 
data reduction process in which two-dimensional charts are constructed in which cases are placed in rows 
and themes (called ‘indexes’ in Framework) are arranged in columns and matched to the cases. In 
framework methodology, summaries of the relationships between themes and cases are placed in each 
intersecting cell that is formed in the chart. The strength of using the tool in NVivo comes from the fact 
that the summaries of the effects of each mechanism in each case can be linked directly to the data in that 
case that is coded to the mechanism.  
It should also be noted that while Ritchie and Spencer (2002) say little about the explicit philosophical 
orientation of the method, NatCen’s own internal training materials have identified the approach as “ 
‘critical realist’, or ‘pragmatic’ ” (Wardle, 2011, p. 2). In this study, the mechanisms which have been 
identified using retroductive analysis of the narrative networks will be reanalyzed using framework 
matrices. The mechanisms will be used as themes, and summaries of the operation of the mechanism 
within each case will be placed in the intersection.  
4.8 Enfolding Literature 
The mechanisms identified in the study are information-processing mechanisms that are part of human 
cognitive systems. There is a long tradition in cognitive science of modeling the operations of the mind as 
a set of information-processing mechanisms (Bechtel, 2008; Boden, 2004). This study extends that 
tradition by using the lens of distributed cognition to propose mechanisms that occur at the level of both 
individual and embodied distributed cognitive systems (Thagard, 2012). If these mechanisms truly exist, 
then there should be evidence of them in the extensive literature that exists on the operations of the mind, 
and those of the extended systems which form part of the distributed cognitive system. This does not 
mean that the retroductive analysis will be constrained by the structure of existing cognitive theories (see 
Weick, 1989, p. 516), but that the kinds of patterns that the mechanisms imply should to some extent be 
observable in the prior literature (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011). The reasoning follows the critical realist 
principle of Triangulation (Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
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This study will not attempt to “falsify” or “test” the mechanisms retroductively derived, apart from the 
empirical corroboration that is a part of the research design. However, to support the findings, and 
provide an additional source of evidence triangulation, examples from literatures such as those on 
creativity, cognitive science, the history of science, and philosophy, will be enfolded into the analysis, to 
strengthen the case for the explanation provided by the mechanisms. 
4.9 Closure 
Eisenhardt (1989a) notes that there are two important aspects to the issue of how to define the point of 
closure, when the study should be terminated. The first aspect is when to stop adding cases to the study: 
i.e., when to stop collecting data. Ideally, this should be done when theoretical saturation is reached. That 
is, when the marginal learning from each case becomes small, because what is being seen has been seen 
before. While Eisenhardt (1989a, p. 545) notes that pragmatic considerations (e.g., resource and time 
constraints) can influence this decision, the goal of theoretical saturation is the ideal, and will be aimed 
for in this study. The second aspect of closure is when to stop iterating between theory and data: i.e., when 
to stop data analysis. Again, the ideal is saturation, which is again described as the point at which the 
incremental improvement in the theory being developed is small. Of course, given the iterative nature of 
data collection and analysis in Eisenhardt (1989a)’s framework, these two aspects of closure are highly 
interconnected. 
In this study, the question of how to define the point at which theoretical saturation is reached is 
addressed as follows. Since the goal of the study is to identify the set of mechanisms that explain creative 
appropriation in a general sense, rather than in a specific context, it will be important to verify that each 
mechanism identified is causally effective under different circumstances. The cases selected will therefore 
be theoretically replicated to ensure that each case context has distinct characteristics. Theoretical 
saturation for data collection will be defined as the point at which: 
1. The set of mechanisms identified is sufficient to code each node of the narrative network in each 
case 
2. Every mechanism has been observed to be effective in more than one case. That is, each 
mechanism is corroborated, in the sense of A. S. Lee and Hubona (2009) 
3. Adding a new case does not result in the discovery of any new mechanisms, or result in a 
significant reformulation of already-identified mechanisms 
For data analysis, theoretical saturation will be defined as the point at which I have satisfactorily shown 
that the hypothesized mechanisms sufficiently approximate reality. This point will be reached when the 
empirical corroboration of the identified mechanisms is complete. Wynn and Williams (2012) list criteria 
for evaluating casual explanations based on mechanisms from a realist perspective based on Runde 
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(1998), by applying rigorous empirical scrutiny to the findings. They are based on the following causal test 
questions: 
1) Are the causal factors of the phenomenon actually manifest in the context? 
2) If the causal factors were part of the context, were those factors causally effective? 
3) Do the causal factors provide a satisfactory explanation to the intended audience? 
4) Does the proposed mechanism provide causal depth? 
When each of these questions has been addressed for the set of mechanisms identified as a whole, 
analytical saturation will be defined as having been reached.  
4.10 Discussion 
A key benefit of the case study approach is the ability to make use of opportunities presented by the data. 
In this study, I will use complementary analytical techniques to pull apart the data in the explication of 
events, and the analysis of the structures in context, as recommended by Wynn and Williams (2012). I will 
do so in a way that is fully consistent with the Eisenhardt (1989a) framework. The combination of 
narrative networks and framework matrices addresses a specific problem identified in chapter 2 that is 
endemic to studies of appropriation in field contexts. Together they can capture the performative aspects 
of an ostensive series of events, making them a suitable set of lenses through which to look at creative 
appropriation in context. Together with the opportunistic use of replication logic (Yin, 2009) to find 
informative patterns in the data, the methodology above provides a solid foundation for the retroductive 
analysis that is central to this project. 
It should also be noted that the mixing of processual and thematic logics in this study mirrors the 
approach of Eisenhardt in her studies of strategic decision-making (Bourgeois III & Eisenhardt, 1988b; 
Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois III, 1988). These were part of the foundation for the 
development of her theory-building roadmap and are cited several times in Eisenhardt (1989a).  
Overall, the approach attempts to follow the advice of Easton (2000) to be both rigorous and creative, 
employing creativity to study creativity.  
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Chapter 5. Case Studies 
5.1 Introduction 
The data collected in the study was analyzed from two perspectives. There was a nomothetic holistic 
analysis of all the data, including natural experiments, negative cases, and overall observations. There was 
also an ideographic atomistic analysis of several selected cases. As a general rule, the atomistic analyses 
were used to identify and describe the mechanisms, while the holistic analyses contributed insight into 
how the mechanisms work together as a system. The atomistic analyses are based primarily on narrative 
accounts of incidents in which systems were creatively appropriated by users. As Leonardi (2011, p. 155) 
notes for reading chains of imbrications, the choice of a case boundary is largely arbitrary. A number of 
starting points could easily be argued for each case, it could be defined as when the main characters were 
trained, or when the background factors of the case came into being. The boundaries set in each of these 
cases was determined both by the researcher’s judgment and the limitations of access to data in each case. 
This is a limitation of much real-world case research (Yin, 2009).  
In this chapter I will follow Yin (2009)’s “fourth strategy” for reporting multiple-case studies by not 
attempting to completely describe each case, but rather defending the findings from abbreviated vignettes 
about what happened in different contexts (Yin, 2009, pp. 172-173). I will summarize the data collection 
exercise as a whole, then I will focus in on the cases, providing brief descriptions of each organization, and 
describing what happened that contributes to knowledge about the mechanisms. I will then briefly 
describe the procedure that was followed for measuring the “creativity” of the appropriation process in 
each case. I will then describe the initial observations and reasoning that led to the modification of the 
study to a critical realist perspective.  
5.2 Summary of Data Collection 
The data described below was collected over the course of 14 months from May 2012 to July 2013. The 
data was collected in organizations in three cities across New Zealand. Participant organizations were 
identified through contacts in industry, as well as referrals from existing participants and colleagues in the 
Human Interface Technology (HIT) Lab, New Zealand. In each organization in which I collected data, the 
process began with the identification of, and initial meetings with, a participant within the organization 
who served as main informant. In some cases, such as the organization called Alpha below, the approval 
of the main informant (the CEO) was sufficient to gain access to the organization. In other cases, such as 
the organization called Eta below — a medical device manufacturer — collecting data required me to be 
cleared for access to sensitive internal information, and approval had to be gained from the company’s 
parent company overseas before I was able to collect data.  
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In each organization I sought to identify incidents in which end users had appropriated an IT system in a 
way which could potentially be rated as creative. When such incidents were identified, I then checked to 
see if the criteria for case selection outlined in the section “Case Selection and Protocols” was fulfilled in 
terms of the data that was available, and whether the case was an appropriate theoretical replication — 
i.e., was sufficiently dissimilar from previous cases to promise to give relevant additional information. In 
the four organizations where such cases were found, I followed the procedure outlined in the case study 
protocol. Not all cases of which I became aware were included in the study. For example, in one company 
I was told of a case of creative appropriation that was interesting, but which could not be further 
investigated without putting participants at risk (an internal system had been used in a legal, but officially 
unsanctioned, manner). This case, and the company, were therefore dropped from the study. 
In two organizations, I found conditions that classical theories of creativity would suggest were highly 
conducive to creative action, but where no creative appropriation had occurred. This was very interesting 
in light of the open question about whether the determinants of creative appropriation were somehow 
different from those where creative action was an explicit goal of the creative actor. I dubbed these 
organizations “negative case” organizations, and collected data that I thought was relevant in them. In the 
“negative case” organizations I followed a similar procedure to the case study protocol, but replaced the 
Critical Decision Method (CDM) semi-structured interview protocol with an unstructured exploratory 
interview protocol.  
In two of the organizations in which I collected data, I did not collect data on specific individual cases, but 
rather observed organization-level trends that gave insight about the nature of the determinants of 
creative appropriation, and contributed to the theory that was developed. Following Yin (2009), I used 
replication logic in each of these cases, treating them as natural experiments that gave insights into the 
nature of the appropriation process. I describe those organizations and the data I got from them in the 
section “Natural Experiments” below.  
Finally, once the theory described in the later chapters of the thesis had been developed, it had to be 
compared to reality to see if it could generate plausible explanations for real-world events in other 
contexts. I went into two organizations in which making sense of user appropriation behaviors is an 
intrinsic part of their regular operations. One is a technology consultancy that specializes in developing 
custom bespoke IT-based system solutions for industry clients. The other is a penetration-testing firm, 
which tests and certifies the security of websites that handle confidential data by running simulated 
hacking attacks against those sites. I conducted confirmatory unstructured interviews with experts from 
each company as part of the Empirical Corroboration phase of the project. 
In all I conducted data collection in ten organizations concerning 18 cases in which IT systems were 
appropriated in ways that were novel, useful, and new to the users who were involved in the appropriation 
process. Five of those 18 cases were investigated in depth using the CDM technique. I conducted 49 
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formal interviews, and had a large number of informal conversations and interactions with staff in the 
participant organizations. In addition, I collected documentation, archival records, made direct 
observations and collected physical artifacts, to collect as many types of data as were available on each 
case (Yin, 2009). In addition to interviews and collection of archival data, I also conducted discussions 
with industry experts, and conducted meetings and workshops with innovation specialists and engineers 
from industry. The cases for which I conducted CDM interviews were rated for creativity using a 
procedure based on (Amabile, 1982, 1996)’s Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT). I conducted five 
rating interviews, including pilot and test interviews, which will be described in the next section.   
5.3 Measuring Creativity in the Cases 
Creativity researchers have been accused of not knowing what they are talking about, according to 
Amabile (1996, p. 19). That is a somewhat tongue-in-cheek characterization of a serious issue for 
creativity researchers: the “criterion problem” (Amabile, 1982, 1983; Batey & Furnham, 2006). In order 
for studies of creativity to establish content validity, they must confirm that what they are studying is, in 
fact, “creative”. While there are many ways of defining “creativity”, there has to be an underlying 
consensus on the meaning of the term in order for studies to measure a common thing (see 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p. 24). The current consensus in studies of creativity has tended toward treating 
creativity as a matter of consensus among suitable raters about the “creativity” of a product. The most 
commonly-applied technique for performing this measurement is the Consensual Assessment Technique 
(CAT) (Hennessey & Amabile, 1998; R.K. Sawyer, 2012), commonly attributed to Amabile (1982), 
although R.K. Sawyer (2012) credits Csikszentmihalyi (1965) with the first usage. 
The CAT is one of the most widely accepted methods of measuring creativity in research. It involves the 
independent assessment of the creative product by appropriate raters. Appropriate raters are individuals 
who are familiar with the domain in which the creative product is produced. There is conflicting evidence 
on whether judges need to be expert in the domain, but they do need to be familiar enough to know the 
rules of the domain (Amabile, 1996). The measurement method employed in this study was based on the 
CAT.  
In order to measure the creativity of the specific appropriation incidents that were chosen for the study, 
anonymized descriptions of the events and contexts involved was necessary. Constructing these 
descriptions presented unique challenges. The descriptions had to be detailed enough to allow a rater to 
judge the level of creativity that the incident represented. However, they could not be so detailed as to 
compromise participant anonymity, or to give away participants’ intellectual property. The descriptions 
were constructed and printed on single-sided paper sheets. The ratings were done in interviews in which 
each rater was presented with one sheet at a time to assess. Raters were asked to use their own definition 
of what was “creative”, as in Amabile and Gryskiewicz (1987). In conformance with the CAT, the order in 
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which the sheets were presented in each interview was determined by a random sorting algorithm, so that 
presentation order did not bias the data. Also, every rater had to be shown the exact same sheet for each 
case. While the rating exercise was being conducted, raters were invited to ask any questions for 
additional details they thought were necessary to make their judgments. Afterward, they were asked to 
explain the criteria they had used to make their judgments in each case.  
Three major issues emerged during the conduct of this exercise. The first was that critical facts about the 
cases, which were relevant to the rating of the “creativity” of the individuals involved in the case, almost 
invariably emerged after data collection was started. To address this issue, I decided that each case would 
be rated only after all its data had been collected and analyzed. Only the five cases that were fully analyzed 
(i.e., had full CDM interviews done with participants and had narrative networks and framework matrices 
constructed), were part of the final rating exercise. 
The second issue was that the domain which the raters had to be familiar with is not well defined. In a 
study of creative pianists, for example, it would be simple to define the kind of expertise that is relevant to 
judging their output. However there are a wide range of activities which can be said to fall into the 
category of “appropriating IT systems”. This created a challenge in terms of identifying the specific 
expertise that was required by raters. For example, in an early trial, one rater — a highly trained 
postdoctoral computer science researcher — was unable to draw on any frame of reference beside himself 
and his research colleagues for assessing what was creative. This made his rating criteria inappropriate for 
cases involving users who were not computer scientists. 
 In the final analysis, I used three highly experienced expert raters (J. C. Kaufman, Baer, & Cole, 2009) 
who shared the following characteristics: 
 Long experience  
 Experience in field or industry settings  
 Broad range of experience 
 Not otherwise involved in the project 
The third issue had to do with what details should be in the case descriptions. For example, in one trial, a 
rater made a judgment explicitly based on the fact that he knew that a certain type of software was 
commonly used in certain way. This revealed that the date when the incident he was rating occurred (20 
years before, when that type of software had just been introduced), was a relevant detail. The case 
description therefore had to be expanded to include the date. Because each rater had to receive the exact 
same description to rate, this meant that the exercise had to be started over.  
In the end, the five cases that had narrative networks created for them were all rated as creative by at least 
two independent raters. The raters chosen were all experts in computer technology who also had extensive 
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experience and expertise in working with end users. Each rater came from a different professional 
background: one was a software developer, one an industry consultant, and one an IT support 
professional. No rater rated all five cases as “creative” and interesting differences in the criteria that were 
applied by different raters emerged during discussions. However, each of the five cases was rated creative 
by at least two of the raters.  
The divergent criteria applied to cases by raters from different backgrounds proved interesting and, in 
some cases, unexpected. It suggests that this would be a fruitful area for future work. However, it is 
outside the scope of the present study. 
5.4 The Case Data 
In the following sections I will briefly describe the participant organizations in which I collected data. I 
will describe the organization, and what it does; who my informants within the organization were; what 
happened in each organization and, where relevant, what happened in the case(s) of creative 
appropriation that occurred within them.  
The organizations are sorted into categories by the kind of data that I collected in each.  
 In the Creative Incident Cases section are the organizations in which I conducted full CDM 
interviews, then constructed narrative networks and framework matrices to describe the data. 
Analysis of data from these cases led to the identification of the mechanisms that form the core of 
the findings reported for this study 
 In the Negative Cases section I list the organizations in which no cases of creative appropriation 
were found, despite the existence of conditions that seemed to be conducive to it occurring. 
Analyzing what was happening in these organizations helped to shape my retroductive analysis. 
The mechanisms I have identified can explain why no creative appropriation happened in these 
organizations.  
 In the Natural Experiments section are two organizations in which analyzing developments at the 
collective level using replication logic added important insights about creative appropriation. This 
helped to shape the retroductive analysis. 
 In the Corroborative Interviews section I describe two organizations which have the 
development of use cases and the analysis of user appropriation behaviors at the core of their 
business processes. One is a system development firm, the other a security consultancy. As part of 
my empirical corroboration exercise, I interviewed the CEO/founder at one, and a consultant at 
the other. The feedback I got in each was consistent with what I expected from the findings from 
the analysis.  
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5.4.1 Creative Incident Cases 
These are the firms in which I performed primary data collection, and which provided the data for the 
narrative networks and framework matrices. In each of these firms, I had one primary informant who 
gave me access and enabled me to collect data within the organization.  
A brief description of the firm, the case (in one firm, cases), and the context is provided below.  
5.4.1.1 Zeta 
Zeta is a large university in the South Island of New Zealand. It was established approximately 200 years 
ago and has close to 1,000 staff and 20,000 registered students. Zeta offers undergraduate and 
postgraduate courses in a wide variety of disciplines. Many of the courses taught at Zeta have an 
integrated Information Technology component. However, the use of IT at Zeta is also integrated into the 
administration of the institution. For example, all registered students receive a login account that can be 
used to access online library resources, pay for printing and scanning, and access other services. This 
account is synchronized across all the university services that can be accessed over the internet. My 
principal informant was a university lecturer in the Computer Science department who I will identify as 
RF. 
Zeta’s Learning Management System (LMS) is an adaptation of the open-source Moodle learning 
management application. Moodle has been integrated into the teaching and evaluation activities of many 
courses at the university and it is one of the official sources of information at the institution. All students 
at Zeta are required to have globally unique log-ins which are tied to the Moodle system through the 
university’s LDAP directory. For its purposes, Zeta has installed and configured Moodle on its web 
servers, and has named its LMS to conform to the university’s legal branding requirements. Because 
replicating the university’s branded name for the LMS would compromise the anonymity of the 
institution, in this document the implemented LMS at Zeta will be identified as “Socrates”. 
Ever since his arrival at Zeta in 2004, RF had been frustrated by the limitations of the LMS system’s 
testing abilities. Because of the number of students, it was not practical to give them constant individual 
feedback on each of their projects, so automated testing was necessary to reinforce learning as well as to 
assign partial grades for the course. There were three major ways in which grades were assigned during 
the course: a final examination, a major project, and in-course quizzes. The exam was not useful for 
learning purposes since it occurred at the end of the term. There was an ‘autotester’ system so that 
students could submit partial work for the major project and get feedback on how well it was being done. 
However, the autotester ran as a nightly batch job every 24 hours. That meant that the students could 
receive feedback on their work only once per day. RF was unsatisfied with the version of the autotester 
that was there when he arrived, and wrote a new version that improved on it. 
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The most regular source of feedback that the students got was in the short quizzes which were given to 
reinforce what was taught in lectures. Students who took these quizzes got immediate feedback on 
whether their answers were correct. However, the kinds of questions that Moodle allowed instructors to 
write did not let the students practice writing code - which RF felt was absolutely necessary for learning. 
Workarounds which allowed students to work with code were very demanding, and still did not allow for 
the crafting of the kinds of questions he wanted.  
RF spent years making incremental improvements in the LMS-based system, trying to design different 
ways to develop and test the skills he wanted to enhance in his students. In 2009, he first encountered a 
website that allowed users to practice coding by writing small programs to accomplish tasks on the site. 
He recognized that it provided the kind of functionality that he wanted in his quizzes, but it was not, by 
itself, useful for his courses. After thinking through the challenges and the desired functionality over the 
course of several months, he wrote a module for testing blocks of Python code that he called 
“PythonCode” (name changed). This module was deployed and tested on a Moodle development server. 
After PythonCode was found to be functioning properly, the lecturer contacted the university’s IT support 
team to get it deployed on Zeta’s main Moodle server. A difficulty arose because the version of Moodle 
deployed on the main servers did not support functions that were needed by PythonCode. This was 
resolved by deciding to let the students in RF’s class log in to the development server. A long collaborative 
process between RF and several staff members in the IT department ensued to get the module working 
properly with the university’s environment and to provision the development server so that it could 
handle the load imposed by RF’s class. IT renamed the module to “PySoc” (name changed) to match Zeta’s 
LMS naming convention.  
After the initial technical problems were dealt with, PySoc became a very useful and highly-regarded 
teaching tool that is well spoken of by all the lecturers and tutors who use it. A colleague of RF’s who also 
teaches the same class and has taught Python in the department before and after the implementation of 
PySoc, described it as “infinitely better” teaching with the module. Letting the students write code to 
answer questions “makes more sense” and makes it easier for them to get the concepts being taught. 
5.4.1.2 Beta 
Beta is a manufacturing company that operates in a number of countries, including Australia, New 
Zealand and China. In NZ, their main activity involves designing, taking orders from customers for, and 
planning and coordinating the manufacture and shipment of their main product. To protect the 
intellectual property of the company, the product that they manufacture will be identified in this thesis as 
“widgets”. All manufacturing of widgets is currently done at a factory in China. My principal informant 
was the IT manager of the company, who I will call MC. 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
122 
 
Beta has been in business for over 40 years and was started by a pair of business partners who still run the 
company. Throughout that time its principal business activity has been the design and manufacture of 
widgets. It does not sell widgets directly to the public, but to resellers who stock them in retail outlets. 
Originally, the design of widgets was done using an electronic device designed for the purpose — Plotter — 
and the company’s manufacturing operations were carried out at a factory in NZ by staff who had been 
trained to work with Plotter. However, when demand increased, it became necessary to outsource some of 
the manufacturing operations, and the company entered into a business relationship with a factory in 
China. The factory was not familiar with Plotter, and so a special set of documents was designed to give 
the factory instructions on how each widget should be built and which materials should be used for each 
part. The unit costs of building a widget were much lower at the China factory, and eventually all widget 
production was moved overseas. 
About 20 years ago, a crisis occurred at Beta because of a rapid increase in the volume of business. 
Different “lines” of widgets have specific designs and specifications. The specification documents for each 
shipment of widgets were sent to China by fax. However, with the large numbers of shipments, version 
control problems began developing, and shipments would arrive from China that had outdated or 
incorrect specifications. When this happened, there would be disputes with the factory about what 
instructions had been sent and when, making it difficult to determine who was responsible for the spoiled 
shipments. Communicating with the factory by fax became unwieldy and unsustainable.  
In the New Zealand widget industry, access to personal computers and the internet was rare at that time, 
but Beta acquired a PC and an internet account for testing purposes. The supervisor of the production 
department — who I will call KT — had a discussion with her manager about the losses, both in terms of 
time and money, because of the problems that were developing with the factory. KT then had a discussion 
with JG, a member of her staff in the department who had been “playing around” with the computer. One 
of the software packages that was on the computer was an office productivity application that I will 
identify as Product. JG used some features of Product to develop an electronic representation of the 
information that was included in Beta’s specification sheets that were sent to the factory. JG, along with 
KT and her manager, refined the Product document so that it could substitute for the physical document 
that was then being faxed to the factory. The files from the productivity application could be sent via email 
to the factory, and the emails provided an automatic way of time stamping each set of documents. 
Over time, the production team became increasing familiar with Product. Also, the feature set of Product 
grew as it was regularly updated by the software company that produced it. As a result, much more 
sophisticated procedures such as the graphical representations of design elements and automated quality 
control steps were built into the software-mediated communications with the factory.  MC, the current IT 
manager at Beta, expresses surprise that the production department continues to use Product, since 
specialized software tools that are designed specifically for designing widgets exist in the market. He has 
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got them to try several of these packages to see if they prefer them to working in Product, however the 
production team rejected them all.  
The production department feels that the Product process they developed is optimal for the collaborative 
and iterative design process they employ. The specialized packages were focused on the initial design 
process, but did not allow them to modify designs or work with other stakeholders in the way that Product 
does. Also, in the widget industry, certain design elements are key differentiators for particular brands. 
Product allows them to modify previously-designed widgets in order to develop their new lines, which 
saves time and effort, while enabling them to retain the unique design signatures of their own brands of 
widget. The Product system is now intrinsic to the design process for Beta widgets, and is a critical part of 
their business. Product, it should be noted, is an office productivity system originally designed to be used 
for functions such as budgeting and inventory management.  
Several years after the initial development of the Product system, the founders of Beta decided that the 
company had outgrown their own style of leadership, and needed professional management. They hired a 
team of professional managers which included a CEO, and an IT manager, who I will call RR. The hiring 
of the new executives was part of an effort by the founders to formalize their internal processes and 
increase efficiency, since rapid growth in their order volumes was making a number of business processes 
more difficult to manage. One particularly difficult process was communicating with customers about 
what types of widgets they wanted to buy, and in what quantities. Beta would receive relatively small 
orders for each line of widgets from each customer. When the orders were collated, they would then 
decide which lines of widgets could be economically manufactured, given the total number of orders. 
Several lines would typically be dropped at that point in the process, and the prices of some lines would 
have to be adjusted in order to make them profitable. The adjusted catalogue would then go out again to 
customers to enable them to make necessary changes to their orders based on the adjustments that had 
been made.  
All the communication necessary to manage this process had traditionally been done using a large, 
printed order book, copies of which were physically distributed to the customers. As the volume of orders 
increased, this system became increasingly untenable. Small errors, such as differences between the 
product codes in the order book and those in the company’s internal inventory management system, 
would mean time-consuming delays and frustrated orders by customers. In addition to the inefficiencies 
created by errors, the sheer volume of work required to run the manual system was making it impossible 
meet production deadlines. The merchandise manager, who I will call AN, discussed the situation with the 
new IT manager, RR. AN and RR agreed that there was a need to improve the efficiency of the ordering 
process, while maintaining the configurability and verifiability of the manual process. RR had several 
meetings with the marketing and customer relations staff, then went away to develop a solution.  
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RR designed a system which automated the ordering process using an electronic file generated by 
Product. The information that had previously been sent to customers in the paper order book was 
transferred into Product, and was sent to customers via email. Email made it easier to manage the 
communications with customers, and the files from these orders were returned to the IT manager after 
they had been filled out by customers. Information from their finalized order files (in Product) was then 
typed into Beta’s ERP package for order processing. The IT manager became deeply involved in each step 
of the ordering process. The production of the electronic file with the order options for widgets was done 
by RR, who was also responsible for uploading the finalized order files to the ERP.  
A few years after this system had been put into effect, the IT manager that had replaced the paper order 
book with a Product file resigned, and MC — the current IT manager — was hired to take her place. MC 
was highly dissatisfied with the large amount of manual processing that was involved in the processing of 
customer orders. MC had significant experience as a software engineer, and spent the first three weeks on 
the job automating the process of creating the Product order book. His initial goal was to reduce errors: 
the (then) current system made it possible to type in combinations of options for widgets that were not 
actually available, and a lot of time was spent dealing with data entry errors on the part of Beta and/or its 
customers. He also wished to move responsibly for the ordering process to the sales department, which 
was formally responsible for it. He then designed an intermediary system which would automatically 
“scrape” order configurations from the completed Product order files and load them into the ERP. He also 
designed automated reports that enabled the sales department to accomplish much of the checking and 
verification that had previously been done by RR. This arrangement makes his involvement in the actual 
ordering process minimal.  
This researcher noticed an apparent similarity in the solutions that were developed for both the spec sheet 
and order book processes. Both were triggered by similar pressures being placed on a largely manual 
system. Both were similar in concept: convert the manual files to electronic files that were more versatile, 
and could be sent via email for automatic time stamping. Further, both used the same software 
application (Product), and both solutions had other underlying similarities that the researcher noticed 
when looking at the actual files. However, in approximately six hours of interviews as well as numerous 
informal discussions with several persons who had been part of the events, not one of the participants 
from Beta showed an awareness of the similarities between the two solutions.  
5.4.1.3 Alpha 
Alpha is an independent information and knowledge management consultancy, based in a major city in 
New Zealand. The company develops solutions for complex challenges for institutional and government 
clients. It was started by a consultant with a PhD in atomic physics who had worked in a number of varied 
roles before starting the company. Alpha engages in consulting projects that sometimes require 
coordination from three or four government agencies at the same time. Alpha presents its solutions to 
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clients in the form of a consultancy report. This report — which takes the form of a bound book — is 
presented to the client at the end of the engagement, but the materials that make up the final report are 
developed iteratively over time, and often through a consultative process that involves various 
stakeholders in the multiple agencies. My informant was the founder-president of the company, who I will 
call JS.  
In the late nineties, Alpha used a particular desktop publishing package — hereafter called Desktop — to 
produce the final printed report. Support for the Macintosh version of the Desktop product was dropped 
by the software publisher that distributed it, after Apple converted their operating system to a new Unix-
based core. The publisher told their customers to move to Microsoft Windows. Alpha refused to change 
platforms, and so was forced to find a new way to produce their published reports. Alpha conducted a 
structured search of all the available desktop publishing solutions then on the market, but could not find 
another package that met their needs. At the same time that this was happening, Alpha began to use wikis 
— online collaborative webpages — to collaboratively develop project documents with their clients.  
Alpha decided to build its own typesetting engine for converting web documents into structured 
documents that are suitable for printing. They started work but soon found that they were having 
problems with some steps in the process. They went to a nearby university for advice. While they were in 
talks with the university, DL, a computer science student who had been working with a formatting 
language for text, heard about the problem. He hacked together a basic prototype of a system for 
converting wiki pages into publication-quality output by piping the HTML code through scripts written in 
the formatting language he was working with. Alpha applied for and received money from a government 
fund for innovation research, which they used to hire DL part-time, giving him three months to produce a 
proof-of-concept system that could meet the requirements of the organization.  
While the system was being developed, the team at Alpha discovered a number of other related projects 
on the internet which had been released as open-source projects. Code from these open source projects 
was integrated into the system that the student was developing. The proof of concept system — hereafter 
called Publish — was completed and worked satisfactorily, producing publication-quality reports that 
were suitable for distribution. Publish was put into service in Alpha, and was also released to the public as 
an open-source, publicly available resource on the internet.  
Publish became unexpectedly popular. A number of organizations who wanted specially formatted 
documents began to get in touch with Alpha and ask them to make modifications to Publish so that it 
could handle their special requests. These included a global community that was producing recipe books 
from different countries, a university that wanted their students’ computer science web projects converted 
to a format that could be bound with a thesis, and a number of other projects involving converting wiki-
style web pages into formatted print outputs. The Publish system evolved as it was modified to meet each 
of those requests.  
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After Publish had evolved into a “highly capable system” as a result of being extended to meet different 
specific needs, JS was introduced to a developer, who I will call HG. HG was trying to develop an online 
platform that could enable a writer to write a book on a popular online blogging platform, which I will call 
Blog, press a button, and get output formatted as an e-book, or press another button and get a print 
version that can be delivered to an on-demand printer. According to JS, it typically takes 12 months from 
the time an author delivers a manuscript to a publisher to the time that the published book is in her 
hands, and an additional six months for the e-book. HG had built a system, but it was lacking several 
necessary features. The two of them decided to work together and it turned out that Publish had most of 
the features that HG’s system lacked. They worked together for a few weeks and were able to demonstrate 
the combined system — which they have named PubBooks (name changed) — at a major publishing 
conference. Their system has the potential to turn a process which currently takes over a year into one 
which takes several hours.  
JS describes the set of accomplishments which led to PubBooks this way: 
“… So I think this is really quite exciting about where this kind of technology ought to be 
going.  So I kind of think that the stuff that we’ve done was - we stood on the shoulders 
of giants, right? We actually didn’t do very much in the project because we took a whole 
bunch of existing components, we tweaked them and then we put a little wrapper across 
the top that made these previously disparate components able to talk to one another, to 
produce something new and useful for us. And it turned out that a bunch of other people 
were able to do something new and useful for them, and then this other project over 
here using another set of components was able to pick up and build on top of what we’ve 
done. 
So I kind of see that we’re just a little stepping stone in this and so we’ve relied on giants 
and I think what HG’s doing with [PubBooks] is really interesting. So we’ve kind of 
made this little bridge that’s allowed one set of giants to communicate to the next set of 
giants. Because of course, he was building on what the [Blog] guys had done and what 
the e-pub people had done. And I think that’s what this is all about: you break out of 
these monolithic software silos and say “Well, there are actually a whole lot of software 
components that in and of themselves do useful things.” Wikis are useful, [the formatting 
language] is useful, [Blog] is useful, but when you can connect them up, and they’re all 
built to be connected, then you can start to do things that were never possible before.” 
5.4.1.4 Gamma 
Gamma is a relief organization that specializes in deploying teams to disaster zones to offer medical 
support, distribute aid and supplies, mount rescue efforts and coordinate with local governments and 
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other disaster relief organizations in the aftermath of major disasters around the world. In order to 
accomplish these goals, emergency telecommunications and IT capabilities are essential. There are a 
number of response teams in the world that maintain trained personnel and equipment to deploy 
emergency ICT capabilities to disaster zones, and one of them is based in a city in the North Island, New 
Zealand. My informant was the senior manager responsible for international disaster response, who I will 
refer to as MP. 
In order to make emergency deployments on short notice practical, it is necessary to use equipment which 
is capable of running familiar tools for managing communications, processing data and performing 
simple tasks which are necessary in the disaster zone, without requiring extensive training or imposing a 
steep learning curve on responders. Standard equipment for deployments include pre-configured laptops, 
handheld two-way radios, satellite phones, and VHF base transmitters. A significant amount of the work 
that needs to be done in a disaster zone is administrative: making resource requests, filing reports, etc. 
The IT and communications infrastructure is crucial to the successful managing of the logistic challenges 
of disaster relief. However, there are several challenges that come with each of the commonly-deployed 
systems, some of which are listed in Table 4: 
Table 4: Typically-deployed Equipment for Response Teams 
Equipment Challenge 
Laptops Significant power requirements. Spend unnecessary time 
downloading updates over the limited (and expensive) available 
bandwidth. Take too long to set up. 
Two-way radios Expensive. Personnel need to be trained in proper radio procedure. 
Voice communication can encourage ‘thinking while talking’ which 
wastes time 
Satellite phones Very expensive. Useless indoors or in places where there is no clear 
line-of-sight to the sky, so not reliable in some circumstances.  
VHF equipment High power requirements. Can take a long time to set up. Can be 
very difficult to get through customs. Use of spectrum varies by 
country and equipment needs to be configured for each site.  
 
Because of these challenges, there had long been some pressure to deploy mobile phones to disaster 
zones. Mobile phones are a familiar technology for most users in many parts of the world. They are 
extremely cost-effective, can contain cameras and GPS units, and have a significant amount of computing 
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power. However, mobile phones have a significant weakness: without a working communications 
infrastructure, they become single-user PDAs. The kinds of disasters that Gamma response teams are 
deployed to often involve interruptions in telecommunications services. 
MP and a team of both professional (as in, employed to Gamma) and volunteer experts, over the course of 
several months, have developed a way of combining several different IT systems in order to deploy mobile 
phones usefully in areas where there is no working telecommunications infrastructure. The system, which 
he has named ‘Mobile Data’ (name changed), is comprised of the following components: 
 Android Cell Phones – the system will work with any standard Android phone 
 The Mesh project – The Mesh project (name changed) is run out of a university in Australia, and 
is essentially a software system that enables Android phones to form a mesh network among 
themselves. This means that, in the absence of a working cellular network, the phones will talk 
directly to each other. If a message is sent from one node of the network to another that is not in 
range, the nodes (phones) will use each other to ‘hop’ the message from node to node, until the 
message reaches its intended destination. The project also implements a store-and-forward 
capability: when a message exists and there is no forwarding node within range, the message will 
wait until another node (phone) comes within range. The message will then hop onto that phone 
and keep propagating across nodes (much like a virus) until it reaches the destination node. 
 The Tracker tracking beacon – Tracker (name changed) is a small device, roughly the size of a 
pack of cigarettes. It was developed by a company in North America as a safety device for tracking 
and sending distress signals for hikers, mountaineers, and persons who may be outside of the 
reach of telecommunications infrastructure. It is designed to send distress signals via satellite 
uplinks. However it is also capable of sending simple text messages along with a tracking signal. It 
communicates with satellites and needs a line-of-sight to the sky to operate. 
 Forms – Forms (name changed) is an electronic forms and data fusion platform developed by a 
company in North America.  
The Mobile Data system brings the various parts together as follows. The Mesh and Forms software is 
installed on Android cell phones which are distributed to volunteers within the disaster zone. Volunteers 
fill out electronic forms to make reports, etc. The data captured by these forms is propagated over the 
mesh network to other nearby phones, each of which acts as a node on the network. The store-and-
forward capability of the software means that this can be done seamlessly even when there are no 
available nodes nearby. Whenever other phones are nearby, data automatically propagates to them. This 
propagation continues until a phone which is within range of a Tracker unit gets the message. The Tracker 
unit sends the message, along with sundry data such as the coordinates from which the message was sent 
(using the text messaging facility) to a back-end server, using satellite transmission. 
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This means that data collection can be done automatically by sending Mesh-enabled phone through a 
disaster area until one of the phones comes within the range of a Tracker unit that has line-of-sight to a 
satellite. At that point, the data will be propagated to any location in the world where it can be collated 
into useful information. This system eliminates several disadvantages of the traditional IT systems usually 
deployed to disaster zones. 
o The devices are familiar to most users and require less training and support than traditional 
laptops 
o The entire system takes far less time to set up than traditional systems 
o The mobile phones are extremely cost-effective and contain useful ancillary features (camera, 
GPS, accelerometers, etc.) 
o An entire ‘base station’ (mobile phone and Tracker unit) can fit in a pocket 
o The use of electronic forms structures the data-entry process and ensures comprehensive 
reporting while reducing air time lost to ‘thinking while talking’. 
o The store and forward capability means that it is not necessary for personnel to remain outside to 
stay in contact, as is necessary with Satellite Phones 
o The equipment is typically familiar to customs in most countries and will tend to reduce or 
eliminate clearance delays (a significant problem when trying to move radio equipment across 
borders) 
The new system also introduces several advantages over the regular systems, including 
 The use of in-phone GPS units can automatically add location data to reports 
 GPS can also be used to monitor the safety of volunteers 
 Store and forward enables the implementation of creative reporting procedures (e.g., flying a 
model airplane with a phone attached over an inaccessible disaster site) 
 The same equipment can be used to access the cellular network when it is available. That means 
money can be pumped into the local economy after a disaster through purchase of 
telecommunications access, while maintaining the resilience of an independent infrastructure 
capability. 
Mobile Data has been successfully field tested by Gamma in a field simulation. The system was being 
refined and prepared for deployment when I conducted interviews. 
The story of the development of the Mobile Data project began many years ago. One of the most 
challenging aspects of successful disaster response is the setting up of infrastructure to manage 
communications and information flows within the disaster zone, and between the responders in the zone 
and the central organization. The equipment needed for this function is expensive, heavy and complex. 
Certain elements of the system, such as VHF repeaters, need expert tuning at set-up, as well as expert 
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maintenance. They were also difficult to transport into and out of countries, because spectrum regulations 
vary from country to country and getting local authorities to allow the importation of radio equipment 
often called for extensive negotiations. For these and other reasons, several persons who were involved in 
the process had repeatedly suggested to MP that he should deploy mobile phones in disaster zones, rather 
than expensive, heavy radio equipment.  
One of MP’s duties is to constantly develop new and better technological solutions for the needs of 
responders in sister zones. He is constantly looking for ways to make the equipment that is deployed with 
his teams lighter, smaller, and more effective at getting the job done. However, mobile phones are 
dependent on the communications infrastructure, and are useless for communication when the 
telecommunications grid has been disrupted. Since this is often the case in areas where Gamma’s 
response teams are deployed, MP decided it would be impractical to depend on mobile phones. 
Another important part of the story occurred at approximately 22:00 hours UTC on January 12, 2010. PT, 
a lecturer at major university in Australia, was driving to work when news about a major earthquake in 
Haiti was broadcast on the radio. What followed is best told in his words: 
“ …the defining moment for the [Mesh] project was when I heard about the Haiti 
earthquake on the radio on the way into work and, as is human nature, we like to try 
and make ourselves feel a little bit better about situations when they occur and so it was 
sort of seeing that and I realized immediately that it was the loss of communications 
capability was going to be a big problem for the people and that it was going to have, 
you know, loss of law and order and things were very likely to result. And so it was sort 
of thinking to myself, ‘well hey, they can ship in by air with communications equipment 
and hopefully get it back up in that sort of about three day window that you really have 
to prevent chaos from ensuing.’ And while I’m thinking this happily to myself, the 
person on the radio basically is reading off the report there and says that the airport in 
Haiti has been reduced to one runway and that one runway is carrying one plane every 
thirty minutes in or out. And I thought, ‘hmm, ok, they’re not going to fly stuff in, but 
that’s alright, I’m resourceful,’ I can think about other ways that they can get the gear in 
and, you know, me not have to face this reality of what they’re going to have to deal 
with then. So well, you know, Dominican Republic and Haiti are joined by a highway, 
they would be able to truck communications equipment in and also, you know, gear to 
set up the runway. So I’m thinking this happily to myself and the person on the radio 
says ‘and practically every road in Haiti has been destroyed by the earthquake,’ so I’m 
sitting thinking, you know, ‘this is kind of bad, but I’m a resourceful person, and Port au 
Prince has a harbor, so they’ll be able to ship in, cargo ship in, Dominican Republic or 
wherever the nearest harbor is that they can fly into a put a lot of stuff onto a cargo ship 
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and, you know, sail it quickly round to the harbor and start rebuilding from the harbor 
out.’ I’m thinking this happily to myself when the person on the radio says, ‘and the 
harbor in Port au Prince has collapsed.’ 
And I still just remember the rawness of that moment and just going, ‘well there’s 
actually no way that they can deal with this,’ and it’s actually interestingly I mean it’s 
actually the definition of a disaster by many accounts is an emergency when there is not 
the capacity to respond. So it was clear to me that, you know there was this disaster 
that was going to transpire there in Haiti and as I’d thought about it over the next few, 
well very quickly realized that something ought to be done, that the mobile phones 
becoming useless in people’s hands was a great tragedy and an unnecessary one. And so 
yeah starting thinking about, you know, airdrop in, you know almost Transformer-like, 
self-assembling phone towers that would park themselves on the ground and pop out a 
solar panel or two and set up/mesh radio links to one another and this was all fine and 
wonderful and completely impractical - well actually not completely, it actually could be 
done - but what I realized, actually, the more I thought about it, was actually the mobile 
phones already had the means to communicate with one another. It really is just an 
accident of history that they’re not enabled to do so.” 
PT began what would become the Mesh project as a collaborative effort within the university where he 
worked. It expanded to a project across several countries to build an open-source software solution that 
would allow mobile phones to communicate without infrastructure. MP heard about the Mesh project and 
the two of them, along with their respective teams, began to collaborate on getting the Mesh system 
integrated into a solution that could be deployed to responders in disaster zones. They began to integrate 
the direct-communication and store-and-forward functions in Mesh into a system that met Gamma’s 
operational needs.  
Another element of the system was added in August 2011 when MP, at a trade show, saw the Tracker 
product, which at the time had not yet been released to the public. Tracker had been developed by its 
manufacturer as an emergency beacon for hikers, hunters, and other persons traveling through wilderness 
areas where there was no telecommunications infrastructure. MP started negotiations with the 
manufacturers of Tracker to try to get them involved in the development of Mobile Data, but their own 
conceptualization of the uses of the device they had built was very different from MP’s. Finally, after 
lengthy negotiations, they agreed to join the project. The makers of Forms also joined the project, and the 
entire team worked for several months to produce a working integrated system.  
MP, who was the main driver of the project, has developed a network of expert volunteers who assist him 
in developing good ideas and getting them implemented. One of those volunteers — one who was critical 
in getting the Mobile Data project completed – is an expatriate engineer who moved to New Zealand 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
132 
 
several years ago who I will call KF. While I was talking with him about Mobile Data, KF mentioned 
another idea which he had had about two weeks before we spoke. It involved using mobile phones as file 
servers in disaster zones. A lot of complications in disaster zones resulted from the need to maintain 
traditional PC file servers in the base camp office. Using mobile phones with large-capacity SD cards 
would eliminate a lot of the complications involved in using traditional hardware and software which has 
built-in capabilities for security and user management which are unnecessary and waste time under 
disaster conditions. The low cost of the hardware would also enable redundancy and allow multiple 
‘servers’ to be deployed where needed instead of being centrally located in a ‘base’.  
Just as was the case in Beta, I immediately noticed what seemed to be structural similarities in the nature 
of the problem space and the proposed solution between the Mobile Data idea and the file server idea. I 
asked KF if the file server idea was related to Mobile Data, and he replied that it was unrelated. When I 
asked KF where the idea had come from, he replied: 
“… I forgot, it’s just - because I think I was at the training exercise and I thought like, 
this is stupid, like - I actually had to watch people go through the exercise and evaluate 
them, so I thought, well, if we just used a Smartphone it would be done like, in a much 
shorter time, and with much less knowledge, because they had all these components like 
bad cables and like sticks and cables and so on, because they have to do problem 
solving.  
The problem solving becomes much less because there is much less that can go wrong if 
it’s one concise package.” 
MP, who was there when I asked the question, agreed that it was a new idea, and they both explained to 
me the difficulties caused by using PC-based file servers and the ways in which using smartphones with 
large SD cards as servers would be an improvement over the equipment that they currently deployed with 
their response teams. Neither of them seemed aware of the similarities I perceived between their 
explanations of the advantages of smartphone servers over the current servers, and their explanations of 
the advantages of Mobile Data over their current communications infrastructure.  
5.4.2 Negative Cases 
In these organizations, conditions were found that many theories suggest should be conducive to creative 
action. Despite this, no cases of creative appropriation were found. Findings in these organizations proved 
valuable in enhancing understanding of the mechanisms identified through the main retroductive 
analysis. 
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5.4.2.1 Kappa 
Kappa is a company that is based in the South Island of New Zealand. It is a small company whose 
primary business activity is operating a mobile surgical facility which operates across all of New Zealand. 
The mobile surgical facility is housed in a large semi-trailer rig. A trailer head (a large truck designed to 
tow semi-trailers) tows the rig to areas of New Zealand which are remote and do not have easy access to 
medical facilities. The trailer is a fully equipped mobile surgical facility which has a built-in leveling 
system. The rig moves around New Zealand on an annual schedule performing minor operations in 
remote areas that are otherwise underserved by medical and surgical resources. I was granted access to 
the company by the founder-manager, a senior surgeon. The company’s IT assets are managed by a pair of 
senior engineers — who I will call DL and DS — who both had long careers in industry before they joined 
Kappa, including stints at IBM and Siemens. I interviewed both of them at the company’s headquarters. 
Information and communications technologies are a critical part of enabling the facility to function. For 
example, the kinds of collaboration and consultation that would normally take place in a hospital have to 
be conducted through secure IT links when the rig is deployed in remote areas. The internal operations of 
the company also utilize IT a great deal. DL and DS are both highly experienced IT engineers, both of 
whom had several years’ experience in major technology companies before joining Kappa. Both engineers 
are deeply involved in the IT aspect of all Kappa’s operations, both medical and administrative. Both 
engineers were able to state categorically, that they had seen no instances of creative appropriation of IT 
in any of the units of the business.  
Both engineers were also in agreement on why they think this is so. They said that Kappa is a small 
company and that any user requirements — feature requests, problem reports, etc. — come directly to 
them and are dealt with quickly. Both of them had found, in their former jobs, that users become creative 
when they don’t have easy access to IT resources. Required system modifications take time, and frustrated 
users find innovative ways around problems. In Kappa, in contrast, “…about half of our users are within 
about a 20 meter radius of our desks. They just walk over and you can often make a change that day, 
tweak a system within an hour.”  
5.4.2.2 Theta 
This company is a small and dynamic software developer based in the South Island in New Zealand. It has 
an ‘open plan’ office in which all teams are co-located and is led by a CEO who is also an active developer. 
They have developed projects for a number of major entities in the entertainment industry, including US 
and European companies which are household names, and are quite expert at what they do. They also 
have a culture of experimentation: they have invested quite heavily in ‘trying out’ new technologies. For 
example, they invested time and effort into building flash games for mobile platforms when it was clear 
that the hardware was not powerful enough to run it at acceptable speeds for a commercial product, in 
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order to test their ability to do it. My informant was one of the founders and is now Chief Innovation 
Officer at the company. I will identify him as SM. 
Theta has a highly skilled team of programmers, designers, graphics artists and other specialists. They 
have completed projects for major companies that are household names in media, entertainment and 
gaming in a number of countries, including the UK, Canada and the US. While they have a heavy work 
schedule and tight deadlines, the internal culture of the organization values creativity and 
experimentation. For example, SM showed me a demo of a game running on an early version of a certain 
mobile platform using a certain application runtime environment. The version of the hardware that the 
game had been developed for does not support a level of performance that would make the game playable 
for commercial release, and the designers at Theta knew this. They built the game, SM told me, not to 
make a profit, but “to see if we could do it” since developing in that environment for a mobile platform 
had special challenges.  
Despite the presence of a highly skilled technical team, an environment which encourages 
experimentation and an organizational culture that is supportive of creativity, the company could not 
identify any instances of employees finding creative ways to apply IT systems. SM  was surprised by this, 
and asked his team to double check this finding, as both he and I had expected that numerous examples of 
creative appropriation would be found in the organization, given its culture and the kinds of people who 
work there. However, no such cases were found. 
5.4.3 Natural Experiments 
There were two organizations in which I conducted data collection that greatly contributed to the findings 
of the study, but did not actually contribute specific cases which were part of the retroductive analysis. In 
each of these cases, specific patterns noted in the data were analyzed at the collective level by applying 
replication logic, in the manner recommended by (Yin, 2009). 
In organization Eta, I was briefed on the company’s internal change and innovation processes, conducted 
several formal interviews and a large number of informal interviews. I also attended the company’s 
annual Innovation Day, or “hackathon”, where I saw many improvisational solutions by engineers which 
may become the basis for future products. While none of the specific cases that I looked at in Eta are 
included in the analysis that I did in this study before reaching theoretical saturation, it contributed to my 
understanding of creative appropriation in unexpected and unintuitive ways. In organization Phi, a 
serendipitous (from my perspective) set of circumstances set up a kind of “natural experiment” in which 
two systems within the company exhibited very different patterns of creative appropriation.  
In each context, information from the organization contributed to my findings, not through the analysis of 
a specific incident, but through a comparison of circumstances. In Eta, I was able to compare the type of 
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creativity that was apparent in the company (product creativity) with the type that was much rarer, or 
nonexistent (use creativity). In Phi, I was able to compare a system and context which triggered high 
levels of use creativity with one that did not. Because in each case I applied replication logic in order to 
learn about different aspects of creative appropriation, I have classified both of these cases as “natural 
experiments”.  
5.4.3.1 Eta 
Eta is an engineering firm that builds motorized accessibility devices for disabled persons. They are an NZ 
company that is now part of a US-based group, but they operate fairly autonomously. Because their 
products are essentially medical devices, they have extremely stringent quality control procedures and 
documentation and reporting rules. They are regularly audited by the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and other regulatory agencies. They have developed rigorous procedures for ensuring that their 
products are up to code, and maintain documentation to demonstrate that the necessary testing and 
quality control procedures were followed for each product. With the support of the local management I 
was granted access to the company by the US corporate office and my principal informant was a senior 
manager in charge of developing new technologies at the company who I will call IR. 
Eta has an extensive and highly organized formal process for evaluating requirements and market 
opportunities, generating and evaluating ideas, and designing and developing technologies for 
implementing those ideas. The level of formalization is, in part, driven by their reporting requirements as 
a medical device company. Eta is regularly audited by regulatory agencies from different countries in 
which their products are marketed. Their products are subject to stringent documentation and testing, as 
a result. However, the need to innovate and offer new and improved solutions to patient needs is also a 
high priority. Because of the stringent testing requirements for their products, there is a constant pipeline 
of experimental products being tested. The administrative, research and development, and production 
facilities are housed in a single large compound, and an upper floor of the main building contains a “test 
run” in which engineers can try out experimental features in an artificial environment with an obstacle 
course and ramps. When I toured the facility, this test environment seemed quite popular. 
The walls of Eta are covered with whiteboards and drawing tools and, in some cases, are designed to be 
drawn on directly. Workspaces are configured to enable teams to collaborate easily and without undue 
mediation. Eta also has a formal process for submitting, evaluating and developing ideas about how it can 
improve its internal processes. Employees can submit ideas into a system via a panel with diagrams of the 
process and boxes for change requests, located in a main hallway. There is a process by which each of 
these ideas are reviewed by an internal review group comprised of representatives from each major 
functional area of the company. The review board is able to facilitate collaboration across functional 
groups to implement ideas which “make the cut”. The display panel is designed so that the progress of 
each idea through the system is transparent and can be tracked by the person who submitted it. The 
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internal atmosphere is focused, but there is a lot of easy banter, and employees can often be seen using 
the visual aids in workspaces, having meetings in spaces designed for ad-hoc gatherings, etc.  
I investigated a number of incidents in which users appropriated technology in unexpected ways in Eta. In 
one case, an engineer whose hobbies include an interest in obsolete communication protocols, found a 
way to use one of those protocols — one that had been designed for data transmission on media with high 
“noise” levels — as a solution for designing control inputs for users who lacked fine muscle control. 
Another incident was the implementation of a records management system in which the Eta engineers 
developed such a novel and useful solution that the developers adopted their solution and integrated it 
into the next version of the software. I also attended the company’s annual “hackathon” (formally: 
Innovation Day), in which a number of current problems were put up on a board, teams of employees 
picked a problem, and were given six hours to “hack” together a solution using available parts. I saw a 
number of unexpected and insightful solutions to problems, some of which may make it into future 
products.  
For various reasons, the incidents I investigated at Eta were not included in the retroductive analysis 
before theoretical saturation was reached. However the larger insight about creative appropriation that it 
contributed to the analysis lay in the differentiation between two types of creativity that I saw within the 
company. In terms of product creativity — where creativity was a deliberately-sought goal state in terms 
of maximizing the utility of the firm’s physical products — Eta was highly innovative. The time and 
resources that Eta’s management invests in this kind of creativity has resulted in a series of innovative 
products which have given the company a reputation for creativity within its industry. However, in terms 
of process creativity — where creativity is a goal state in terms of maximizing the utility of the firm’s 
internal processes — Eta was only modestly innovative.  
This is despite the fact that this kind of creativity (process) is a consciously-sought goal in the company, as 
reflected in its highly designed change process. A lot of resources were invested in the development of the 
change process, and the time and effort of a lot of busy managers are invested in its operation. Despite 
this, the ideas that successfully make it through the change process tend to be fairly modest in scope. SG, 
the leader of the section that runs the change request process, explained that issues often arise with the 
most complex ideas. He described them as follows: 
“… in theory, this works really smoothly and this works really well and gets people 
involved. But what tends to happen is that some of the ideas people bring to the table but 
they’re not really willing to drive it. So they really want other people to drive it, in 
which case, we try to help that out and we try to get the right people involved, but if it’s 
not really going anywhere then a lot of those can stall. So people don’t necessarily have 
the willpower or the engagement to drive their own ideas.” 
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Ideas which are low in scope and bring immediate benefits tend to be implemented quickly. However, 
ideas which involve more work and longer commitment tend require investigation of their projected 
effects, coordination between different functional areas, assessment of costs, and other processes that 
require at least one very interested person — a ‘driver’ — in order to make the idea happen. SG described 
what tended to happen with such ideas: 
“… So a lot of the issues we actually have is the things that have been in there a long 
period of time tend to make less progress than ones that are raised now. As we’ve been 
developing the overall process it’s becoming better and better, so we’re getting better at 
bringing people down and talking about their idea and moving and progressing it on. 
But if we don’t do that in a timely manner, then things tend to stagnate and people tend 
to lose focus on it. So things need to be processed quickly and continued to be pushed for 
us to make progress with it. If they sit there for a long period of time, there’s potential 
that they’re just going to stagnate.” 
Despite the fact that this process was designed to facilitate the nurturing and implementation of ideas 
about how to perform internal processes — including the appropriation of IT systems — in better ways, 
the change process was not the source of any of the incidents of novel and useful appropriation of IT that I 
identified at Eta. 
What Eta did contribute to my analysis was one fundamental insight: creative appropriation does not 
just happen. Not only does it not just happen, but it is very hard to facilitate and encourage. Even when 
major resources, technical skill and an encouraging organizational culture are applied, really novel, 
surprising appropriation patterns do not emerge without significant triggering conditions. This is, of 
course, a triangulation of the finding in one of the “negative cases” — the software developer Theta. Eta 
was not a “negative” case (some cases of novel and useful appropriation were found there), but again there 
was the pattern of a highly innovative organization, which  was very successful at product creativity, 
showing much less process creativity than might have been expected, given the environment.  
5.4.3.2 Phi 
Phi is a multinational firm that sells access to cloud-based accounting software for small to medium-sized 
business customers, using an online subscription-based model. It was founded within the last ten years 
and has grown rapidly since its inception. It is based in a city in New Zealand, and has operations in New 
Zealand, Australia, the UK, and the US. I looked at several interesting cases within Phi, but what stood out 
— and what I have focused on for this project — is an interesting natural experiment occurred across 
departments in the firm. My primary informant was the chief software architect at the firm. 
Phi’s policy is to ‘eat its own dog food’, and so it runs a part of its own accounting operations using the 
software that it sells to customers. I spoke with the head of the Finance department, whose team handles 
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payroll, accounts receivable and payable, and all other financial functions for the entire firm. To do this, 
they use Phi’s software. However, there is a serious mismatch between their needs and the software that 
they sell. Phi is a multinational company that operates across several different regulatory environments in 
different countries with different currencies. They are also publicly listed and subject to stringent 
reporting requirements. They have highly trained staff to meet these needs, but many of the features they 
need are not to be found in their software. It is aimed at small to medium-sized business owners who want 
to be able to run their businesses without hiring an accountant. In response to challenges which arise 
from this, the Finance department has direct dialog with the developers of the software on a regular basis. 
Features which they need that would also be useful for customers are added to the commercial product. 
Features which they need which would not be useful for their target market (e.g. the ability to handle an 
international payroll in multiple currencies), or which cannot be added quickly, are outsourced to partner 
companies. There were no instances of creative appropriation of the IT systems that they use which the 
head of Finance could identify. 
Phi also uses an internal business-process management system that I will call Process for internal 
business process management (BPM) purposes. Process is not available to the public and is not a 
commercial product. It was developed in-house for the company’s needs, and until recently it had a single 
developer working on it. I spoke with the developer who runs the Process team (which, until recently, had 
one member: himself). He was able to tell me about seven significant cases of unexpected uses of the 
Process system by users that he had observed, spontaneously and without preparation. Apparently, users 
are continually coming up with new ways to “hack” Process, and use it in ways which were not intended or 
expected by the developer. 
5.4.4 Corroborative Interviews 
One of the requirements for mechanisms identified in a critical realist study is that they must adequately 
represent reality (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 801). After the retroductive analysis, as part of the empirical 
corroboration phase of the project, interviews were done with participants from organizations who would 
have a good intuitive grasp of typical user behaviors based on their roles. One is a consultant with years of 
experience in eliciting user requirements for complex systems, the other a security consultant who has 
extensive experience in analyzing how some users may unexpectedly appropriate complex systems by 
breaching their security. 
5.4.4.1 Lambda 
Lambda is security consultancy that specializes in penetration-testing. It employs consultants who are, 
essentially “white hat” hackers. They are typically called in to test the security of e-commerce and other 
public-facing websites that access or store sensitive data. They do so by conducting simulated attacks, 
using techniques and tools similar to those used by malicious hackers and cyber-criminals. They are often 
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called in by companies who are preparing to deploy new web-based services, and a certification from a 
company in their line of business is a requirement for doing business in some industries.  
After the retroductive analysis, I interviewed a consultant at Lambda to assess the explanatory power if 
the mechanisms identified. We spoke about the common tendencies he observed in terms of how 
programmers worked when building secure websites, and how he and his colleagues made judgments 
about how programming teams worked, and figured out which tests to use at sites. 
My findings from this interview were consistent with what I expected from the mechanisms that I had 
identified. 
5.4.4.2 Delta 
Delta is a consulting firm that develops bespoke IT solutions for clients. They see themselves primarily as 
a design firm, but they design systems that involve IT. The solutions they develop often have both 
hardware and software elements. My interviewee was the founder/owner of the company, who is an active 
consultant and is also a leader in the New Zealand IT community. We discussed how users typically 
appropriate systems after deployment, as well as the communication process between developers and 
customers, and how this is affected by factors such as background and experience on each side. 
My findings from this interview were consistent with what I expected from the mechanisms that I had 
identified. 
5.5 Initial Observations and New Research Question 
As recommended by Eisenhardt (1989a), the study was begun with no preconceived model of what causal 
relationships would be found. The initial plan was to collect data about what happened in each case — 
with special attention being given to the a priori constructs drawn from Amabile (1996) – and see what 
emerged from examining cases in which systems were appropriated in a novel and useful manner. The 
assumptions being applied at the time were the positivist/empiricist assumptions that Eisenhardt (1989a, 
p. 546) states are reflected in her approach. In her own research, based on this method, the form of the 
theory that was developed was a synthetic variance theory (Langley, 1999), and this seemed consistent 
with the type of explanation I was trying to develop. I was therefore looking for patterns of factors at work 
in cases of successful creative appropriation that could be synthesized into an explanatory model. The 
second participant organization visited during fieldwork was Theta, the software development company. 
Despite the fact that Theta had high levels of the components that Amabile suggests are required for 
creative discovery at both the individual and organizational levels (Amabile, 1988, 1996), and despite the 
fact that the CEO expected that we would find several instances in which his staff were using their systems 
creatively, we found none.  
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I realized that not finding creative appropriation in a context were it would be expected to occur was an 
interesting finding, and might contribute a great deal to an understanding of the phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, the then-current design of the study was poorly suited to learning from such a context. If 
there was no “case”, then there would be no pattern of factors to observe. As such, I decided to change the 
form of explanation from a synthetic variance strategy (Langley, 1999) to a mechanism-based strategy 
(Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). The mechanism-based strategy is not tied to a single set of metatheoretical 
assumptions, and is not necessarily critical realist. However, the critical realist model provides a set of 
principles that can guide the construction of a mechanism-based explanation (Wynn & Williams, 2012), 
and I found it a logical and compelling view of the nature of reality which I believed formed a sound 
foundation for theorizing (Easton, 2010). I therefore adopted critical realist assumptions, and changed my 
research questions to fit the new approach.  
The form of the research questions in a critical realist study take a standard form based on the goal of 
identifying mechanisms (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 804). A single research question was then adopted. It 
was: 
 What are the mechanisms that explain end user creativity in the appropriation of Information 
Systems at the individual level? 
Given the theoretical replication strategy followed in selecting cases, I was able to observe creative 
appropriation happen in a number of different contexts, under different conditions, with the actual 
ideation and enactment processes involved being conducted by different users with different backgrounds 
and properties. The users used different kinds of systems for different tasks, and, in some cases, there 
were different teams of users using different systems who worked collaboratively to appropriate systems. 
The theme that emerged from the case data was patterns of information processing. There were certain 
ways that people processed information that were recognizable across cases. I also noticed that these ways 
of processing information seemed to apply, not only at the individual level, but also at the collective level.  
It was clear, also, that it would be meaningless to try to describe individual-level processing without 
reference to the collective processes in which that processing was embedded. The scope of the thesis was 
limited to explaining creative appropriation at the individual level, but appropriation always occurred in a 
collective context. At times, what made a solution successful was not the work of a single “creative” 
individual, but the collective effort of a group, or several groups. It therefore became apparent that, even if 
I was proposing an explanation that was limited to the individual level, I would need to use language that 
could account for collective-level processes.  
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Chapter 6. Data Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the analytic procedures that led to the identification of the mechanisms, and the 
development of the integrative model that shows how the mechanisms work together at the individual 
level. Although in critical realism analysis is recursive and parallel, the analytical process in this study can 
be thought of as having two major components. The first component is the development of the theoretical 
framework that will be used to theoretically redescribe the data (Wynn & Williams, 2012, pp. 796, 809). 
The second component — which relies on the first — is the actual retroductive analysis that identified the 
mechanisms.  
I will therefore proceed by first describing the development of the framework, then explaining the 
retroductive process. 
6.2 Structural Analysis 
Data was collected in each participant organization. Interviews, transcripts and documentation collected 
were imported into the NVivo case database. Extensive field notes were made, encoded to audio and 
imported into the case database. Where code samples and artifacts could be converted into an NVivo-
friendly format this was done and they were imported. Where it was not possible to digitize or convert 
case materials, descriptions were made in text documents and these were imported. In conformance with 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), data analysis was started and carried out in parallel with the collection of data.  
The first step of a CR analysis is to “identify and analytically resolve the components of the structure that 
are causally relevant” (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 798).The challenge of structural analysis was therefore 
confronted quite early in the research process. The fact that the cases were theoretically replicated (Yin, 
2009) increased the dimensionality of the data and, with it, the potential complications of identifying the 
structures that were causally relevant, not only in a single case, but across all the cases. It is for this reason 
that Wynn and Williams (2012) suggest that because of the complexity of structural analysis, CR case 
research will normally be idiographic in nature (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 804). However, both Wynn 
and Williams (2012) and Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) mention the use of existing theoretical knowledge 
about the phenomenon under investigation as a way to get at the underlying structural elements of the 
causal mechanism.  
It was necessary to do this by theoretically redescribing the data (Wynn & Williams, 2012, pp. 796-798, 
809). I looked at a number of existing theoretical frameworks, but found none which were a satisfactory 
fit for the kinds of structural analysis that I was conducting. The historical developments described in 
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Chapter 2 may explain why this was the case. Since a suitable analytical framework did not exist, I needed 
to build one. Below I outline the process of developing that framework.  
6.3 Developing AFT 
The framework whose development is described below is named Affordance Field Theory (AFT). It is 
proposed as a tool for redescribing case data to enable the analysis of appropriation activities across cases, 
in different spatial and temporal contexts, using a common set of conceptual objects, actions and 
relationships. The need for a “common language” to aggregate knowledge gained in different contexts is 
an issue that has been discussed at length in IS (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999; Davenport & Markus, 1999; 
Moore & Benbasat, 1991). The arguments are complex and not easily amenable to simple reductive 
summarization, but many of them have to do with the tension between the need for common concepts to 
enable the accumulation of knowledge (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999), vs. the potentially restrictive effects of 
the constraints of using a common set of concepts (Davenport & Markus, 1999). The settling of this debate 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the underlying issues are relevant. On the one hand, in order to 
make the claim that I am inductively developing theory that is grounded in the data, it is necessary to let  
the data speak, so to speak, by not pre-applying theoretical assumptions about what will happen or what 
causal paths do or do not exist (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  On the other hand, the data must be reduced to 
theoretical categories in order to facilitate structural analysis (Wynn & Williams, 2012).  
To address these divergent requirements, AFT is designed to be a purely descriptive theory. It is Type I 
theory, according to the typology of Gregor (2006). It does not extend beyond analysis and description, 
does not specify causal logic or expected outcomes, and is axiologically neutral. Because of this 
construction, AFT is proposed to be a suitable tool for analyzing what happened in each case, without 
making implicit assumptions about how or why what happened, happened. It therefore useful for 
structural analysis, but does not unduly bias the retroductive analysis that guides the discovery of the 
mechanisms.  
The conceptual categories used to analyze data must be based on theory (Moore & Benbasat, 1991), and 
AFT is based on well-established theories from a number of disciplines that have been integrated 
according to a well-respected framework. The foundations of AFT, and the process of developing it, are 
described below. 
6.3.1 Adaptive Structuration Theory 
In 1985, scholars at the University of Minnesota embarked on what would become a decades-long 
research program probing the effects of computer systems that facilitated collaborative decision-making 
(called Group Decision Support Systems, or GDSS) on group processes and outcomes (DeSanctis, Poole, & 
Zigurs, 2008). After initially developing a taxonomy for describing GDSS systems and the environments 
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they function in (Desanctis & Gallupe, 1987), the researchers were faced with the need to integrate and 
synthesize results across a number of subsequent studies. This task was complicated by the fact that then-
existing research on GDSS had produced conflicting findings on the effects of those systems (see Poole & 
DeSanctis, 1989, p. 149). Since the existing literature did not offer consistent guidance in terms of the 
assumptions that should be brought to the problem, DeSanctis and Poole sought to blend insights from 
what they considered the two dominant schools of thought in the study of the impact of IT in 
organizations: the deterministic (i.e., positivist-oriented) “decision-making school” and the interpretivist 
“institutional school” (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). They developed an integrative perspective inspired by 
Giddens (1984)’s theory of structuration, which they called Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST). 
Although AST was designed to support their research program on GDSS, it was proposed as a general 
framework for the study of IT effects (Poole & DeSanctis, 2004). DeSanctis and Poole (1994) adopted a 
‘soft-line deterministic’ position that views technology as providing rules and resources that enable and 
constrain human behavior (structures as defined by Giddens (1984)), while social practices moderate 
their effect on behavior. They proposed that advanced IT systems provide structures that can be described 
in terms of: 
 Structural Features – “the specific types of rules and resources, or capabilities offered by the 
system (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994)”. This can be understood to be the full set of bundles of 
functionality that are provided by the system 
 Spirit – the “general intent with regards to values and goals underlying a given set of structural 
features (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994)”. This is seen as a separate concept from the intentions of the 
designers. It is the ‘official line’ about how the system ought to be used, and emerges from the 
amalgam of influences which result in the final form of the system. 
The structures within a technology system are brought into action as they are accessed and applied by 
users. In the process of enacting the structures within the technology, users may change them, applying or 
modifying the features in ways that are not consistent with the system spirit. While these processes may 
evolve over time, they can be observed by researchers through isolating and analyzing specific instances in 
which users make use of the structures within the technology – what DeSanctis and Poole term 
appropriation moves. Appropriation, a concept rooted in the work of Marx and Hegel, emphasizes the 
constitutive nature of using an object, the way that the act of use can redefine both the object and the user 
(Poole & DeSanctis, 1989). For example, a shovel is a tool for digging that may be used by a farmer. 
However, using it to hit someone over the head can redefine the shovel into a weapon; and at the same 
time, can redefine the farmer into a murderer. Therefore, the nature and effect of a technology and its 
user, are contingent on how that technology is appropriated. Incidentally, this represents one of the few 
instances in which a concept from structuralism has been included in a mainstream theory within IS (see 
(W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004) citing (Hirschheim & Klein, 1992)).  
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In AST, appropriation moves involve  
a) Making choices about how to use technology structures  
b) Choosing to appropriate technology features faithfully – in a manner consistent with the spirit of 
the system and the design of the features; or unfaithfully – out of line with the system spirit  
c) Selecting different instrumental uses for the technology, and  
d) Displaying different attitudes as the technology structures are appropriated. 
AST was a significant contribution to IS (Markus & Silver, 2008) and has become one of the most 
influential frameworks in the discipline (Bostrom, Gupta, & Thomas, 2009). However, despite its wide 
success, or perhaps, precisely because of it, it has also been severely critiqued by researchers both within 
and outside of the discipline. I will discuss this critique, in turn. 
6.3.2 Critiques of AST 
While recognizing the contributions of AST, Markus and Silver (2008) point out three major concerns 
with it that have been raised in the literature: 
 Viewing structural features and spirit as sources of structure – in the sense of Giddens – 
contradicts Giddens’ own definition of structure. Giddens was a sociologist, concerned with the 
influence of social structures on individual human agents, and vice versa. He regarded structure 
as being embodied in human ‘memory traces’ (Giddens, 1984), and explicitly rejected the idea of 
structure being able to exist outside of the action of social actors in artifactual objects (for a fuller 
discussion, see (Jones & Karsten, 2008, 2009; Poole, 2009)).  
 Analyzing structural features can be problematic for researchers because of the need to conduct 
feature analysis at a certain level of abstraction. At any given level, system features are made up of 
lower-level features which are made up of lower-level features, ad infinitum. There is no clear 
stopping rule to guide researchers on what point is appropriate for terminating elaboration of 
sub-features. This repeating decomposition problem is inadequately addressed by the measures 
proposed by DeSanctis and Poole (1994). 
 DeSanctis and Poole (1994) define the spirit of the technology as “the general intent with regards 
to values and goals underlying a given set of structural features”. Many theorists reject the 
attribution of constructs such as ‘intent’, ‘values’, and ‘goals’ to non-human artifacts (Jones & 
Karsten, 2008). 
Markus and Silver (2008) point out that, partly as a result of concerns such as those listed, the concepts of 
structural features and spirit have not been nearly as widely adopted by researchers as the concept of 
appropriation.  
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6.3.3 Markus and Silver 
To address the aforementioned concerns, Markus and Silver (2008) have proposed an updated model of 
AST. This model replaces the concepts of Structural Features and Spirit with three new concepts: 
Technical Objects, Functional Affordances, and Symbolic Expressions.  
These are defined as follows: 
Technical Objects are IT artifacts and their component parts, including user interfaces and ‘boundary 
objects’ such as charts, graphical representations and other outputs which are directly accessed by users. 
They are real things in that they do not depend on human perceptions in order to exist, and as such, have 
properties, which may range from physical (e.g., color), to abstract (e.g., reliability) characteristics. 
Technical objects are typically made up of component technical objects, and are therefore subject to the 
repeating decomposition problem that also affects DeSanctis and Poole (1994)’s Structural Features 
concept. The two relational concepts – functional affordances and symbolic expressions – included in 
Markus and Silver (2008) are intended to address this problem. 
Functional Affordances are a relational construct linking an animal (in an IT system-use context, 
typically a human) to (technical) objects in its environment. Markus and Silver define it as “a type of 
relationship between a technical object and a user (or user group) that identifies what the user may be 
able to do with the object given the user’s capabilities and goals”. The concept of the functional affordance 
enables the researcher to limit the range of technical objects examined with reference to the level of the 
goals of the user. 
The concept of functional affordances is developed from the work of (Gibson, 1977, 1979). A perceptual 
psychologist working in the field of visual perception, Gibson invented the concept of affordances to 
describe the set of possibilities for action offered an animal by the features of its environment. He defined 
the concept as follows: “An affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its 
substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal” (Gibson, 1979). Affordances are not 
classifications: just because an object affords sitting does not make it a seat. They are, rather, action 
potentials created by capabilities of the animal and properties of the environment. Affordances may be 
communicated to the animal by means of various signals, such as optical information (Gibson, 1979, p. 
140), but they are a separate concept from the animal’s perceptions.  
It is worth noting that there are actually two versions of the affordance concept in the contemporary 
literature; two versions which are related, but distinct. In the ecological psychology literature, there is a 
rich literature on affordances in the Gibsonian tradition: non-deterministic relationships describing 
action potentials between animals and aspects of their physical environments. However, in the literature 
on design science and human-computer interaction, there is an identically-named concept of affordances. 
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The literature on this branch of the affordance literature concept has its origin in Norman (2002). In this 
work, Norman interprets the concept of affordances as mental interpretations of things, based on past 
knowledge and experience (Norman, 2002, p. 219), and acknowledges that this interpretation is in 
conflict with the views of many Gibsonian psychologists. Conceptualizing affordances as mental 
representations fit with Norman’s purpose of communicating principles that could guide designers in 
creating artifacts that contain clear perceptual information about how they should be used. However, it 
did so at the cost of creating potential for confusion across the ecological and design literatures.  
Markus and Silver (2008)’s conceptualization of functional affordances makes it clear that they intend to 
draw on the Gibsonian version of the affordance concept, and they explicitly cite the ecological psychology 
literature of which Gibson’s contributions are the foundation. 
Symbolic Expressions are a relational concept linking the properties of a technical object with the 
interpretations of that object by the user. Markus and Silver define it as “the communicative possibilities 
of a technical object for a specified user group” Markus and Silver (2008, p. 622). They draw on literature 
from the discipline of semiotic engineering. Semiotics is the study of sign systems and communication (De 
Souza & Preece, 2004). It is fundamentally concerned with signs - anything which can be substituted for 
another thing in human communication (De Souza & Preece, 2004, p. 583). This domain is necessarily 
large, and its boundaries can be difficult to identify. Eco (1979) defines it as “the discipline studying 
everything which can used in order to lie”, proposing that if something cannot be used to lie, then it 
cannot be used to convey truth. Therefore semiotics is concerned with symbol systems, communication 
channels, and all other things which can be used to convey information, in such a way that the sender can 
have any discretionary control over the meaning conveyed by the message.  
Markus and Silver (2008) see interactive computer systems as having interfaces which can serve as 
messages from designers to users about how to interact with the system in order to attain desired goals or 
experiences. However, this is not the only source of symbolic expressions in their conceptualization. Other 
sources, such as contextual factors, public information and cultural norms, can also create symbolic 
expressions: either directly, by assigning values to the technology itself; or indirectly, by assigning 
meanings to properties of the technology. An example of cultural norms creating symbolic expressions 
which may affect the message sent by an IT artifact may be seen in the example of Perlroth (2012). This 
article in the New York Times, titled “The Blackberry as Black Sheep”, reported on the shame and stigma 
that owners of the Blackberry personal communication device felt when using their devices around 
colleagues or relatives who have more modern and feature-rich devices made by other manufacturers. 
Such messages in the public sphere affect the perceptions of, and the messages conveyed by, technology 
artifacts — certainly, in this case, in ways that not intended by the designers of the Blackberry. The 
attachment of culturally-specific meaning to technology properties is another way in which symbolic 
expressions may arise which are quite independent of designers. For example, Markus and Silver (2008) 
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cite the example of the color red, which may convey very different messages to Western and Asian user 
communities. For this reason, they emphasize that symbolic expressions are not to be seen as properties 
of the system, but rather as relationships between the system properties and specified user groups. 
Just as the concept of functional affordances is a relational concept that bridges the gap between the 
properties of a system and the way/s that a user can use that system, the concept of Symbolic Expressions 
is a relational concept that bridges the gap between the properties of a technical object and the 
interpretations of that object by the user.  
6.3.4 Limitations of Markus and Silver 
Markus and Silver (2008)’s conceptualization extends that of DeSanctis and Poole (1994) in ways which 
address several concerns which have been raised by scholars, and their extensions have been usefully 
applied in subsequent research (Goh et al., 2011; Grgecic & Rosenkranz, 2010, 2011). However, Markus 
and Silver’s conceptualization, by their own account, leaves room for further conceptual development. 
They make the point that a full explanation of IT effects cannot be complete without careful 
conceptualization of users and environmental contexts (Markus & Silver, 2008, p. 620); and they 
explicitly state that developing such conceptualizations is beyond the scope of their paper. Their omission 
of these conceptualizations makes sense in light of their stated goal in their paper: to enable researchers 
to construct better hypotheses for IT effects and design science research (Markus & Silver, 2008, pp. 614, 
620-621, 627-628). Such hypotheses would, presumably, specify a range of user/s and context/s within 
which the testable predicted relationships would hold. However, this tends to obstruct the application of 
Markus and Silver (2008)’s model to anything other than hypothesis testing research.  
The difficulties can be illustrated using one of the studies that has applied Markus and Silver (2008)’s 
reconceptualization. Goh et al. (2011) sought to understand the keys to a successful implementation of 
Health IT systems in hospitals. They explored this by looking at the case study of an implementation of a 
computerized document management system (CDS) at a large hospital in a major metropolitan area of the 
United States. They used the theoretical lens of organizational routines (M. C. Becker, 2004; Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003), and the analytical technique of narrative networks (Pentland & Feldman, 2007). To 
theorize the interaction between the CDS and the narrative of its implementation – i.e. how it was 
appropriated by users – they used Adaptive Structuration Theory, utilizing Markus and Silver (2008)’s 
concepts of functional affordances and symbolic expressions. This allowed them to examine the complex 
bi-directional interactions between the technology and its users (Goh et al., 2011, p. 569), and examine the 
role of agency in the unfolding of the case.  
The following observations can be made from Goh et al. (2011). 
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 Markus and Silver’s concepts are useful and effective tools for examining the interaction between 
users and IT systems, especially in those situations where the intention is to open the ‘black box’ 
— understand the underlying dynamics of the causal influences on those interactions.  
 Notwithstanding the above, the representations of functional affordances summarized in the 
narrative networks that are constructed omit crucial information that is relevant to a full 
understanding of the IT implementation. For example, one critical event that occurred in the 
transition phase of the implementation was that the mobile access carts for the system (known as 
Computers On Wheels, or COWs) began to fail because of insufficient battery charge. When 
COWs batteries failed while they were in use, it would cause the loss of any partially-entered data 
- leading to frustration, delays, and extra work (Goh et al., 2011, p. 575). This led to several effects, 
such as negative reactions to the system, and competition between teams of users for ‘possession’ 
of working COWs. However, because of the mono-dimensional nature of the functional 
affordance concept it is impractical to represent the complex nature of the type of failure and its 
several effects. It is simply represented as “Lack of workable COWs” in the narrative network. 
 Symbolic expressions come from several sources and can be complex, ambiguous and 
contradictory. Different symbolic expressions can have different effects, and different levels of 
effect, on individual users. For example, during the pre-implementation phase of the 
implementation, users were subjected to positive symbolic expressions in the form of advocacy 
and marketing materials concerning the system. During the transition phase they were subjected 
to negative symbolic expressions as a result of problems with the system. However, through the 
action of agency in the form of interventions and statements of support from senior staff, negative 
symbolic expressions regarding the system were replaced with positive ones, leading to the 
eventual success of the project. However, in the representation of these processes: the positive 
and negative messages influencing users’ reactions to the system; and the reactions of users to 
both sets of messages, were depicted as ‘symbolic expressions’. This leads to considerable 
confusion and makes it difficult to represent what is actually happening in a theoretically abstract 
way. 
The problems identified may be summarized as follows. 
 The mono-dimensional nature of the Functional Affordances concept makes it difficult to 
represent the complex nature of user interaction with the properties of technical objects; 
interactions which can involve unsuccessful attempts to access existent features, mistaken 
attempts to access non-existent features, problems, and failures – rather than just the successful 
access of existing affordances.  
 Symbolic Expressions can come from several different sources and can be complex, ambiguous, 
and contradictory. Different symbolic expressions can have different effects, and different levels 
of effect, on individual users. However, in Markus and Silver’s conceptualization, there is little 
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way to represent the lack of equifinality in the effects of different symbolic expressions since both 
the message and the effect of the message on the recipient of the message are represented by the 
same concept.  
 DeSanctis and Poole (1994), in defining AST, proposed not only a set of concepts to represent 
embedded sources of structure in technology and its appropriation, but also a set of proposed 
relationships between those concepts and potential outcomes. This set of propositions, in 
conformity with the ‘soft deterministic’ stance that they followed, did not specify a set of causal 
relationships between inputs and outcomes. However, they did serve to focus enquiry and give 
direction about the questions that could – and ought to – be asked when applying AST to the 
analysis of empirical findings. Several of those propositions may need to be revisited in light of 
Markus and Silver’s modifications. For example, faithfulness of appropriation, a key concept in 
AST which describes the extent to which an appropriation move is consistent with the system 
spirit, loses its meaning when the concept of spirit is replaced with symbolic expressions. A new 
framework for linking AST concepts to user behaviors is therefore required. 
Attempts to represent user perceptions and behaviors must make a trade-off between generalizability, 
simplicity and accuracy (Tate & Evermann, 2009). The concepts proposed by Markus and Silver (2008) 
appear to privilege simplicity at the cost of accuracy by making it difficult for researchers to represent 
complex appropriation processes while maintaining conceptual abstraction (Tate & Evermann, 2012).   
In the next section, I will revisit the source literatures for the concepts proposed by Markus and Silver 
(2008), and will draw on further literature from cognitive science to propose a framework for 
conceptualizing the interaction of user, system and task in a more comprehensive way.  
6.3.5 Extending Markus and Silver 
In this section, I propose extensions to Markus and Silver (2008)’s concepts in order to allow for a more 
detailed analysis of the appropriation processes involved in the use and adoption of advanced information 
technologies. Specifically, I look at affordance types, user effectivities, and system representations.  
Affordance Types 
The concept of functional affordances is developed from the work of (Gibson, 1977, 1979). Gibson 
developed the concept of affordances to describe a set of possibilities for action offered an animal by the 
features of its environment. Ontologically, an affordance is not a property of an animal (the preferred 
term in ecological psychology) or an object, but a relationship between properties of the animal and the 
properties of an object. It represents an action potential created by the relationship between such 
properties. For example, the following question can be asked: If a man on a level surface is faced with a 
raised platform, does the platform afford the act of stepping up onto? The answer is not inherent in the 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
150 
 
properties of the animal (the man) or the object (the platform) but rather a relationship between the 
properties of each – namely, if the height of the platform is 88% or less of the length of the man’s leg, it 
affords stepping (Warren, 1984). This is true regardless of the actual value of either property, and is not 
dependent on whether or not the man is aware of the relationship.  
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) provided a typology of appropriation moves to guide researchers in 
conducting analysis. However, this typology is closely tied to the notion of technology artifacts as sources 
of structure, as their formulation assumes that technology has embedded social structures. It must 
therefore be revisited when considering affordances, which are not sources of structure, but avenues of 
agency. Gaver (1991) has extended the work of Gibson (1979) in a way that may fill the gaps in the current 
conceptualization of functional affordances, enabling them to convey more information about the way 
that users apprehend and utilize affordances in their interactions with IT artifacts. He proposed that since 
affordances are independent of perception, it is possible to separate an affordance (i.e., an action 
potential) from perceptual information about the affordance. On this view, he proposed the following 
matrix of affordances: 
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Gaver’s Typology of Affordances 
 
Figure 6: Typology of Affordances  
 
Where perceptual information exists for an existing affordance, it is a Perceptible Affordance, which may 
be perceived and acted upon by a user. Where there is no information revealing the existence of an 
existing affordance, it is a Hidden Affordance, which cannot be perceived, but may be inferred from other 
evidence. Where existing information points to an affordance that does not exist, it is a False Affordance 
which may lead to errors as users try to act on it. Finally, where there is no information to suggest the 
existence of an affordance that does not exist, there will be a Correct Rejection. Gaver (1991) also noted 
that where objects afford complex actions those affordances may be sequential: acting on a perceptible 
affordance may lead to information indicating new affordances. For example, in a word processing 
program, the Paste affordance may be revealed only after the Copy affordance has been utilized. 
Affordances may also be nested in space: an icon – say a picture of a disk – may, by itself, afford clicking. 
However, in the spatial context of a toolbar at the top of an application window, the same icon may afford 
saving a file.  
User innovation often involves exploratory behaviors, including learning by trial and error. They can 
evolve over time, and are often shaped by context (Jasperson et al., 2005). Gaver (1991)’s extensions to 
the concept of affordances can therefore usefully extend Markus and Silver (2008)’s concept of functional 
affordances, giving researchers a tool for representing these complex interactions with IT artifacts over 
time. 
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User Effectivities 
Markus and Silver (2008) emphasize that functional affordances are possibilities for goal-oriented action 
afforded to specified users or user groups. Affordances can only exist where there is a match between user 
properties and the properties of technical objects which create action potentials in turn. A specific 
information technology which is programmable will offer certain affordances to a user with programming 
skills that it will not offer to a user who does not.  
Shaw, Turvey, and Mace (1982) proposed a concept that can be used to represent properties of a user (or 
potential user) of a technical object – the concept of the effectivity. They used as a starting point Turvey 
and Shaw (1979)’s formalization of the concept of the affordance: 
 A situation or event X affords action Y for animal Z on occasion O if certain relevant mutual 
compatibility relations between X and Z obtain 
Then they defined the concept of the effectivity as: 
o An animal Z can effect action Y on an environmental situation or event X on occasion O if certain 
relevant mutual compatibility relations between X and Z obtain 
The concepts of the affordance and the effectivity are complementary: a situation or object cannot offer an 
animal an affordance if the animal does not possess the necessary effectivities (Michaels, 2003). As such, 
effectivities — which can include properties such as abilities and aptitudes (Greeno, 1994) — can 
parsimoniously be described as properties of animals that allow them to make use of affordances 
(Chemero, 2003). The notion of the effectivity enables us to account for the fact that the same IT artifact 
(e.g., a laptop), can offer completely different possibilities for action (affordances) to one user – a novelist, 
and another user – a software  developer; even though both may access the same physical properties of 
the artifact (e.g., screen, keyboard, trackpad) during the appropriation process. 
As such, the effectivities concept can reasonably be used to extend the interaction model proposed by 
Markus and Silver (2008), providing a conceptual object for representing the individual characteristics of 
users and user groups which result in the creation of functional affordances for those groups with respect 
to a given technical object. This allows us to ask questions about both sides of the user/technical object 
pair to discover what creates novel affordances and, in turn, leads to innovative appropriations of IT.  
System Representations 
Symbolic expressions, in Markus and Silver (2008), are messages concerning the system and how it may 
be interpreted and used. These messages may originate with designers, but they are not equivalent to 
designers’ intentions. Problems during the system development process, marketing documentation, 
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public media and other information sources may also send messages about the system to users, some of 
which may conflict with designers’ intentions (Perlroth, 2012). In addition, individual differences among 
users may result in multifinality in the effects of symbolic expressions: the effect of a marketing flyer, for 
example, may be contingent on a user’s attitude to advertising. 
To represent the user’s picture of the system – the picture that may be shaped by symbolic expressions 
rather than the messages themselves – I propose the concept of System Representations. Davern et al. 
(2012a) use a similarly-named concept in their organizing framework for exploring research on cognition 
within IS, however my definition of the concept is more abstract. I define system representations as the 
mental representation of the system that is held at any given time by an individual user, or the shared 
mental representation of the system that is held by a user group. Unlike user perceptions – which are 
typically measured with self-report instruments and depend on users to reflectively assess and report 
their own mental states, system representations are conceptualized as embodying the full mental map of 
the system. Given extensive evidence from cognitive psychology that cognitive maps include elements that 
are not accessible to conscious awareness (Evans, 2008; Sloman, 1996), this implies that they cannot be 
directly measured using existing instruments. They must be retroactively inferred from what users 
actually do. This is significant, given the substantial evidence from previous research that self-reports 
often do not give a full and accurate picture of actual usage behaviors (Straub et al., 1995). 
6.4 Affordance Field Theory 
In this section, I combine the above extensions to Markus and Silver (2008) and the new 
conceptualizations into an integrative framework that conceptualizes how users enact and identify 
appropriation moves. I take the common perspective in IS that using it systems involves three 
fundamental conceptual objects: users, systems, and tasks (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006; Pentland & 
Feldman, 2007). The conceptual framework shows how any interaction of these conceptual objects can be 
represented using an interaction model consisting of a set of objects, relationships, and actions. Figure 7 
visualizes this model. 
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Affordance Field Theory 
 
 
Figure 7: Affordance Field Theory Interaction Model 
 
Table 3 provides definitions of the main constructs. 
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Table 5: AFT Acronyms and Definitions 
Objects 
Acronym Name Definition 
User User An individual or user group which 
appropriates the properties of a system 
in a goal-directed manner to perform a 
task 
User 
Effectivities 
User Effectivities Properties and capabilities of the user 
which create affordances in combination 
with the properties of the system 
System System or Technical Object IT artifacts and their component parts, 
as per (Markus & Silver, 2008) 
System 
Properties 
System Properties Properties of the system which create 
action potentials.  
SE Symbolic Expressions Messages that may be interpreted by the 
user concerning how a system is to be 
interpreted, and how it may be used 
SR System Representation The full mental model of the system held 
by a user or user group 
TIP Technology in Practice  A sociotechnical object formed by the 
user and the technical object 
APF Action Potential Field An area representing all possible 
affordances which may be created by the 
technical object 
AF Affordance Field An area representing all available 
affordances created by the intersection of 
user effectivities and technical object 
properties 
PAF Perceived Affordance Field An area representing all affordances 
which can be perceived by the user, given 
the user’s system representation  
NAF Normative Affordance Field An area representing the conventional 
range of affordances available to typical 
users of a system 
Actions 
AP Move Appropriation Move A constructive use of a system that 
determines its nature and effect 
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AF Widening Affordance Field Widening A user’s finding novel ways to apply 
existing properties of the system 
AF Stretching Affordance Field Stretching A user’s finding novel properties or novel 
way to apply the properties of the system 
Overlap Overlap Incongruence among the different 
affordance fields which create effects 
AASS Available Affordance Space 
Search 
The process of seeking and identifying 
available affordances carried out by a 
user 
Relationships 
Convergence Convergence The degree to which the elements of the 
shared model of a system held by a user 
are common across members of a group. 
Represented by the degree to which the 
individual affordance fields intersect 
Overlap   The degree to which the different types 
of affordance fields of a TIP are 
dissimilar.  
FA False Affordance A type of overlap in which the perceived 
affordance field extends beyond the 
affordance field. Indicates that a user 
perceives an affordance which does not 
exist. 
HA Hidden Affordance A type of overlap in which the affordance 
field extends beyond the perceived 
affordance field. Indicates that the user 
is not aware of an existing affordance. 
 
To represent the main constructs, I borrow Gibson (1979)’s concept of a visual field as the context in 
which an affordance becomes available for perception. The background of the image visualizes a vast 
surface, which represents all the possible ways in which any technical object can be used – the domain of 
all possible action potentials or tasks. Within this domain, we conceive that the potentials for interaction 
between users and systems, and the accomplishment of tasks through that interaction, can be represented 
with a set of conceptual objects, relationships, and actions. These are defined as follows. 
6.4.1 Conceptual Objects 
User 
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In keeping with the specifications of Markus and Silver (2008, pp. 622, 628), I use the generic term “user” 
to define individual users or user groups. Users are defined on an ad-hoc basis depending on the scope of 
specific studies. Users have effectivities which may create action potentials in combination with the 
properties of technical objects, creating affordances. Users also evaluate and interpret symbolic 
expressions – messages about the system and the way in which it may be used – which may come from a 
number of sources, including direct interaction with the technical object. These interpretations lead to the 
user forming a mental model of the system (Bostrom, Olfman, & Sein, 1990), which, in common with 
previous researchers (Davern et al., 2012a), I define as a system representation. 
System 
A parsimonious way of saying “Technical Objects,” as per Markus and Silver (2008). As technical objects, 
systems have properties that can create action potentials which may be engaged to perform tasks. System 
properties may also be interpreted by users, and are thus one source of symbolic expressions. Symbolic 
expressions, in turn, can create System Representations, which represent the user’s cognitive model of the 
system. Note that systems themselves can be thought of as representations: representations of task 
domains (Burton-Jones & Grange, 2012; Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006). 
Technology-in-Practice (TIP) 
The effect that technical objects have on the world depends, in part, on their intrinsic nature – i.e., their 
properties; but also on the way in which they are actually used. Systems may intrinsically be capable of a 
variety of functional actions, but the actions that are selected, and the way those actions are implemented, 
by users is what determines their actual nature in a use context. For example, a computer program such as 
Microsoft Excel could be a tool for maintaining stock lists, designing forms, maintaining a simple budget, 
or performing complex quantitative modeling, depending on how it is used. Orlikowski proposed the 
concept of the “technology-in-practice”: a sociotechnical construct formed by the user and the system, 
whose nature is determined by the enactment process involved in its use (Orlikowski, 1999, 2000). I will 
adopt this concept. 
System Representation 
The available symbolic expressions regarding a system lead the user to create a mental model of the 
system and how it may be used. This mental model is the System Representation held by the user. The 
System Representation is fluid and may change as the user is exposed to information about the system. It 
should be noted that the Technology In Practice is formed by the properties of the system combined with 
the effectivities of the user; while the System Representation is formed by the user’s cognitive processing 
of symbolic expressions. 
Action Potential Field (APF) 
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Some of the properties of a system may include capacities for actions that may be applied by users to 
interact with elements of the environment in order to produce outcomes that fulfill users’ goals. Another 
way of saying this is that system properties create action potentials. The action potentials of any system 
are a subset of the action potentials created by all systems. Within the domain of action potentials, the 
action potentials created by the properties of a specified system form that system’s Action Potential Field. 
In the AFT model, it is represented by an elliptical area representing the intersection of the system’s 
properties with the domain of potential tasks to which any system could be applied. It represents all the 
possible ways in which the system may be used by any user.  
Affordance Field (AF) 
The user side of the TIP has effectivities which can combine with the properties of the artifact side of the 
TIP to create affordances. This range of affordances so created can be represented by an elliptical area 
which we name an Affordance Field. The affordance field represents all the tasks that a specified user can 
perform with the specified technical object. For most TIPs, the affordance field will always be a subset of 
the action potential field because no user is likely to have all the effectivities necessary to make use of all 
the action potentials offered by the system.  
Perceived Affordance Field 
While the affordance field is determined by the intersection of user effectivities and system properties, the 
user will not necessarily have perfect information about either of those conceptual objects. The user will 
become aware of the system’s properties and develop a mental model of the system and how it can be used 
through symbolic expressions which may come from explicit information sources, or implicit meanings 
attached to symbols in the context. These symbolic expressions will lead the user to form a system 
representation that will determine what affordances are perceived to be offered by the system. The 
Perceived Affordance Field represents all the affordances which the user can perceive to exist, given her 
current system representation. 
Normative Affordance Field 
For any given technical object, there will be a range of uses which are conventional or ‘standard’, and 
some which are feasible, but unusual or unexpected. For example, a tablet computer may be used as an 
email client (normal), but may also be used as a file server (non-normal, but feasible). The range of 
conventional uses is represented by the Normative Affordance Field, which we define as area within the 
action potential field within which the user affordance field will commonly fall. The normative affordance 
field can be defined statistically, by measuring the typical use patterns of users, or inductively, by analysis 
of the symbolic expressions available to users. 
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6.4.2 Relationships 
The relational concepts in AFT represent relationships between the conceptual objects that describe the 
state of the relationship at a given point in time between the conceptual objects above. I propose two 
types of relationship. Overlap, describes a type of relationship between the different types of affordance 
field.  Convergence is specific to analysis of user groups and relates to the relationship between the 
members of the user group. 
Overlap 
Each of the different types of affordance field represents a different aspect of the relationship between the 
user and the system: an affordance field represents what the user is able to do with the system; a 
perceived affordance field represents what the user perceives that they are able to do with the system, and 
the normative affordance field represents the prevailing norm regarding how the system ought to be used. 
The potential differences in these concepts can be represented as the degree of overlap in the respective 
affordance fields of the model.  For example, a specific user, when accessing the action potentials of a 
specific technical object, will have specific affordances. However, the user may perceive the existence of 
affordances which do not actually exist: e.g., the user may believe that the system offers a specific action 
potential when, in fact, it does not. This false affordance can be represented in the model as the perceived 
affordance field extending beyond the affordance field. In contrast, the user may fail to perceive an 
existing affordance – creating a hidden affordance. This can be represented by the perceived affordance 
field failing to cover part of the affordance field.  
The different types of affordance fields are related, but independent, constructs. This means that their 
relationship to each other may differ over time in a sequential manner. For example, a user may have a 
goal that involves accomplishing a task outside of the action potential field. This would mean the user’s 
perceived affordance field would stretch beyond her affordance field (by definition, an affordance field can 
never stretch beyond a system’s action potential field). However, affordance fields are dynamic — making 
an appropriation move can distort the affordance field (e.g., making configuration changes to a system 
can change its capabilities and distort its affordance field). For the user, making a series of appropriation 
moves, each of which stretch the affordance field and the action potential field, may bring the task within 
the affordance field. The task would therefore be accomplished through making use of a serial affordance. 
Convergence 
Like Markus and Silver (2008), I intend the constructs in in affordance field theory to apply to specified 
users and user groups. As such, AFT objects, such as system representations, may be held by individuals, 
or shared across collectives. Other concepts, such as effectivities, may also be distributed among the 
individual members of collective user groups. In groups where objects such as representations are held by 
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multiple individuals, one characteristic of the group which may be considered is the degree to which each 
individual’s representation is similar to the representations of other individuals within the group. 
Variations in this characteristic may result from factors such as member similarity and group 
cohesiveness, and may have various effects on the effects and outcomes associated with the group. Shared 
objects such as representations may be, in part, a product of the individual representations held by 
members of a group, but they may also be emergent from group processes. The variability in the similarity 
and cohesiveness of shared representations and distributed mental models may be expressed by the 
concept of convergence. Convergence is defined as the degree to which shared informational 
representations of conceptual objects in a group are common across members of the group. Convergence 
varies along a continuum from tightly converged to loosely converged based on the degree of 
commonality in the representation held across the group. It can be visualized by reference to the model of 
the affordance field: 
Degree of Convergence 
 
 
Figure 8: Degree of Convergence 
 
In this model, the degree of convergence can be represented by the degree to which the elliptical areas 
representing individual affordance fields intersect. 
Affordance field theory provides a representational scheme to depict levels of convergence for specified 
concepts within specified groups, but does not predict causal relationships between degrees of 
convergence and outcomes or effects. This allows it to be used by researchers employing different 
assumptions about the specific effects of levels and types of convergence, and effects which may be 
unexpected, and nonlinear in nature (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). 
6.4.3 Actions 
Appropriation Moves 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
161 
 
In AFT, the concept of appropriation is conceptualized in a way largely similar to the way it is defined in 
the original formulation of adaptive structuration theory (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). Appropriation 
references the fact that the way an object is used is key to determining the nature of the object: a hammer 
can be a tool, a weapon, or a symbol; depending on how it is used. As such, the intrinsic nature of a system 
is not determined simply by its properties, and the same system (object) can be a different thing in 
different contexts (Poole & DeSanctis, 1989). 
Appropriation is fundamentally similar in both DeSanctis and Poole (1994)’s and Markus and Silver 
(2008)’s versions of adaptive structuration theory, but it also has important differences. DeSanctis and 
Poole saw the structures within the technology as being enacted by users through appropriation moves, 
which involved: 
a) Making choices about how to use technology structures 
b) Choosing to appropriate technology features faithfully – in a manner consistent with the spirit of 
the system and the design of the features; or unfaithfully – out of line with the system spirit 
c) Selecting different instrumental uses for the technology, and 
d) Displaying different attitudes as the technology structures are appropriated. 
When the fundamental concepts of structural features and spirit are replaced, as was done by Markus and 
Silver (2008), it is obvious that the processes inherent to the making of appropriation moves must also be 
reconceptualized. The action concepts discussed below form a framework for analyzing the action 
“behind” appropriation moves in AFT. 
Affordance Field Widening 
Affordance fields are dynamic objects, in that changes to the elements that determine the area of the field 
will result in changes to the corresponding field. For example, changing a user’s effectivities through 
training, for example, may change the user’s affordance field. Changing the way a user interprets system 
properties by exposing the user to analogues (Bostrom et al., 1990) may change her perceived affordance 
field, etc. It is proposed that affordance fields can be changed by being distorted in two orthogonal axes: 
they can be widened, or stretched. It is theoretically possible for an affordance field to be contracted, 
rather than expanded: for example, the user of a system that permits two-handed operation may have a 
contracted affordance field if she breaks a hand. However, the circumstances in which AF Contraction 
would occur are likely rare. For such situations, I believe that representing such distortions as negative 
widening or stretching would be appropriate. 
In affordance field widening novel ways of applying existing properties of the system are developed or 
discovered by the user. This includes applying known properties in new ways or transferring their 
application to novel problem domains.  
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The fundamental activity involved in AF widening is analogic transfer.  
Affordance Field Stretching 
In addition to the discovery of new ways to apply existing properties of systems, users may also discover 
or develop completely new properties or application methods. For example, a user may make use of an 
application programming interface or macro facility provided by the system to extend its capabilities – 
thus creating new action potentials. This is represented in the AFT model by affordance field stretching.  
The fundamental activity involved in AF stretching is generative production. 
Available Affordance Space Search 
The appropriation of a system by a user is typically a goal-directed activity (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006, 
p. 231). In this context, I define a goal as do Fishbach and Ferguson (2007, p. 491): “a cognitive 
representation of a desired endpoint that impacts evaluations, emotions and behaviors”.  When users 
have goals that they perceive can be accomplished by the application of properties of a system, they seek 
ways to apply those properties. The general way of representing the search for a problem solution is that 
an intelligent system (typically, a human) traverses a “problem space” (M. Perry, 2003, p. 195): an 
abstract representation of the goal state that is being sought and the possible routes to that state (Boland, 
Goraya, Berente, & Hansen, 2009). I propose that the search for an appropriation move that is possible 
(i.e., within the Perceived Affordance Field) and will result in the attainment of the desired goal state 
represents a traverse of a problem space by the user. The problem space they traverse is that of the 
available affordances offered by the system, which I define as the Affordance Space. When they identify 
available affordances created by their own effectivities and the properties of the system, they make 
suitable appropriation moves based on that perception. This can be represented as a search of the 
Affordance Space offered by the system.  
Users will typically search for affordances that correspond to their effectivities, rather than seek action 
potentials which are not available to them. For example, if a user with no programming skills is seeking to 
use a system which exposes an API, the user will typically search for ways to use properties which they do 
have the skills to exploit, rather than seek properties which they cannot use. In other words, users seek 
affordances which are available to them. The user will therefore conduct an available affordance space 
search to identify exploitable affordances which match their goals. It is worth noting that, in the case of 
user groups, different members of the group may have different effectivities (e.g., one member may have 
domain expertise, and another, programming skills). In this case, the group’s available affordance space 
will represent the sum of the affordances created by individual members’ effectivities, as well as any group 
network effects.  
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6.5 Applying AFT 
The above descriptions may appear to represent the making of appropriation moves as a single-step 
process. In the real world, this is often not the case. Appropriation moves may involve multiple steps, 
including failed attempts, satisficing, unforeseen consequences, etc., etc. Affordance Field Theory 
attempts to standardize the way the steps are represented. For example, a user may conceive a goal 
(Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007), which is outside of the current Affordance Field, and pursue it by making 
use of serial affordances to stretch the affordance field. This is not only a highly condensed representation 
of the process of system development, in which existing tools and components are used to build a new 
system, but is also the activity that people are often involved in when they “implement” a system. 
However, this kind of behavior is not limited to the development or implementation of systems. People 
develop goal states and pursue them through modifying the way they use systems at various points in the 
system lifecycle. In the course of doing so, they engage in cycles of ideation and enactment that move 
them toward that goal state. AFT provides a set of standard conceptual categories for events that occur in 
those cycles. 
The stated goal of Markus and Silver (2008) was enabling researchers to construct better hypotheses. The 
goal of AFT is broader: to enable researchers to ask better questions. By representing the full problem 
space of user interaction with IT, it facilitates a range of questions that go beyond the scope of traditional 
hypotheses.  
6.6 An Illustrative Case 
To illustrate how AFT concepts were applied in order to analyze the case data, it may be useful to return to 
one of the “Creative Incident” cases from chapter 5, and show how the events in the case can be 
theoretically redescribed using AFT. Below is a copy of the description of the “Order Book” case from 
organization Beta: 
Several years after the initial development of the Product system, the founders of Beta 
decided that the company had outgrown their own style of leadership, and needed 
professional management. They hired a team of professional managers which included a 
CEO, and an IT manager, who I will call RR. The hiring of the new executives was part of an 
effort by the founders to formalize their internal processes and increase efficiency, since 
rapid growth in their order volumes was making a number of business processes more 
difficult to manage. One particularly difficult process was communicating with customers 
about what types of widgets they wanted to buy, and in what quantities. Beta would receive 
relatively small orders for each line of widgets from each customer. When the orders were 
collated, they would then decide which lines of widgets could be economically manufactured, 
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given the total number of orders. Several lines would typically be dropped at that point in the 
process, and the prices of some lines would have to be adjusted in order to make them 
profitable. The adjusted catalogue would then go out again to customers to enable them to 
make necessary changes to their orders based on the adjustments that had been made.  
All the communication necessary to manage this process had traditionally been done using a 
large, printed order book, copies of which were physically distributed to the customers. As 
the volume of orders increased, this system became increasingly untenable. Small errors, 
such as differences between the product codes in the order book and those in the company’s 
internal inventory management system, would mean time-consuming delays and frustrated 
orders by customers. In addition to the inefficiencies created by errors, the sheer volume of 
work required to run the manual system was making it impossible meet production 
deadlines. The merchandise manager, who I will call AN, discussed the situation with the 
new IT manager, RR. AN and RR agreed that there was a need to improve the efficiency of 
the ordering process, while maintaining the configurability and verifiability of the manual 
process. RR had several meetings with the marketing and customer relations staff, then went 
away to develop a solution.  
RR designed a system which automated the ordering process using an electronic file 
generated by Product. The information that had previously been sent to customers in the 
paper order book was transferred into Product, and was sent to customers via email. Email 
made it easier to manage the communications with customers, and the files from these 
orders were returned to the IT manager after they had been filled out by customers. 
Information from their finalized order files (in Product) was then typed into Beta’s ERP 
package for order processing. The IT manager became deeply involved in each step of the 
ordering process. The production of the electronic file with the order options for widgets was 
done by RR, who was also responsible for uploading the finalized order files to the ERP.  
A few years after this system had been put into effect, the IT manager that had replaced the 
paper order book with a Product file resigned, and MC — the current IT manager — was 
hired to take her place. MC was highly dissatisfied with the large amount of manual 
processing that was involved in the processing of customer orders. MC had significant 
experience as a software engineer, and spent the first three weeks on the job automating the 
process of creating the Product order book. His initial goal was to reduce errors: the (then) 
current system made it possible to type in combinations of options for widgets that were not 
actually available, and a lot of time was spent dealing with data entry errors on the part of 
Beta and/or its customers. He also wished to move responsibly for the ordering process to 
the sales department, which was formally responsible for it. He then designed an 
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intermediary system which would automatically “scrape” order configurations from the 
completed Product order files and load them into the ERP. He also designed automated 
reports that enabled the sales department to accomplish much of the checking and 
verification that had previously been done by RR. This arrangement makes his involvement 
in the actual ordering process minimal.  
This account could be broken down into the following core events and descriptions: 
Table 6: Example Descriptions of Events in Beta Case 
Event Description 
RR joins the staff at 
Beta 
RR is an experienced IT manager and is hired because of her corporate 
background. She sees her main duties as helping to change the 
organizational culture at Beta, and improving the efficiency of the firm’s 
operations.  
RR is familiarized 
with the systems in 
place at Beta 
As part of her induction to her duties at Beta, RR becomes familiar with 
all the systems which are used in their operations in different 
departments 
AN and RR meet to 
discuss the 
problems being 
experienced with 
the manual system 
for processing 
customer orders 
In light of RR’s mandate to improve efficiency, AN asks her to find a way 
to improve one of Beta’s key business processes: collecting customer 
orders 
RR develops a 
solution to the 
problems which 
involves using the 
features of Product  
RR recognizes a similarity between the problems that the production 
department had solved using the features of Product, and the problem 
that was now faced by the customer service department. She develops a 
solution based on Product that is similar to the one developed by the 
production department. This solution achieves two goals: it improves 
the efficiency of the process, and it puts her at the center of one of the 
firm’s most critical business processes, where she is able to influence a 
change in culture 
MC joins the staff 
at Beta 
MC is an experienced software engineer and is hired because of his 
expertise with the technical systems being used by Beta. His main goals 
are improving the reliability and efficiency of Beta’s IT systems, and 
fixing a culture of excessive dependence on the IT staff to perform line 
operations among the users, which he sees as unsustainable 
MC modifies the 
Product-based 
system to reduce 
manual operations 
and automate 
MC makes modifications to the ordering system that reduces the need 
for manual data entry, and creates tools that allow the sales staff to 
manage most of the process of soliciting and processing customer 
orders. This solution achieves two goals: it improves the reliability and 
efficiency of the ordering system, and it allows the end users to take 
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several processing 
steps 
control of the ordering process, reducing the involvement of IT staff. 
 
This set of events can be theoretically redescribed using AFT constructs (with the construct type in 
parentheses), as follows: 
Table 7: Example Re-description of Events in Beta Case 
Event Re-Description 
RR joins the staff at 
Beta 
RR brings a number of Symbolic Expressions (object) from her prior 
training in IT and her corporate background. Her major goals are helping 
to change the organizational culture at Beta, and improving the efficiency 
of the firm’s operations.  
RR is familiarized 
with the systems in 
place at Beta 
As part of her induction to her duties at Beta, RR develops System 
Representations (object) of the all the Systems (object) at Beta. 
She develops Perceived Affordance Fields (object) for each System 
(object) and begins an Available Affordance Space Search 
(action) for Appropriation Moves (action) which can accomplish 
her goals 
AN and RR meet to 
discuss the 
problems being 
experienced with 
the manual system 
for processing 
customer orders 
In light of RR’s mandate to improve efficiency, AN asks her to find a way 
to improve one of Beta’s key business processes: collecting customer 
orders 
RR develops a 
solution to the 
problems which 
involves using the 
features of Product  
Because of Symbolic Expressions from seeing what the production 
department has done with Product, RR’s Perceived Affordance Field 
for Product is Widened (action) beyond the Normative Affordance 
Field (object) of the System. Due to PAF Widening RR identifies an 
Appropriation Move which involves using Product as a 
communication system, just as the production department did. Utilizing 
Effectivities (object) from her training and background, she uses 
Action Potentials (object) offered by the properties of Product and 
makes the AP Move. Doing so accomplishes her two major goals. 
MC joins the staff 
at Beta 
MC is an experienced software engineer and is hired because of his 
expertise with the technical systems being used by Beta. Because of 
different Symbolic Expressions that he has got from his own 
background, he develops different goals from RR and begins an 
Available Affordance Space Search for AP Moves which can 
accomplish his goals 
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MC modifies the 
Product-based 
system to reduce 
manual operations 
and automate 
several processing 
steps 
MC develops goals which are outside the Affordance Field of the 
System created by RR, such as reducing manual entry, and giving sales 
staff control of the ordering process. Utilizing Effectivities from his 
background as a software developer, MC makes use of Serial 
Affordances (object) offered by APIs in Product. He is able to Stretch 
the Affordance Field (action) of Product until the AP Moves that 
accomplish his goals are within the Affordance Field (object).  
 
It should be noted that the statements in the above descriptions of the events are based on conclusions 
formed by analyzing the case data. As has been noted previously, some of these conclusions are subject to 
the multifinality inherent in the critical realist Open Systems Perspective (Wynn & Williams, 2012). As 
such, there may be multiple possible explanations for an event, and the researcher must employ judgment 
rationality to reach a conclusion. However the test of AFT is not whether it can “prove” any single 
explanation or description of an event – given the limits of the available data, that would not be possible. 
Rather, the test of AFT is whether it can theoretically redescribe any explanation that has been generated 
through judgment rationality. AFT meets this test. 
For example, the re-description of the fifth event in Table 7 gives the following AFT-coded description of 
the event: 
Because of Symbolic Expressions from seeing what the production department has 
done with Product, RR’s Perceived Affordance Field for Product is Widened beyond 
the Normative Affordance Field of the System. Due to PAF Widening RR 
identifies an Appropriation Move which involves using Product as a communication 
system, just as the production department did. Utilizing Effectivities from her training 
and background, she uses Action Potentials offered by the properties of Product and 
makes the AP Move. Doing so accomplishes her two major goals. 
What if, on collecting further data, it was decided that it would be more accurate to say that RR was not 
influenced by what the production department did, and generated the idea to re-purpose Product on her 
own? The description could be rewritten: 
Because of Symbolic Expressions from her background and training, RR was able to 
Stretch her Perceived Affordance Field for Product beyond the Normative 
Affordance Field for the System. Due to PAF Stretching RR identifies an 
Appropriation Move which involves using Product as a communication system. 
Utilizing Effectivities from her training and background, she uses Action Potentials 
offered by the properties of Product and makes the AP Move. Doing so accomplishes her 
two major goals. 
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AFT is therefore able to function as a descriptive theory, and is not tied to any particular interpretation of 
the data.  
It should also be noted that at a more (or less) atomistic level of analysis there would be a different 
number of events, moves, etc. The critical realist principle of Emergence (Wynn & Williams, 2012) is 
applied to analyze events at a certain level of detail. 
6.7 Limitations of AFT 
It should be noted that AFT provides a way to represent the cycles of ideation and enactment that are 
involved in developing novel appropriation method effectively. As such, it is useful for studies 
investigating contexts in which this kind of behavior is important. AFT is a useful tool for asking how and 
why questions about how systems come to be appropriated in certain ways. AFT also provides a useful 
tool for comparing appropriation behaviors across contexts in multiple-case studies or research programs 
AFT is less effective when the focus of a study is on measuring the extent of use, especially when such 
extents are best represented as quantities, frequencies, or making comparisons about productivity or 
efficiency. For such research problems, methods for measuring use such as the procedure developed by 
Burton-Jones and Straub (2006) may be more appropriate.   
Another limitation of AFT is its use of spatial metaphors and language to describe individual and 
distributed cognitive processes. Boland (2001) has discussed the confusion created by the human 
tendency to use a primarily spatial vocabulary to describe cognition and behavior, which unfold as 
temporal processes. There is room for further development of AFT to more realistically represent the time 
dimension of cognitive processes. 
6.8 Discussion of AFT 
It must be acknowledged that AFT contributes to an ongoing, and sometimes contentious, discussion 
about how cognitive and behavioral processes should be represented in research. From a social cognitive 
perspective, shared cognitive structures representing environments and tasks in organizations have been 
captured in concepts such as Orlikowski and Gash (1994)’s “Frames”. However, Gal and Berente (2008) 
have argued that temporally bounded, technologically centered and individually-focused models of 
cognition such as frames offer superficial explanations for IS phenomena, and argue for a social 
representations theory approach. However, these arguments occur at the “representation and algorithm” 
level of Marr (1982)’s hierarchy of abstraction, rather than the “computational theory” level. AFT does not 
presuppose a representational scheme and is not incompatible with either approach. AFT could, for 
example, be used to frame questions about the efficacy of different representational models for cognitive 
processes. 
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As was noted in chapter 2, the IS discipline has recently seen a number of new models proposed for 
representing the interaction of users with IT systems (Germonprez et al., 2011; Leonardi, 2011; 
Orlikowski, 2007). As another new model, AFT can make claim to the following merits: 
 Represents the full problem space of user interaction with IT, having conceptual objects to 
represent the user, the system and the task 
 Enables the representation of the flows of information and other influences that shape user 
behavior — in the form of SEs 
 Enables consideration of the potential, as well as actual, appropriation behaviors that users 
engage in 
 Provides a common language (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999) for analyzing user behaviors across 
contexts — even in intensive research 
However, it also has the following limitations 
o Does not represent repetitive, common units of use as well as some competing representational 
schemes 
o Limited representation of contextual detail. 
o For research contexts where measurement of efficiency in performing repetitive tasks is 
important, other representational strategies such as that proposed by Burton-Jones and Straub 
(2006) may be more effective 
As such, AFT provides another tool for researchers involved in the study of change and ideation events in 
IS research. It may be particularly useful in multiple-case studies, in which findings from different case 
contexts must be integrated. It may also be used in multi-method research programs. The objects, actions 
and relationships of AFT may be operationalized in a number of ways and can be useful for asking what, 
how and why questions. It may even be used to represent aggregate findings across studies, providing a 
common language for different researchers looking at similar problems (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999). 
All told, AFT represents a significant contribution to the ongoing discussion in the literature about how 
the utilization of information systems by users should be represented. It is one of the major contributions 
of the study. 
6.9 Within-Case Analysis 
The analysis of data in this study can usefully be looked at using Eisenhardt (1989a)’s categories of within-
case and cross-case analysis. In this section, I summarize the within-case analysis conducted. The analysis 
begins with the a priori codes based on the work of Amabile. However, as the coding scheme was changed 
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(along with the design of the study, as permitted in Eisenhardt (1989a)’s method), AFT is used to 
theoretically redescribe the data. 
The following section summarizes the within-case analysis undertaken in each of the five cases that were 
theoretically selected before saturation dictated the termination of the analysis. 
6.9.1 First-Cycle Coding 
In this phase of the analysis the recorded interviews were transcribed and the interview media files, along 
with the transcripts, were loaded into NVivo. The transcripts were coded and then first cycle coding 
(Saldaña, 2009) was done, initially using the a priori codes from the work of Amabile (Amabile, 1983, 
1988, 1996). This phase of the work also served to deepen familiarity with the data, and assist in 
developing the overall analytical strategy. The initial coding and analysis was done in parallel with the 
data collection, and, as recommended in (Eisenhardt, 1989a), and consistent with (Calderwood, Crandall, 
& Klein, 1987; G. A. Klein et al., 1989), minor changes were made to the case study protocol in response to 
learning during the study. For example, the Time Line Verification and Decision Point Identification step 
from the full Critical Decision Method had been dropped (Crandall et al., 1998, p. 16). However, during 
data collection I found that assisting me in constructing a timeline often prodded participants to correct 
temporal order confusion in their initial accounts of the incidents. In response to this, I included an 
abbreviated timeline construction exercise in the interviews. 
6.9.2 Narrative Networks 
Narrative networks were constructed using the guidelines of Pentland and Feldman (2007). The narrative 
networks were constructed by analytically combining all the evidence in each case: typically multiple 
interviews, as well as email transcripts, public documentation, website change logs, annual reports, 
software samples, and observations. The construction of the narrative networks was a primary analytical 
step in the research process, as it involved analytically reducing the data, resolving conflicts between data 
sources, and selecting which events were judged to be part of the “core story” (Pentland & Feldman, 2007, 
p. 782) in the narrative.  
After the narrative networks were constructed, they were then coded with AFT constructs. Each node in 
the narrative net (which represents an action: two or more actants and an action that connects them), was 
theoretically redescribed (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 796) using objects, actions and relationships from 
AFT.  
This makes the actions in the nodes more easily comparable to facilitate the retroductive analysis.  
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6.10 Cross-Case Analysis 
The following sections summarize the cross-case analyses conducted during the study. It should be 
emphasized that the analyses described in these and the preceding sections are done iteratively in parallel 
(Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 796), but are described serially. 
6.10.1 Refining the Research Question 
As discussed in the section on CR methodology in Chapter 3, a critical part of structural analysis is 
deciding which type of mechanism is being studied. Since there are typically a near-infinite variety of 
structural entities involved in any real-world research context, it is necessary to determine which 
structures are causally relevant (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 798).  
In this study, as I analyzed the data from the cases, it became clear that the driving force behind incidents 
of user creativity lay in decisions made by participants in those incidents. Users decided to change the way 
that they used the systems they interacted with. The centrality of decision-making in case studies has been 
noted by Yin (2009). This meant that I needed to look at the processes that led to the decisions that 
participants in the cases had made, and the actions that they took as a result of those decisions. As I did 
so, I found patterns in the data, both within and across cases, that could be explained by dual-process 
theories of reasoning and judgment. I also realized that I was seeing patterns of action at the collective 
level which paralleled actions which might be explained by theories of reasoning at the individual level. 
Finally, although I did not change the scope of the study, I realized it would be impractical, and 
misleading, to try to explain the actions of individuals without describing the environmental and social 
contexts in which they were making decisions.  
These realizations were used to determine the analytical strategy followed in the study, as prescribed by 
Eisenhardt (1989a). I adopted cognitive science as an overarching lens, and selected dual-process theory 
as an analytical lens. I selected distributed cognition as a way of extending the analysis of cognitive 
processes beyond individual users and out to the groups and collectives of which they were a part and 
with which they collaborated. I selected a cognitive task analysis technique that had been applied in 
studies of decision-making — the Critical Decision Method — as a data collection instrument. I selected 
two analytical tools that were suitable for analyzing what people do, and the cognitive inputs to their 
actions: narrative networks and framework matrices. Finally, I refined the research question further, to 
reflect the clarification of the scope of the study. The refined RQ is: 
 What are the cognitive mechanisms that explain end user creativity in the appropriation of 
Information Systems at the individual level? 
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6.10.2 Retroductive Analysis 
The retroductive analysis was carried out following the guidelines of Wynn and Williams (2012). For each 
node of the narrative network that had been constructed and coded using AFT constructs, I applied the 
retroductive question: What cognitive mechanism must exist in order for the observed action to have 
been taken?  
The primary analytical tool employed was multiple thought trials, following (Weick, 1989). Thought trials 
were conducted to hypothesize the existence of cognitive mechanisms that could explain the actions 
observed in each node of the narrative networks. Candidate mechanisms were applied to the node, then to 
other nodes in the data. Where a mechanism M could explain the action in a node it was preserved. If it 
could not explain the action in a subsequent node, a new mechanism N was developed for that node. If a 
subsequent action could be explained by M, then the node was coded to M. If the second node did not 
quite fit M, but could be explained by a modified version Ma, then M was modified to Ma if Ma could also 
explain the original node coded to M. The fact that all the actions in each node were coded in AFT 
constructs facilitated the application of mechanisms across nodes.  
This process continued until all nodes in all narrative networks had been explained by hypothesized 
mechanisms. As a test of the comprehensiveness of the set of mechanisms, the narrative networks, which 
had been coded with AFT, were recoded with the identified mechanisms. One test of the adequacy of the 
set of mechanisms that had been identified was the ability of those mechanisms to code each node in each 
narrative network.  
The scope of the thesis required that the mechanisms not only describe but also explain the creative 
appropriation of IS by end users — at the individual level. In order for the mechanisms to provide an 
explanation, it was necessary to show how they work together as a system. A model that integrates all the 
identified mechanisms and shows how they explain creative appropriation at the individual level was 
developed. This model will be introduced in the following chapter. 
6.10.3 Second Cycle Coding 
As per Saldaña (2009), a second cycle of coding was done to the raw data. In this cycle, the mechanisms 
identified in the retroductive analysis were used to directly code the data. Data points that illustrated the 
activation of a particular mechanism were coded to that mechanism. All coding was done within NVivo.  
The CR principle of multifinality implies that a visible outcome may be the result of more than one 
mechanism — that is, there are situations in which there are multiple possible explanations for an 
outcome. In situations within the data where there was some ambiguity about mechanism which caused 
an outcome, judgment rationality was applied to find the mechanism which provided the best 
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explanation of the outcome (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 795). This kind of application of judgment is a 
common necessity when working with unobservable mechanisms. It is justified in this study by the fact 
that the goal of the study is not to precisely enumerate all the mechanisms working in each case (which, 
given the limitations of the available data, is likely not possible). It is rather to identify a set of 
mechanisms which can explain the outcomes observed in each case.  
It should be noted that there is no expectation that there should be a symmetry between the coding of the 
narrative networks and the coding of the data. The narrative networks are an analytical reduction of the 
case data, and there is therefore no direct correspondence between points in the raw data and nodes in the 
narrative networks.  
6.10.4 Framework Matrices 
For empirical corroboration of the mechanisms, framework matrices were run on the recoded case data 
using NVivo software tool (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002). The framework matrix tool generated matrix charts 
of the coded data. The final charts were 5 x 9:  
 5 cases: 
o Beta case 1  
o Beta case 2 
o Gamma case 1 
o Alpha case 
o Zeta case 
 The data was coded to: 
o Simulation (for simulation outputs) 
o D. Cog (for distributed cognitive operations) 
o And seven cognitive mechanisms (listed in the following chapter) 
The framework matrices represent a form of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), in contrast to the 
narrative networks which are a processual tool. The complementary logical forms of the tools provide 
confidence in the explanatory power of the mechanisms (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 801). While, there is 
no expectation of symmetry across the analyses, the test is that each kind of explanation makes sense: that 
is, shows causal depth and sufficient explanation of reality (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 801). 
6.11  Natural Experiments 
Yin (2009) (on whose methodology Eisenhardt (1989a) is partially based) recommends the use of 
experimental logic to make comparisons and tease out patterns in case data. In the data in this study there 
are two patterns which created opportunities to use experimental logic.  
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One of these patterns is the conflicting usage patterns of the two systems at organization Phi. In Phi, the 
users of the system Process exhibited a tendency to constantly find ways to appropriate the system that, 
even though they were not formally evaluated by raters, seem to meet the study’s creativity criterion: they 
were novel, useful, and surprised the developer of the system (the developer and administrator of Process 
was one of my primary interviewees at Phi). On the other hand the staff of the Finance department, who 
had similar skills and also had a system that did not conform to their needs, did not creatively appropriate 
the system on any occasion.  
Likewise, at another level of analysis, it is possible to look at the pattern in the cases overall. That is, the 
conditions at the negative case organizations (Theta and Kappa), can be compared with the conditions at 
the organizations in which cases of creative appropriation were found and investigated2 (Alpha, Beta (2 
cases), Gamma (2 cases, 1 investigated), Zeta, and Phi (the Process cases)). The primary observation from 
comparisons across these cases is this: creative appropriation tends to NOT occur in a ‘natural 
progression’ of use becoming more sophisticated. This contradicts what may be expected from the work of 
Saga and Zmud (1993), Jasperson et al. (2005), and other popular stage theories of how novel use 
patterns should evolve. Instead, creative appropriation seems to be driven by loss avoidance. The losses 
can be process losses (e.g., Beta not being able to keep up with expanding business demand while using 
their fax-based communication system), or actual losses (e.g., Alpha losing access to their regular software 
solution for handling project reports). Users will typically make use of other resources for avoiding 
process losses before resorting to creative appropriation — as was observed in the Finance department at 
Phi. 
The mechanism-based explanation should address why this pattern is observed — i.e., it should explain 
the findings from the quasi-experiments. The mechanisms that explain this pattern will be described in 
the following chapter. 
6.12 Theoretical Saturation 
Saturation was determined to have been reached under the following circumstances.  
Of the 18 potential cases of creative appropriation identified, five had been investigated and analyzed in 
detail. It had been previously been decided that mechanisms would be required to be confirmed: that is, 
seen to be active in more than one case. There was no a priori assumption that evidence of every 
mechanism would be observed in every case; but it was decided that no mechanism would be accepted if 
there was only evidence for its existence and action in a single case.  
                                                             
2 Although a number of incidents in which systems were appropriated in new and useful ways were discovered during field research, 
only the ones which were part of the formal rating exercise are being counted as “creative” for the analysis. 
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In the actual analysis, evidence for each mechanism identified was observed in each of the cases that 
underwent a detailed examination (i.e., had a narrative network and framework matrix constructed). 
Further, in each (detailed) case, all the case data (narrative network nodes, framework matrix blocks) was 
fully explained using the identified mechanisms. Also, no additional mechanisms were uncovered over the 
last two cases investigated (Gamma and Phi), and no modifications to the integrative model were made to 
accommodate patterns in those cases.  
It was therefore determined that theoretical saturation had been accomplished after the five cases listed 
earlier were analyzed. 
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Chapter 7. Findings 
All models are wrong, but some are useful 
George Box 
7.1 Creativity - a complex outcome 
The mechanisms identified in this study constitute a parsimonious model for explaining the cognitive 
information processing activities that occur during incidents of user creativity. The mechanisms described 
here summarize a set of patterns that seem common in successful events of creative appropriation. They 
do not guarantee it will happen, but they tend to explain events when applied retrospectively to the data. 
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) note that mechanisms are inherently hierarchical in nature; and that 
individual mechanisms may be modified adaptations, or representations, of more abstract mechanism 
schemes. They may themselves contain components which are mechanisms at a less abstract level. They 
note that an explanation of a mechanism is not required to explain all the other mechanisms that it may 
be connected with at other levels. Nonetheless, in this analysis, I will describe a set of mechanisms, I will 
describe the mechanism schemes that some of the mechanisms appear to be types of, then I will integrate 
the mechanisms in order to describe how they work together as a system. This “system of mechanisms” 
can be seen as a mechanism itself, of which the component mechanisms are part, which means I will 
describe mechanisms at three levels of abstraction.  
This full model — including the mechanism schemes, the mechanisms themselves and the integrative 
model — is not a process model in the strict sense. It does not describe a “creative process” which has a 
well-defined beginning, middle, and end. Rather, it describes a set of information transformations which 
are iterative and continuous. The integration of the individual mechanisms describe a system, it can be 
visualized as being like an electrical circuit. The circuit starts and initiates a particular set of information 
processing operations which will be described. These operations continue until the creative appropriation 
process ends. The flow of information through the system is cyclic, rather than serial. Nonetheless, the 
characteristics of mechanisms — like gates in a circuit — shape how the overall system functions. It is a 
creative system, rather than a creative process. 
The overall system constitutes a means for explaining the actions which take place during, and are 
causally effective in, incidents of creative appropriation. As such, it is a Type II theory, according to the 
typology of Gregor (2006). The components of this theory are described below. I will begin by describing 
the conventions I will follow in reporting the findings. 
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7.2 Explanation by Cognitive Mechanisms 
Decisions about the beginning and end points of cases, primary foci, etc., are always, to some extent, an 
analytical decision on the part of the researcher, rather than something that is obviously inherent in the 
world (Leonardi, 2011, p. 155). This is an inherent feature of some types of case studies (Yin, 2009). For 
example, in the Gamma case, several different organizations, and several different systems; each 
organization with a different mission, and each system with a different intended purpose; were brought 
together. They were brought together in an integrated way to develop something new that would serve 
Gamma’s unique interests. Any or all of these systems could have been selected as the key focal artifact, 
but one (mobile phones) has been chosen for clarity and focus. The reason for this is that the case data is 
being used primarily to demonstrate the existence and causal depth of mechanisms, rather than to 
present the viewpoint of any particular actor or investigate the facts of any particular case. Therefore, the 
focus is on the underlying causal mechanisms at work in each case, rather than the detailed nature of the 
cases themselves 
Each mechanism will be described in text and diagrammatic form. The text description of the mechanisms 
will be accompanied by a diagrammatic representation of the logical form of the mechanism: showing 
how the structural elements – the information structures and transforms – that make up the mechanisms 
relate to each other. Two forms of evidence will be given for each mechanism observed. The first form will 
be evidence of the operation of the mechanism at work in at least two of the detailed cases. Evidence from 
the quasi-experiments, including the negative cases, will be used to support the operation of the 
mechanisms and gain further contextual evidence about their enabling, stimulus, releasing, or 
constraining conditions (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 794). However the description of the mechanism will 
provide examples of the mechanism in action. The second form of evidence will be from literature: 
examples of phenomena which are explained by the mechanism at one or more of the levels at which it 
operates. The evidence from the literature will be followed by a diagrammatic representation of the 
functional logic of the mechanism. This will describe what the mechanism does, and the logic of the 
strategy it uses to do it (Marr, 1982). Where necessary, the operations of the mechanisms will be 
described at different levels of cognition. 
It should be reiterated at this point that the fact that multifinality and equifinality apply to the activation 
of mechanisms make it difficult to map from particular events to particular mechanisms without some 
ambiguity. The same event can sometimes be modeled as the outcome of different mechanisms. 
Therefore, the goal of the analysis is not to prove that particular configurations of mechanism activation 
did occur — given the lack of direct observation and direct access to mental processes, that would in many 
cases be impossible. The goal of the analysis is, rather, to demonstrate that the identified mechanisms can 
explain the events observed.  
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Mechanisms, being typically directly unobservable, must be treated in much the same way that 
hypotheses are treated in hypothesis-testing research (Wynn & Williams, 2012). They can never be 
‘proved’, but must be rigorously compared to other possible explanations and to existing evidence, until 
they are acceptable as explanations for observed events (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). The mechanisms 
here are proposed to be cognitive in nature. Each is based on direct observations in the case data. 
However, since each mechanism represents a cognitive operation, it is logical to expect that evidence 
should exist in the literature on cognitive processes which supports the existence and operation of that 
mechanism. This should hold, unless the mechanism in question has never been observed before.  
For the mechanisms I will describe, there is considerable evidence that they exist and have been observed 
previously. There is a wealth of research on metal processes in the literatures on decision making, 
reasoning, judgment and social cognition (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Morewedge & Kahneman, 
2010; Stanovich, 2011), exploring how dual-process theory can explain experimental and field-based 
research findings in those domains. The operations represented by the mechanisms identified in this 
study are explained in that research, and so findings from those domains can be used as corroborating 
evidence for the existence of the mechanisms I propose. Incidentally, this supports the business-as-usual 
hypothesis of creativity, which states that creativity and intuition emerge from everyday mental processes, 
rather than an exclusive set of ‘creative-only’ processes (R.K. Sawyer, 2012; Weisberg, 1995). 
The full set of mechanisms identified is listed below. For each mechanism, evidence will be provided to 
support it at the individual cognitive level, and examples will show how it may function at the 
organizational level. 
7.3 Structural Components 
Mechanisms are structures, which have capacities for action (powers), and typical actions (tendencies). 
The mechanisms being described are constituted by the following structures: 
Information  
Information is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “What is conveyed or represented by a 
particular arrangement or sequence of things” (Dictionary, 2014). The things arranged in sequence can 
include such things as neurons and brain structures (mental information); patterns of pressure and sound 
waves (audible speech); patterns of color or shape (written language); and other environmental cues.  
Representations  
Information can typically take many forms. However, only some of those forms can be directly 
manipulated by the cognitive system. In order for information in the environment, such as a pattern of 
vibrations displacing the air in a wave pattern (sound), or a pattern of photons in the visible spectrum 
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(light), to be used in cognitive operations, it must be converted to a form that is compatible with the 
symbol system that is used internally by the cognitive system. The internal symbolic structures are known 
in cognitive science as representations (Thagard, 2012). Representations can be thought of, in practice, as 
descriptions of the things represented (Marr, 1982, p. 20). 
Actions — or powers — are capacities for action which are part of structures which constitute 
mechanisms. The primary power exhibited by each mechanism described below is the power of 
transformation: the ability to change the form of the ordering of things that conveys information. This 
can include transforming sensory inputs into internal mental representations, transforming the form of 
mental representations, and transforming mental representations into signals that actuate the motor 
system (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983), leading to individual action, as well as communication processes 
that prompt action at the distributed cognitive level. A detailed description of the transformations that are 
triggered, as well as the transformations that are typical to each mechanism, is included in the detailed 
descriptions below. 
7.3.1 Mechanism Schemes 
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) note that mechanisms are hierarchical, in that mechanisms at one level 
often  presuppose the existence of mechanisms at a lower level that explain elements of its operation. This 
implies that descriptions of mechanisms can be modified adaptions of more general mechanism schemes.  
The following two mechanism schemes have been identified in this project. They will be described here, 
then referred to when describing the mechanisms which are types of them.  
7.3.1.1 The Serial Structuring Mechanism 
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The Serial Structuring Mechanism 
 
Figure 9: The Serial Structuring Mechanism 
 
This mechanism scheme takes a representation as input. It performs some transformation on the 
information contained in that representation, then outputs an updated form of the input representation.  
7.3.1.2 The Abstraction-Association Mechanism 
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The Abstraction-Association Mechanism 
 
Figure 10: The Abstraction-Association Mechanism  
 
This mechanism scheme takes two inputs: an incomplete representation of an external object or 
condition, that is, one which has some properties or features missing; and some type of a prototypical 
representation of that object or condition. The mechanism scheme combines the incomplete 
representation and the prototype to create a full representation of the object or condition, that is, one 
which has all applicable properties and features. 
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7.4 The Representation Construction Mechanism (RCM) 
The Representation Construction Mechanism 
 
Figure 11: The Representation Construction Mechanism 
 
The Representation Construction Mechanism (RCM) constructs the Primary Representation (PR) of the 
world that is held by the cognitive system at any time. It is a type of the Abstraction-Association 
Mechanism. It is described below. 
7.4.1 Description 
The Representation Construction Mechanism (RCM) is a type of the Abstraction Association Mechanism. 
Its function is to create the model of the state of the external world that is maintained by the cognitive 
system. The RCM takes as input incomplete information about the state of the world from the sensory and 
perceptual system. It also takes as input prototypical cues about the state of the world. These prototypical 
cues may include previously encoded learned knowledge about likely states of the world; primed 
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schematic representations, and predispositions based on expectations. The RCM constructs a 
representation of the world by combining direct and explicit sensory information about the state of the 
world with prototypical information to create an associatively coherent (Kahneman, 2011) mental model 
of the state of the external world: a Primary Representation (PR). It must be noted that the associative 
coherence of the PR does not imply its veridicality.  
The following hypothetical scenario can illustrate the operation of the RCM in action.  
A hiker in the United States is walking on a trail. She is enjoying the scenery, when she 
hears a hissing noise, accompanied by a rattling sound. The hiker looks down and sees a 
snake on the trail in from of her. She recognizes it as a rattlesnake, the species which is 
responsible for more snake bite deaths than any other in the US. Frightened, she jumps 
backward, then turns and runs down the trail in the other direction.  
This brief scenario illustrates the operation of the RCM. Information about the presence of the snake is 
available to the hiker in a number of forms, but none of these forms are internally usable by the hiker’s 
cognitive system. All of the information is in the form of arranged patterns of things that form signals that 
are part of the external environment which is not part of the hiker’s reasoning system, and must be 
converted to mental representations which can be manipulated by that system. The signals in the pattern 
of pressure waves moving through the air must be captured by the hiker’s auditory system and converted 
to mental representations of the phenomenon that she can understand as sound, so that she can hear it. 
The arrangement of patterns of photons that outline the object on the trail must be captured and 
converted to a visual image by the hiker’s optical system, so that she can see it. None of these conversion 
processes are as direct or uncomplicated as they seem perceptually. The organizing of patterns of photons 
by the visual system into perceptual representations of objects in the visual field is a complex process that 
depends on both direct stimuli to the optical system and processing within the visual system in the brain. 
The precise steps involved in this processing is a matter of ongoing debate in the field of visual perception 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989). In like manner, the seemingly-simple process 
of “hearing” has been shown to actually involve a complex integration of stimuli from not only the 
auditory, but also the visual and tactile systems (Gick & Derrick, 2009).  
However, hearing and seeing the snake will not be useful in terms of motivating the hiker to take the 
appropriate action (avoid the snake), unless the hiker knows what a snake is. This phenomenon of 
“knowing” — what it is to know, and the nature of knowledge — has been the subject of extensive 
philosophical enquiry, but in this context “knowing” can be taken to mean having a mental model which 
corresponds in some way to a property of the outside world, or an object in the world; and contains 
information about the property or object. The hiker, upon seeing the snake, exhibits knowledge which 
goes beyond the direct sensory inputs that the signals about the snake that she has seen and heard. She 
knows the name of the type of snake. She knows that the snake is poisonous and dangerous. She flees 
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from the snake. This suggests that the sight of the snake gave her access to knowledge about the type, 
characteristics and behavior of the snake. How did this happen? 
For the information about the presence of the snake to prompt the hiker to take the appropriate action, 
she would need to have a prototypical mental model that has a shape, and makes a sound, that 
corresponds to the object that she perceptually detects on the trail. Let us label that mental model as 
$snake$, and the object on the ground (snake). When she perceptually discerns the properties of the 
object on the trail, a matching-to-prototype process (Calderwood et al., 1987, p. 2) that is fast, automatic, 
and non-conscious (i.e., is part of System 1) occurs: a reference linkage (Leslie, 1987, p. 415) between the 
object (snake) and the mental model $snake$ is created. A symbolic object within the cognitive system is 
created that is an instance of the prototype $snake$ that represents the object on the ground: we can label 
this representation $snake. There are some properties of $snake that will be immediately accessible via 
the signals received from the environment, such as location, color, size, etc. However, there are a number 
of properties of $snake of which the hiker becomes aware that do not map directly to signals in the 
environment. She knows type (rattlesnake), history (responsible for many deaths), appropriate response 
(flee), all of which are not contained in the direct stimuli.  
These things are “known” by the hiker because of the properties of the matching process which occurs. 
The prototype $snake$ contains information about possible instances of the object (snake) which includes 
a number of pieces of information about objects of the type $snake$ that can be expressed in the form of 
rules (Anderson, 1993). These rules can be expressed in the form of IF…, THEN…, statements. One such 
rule may be expressible as: 
IF $snake has rattle on tail 
THEN $snake_type=rattlesnake  
Such rules may include further information in the form of conditional rules, which define attributes of 
objects dependent on values of other attributes of those objects, for example: 
IF $snake_type=grass snake 
THEN $snake_poisonous=FALSE 
ELSE 
IF $snake_type=rattlesnake 
THEN $snake_poisonous=TRUE 
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It should be emphasized that this is not to suggest that “knowledge” in the mind is necessarily arranged 
according to a system of IF THEN rules. However there is a long-held consensus in cognitive science that 
some aspects of human knowledge can be represented with such structures (Anderson, 1993). In the case 
of the hiker, this prototypical knowledge — $snake$ — is combined with sensory inputs to construct a 
representation of the object (snake) within her cognitive system: $snake. Attributes of $snake that are not 
available through direct perception are provided from the prototype, using a process of attribution that 
follows a logical (though often non-conscious) process that may lead to misattributions under some 
circumstances (see (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Treisman & Gelade, 
1980)).  
It is through these perceptual and attributional processes that we recognize things, understand what they 
are, and decide how they should be responded to. In doing so, we create representations of things in the 
environment. The sum total of all the things that we perceive, and hold representations of, in the 
environment at any given time, comprises our Primary Representation of the world. The Representation 
Construction Mechanism creates that representation, and continually updates it as perceptual inputs from 
signals processed through the sensory systems convey information about changes in the state of the 
world. 
In collective contexts, the operations of the RCM correspond to information-gathering activities that may 
be geared toward developing a shared understanding of the true state of the external world. It may, for 
example, correspond to formal information-sharing processes, knowledge management or research at the 
organizational level. In an organizational setting, RCM operations correspond to market research, 
customer data analysis, and other data-gathering activities that the organization will carry out to inform 
strategic decision-making. 
7.4.2 Case Evidence 
The RCM process showed itself to be operating in each case by how participants framed the circumstances 
which led them to develop creative ways of appropriating the systems they were using. In the context of 
creative action, RCM processes can be seen as an analogue of “problem finding”, which has long been 
recognized as a critical element in decision analysis (Gallupe, DeSanctis, & Dickson, 1988; Pounds, 1965).  
For example, in the Alpha case, when faced with the fact that the software publisher was discontinuing 
support for the package that was critical to their workflow, many of the users of Desktop would probably 
have seen a need to adjust their internal processes (e.g., following the publisher’s instructions to move to 
Windows) in order to respond. JS, because of his experience in developing technical solutions for 
unstructured problems (i.e., because of the nature of his available prototypes), saw this as a technical 
problem they could solve by finding, or building, an alternative to Desktop. This was so, even though he 
and his staff did not, at first, know what form the solution would take. 
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In another example, in the Gamma case, the makers of Tracker — the satellite tracking device — had very 
different perceptions of the nature of the device they had built than MP, the manager at Gamma. MP 
described the problems that this difference caused: 
One was I wasn’t in America and they weren’t really looking at the rest of the world yet, 
and the other is, I wasn’t thinking about tracking people, I was thinking about 
communicating, and I had a face to face meeting with them in October because by 
coincidence, I was in America anyway, and that helped to get them to understand better 
my thinking. 
The company had built a device for well-heeled adventurers in a particular market who would pay for the 
extra security of being able to send SOS messages from remote areas. They did not see the device as a tool 
for disaster relief. It took several discussions to change their perception of the device to one that was 
compatible with MP’s, which would motivate them to cooperate with the project: 
But I would say that it probably wasn’t until Christmas 2011, that their corporate body 
language said, ‘here we have a communications device rather than a tracking device.’ 
The RCM of participants in each creative appropriation incident led them to frame the problems they 
faced in a certain way — to develop a particular Primary Representation of the context in which they were. 
This shaped the subsequent decisions they made, which in turn, shaped the sequence of event that led to 
the outcome. 
Collective level RCM processes correspond to structured information-search activities such as market 
research, and the use of business analytics. The structured search for an alternative to Desktop that took 
place in Alpha is an example of a collective RCM process. In Gamma, MP speaks of “their corporate body 
language” to describe the transformation of perspective on the part of the makers of Tracker.  
7.4.3 Literature 
Perception is not simply direct conversion of stimuli to representation, it involves mental transformations 
that are error-prone. Treisman and Gelade (1980) demonstrated this in providing evidence for their 
Feature Integration Theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980, p. 98). However, although the general finding that 
perception is a process and does not provide an unvarnished picture of the state of the external world, 
there are competing versions of exactly how it works (see Wolfe et al., 1989 for a competing version of 
how visual perception happens). The point is that there may be many models, but they all show 
perception to be a cognitively complex process that involves processing and prototypes. Therefore the 
RCM is supported, but is proposed at a level of abstraction that does not require the choice of any specific 
model of how the perceptual process occurs.  
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Another piece of evidence for the RCM is the work of Henrich et al. (2010). They demonstrate that many 
of the aspects of perception that most people regard as “normal” are, in fact, only normal for WEIRD 
people: that is, people from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Developed countries. For example, 
the Muller-Lyer illusion (Judd, 1905) only works for WEIRD participants. This implies that the optical 
calibration mechanisms that produce the illusion are part of the Tightly Compiled Learned Information 
(TCLI) and not the Encoded kNowledge Base (ENB) of System 1 (Stanovich, 2011). We also are aware that 
people have dispositions to, for example, have affective responses to different types of stimuli that are 
stimulus-independent.  
Finally, it ought to be noted that, although examples from the literature on visual perception have been 
used, there is evidence that all kinds of perceptual processes are subject to the RCM (Gick & Derrick, 
2009). The formation of representations results from the integration of the outputs of diverse processes 
into a mental model of the world, which is done non-consciously and automatically (Evans, 2008, p. 264). 
The RCM, as described in this thesis, is compatible with several models of perception, but is not 
dependent on any single model. This is an advantage of conducting the analysis at the computational 
theory level (Marr, 1982). 
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7.4.4 Structure 
RCM Functional Logic 
 
Figure 12: The RCM Logical Structure 
 
The RCM takes as input raw perceptual data from sensory inputs and other data sources (narrative 
accounts, etc.) It also takes as input prototypical representations of how the world is expected to be. The 
input prototypes differ at each level of cognition: schematic memory structures at the S1 level, 
stereotypical beliefs at the S2 level, and archetypical representations at the DC level. These are combined 
with the perceptual data to form the constructed representation of reality that forms the Primary 
Representation (PR). The PR contains representations of objects and phenomena in the world; beliefs 
about those objects and phenomena, and subconscious mental schemas that contain non-conscious 
representations which help to guide the construction and interpretation of the PR, and which may, in fact, 
differ from the conscious belief system.  
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Because the input prototypes are partial inputs to constructing the PR, they will tend to influence the 
structure of the PR in such a way that they are reinforced (i.e., individuals will tend to perceive reality in 
ways which conform to their existing prototypes). The prototypes at each level also tend to reinforce the 
prototypes at other levels (i.e., subconscious schemas will also tend to influence the formation of 
conscious beliefs and representations, and will tend to influence the shared representations of the world 
that are created at the distributed level).  
7.4.5 Conditions 
 Enabling Conditions 
o Incomplete perceptual information about the state of the world 
o Existence of prototypical representation 
 Stimulus Conditions (triggers) 
o Perceptual processes 
 Releasing Conditions (remove impediments) 
 n/a 
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7.5 The Serial Associative Mechanism (SAM) 
 
The Serial Associative Mechanism 
 
Figure 13: The Serial Associative Mechanism 
 
The Serial Associative Mechanism executes routine, well-rehearsed, or cognitively non-demanding 
actions. Logically, it represents a direct change in the state of the primary representation from state 1 to 
state 2 without intervening transformations or combinations. It is the ‘default’ low-power operating mode 
of the cognitive system. It is described below. 
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7.5.1 Description 
This mechanism is the simplest in logical form and is not a ‘type’ of any other mechanism. It takes as 
input the current Primary Representation (PR) of the world. If that representation contains any stimulus 
conditions, it associatively selects the most readily accessible response, triggers it, and updates the PR. It 
is equivalent to routine or familiar action, which is completed without significant cognitive engagement or 
effort.  At the individual level, while this mode of cognition can involve tightly compiled learned 
information (TCLI) from System 1, this mechanism does involve System 2. However it represents a ‘low-
power’ mode of operation that is not as computationally demanding as other forms of System 2 
processing. Specifically, it is differentiated from other forms of System 2 processing by the fact that it 
involves solely non-conditional processing.   
The SAM represents an analogue of what Stanovich (2011) identified as Serial Associative Cognition with 
a Focal Bias. As discussed in the section on cognitive science in Chapter 2, the human cognitive system is 
designed with an overall tendency toward effort minimization. This common way of expressing this is in 
the cognitive science literature is that people are cognitive misers (Evans, 2012b; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). This tendency toward minimizing the computational expense of 
any stimulus response is the reason why the cognitive system tends to default to the System 1 response to 
any stimulus. However, a System 1 response will not be available for every stimulus. Some stimuli may be 
novel, moderately complex, or require conscious attention, even if routine, etc. Such stimuli require a 
System 2 response, but may not require full cognitive engagement. This is where the SAM response comes 
into play. Stanovich (2011) states that people enact the tendency toward being cognitive misers by 
following two rules: 
1. Default to Type 1 processing whenever possible 
2. When Type 1 processing is not available, default to Serial Associative Processing with a Focal Bias 
Serial associative cognition involves moving from stimulus to response without evaluating alternate 
possible responses. That is, it represents linear sequential response without conditional processing. 
Consider two models of the cognitive approach to the same task: brushing one’s teeth: 
Model 1: I need to brush my teeth. I locate my toothbrush on the shelf below the mirror. 
I pick up the brush, pick up the tube of toothpaste beside the brush and squeeze 
toothpaste from the tube onto the brush. I wet the brush under the tap, and then use it to 
brush my teeth. 
Model 2: I need to brush my teeth. Wait a minute, if I brush my teeth, it will take me 2 
minutes longer to get ready. Do I have time? Oh well, I’ll go ahead and brush my teeth.  
I locate my toothbrush on the shelf below the mirror. I pick the brush, pick up the tube of 
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toothpaste beside the brush and; wait a minute. The cap isn’t on the toothpaste. If the 
toothpaste is uncapped it might be dry. I don’t want to use dried-out toothpaste. I 
wonder if… 
The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 can be summarized by a single word which is present in 
Model 2, but absent in Model 1: the word if. The word  “IF” represents the philosophical foundation of the  
concept of hypothetical thought, conditional logic, and a number of important psychological and 
philosophical topics concerning reasoning and behavior (Evans & Over, 2004). The flow of the cognitive 
process in Model 1 is continuous, while in Model 2, the flow of cognition is repeatedly interrupted, and 
alternate possible future states of the world are evaluated in order to determine the optimal behavior to be 
performed. While I will shortly revisit the significance of IF, I will for now define the SAM as cognitive 
processing — which includes behavior — which does not entail the concept of IF.  
A useful metaphor for SAM processing may be found in the concepts of hub and wheel. The hub — around 
which SAM processing revolves — is found in the routines, standard procedures, over-learned (automatic) 
responses, and other forms of processing which are not cognitively demanding and conform to 
recognizable patterns (walking, driving, tooth-brushing, etc.). The wheel is found in the particular 
performance of these recognizable SAM procedures: e.g., driving to work this morning. This is closely 
related to (Feldman & Pentland, 2003)’s concept of routines involving an ostensive and performative 
dimension.  
This mode of processing is both common and highly versatile. There are many complex tasks which are 
commonly done in a routine or habitual manner, and SAM processing can be surprisingly versatile, at 
both the individual (Kahneman, 2011) and collective (Feldman & Pentland, 2003) levels. Habitual 
cognitive processing, also seen as a kind of goal-directed automatic processing (Polites & Karahanna, 
2013), has been a topic of interest in IS research on continuing use of systems, and has spurred calls for 
further research (Guinea & Markus, 2009). However the SAM goes beyond habit. Novel behaviors which 
are carried out in a non-conditional manner without hypothetical thinking are also part of the SAM. The 
fact that there is only one model of the world used in SAM cognition, rather than conditional evaluation of 
multiple worlds, is the reason why Stanovich (2011) refers to this mode of cognition as Serial Associative 
Cognition with a Focal Bias.  
In an organizational setting, SAM operations correspond with following organizational routines and 
standard procedures. 
7.5.2 Case Evidence 
The Serial Associative Mechanism is active when routines are followed, when well-learned actions are 
carried out or regular procedures are followed. This is the default method of stimulus response and tends 
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to remain stable unless the performative aspect of a routine becomes so atypical that the SAM response 
cannot be maintained. For example, in organization Beta, after the production department designed their 
procedure for communicating with the factory in China using Process and email — in response to a crisis 
— almost twenty years ago, the procedure continued to evolve for a few years in response to weaknesses 
that emerged in different elements of the process. However, when the “bugs” were worked out of the 
system, it became stable and has not changed significantly since. As was said by KT, who developed the 
system with her staff: 
“I mean, it hasn’t changed a lot, we’ve kept the same format.” 
After the change of the system from the faxing of paper documents to the sharing of the Product file, as 
soon as the new system met their requirements it became routine and was not changed. This despite the 
fact that KT’s job requirements have changed over the years, and there has been considerable turnover of 
staff. None of these individuals have changed the method of appropriating Product significantly. 
The fact that the SAM mode of processing requires little cognitive involvement and effort makes it 
efficient, and therefore useful under conditions when there is significant competition for attention and 
cognitive capacity. For example, in the Gamma organization, MP said the following when discussing a 
significant problem in disaster zones — getting untrained individuals to use proper radio procedure: 
“But once again, that also means that we don’t have to introduce people to a new way of 
thinking when they’re stressed, or as [KF] began explaining it, when you are deeply 
stressed all you have are headaches, your ability to think narrows and narrows and 
narrows which means there are only two approaches, one is to train to the point where 
unusual things like talking on a radio are a habit or give people tools that use their 
habits.” [Emphasis mine] 
MP was discussing the fact that using familiar tools reduces cognitive load and increases the efficiency of 
untrained responders’ thinking and performance. This was seen as one of the key advantages of using 
mobile phones in the Gamma system, and reflects what would be expected from the SAM. 
At the collective level, SAM procedures are analogous to routines. For example, in the Alpha case, when 
faced with the removal of support for Desktop, they began their search for a solution with a structured 
search for a suitable alternative, in much the same way that they approach structured searches for 
solutions in their consulting work. In Gamma, when MP was discussing his desire to use Tracker as part 
of the Mobile Data platform, he was, in effect, trying to break a routine on the part of Tracker’s 
manufacturer. The company, which is well established and has a history of putting out products, was 
going through the routine of marketing a product with a defined use case. It took some effort for MP to 
convince them to disrupt that routine. 
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7.5.3 Literature 
Many thinking and reasoning tasks can be accomplished in one of two modes: by System 2, or by System 2 
supported by System 1. In the latter mode, a pattern of systematic errors in reasoning can be measured 
that result from patterns in the operation of System 1 (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983a). There is substantial evidence that most individuals spend most of 
their time in this mode of reasoning. This mode corresponds to the SAM.  
It should be reiterated that this reasoning mode does not correspond to non-consciousness. Many routine 
tasks: brushing one’s teeth, driving a car on an open road, etc., do not require significant mental effort, 
but do require conscious awareness. It is also possible to direct more attention to these tasks voluntarily, 
or to stop doing them. This means that they are not part of the System 1 response system, which is 
automatic. However, the two systems work in tandem, and System 1 is always “helping” System 2. That 
means that the ‘suggestions’ that are made by system 1 are more likely to be applied in SAM mode by 
System 2. The view that there are conscious processing modes that are conscious and volitional, but 
require low cognitive absorption and are highly reliant on System 1 processing are also reflected in dual-
process theories (S. Chen & Chaiken, 1999) from social cognition (Evans, 2008, pp. 267-268). 
At the individual level, the SAM mode of cognition seems to display reduced efficiency when called on to 
perform task switching (Monsell, 2003), or perform multiple tasks simultaneously (Rosen, 2008). More 
evidence that it is a low-power mode of system 2, rather than a type of system 1. 
In the same way that following S1-driven routines in can lead to heuristic-led errors in individual 
cognition (see (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)), heuristic processing can lead to errors in collective-level 
cognitive processes — e.g., the reviewing of academic publications, as in famous hoax publications by 
Epstein (1990), Skokal (1996), and, more recently, Duiric, Delilbasic, and Radisic (2013) 
  
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
195 
 
7.5.4 Structure 
SAM Functional Logic 
 
 
Figure 14: The SAM Logical Structure 
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The SAM has the simplest logical structure of any of the mechanisms. It takes as input the current state of 
the Primary Representation (PR). At its core are habits, routines, built-in automatic stimulus responses 
and overlearned responses (TCLI). These semi-automatic responses act on the PR, triggering default 
behaviors, and updating the state of the PR in a continuous, ongoing process. SAM operation is partially 
conscious, but is driven by the most-available low-cost responses that rely heavily on the non-conscious 
System 1. SAM operation tends to continue unless and until it is interrupted. 
 
7.5.5 Conditions 
 Enabling Conditions 
o Well-learned, non-novel task 
o Lack of stimuli calling for increased attention 
 Stimulus Conditions (triggers) 
o Any (default response mode) 
 Releasing Conditions (remove impediments) 
o Normative contextual conditions  
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7.6 The Decoupling Mechanism (DM) 
The Decoupling Mechanism 
 
Figure 15: The Decoupling Mechanism 
 
The Decoupling Mechanism (DM) executes two logical operations: Copy creates a secondary copy of the 
state of the Primary Representation, designated the Secondary Representation; Decouple maintains a 
separation between the Primary Representation and the Secondary Representation. It is described below. 
7.6.1 Description 
The Decoupling Mechanism (DM) is the ‘trigger’ for creative activity. It is triggered when a stimulus 
condition occurs that requires conditional reasoning – that is, the consideration of several ‘alternate 
worlds’ in which the consequences  of following each of several possible paths of action is simulated in 
order to compare outcomes and choose an optimal stimulus response.  
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To illustrate the operation of the DM, I will propose the following hypothetical scenario.  
I am considering buying a green jacket. I go to the store, but none of their green jackets 
fit me. They have jackets in my size, but they are all red. The store offers to order a 
jacket in green in my size, if I wish. I borrow one of their red jackets and wear it in front 
of the mirror while pretending it is green, in order to see how the green jacket will look 
on me. I then decide whether or not to have them order the jacket.  
The preceding scenario seems unremarkable and ordinary. Most persons of normal cognitive ability 
would have little difficulty performing the actions described in the scenario. However, it acquires a deeper 
significance when considered in light of the working of the Representation Construction Mechanism to 
construct a Primary Representation. In that representation, there must exist an object $jacket$, or else I 
would not know what a “jacket” is, in order to consider buying one. I encounter an object in the world, a 
(jacket). A symbol is created in my cognitive system — $jacket — that is linked to the object (jacket) in the 
external world. The symbol $jacket is assigned attributes that correspond to the attributes of the object 
(jacket), including the attribute color=red. This symbol is my primary representation of the object (jacket) 
in the world.  
However, in front of the mirror, I then assign the attribute color=green to the symbol $jacket. The 
dangers of this assignment should be clear on reflection. The object (jacket) has not changed, and the 
signals that it sends to my sensory system remain the same. The wavelength of electromagnetic radiation 
that my eyes detect when I see the jacket remain the same as those that I have a model in my primary 
representation for, such that “this_wavelength=red”, but now I have changed that representation so that 
“red=green”. If I am not careful to reverse this assignment, it is possible that I might corrupt the model of 
color in my primary representation, so that “red=green”. The consequences of this could be catastrophic. 
Consider the possible outcome if I were to drive toward an intersection in my car at high speed, while 
believing “red=green”. Leslie (1987) calls this possible phenomenon “representational abuse”: the 
corruption of the model of the world maintained by the primary representation so it becomes impossible 
to know the actual state of the world. However, except in cases of severe pathology, this almost never 
happens. Why is that? 
It might be thought that because I have long experience with color, the temporary assignment of 
“red=green” will decay with the current contents of short-term memory, while the more stable pattern of 
“red=red” will remain in my long-term memory. However, the capacity to randomly reassign the 
attributes of symbolic entities in the cognitive system, or even create symbols for entities which do not 
exist in the real world — the capacity to pretend — emerges at roughly the same time that the capacity for 
representation emerges: at the beginning of childhood (Leslie, 1987). Psychologists have explored this 
question in depth, and have concluded that this requires the existence and coordination of at least two 
representational structures (McCune-Nicolich, 1981). Leslie (1987) proposed a model of these 
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representational structures, and how they are related, that has been highly influential, and has provided a 
foundation for a great deal of research on the structure of the reasoning system (Stanovich, 2011).  
Leslie (1987) proposed that what defines objects in the primary representation is that each of those 
objects has a direct semantic relationship to an object in the world (Leslie, 1987, p. 414). This is why the 
primary representation can safely direct behavior: if there is a symbol — $snake — that is part of the 
primary representation, it is linked to an object (snake) in the real world. The cognitive system can 
therefore enact a behavioral response to $snake that is appropriate (e.g., run!), given the fact that it is 
linked to an object that has the same characteristics in the external world. To pretend that a snake were 
some other object — e.g., a stick — would endanger the ability of the primary representation to cue 
appropriate behaviors unless the pretend representation is somehow quarantined from the primary 
representation (Leslie, 1987, p. 415). Leslie (1987) provided a model of a cognitive mechanism for 
accomplishing this which he labeled the decoupler. The decoupler creates a copy of the primary 
representation which inherits objects, properties and prototypes from the primary. Leslie (1987) labeled 
this copy a metarepresentation but later researchers have labeled it a secondary representation 
(Stanovich, 2011). Objects in the secondary representation are distinguished from those in the primary 
representation by their opacity (Leslie, 1987, p. 416). In the primary representation, the symbol $snake is 
transparent, in that one can “look through” it to see a real object with real attributes: (snake), since 
$snake is linked to (snake). The symbol #snake in the secondary representation is opaque, in that it is not 
linked to any object in the real world. One may change its fundamental attributes (“#snake=stick”), and 
simulate behaviors based on those changed attributes (pick up stick). Meanwhile, the symbol $snake, in 
the primary representation, will continue to represent external reality and guide appropriate behavior in 
the real world (run from (snake)).  
The DM represents the basic decoupling procedure described by Leslie (1987), but operates at a higher 
level of abstraction. I propose that the same basic mechanism which explains pretense also explains the 
creative appropriation of IT systems by users. Using AFT terms, when a user uses a system, she develops a 
System Representation (SR) that has a reference linkage (Leslie, 1987, p. 415) to the Technical Object 
(TO) that constitutes that system in the external world, which we could label as $system. This SR will 
include properties — functionally equivalent to attributes — that describe the purpose or intended uses of 
the system, the full mental set of such attributes would be part of a prototype we could call $system$. In 
order for the IT system to be appropriated creatively, the user will need to evaluate different possible ways 
in which the system could be repurposed: that is, evaluate different possible appropriation moves. The 
user will develop and evaluate different possible moves in a cognitive process that involves creating a copy 
of the symbolic representation of the system (creating #system, an instance of a broader prototype 
#system#); simulating different ways of appropriating the system (manipulating the attributes of 
#system), and selecting a novel way of appropriating the system. The Copy and Decouple operations — or 
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transforms — by the DM, provide the abstract forms of #system and #system# that enable these 
manipulations to be carried out. Both operations are highly computationally expensive. 
In terms of dual-process theory, the decoupling mechanism involves sub-mechanisms at both the System 
1 and System 2 levels. Decoupling operations involve the voluntary allocation of attention resources. 
However, such operations also involve the copying and maintaining of a dual set of models of the world. 
Not all aspects of that process are conscious. The model proposed in this thesis specifies that both System 
1 and System 2 are involved in the process, but does not specify how the different levels operate, in order 
to maintain the level of abstraction at which the specified mechanisms operate.  
At the collective level, the operations of the DM correspond to deliberate or formal activities aimed at 
planning, problem solving or idea generation which are non-routine. They include the kinds of activities 
one might see in the setting up of formal structures for evaluating strategic options, building R&D 
capacity, or the creation of ad-hoc committees for generating responses to specific challenges.  
7.6.2 Case Evidence 
The Decoupling Mechanism (DM) is active when users break with the routine or normative way of using a 
system and begin searching for ways in which to appropriate the system which are novel and are not 
based on an existing model of how the system is used. This process of searching for new ways to apply the 
system is accomplished through a process of simulation that may be mental (thinking of new ideas about 
how to use the system), social (engaging in group-based brainstorming, generating and evaluating ideas 
as a collective), and material (developing and “trying out” new ways to use the system before fully 
implementing them).  
All three types of simulation can be seen in the case involving organization Alpha. The initial crisis — the 
cancellation of support for their preferred version of the Desktop application — caused them to embark on 
a search for a new way to produce their report. This search was a collaborative process, and involved 
testing normative appropriation patterns for a number of publishing packages, but none of them suited 
Alpha’s needs. They then broadened their solution search by deciding to build their own solution. They 
also broadened the scope of their collaboration by going to the university for help with the problem. While 
they were doing this, DL — the computer science student — heard about their problem and had an idea 
about how his work with a text formatting language could be applied to it. He built a rough prototype, 
which Alpha then hired him to build out and implement. In each of these steps, cognitive simulations — 
ideas about what could work and how — were developed and tested. Most of them were developed, tested, 
and eventually rejected. Even DL’s prototype was a simulation based on an idea about what might work, 
rather than a fully fleshed-out solution, but DL’s idea was cognitive simulation that was enacted physically 
into a material object: a distributed cognitive simulation.  
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The same pattern — developing ideas, trying them out, then building a solution based on an idea that 
performs promisingly in testing — can be seen in each of the cases. At a high level of abstraction, most, if 
not all, creative accomplishments will be the result of a similar series of steps. As such, I propose that 
incidents of creative appropriation will tend to (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 791) involve the activation of 
the DM. 
The evidence from the quasi-experiments shows evidence gives further insight into nature of the DM. 
Users within Phi hacked the system Process a large number of times. The lead developer of Process put it 
this way:  
“… I think once they’ve been put through that process a couple of times where they’ve 
requested a feature change and then given a timeframe that is impossible for them, they 
would have simply stopped asking and they will build stuff as they can.”  
This stands in contrast to the Finance department, which has people with similar skills (most of the 
employees at Phi have advanced technical skills) but have never, apparently, modified the system. This 
pattern is also seen in the “negative cases” of Theta and Kappa. In both companies there are skilled users 
with access to Resources, Techniques and who have (at least, in the case of Theta) high Motivation to be 
creative. As is noted in (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011, p. 152): “Contrasting cases can provide evidence from 
natural experiments regarding how mechanisms operate under different conditions.” After analyzing the 
differences between the contexts in which systems were creatively appropriated and not, it became clear 
that perception of risk of loss was what drove users to appropriate creatively, rather than an altruistic 
“stage” of implementation of the system (Jasperson et al., 2005; Saga & Zmud, 1993). There was no 
instance in which users spontaneously “experimented” with the system to extend its functionality in the 
manner suggested by stage hypotheses. The explanation for this can be seen in the activational 
characteristics of the DM. As MP of Gamma said concerning his ideas about repurposing systems:  
“I can’t be creative on demand, these ideas come when I’ve got a problem to solve”. 
The DM is, like the rest of the cognitive system, biased toward effort minimization (Kahneman, 2011). The 
cognitive system is also biased to avoid uncertainty and risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). To initiate a 
simulation process goes against both biases. The simulation process is cognitively expensive and the 
outcome of a simulation process is inherently uncertain. It is therefore the tendency (in CR terms) of the 
DM to not fire; except in circumstances where the system perceives a risk of high losses if it is not 
initiated. Patterns observed in studies of reasoning support this tendency (Stanovich, 2011, pp. 49-51). 
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7.6.3 Literature 
The model of the operation of the reasoning system that underlies the DM is based on (Leslie, 1987). This 
model and has been very influential in the literature (almost 3,000 citations on Google Scholar), and is 
still a foundation for theories of cognition being developed today (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Evans, 
2012b; Evans & Over, 2013; Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich, 2011).   
The patterns of behavior predicted by the DM have been extensively and consistently recorded in studies 
of reasoning and decision making (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Morewedge & 
Kahneman, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983a). Routine processing strategies result in systematic 
biases in decision making due to the application of heuristic processing strategies. The use of heuristic 
strategies is opaque to the cognitive actor because of a tendency to develop confabulated memories of the 
cognitive process (Evans, 2009). However, deliberate processing strategies or the presentation of problem 
types which are beyond the capabilities of the “routine” processing system can result in more explicit 
serial processing which does not depend on the heuristic strategies (Hess, 1965; Kahneman, 2011). 
7.6.4 Structure 
The DM Functional Logic 
 
Figure 16: The DM Logical Structure 
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The symbol system linked to real-world objects that is created by the RCM creates a Primary 
Representation of the world, which guides the behavior of the cognitive system. Objects in the PR are 
linked to objects in the real world and thus provide a platform for interacting with the world. The DM 
creates a parallel symbol system (the Secondary Representation) that is unlinked – objects in it have no 
semantic connection to objects in the real world. Those objects can therefore be manipulated without real-
world consequence: i.e., they can be used in simulations of actual behaviors. 
7.6.5 Conditions 
 Enabling Conditions 
o Perception of process losses from continuing current methods  
 Stimulus Conditions 
o Anxiety  
o Novelty 
o Complexity  
 Releasing Conditions (remove impediments) 
o Available attention resources 
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7.7 The Attribute Substitution Mechanism (ASM) 
The Attribute Substitution Mechanism 
 
Figure 17: The Attribute Substitution Mechanism 
 
According to Leslie (1987) there are three types of operation which are fundamental parts of the 
Simulation process which takes place in the Secondary Representation. They are: 
 Object Substitution: Making one object stand in for another 
 Attribution of Pretend Properties: Modeling properties for objects that do not correspond to 
reality 
 Creating Imaginary Objects: Inventing objects that are not there 
Two of these fundamental operations are performed by the Attribute Substitution Mechanism (ASM), 
which is a type of the Abstraction-Association Mechanism.  
These are: 
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 Object Substitution 
 Attribution of Pretend Properties; IFF (IF, and only iF) those properties are copied from another 
object that actually has them 
It is described below. 
7.7.1 Description 
One aspect of the simulation process that takes place within the Secondary Representation is substitutive, 
it can be thought of as analogical thinking. There are multiple definitions of “analogy” (see Keane and 
Costello (2001)), but one influential definition is that of Gentner (1983): “an analogy is an assertion that a 
relational structure that normally applies in one domain can be applied in another domain” (Gentner, 
1983, p. 156). “Domain” in this context is taken to mean systems of objects, as well as attributes of and 
relations between those objects, which is functionally equivalent to the contents of the cognitive system’s 
representations at a given time. The logical operation of substituting one object for another (“Let’s 
imagine that the snake is a stick”); or substituting the attributes of one object for attributes of another 
(“Let’s imagine this red jacket is the same color as that green one”) is performed by the Attribute 
Substitution Mechanism (ASM). 
The ASM takes an existing exemplar: an object, action or concept. It selectively drops attributes of that 
exemplar to create an abstract prototype. It then copies attributes of an object, task (action) or idea 
(concept) from another exemplar to the first, in order to create a new exemplar. The ASM performs two of 
the operations involved in simulation according to the model proposed by Leslie (1987). They are Object 
Substitution – in which one object is made to ‘stand in’ for another, and Attribution of Pretend Properties 
– IFF (IF, and only iF) the pretend properties are copied from another object which actually has them. 
Analogical thinking — information processing as performed by the ASM – is used not only in problem-
solving but also as a communication tool (Dunbar, 2001). Though analogical thinking represents a type of 
operation performed by the ASM, the mechanism itself is proposed to be more general that the strict 
definitions sometimes used in studies of analogical thinking. For example, the use of metaphor would not 
fit into some of the more strict definitions of analogy in cognitive science, but fits comfortably within the 
range of operations covered by the ASM.  
In a collective setting, ASM operations are part of such exercises as the construction of models in order to 
analyze real-world processes; the use of metaphor for communication and metacognitive operations as 
part of interpersonal interactions. Studies of group decision-making have shown that analogy is a key 
process involved in both distributed cognitive activities and the communication processes that are part of 
those activities.  
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7.7.2 Case Evidence 
The ASM is a key part of the ideation process. Some theorists of cognition hold it to be the key part of not 
only ideation, but thinking in general (Hofstadter, 2001). As such much of the case evidence could 
probably be used as evidence for the operation of the ASM. However, there are some specific instances 
that show analogy being used in particularly clear ways.  
One is in the Beta case in which the new IT manager solved a problem with communication with the 
firm’s customers by using a Product file as, essentially, a communication tool. This was highly similar to 
the way in which the production department had used a Product file as a communication tool to solve a 
communication problem with the firm’s suppliers many years before. The interesting part of this case is 
that none of the participants remarked on or seemed aware of the fact that the two solutions were so 
similar. Further, the new IT manager would have just joined the company and been introduced to the IT 
systems being used for critical business processes, so she would have been well aware of the way that the 
production department had solved their problem. This could be modeled as an operation of the ASM. 
One notable attribute of the Beta case is that the working of the ASM seemed to be transparent. That is, 
key players in the creative incident seemed unaware of the evidence that the spec sheet case may have 
served as a model for the order book case. This was not the only occasion in the case evidence in which a 
situation that seemed to be evidence for an analogical transfer was not perceived that way by the persons 
involved. For example, in the Gamma case, there was the novel idea that KF had — during the training 
exercise in which they were testing Mobile Data — for using mobile phones in a way very similar to the 
way in which phones were being used in Mobile Data, but to solve a different problem. Again, both KF and 
MP did not appear to see the possible connection. However, there is nothing intrinsic to the ASM that 
requires it to be transparent. For example, in the Zeta case, RF related to me the fact that he encountered 
the coding-practice website online, and it gave him the idea for what eventually became the PySoc 
module. 
ASM processes can also be seen working at the collective level. For example, again in the Gamma case, 
when MP was negotiating with the manufacturers of Tracker, what he was essentially doing was guiding 
them to use a different system metaphor to describe the nature of their product: from a tracking device to 
a communication device. The notion of identifying what the product was, was essentially a matter of 
applying a certain template to it — and MP got them to change the template. 
7.7.3 Literature 
The operation of the ASM is analogous, in many ways, to the use of analogy in thinking. 
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Analogical reasoning has been proposed to be a core process in cognition, and a part of a number of 
processes (Hofstadter, 2001; Thagard & Shelley, 2001). It is an important topic in psychology (Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1997). The precise algorithms behind the implementation of analogy in the human reasoning 
system is the subject of ongoing debates in the literature (Gentner, 1983, 2010; Keane & Costello, 2001). 
The ASM is also reflected in several basic mechanisms of creative cognition in the literature such as 
Conceptual Combination and the use of Metaphor (Thomas B Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997). 
ASM processes are part of the basic operations that comprise normal cognitive functioning (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002). Just as emerged from the case data, there is evidence from the literature that many of 
the substitutions that are part of cognitive processes are transparent to the thinkers — that is, people 
make the substitutions without knowing that they are doing so (Kahneman, 2011). This lends weight to 
the opinions of some researchers that ASM processes — analogical thinking — is at the heart of all 
cognitive processing (Hofstadter, 2001). 
At the computational theory level, the operation of analogical thinking is the subject of broad consensus. 
According to (Dunbar, 1997), analogies consist of two components, the target and the base. The target is 
the concept that is being explained, and the base is another concept which has some structural relation to 
the target. In order to construct an analogy, features of the base are mapped onto features of the target. 
While targets and bases may be more or less distant — that is, have varying degrees of similarity — this act 
of mapping can add insight into the nature of the target by extending the analogy: mapping additional 
features from the base onto the target. Dunbar (1997) found that scientists, in the creative process of 
developing theories, used analogy both as an ideation tool and a communication tool.  
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7.7.4 Structure 
The ASM Functional Logic 
 
Figure 18: The ASM Logical Structure 
 
7.7.5 Conditions 
 Enabling Conditions 
o Existing exemplars 
o Similarities between base and target 
 Stimulus Conditions (triggers) 
o Requirements for reconfiguration 
 Releasing Conditions (remove impediments) 
o Proximity of target and base 
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7.8 The Representation Transformation Mechanism (RTM) 
The Representation Transformation Mechanism 
 
Figure 19: The Representation Transformation Mechanism 
 
According to Leslie (1987) there are three types of operation which are key parts of the simulation process 
which takes place in the SR. They are: 
 Object Substitution: Making one object stand in for another 
 Attribution of Pretend Properties: Modeling properties for objects that do not correspond to 
reality 
 Creating Imaginary Objects: Inventing objects that are not there 
Two of these three operations are handled by the Representation Transformation Mechanism (RTM) 
which is a type of the Serial Structuring Mechanism (SSM).  
These are: 
 Creating imaginary objects 
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 Attribution of Pretend Properties; IFF those properties are invented 
It is described below. 
7.8.1 Description 
Another aspect of the simulation process that takes place in the Secondary Representation is generative, it 
can be thought of as inventive thinking. It represents the development of novel objects, object properties 
or action sequences through a process of mental invention that does not draw on a direct precursor in the 
manner that objects, properties and sequences generated by the Attribute Substitution Mechanism do. 
This can be illustrated using some of the hypotheticals generated before. For example, where there is a 
jacket with the attribute jacket_color=green, and another jacket with the attribute jacket_color=red; an 
analogical transfer process can copy the value of the attribute jacket_color from one jacket to the other. 
Imagining that a red jacket is green can therefore be explained using the ASM. However, if I should begin 
to imagine that my jacket has two wings attached, which will enable me to fly, it is less likely that this 
image can be explained analogically, since the other jackets do not have wings attached. This can 
therefore be modeled as an action of the Representation Transformation Mechanism.  
There is one fundamental question about the RTM that the above example illustrates: does it actually 
exist? There are views of cognition which hold that most, if not all, human cognitive activity can be 
explained in terms of analogical processes (Hofstadter, 2001). Holders of such views would point out — in 
terms of the example above — that in order to imagine a jacket with wings which enable me to fly, I would 
need to have preexisting prototypes for “jacket”, “wings”, and “fly”. Furthermore, my prototype for 
“wings” would already have the attribute “enable_flying=YES” because I interpret the wings as giving me 
that power. The example could then be seen as simply an analogical transfer of a number of preexisting 
prototypes into a new configuration. They could also point out that a number of cultural symbols involve 
objects which have a human body with a winged thorax (e.g., angels, comic book superheroes such as 
Hawkman, etc.), making numerous exemplars available to cue me to analogically transfer “wings” to 
“jacket”.  
This difficulty in classifying a particular mental action as invention or analogue is broader than the 
present discussion. There are a number of mental feats which have been used as examples of “insight” — 
discontinuous generative ideation —that it has been shown can actually be accomplished via a continuous 
logical process (Weisberg, 1995). Ultimately, the issue goes to the unobservability of mental processes. If 
there are multiple possible mechanisms which can generate an outcome, and if it cannot be established by 
direct observation which mechanism causes the observed outcome, then the researcher must employ 
judgmental rationality (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 795).  
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In my analysis, I found ideation events that seem to correspond to the invention of new objects and object 
attributes in the simulation process undertaken by participants. While it may be possible to model these 
events as analogical transfers, I believe that modeling them as invention of the type enabled by the RTM is 
more consistent with current understandings of the structure of the reasoning system, and offers better 
explanatory power than other alternatives. I therefore posit the existence and operation of the RTM. 
7.8.2 Case Evidence 
A number of cases in the data can be modeled as reflecting the operation of the RTM.  
One is in the Beta case in which the new IT manager solved a problem with communication with the 
firm’s customers by using a Product file as, essentially, a communication tool. This is, of course, 
completely different from the standard methods of using Product, which is an office productivity tool. The 
IT manager would have had to completely transform her internal representation of Product and invent a 
completely new way to conceptualize it and instantiate a new way to use it. 
The above interpretation of the case data is, of course, a direct contradiction to the one in the previous 
section, in which the same event was used as evidence for the ASM. The fact is that this equifinality is a 
feature of analyses in which unobservable mental mechanisms are retrospectively applied to real-world 
data. Without controlled experiments, it can be difficult to identify which of a number of candidate 
mechanisms is responsible for a particular event. This can make retrospective attribution something of a 
philosophical problem: in analogical terms, does the thing developed (target) have any relation to a 
previous thing (base)? In real terms, it is almost impossible to identify any technological artifact that does 
not have some kind of structural similarity to any other thing. That said, with the application of judgment 
rationality (Wynn & Williams, 2012), it is possible to identify a mechanism which appears to provide a 
best fit between the case data and the proposed mechanism. I have concluded that the data best supports 
the existence and operation of a mechanism which extends representational concepts, and that this 
concept works better than a “stretching” of the concept of the ASM. 
RTM operations (or perhaps, potential RTM operations) can be seen in a number of cases. In the Beta 
case, MC used the modifications to the ordering process using a custom Product file as a way to move 
responsibility for the ordering process away from IT and onto the sales department. Whereas he could 
have made incremental changes to the system in order to make it more efficient, he used the 
modifications of the system as a way to accomplish a larger goal. The same thing can be said about some 
design elements of the Mobile Data system in the Gamma case. For example, one of the benefits of using 
the store-and-forward capabilities of the Mesh software is that it can streamline data aggregation. Since 
all it need to move data is for one Mesh-enabled phone to be within range of another, one idea for 
collecting data in a disaster zone was to fly a model airplane with a phone attached above areas that are 
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otherwise cut off from communication. This would be a totally new method of collecting data, and is 
enabled by the combination of the component modules of Mobile Data.  
7.8.3 Literature 
The RTM fundamentally describes the ability to solve problems through a transformation of the problem 
space within which the problem lies. Unlike combinations of concepts which are typical in the operations 
of the ASM, this transformation involves making leaps of knowledge from a present state to a new state. It 
is symmetrical with the form of creativity that Thomas B Ward et al. (1997) describe as “conceptual 
expansion”, and what Boden (1996) described as “transformation of conceptual spaces”: inventing new 
ideas by transforming the rules of an established structured system of thought. One debate in the 
literature concerns how this transformation typically happens. 
The process of moving from a state in which a problem solver who does not know how to solve a problem 
suddenly moves to state in which they do know how to solve it has been termed insight in the literature 
(Mayer, 1995). Insight is associated with what is popularly known as the “ah-hah” moment: inexplicable, 
sudden knowledge of the solution to a problem. Often the individuals who experience these sudden 
revelations are not able to explain or describe the process by which they become available. This has led 
some to describe the “moment of insight” as involving a “sudden illumination” which is not predictable 
and cannot be scientifically explained (Metcalfe, 1986).  
However other studies have shown evidence for “non-conscious incubation”, in which a structured 
reasoning process takes place during the solving of insight problems which is much like a conscious 
reasoning process; except for the fact that the subjects do not have conscious awareness of the process 
(Weisberg & Alba, 1981). Further, it has been shown that many of the problems commonly used as 
experimental conditions in studies of “insight” are actually solved through a sequential reasoning process, 
rather than a sudden state-change (Weisberg, 1995).  
The evidence leads R.K. Sawyer (2012) to conclude that the “moment of insight” is the result of a 
structured reasoning process that is only partially available to conscious awareness. This process is 
facilitated by the possession of relevant domain knowledge, and can roughly be equated to a structured 
creative process where the acquisition of the necessary background information has been completed 
before the presentation of the problem (Fisher & Amabile, 2009). 
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7.8.4 Structure 
The RTM  Functional Logic 
 
 
Figure 20: The RTM Logical Structure 
 
The RTM adds (and, potentially, removes) objects and attributes from the Secondary Representation in 
ways not semantically linked to objects and attributes in the Primary Representation. 
7.8.5 Conditions 
 Enabling Conditions 
o Knowledge of problem space 
 Stimulus Conditions (triggers) 
o Lack of contiguous routes to solutions  
 Releasing Conditions (remove impediments) 
o Simulation conditions  
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7.9 The Concrete Transformation Mechanism (CTM) 
The Concrete Transformation Mechanism 
 
Figure 21: The Concrete Transformation Mechanism 
 
The Concrete Transformation Mechanism (CTM) – which is a type of the Serial Structuring Mechanism – 
takes the output of a simulation from the Secondary Representation, and copies it over to the Primary 
Representation. The output of the simulation will be an ‘alternate world’ which represents the stimulus 
response that has been selected as optimal. The CTM will then initiate concrete actions to be performed 
on the real world in order to change the state of the real world to match the state of the simulation output 
condition, typically through activation of what Card et al. (1983) refer to as the motor system.   
7.9.1 Description 
The Decoupling Mechanism initiates a cognitive simulation process which enables the evaluation of 
different “alternate worlds”, in which the consequences of different possible stimulus responses can be 
simulated and evaluated. The output of the simulation process will represent a possible “alternate world”, 
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a simulated stimulus response which represents one possible route to the desired goal-state. This can be 
referred to as an idea. In order for this idea to be implemented, some kind of behavior, such as 
performing an action, verbal expression, or engaging in social interaction, will be necessary. Carrying out 
behavior is not possible from the Secondary Representation. Since the SR is a “quarantine” in which 
mental simulations can take place without representation abuse in the PR (Leslie, 1987), the SR is also 
quarantined from those mental structures that can initiate behavior. An idea (i.e., simulation output) 
from the SR must be copied over to the PR in order for it to result in external action. The simulation 
output must then be transformed from purely mental representations to signals that will actuate the 
motor system (Card et al., 1983). This copying and transformation is done by the Concrete 
Transformation Mechanism (CTM).  
The operations of the CTM are what we are usually talking about when we talk about skill. For example, 
the finding by Ericsson et al. (1993), popularized by Gladwell (2008), that a certain amount of deliberate 
practice is necessary for expertise in most domains of knowledge (the “10,000 hour rule”), describes the 
development of efficiencies of sub-mechanisms within the CTM. These sub-mechanisms are domain-
specific, there is little evidence that systematic practice in one domain can yield increased performance in 
others (S. B. Kaufman, 2009). Intense, deliberate practice appears to have two effects: one is physical 
conditioning, and the other an encoding of action sequences from System 2 into System 1, so that 
elements of performance in the domain become part of the Tightly Compiled Learned Information 
structures in System 1 (Ericsson et al., 1993; Stanovich, 2011).  
However, to describe the CTM as the development of motor skills would understate the diversity of the 
processes that the mechanism subsumes. Many creative actions require the coordination of efforts of a 
number of different individuals, or collective actions. At the individual level, triggering these collective 
actions may involve communication skills, political skills, and other, less easily defined qualities such as 
“leadership ability”. Individuals may have to develop shared representations and goals through 
communication process within their own group and then negotiate with other groups within an 
organizational hierarchy to implement their goals. The CTM involves all these related processes. 
Although the CTM initiates action to change the state of the world to match the optimal output of the SR 
simulation process, this does not imply that the action will necessarily succeed. Changing the state of the 
real world may fail because of a disconnect between the state of the world and the state of the PR (which 
was copied). Or it may fail because of a previously unknown property of the real world that becomes 
apparent when changing it is attempted. Or it may fail for some other reason. If it does fail, the PR will be 
updated with the state of the world’s lack of change by the RCM; the new state, along with any 
information that was gained during the failed attempt, will be copied and decoupled; and the cycle will 
continue, until it is terminated. 
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Collectively, the CTM encompasses what groups do when they take action to accomplish goals. In an 
organizational setting, CTM operations correspond to activities such as product development and project 
implementation, where strategic plans are put into action. 
7.9.2 Case Evidence 
In its broadest sense, the CTM describes the ability of actors to take action in order to implement ideas. 
Therefore, in the broadest sense, all the actions taken by actors in the case data represent the operation of 
the CTM. Manipulating the physical properties of a technical object, engaging in a collaboration, 
managing a team, and negotiating with a number of suppliers, all represent different actions that are part 
of the CTM.  
Specific competencies and skills exhibited by certain actors in each of the cases represent instances of 
activation of the CTM. For example, the technical skills applied by MC in modifying the Product file are 
part of the application of the CTM in that case. In the Zeta case, the skills applied by RF in creating a 
modular modification for the university’s LMS in order to create PythonCode represent illustrations of the 
CTM. However the CTM processes that drive a creative appropriation incident do not necessarily involve 
technical skills or require direct appropriation of technology. For example, when MP negotiated with the 
manufacturers of Tracker in order to get their cooperation with Mobile Data, he was engaging in a specific 
type of CTM activity that requires skill, but involves no direct interaction with a technology artifact. 
It should also be noted that in the case data, CTM activities were not simply part of the implementation of 
ideas, but also an intrinsic part of learning and planning. For example, in the Alpha case, trying to develop 
different solutions for replacing the Desktop application involved CTM processes. Through those 
processes, it was discovered that no available application met Alpha’s needs. The developing and testing 
of a prototype by DL was also a CTM process. These processes were a part of the larger overarching 
process of developing a solution, which I am defining as a “case” (note that the “case” could look very 
different if another arbitrary decision about scope were made and used to analyze the same data 
(Leonardi, 2011)). However, learning from each attempt, and adapting the approach to the problem in 
response to that learning, involved every mechanism.  
While each mechanism describes a coherent logical action, the contribution of each mechanism to the 
creative process cannot be understood in isolation from the others. This fact will be revisited later in this 
chapter.  
7.9.3 Literature 
Engaging in concrete actions may seem like a conscious step in the creative process, but in fact, like all the 
other processes, it depends on, and includes, many aspects of System 1. Often individuals are not 
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conscious of the extent to which their skills draw on non-conscious resources. For example, Snyder, 
Ashitaka, Shimada, Ulrich, and Logan (2013) demonstrated that many skilled touch-typists are unable to 
accurately identify all the keys on a standard qwerty keyboard. When they then gave them a training 
session on the Dvorak keyboard (which none of them had used previously), they found that, although the 
typists learned to use the keyboard, they could not accurately describe the key placement. In the same 
way, artists with fully-developed ideas for a product (such as a sculpted piece), are often unable to verbally 
describe those ideas (Moeran & Christensen, 2013, p. 129). 
This reinforces the point that everyday cognition and behavior is highly dependent on both System 1 and 
System 2. The CTM will, within each domain of creative action, represent an ensemble of skilled 
performance mechanisms which operate at both conscious and unconscious levels within individuals 
(Kahneman, 2011). The CTM will also be responsible for the communicative and coordinative actions 
which initiate and sustain collective action at the distributed cognitive level (Dunbar, 1997).  
Simon (1980, p. 40) calls this part of the cognitive system an interface: it translates between the internal 
environment of the system — where cognitive representations of objects in the world are manipulated — 
and the external environment — in which real objects in the world are manipulated through actuation of 
the sensorimotor system. He notes that the problem of communicating between these two worlds is 
perhaps the most delicate in designing an artificial adaptive system. Progress has been much faster in 
designing systems which replicate the processes in only one of these worlds (mechanical systems and 
information-processing systems) than those which replicate processes in both (interactive “intelligent” 
robotic systems).  
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7.9.4 Structure 
The CTM Functional Logic 
 
Figure 22: The CTM Logical Structure 
 
The CTM “concretizes” abstract simulation outputs from the Secondary Representation, by copying them 
to the Primary Representation, and converting them into actuations of the motor system that result in 
real-world behavior. 
7.9.5 Conditions 
 Enabling Conditions 
o Preexisting TCLI modules 
o Assorted domain-specific practice effects 
 Stimulus Conditions (triggers) 
o Simulation output from SR 
 Releasing Conditions (remove impediments) 
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o Fully-formed simulation outputs 
 
7.10 The Retrospective Reframing Mechanism (RRM) 
The Retrospective Reframing Mechanism 
 
Figure 23: The Retrospective Reframing Mechanism 
 
At the same time that the cognitive system is carrying out steps to transform the world, it is also creating a 
representation of its own activities. This representation is created by the Retrospective Reframing 
Mechanism (RRM). The RRM – which is a type of the AAM – takes as input incomplete narrative 
information about the creative actions being taken. It also takes as input prototypical information about 
the objects, processes and concepts which are involved in creative action. It transforms the incomplete 
narrative information by combining it with the prototypical information, creates a constructed 
representation of the creative process, and writes it to long term storage.  
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The RRM is elaborated below. 
7.10.1 Description 
When individuals or collectives engage in creative activities, they store representations of the events that 
comprised those activities to long-term storage — whether in the form of memories, or in the form of 
spoken narratives, written accounts or other formal records. However, there is a well-documented 
tendency for those accounts to be, not only incomplete, but also systematically biased. Both at the 
individual and small group (Dunbar, 1997), and at the societal and historical levels (Schaffer, 1994), 
accounts of creative events tend to be constructed which are not only false, but systematically 
confabulated according to recognizable patterns. Specifically, certain tropes like the ‘lone inventor’ and 
other myths about creative individuals and the creative process which have been repeatedly disproved by 
empirical research remain prominent in cultural explanations of creative events (R. K. Sawyer, 2007; R.K. 
Sawyer, 2012). Events consistent with this were observed in the case data and it is explained by the 
Retrospective Reframing Mechanism (RRM). 
The basic function of the RRM is to write accounts of events to long-term storage. It takes narrative 
accounts of events — whether gathered from the sensory apparatus, narrated stories, documentary 
accounts, or other sources — and writes them to neuronal or non-neuronal long-term media. At the 
individual cognitive level, this is an automatic process that is performed by System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). 
This process has a tendency (Wynn & Williams, 2012) to build representations which are associatively 
coherent — that is, logically consistent with preexisting knowledge structures (prototypes) and 
structurally comprehensive. Received information about the world is always incomplete. The RRM 
achieves associative coherence and comprehensiveness by combining preexisting prototypical narratives 
with the incomplete narrative information it receives. The result of this combinatorial process is the 
formation of memories which are subjectively complete, but are in fact, partially confabulated. 
The prototypes which are read by the RRM differ by the level of cognition. At the System 1 level they are 
cognitive schemas. At the System 2 level, they are stereotypical beliefs. At the distributed cognitive level 
they are archetypical objects, distributed through communication artifacts such as documents. At each 
level, the output of the mechanism is also different. At System 1, the output is reinforcement of the 
schema, at System 2, stereotypes become entrenched beliefs, at the distributed cognitive level, the output 
becomes shared representations in the form of written records, spoken narratives, etc. Also, at each level, 
each input reinforces the other.  
The RRM explains why myths about creativity that have been well refuted remain current in social 
discourse and continue to shape our conceptions of creative people and actions (R. K. Sawyer, 2007). 
However, like the other mechanisms, it also has broader implications, since it reflects deep underlying 
tendencies, rather than some process which is unique to creative behavior (Weisberg, 1995). It suggests 
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that, like decision making (see Kahneman and Klein (2009)), the process of memory formation may 
require further study in order to understand the conditions under which individual perceptions and self-
reports are and are not reliable measures of actual events.  
7.10.2 Case Evidence 
Since the primary source of data for each case was semi-structured interviews with participants who had 
taken part in the incident, all the cases can be expected to have been influenced by the RRM. This problem 
of the subjectivity and distortion of reported accounts is a well-known limitation of interview data 
(Dunbar, 1997), and is also a problem with quantitative self-report data (Straub et al., 1995). This kind of 
narrative distortion is often attributed to conscious effects such as social desirability bias, but is often an 
effect of confabulation by the cognitive system (Evans, 2009). Often, the effects of this confabulation are 
transparent, and undetectable. In this study, there were a few incidents in which the effects of the RRM 
may have been made visible.  
In the case data, there were indications of the operation of the RRM in several instances where 
participants seemed unaware of relationships that were visible in data they had supplied. For example, in 
the Gamma case, the consultant, KF, did not seem aware of the fact that his idea for using mobile phones 
as file servers in disaster zones was quite similar structurally to the fundamental idea behind Mobile Data. 
Interestingly, MP, who was the main driver behind the Mobile Data project, did not seem aware of the 
similarity either. In such a case, it is often true that there are multiple possible explanations for the 
observed facts. For example, it might be assumed that KF was aware that he was inspired by Mobile Data, 
but was withholding that information in order to take full credit for the idea. However, my observations of 
KF, MP, and the collaborative spirit of the members of the Mobile Data team that I met and interacted 
with, makes me doubt that this is the case. It is also possible that KF may be completely accurate — maybe 
his idea is completely unconnected to Mobile Data and was not inspired by it in any way. Since it is not 
practical to directly observe cognitive processes, this possibility cannot be disproved. However, applying 
judgment rationality, the most likely explanation appears to be that KF was inspired by the Mobile Data 
idea (which, it must be noted, he made substantial contributions to), and that he is not aware of it because 
of the operation of the RRM. 
A similar explanation for the genesis of the order book case in organization Beta by the IT manager RR 
also makes sense. RR was facing a problem that was structurally similar to the problem that the 
production department was trying to solve when they developed the system for communicating with the 
factory using Product. As a new manager, RR would have been familiarized with the existing systems in 
Beta, and would have been briefed on the background of spec sheet system. It seems most rational to 
assume that — either consciously or non-consciously — she was inspired by the spec sheet system to 
create a similar system using Product to communicate with customers. However, that idea does not 
appear to have occurred to any of the participants who I interviewed about the incident.   
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It should be reiterated that the RRM is always at work. Discrepancies in data can make it visible, but 
without it the data itself would not exist. 
7.10.3 Literature 
At the individual level, the effects of the RRM can be seen in the body of literature that reflects the human 
tendency to misremember narrative events. Apart from generalized memory decay over time, there is 
substantial evidence that the ways in which memory errors happen are systematic. An example if this is in 
Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996), which demonstrated that memories of a painful treatment — in this 
case, a colonoscopy — were systematically incorrect. Specifically, they found that the peak intensity of 
pain, and pain during the last 3 minutes of the procedure, determined their memories of the intensity of 
the experience. Patients’ memory of the intensity of the procedure was not determined by total pain in 
terms of the time experienced — duration neglect — but rather by those metrics — the peak-end rule 
(Kahneman, 2011). Patients who had clearly suffered more in terms of pain over time could be made to 
have less intense memories of the procedure.  
At the collective level, Schaffer (1994) showed that many stories of creative discoveries were 
systematically confabulated, rather than direct reflections of the actual narrative. The tendency to 
systematically confabulate the origin stories of scientific discoveries is one of the major themes in the 
sociology of science, and has been explored by Stigler (1983), Merton (1957), and others. In fact, the 
prevalence of the phenomenon led Stigler to propose Stigler’s Law of Eponymy (Stigler, 1980), which 
states, succinctly: “No scientific discovery is named after its discoverer.” Stigler credits Merton with the 
idea, thus making Stigler’s Law an example of Stigler’s Law. The tendency has also been noted in many 
other domains, and has been the basis of challenges to the structure of the patent system (Lemley, 2011).  
The tendencies noted above give some indication of the way that the RRM operates. It collects incomplete 
information about the narrative event being stored (such information always being incomplete). It then 
compresses that information using rules (such as the peak-end rule), with a tendency to designate events 
as types of a category. The implications of these tendencies will be explored in the next chapter. 
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7.10.4 Structure 
The RRM Functional Logic 
 
Figure 24: The RRM Logical Structure 
 
The RRM takes as input raw event data, from sensory inputs and other data sources (narrative accounts, 
etc.) It also takes as input prototypical representations of how the event is expected to unfold. The input 
prototypes differ at each level of cognition: schematic memory structures at the S1 level, stereotypical 
beliefs at the S2 level, and archetypical representations at the DC level. These are combined with the event 
data to form the constructed representation of events that is written to long-term storage by the 
mechanism.  
Because the input prototypes are partial inputs to constructing the story, they will tend to influence the 
story in such a way that they are reinforced (i.e., actors will tend to remember an event in ways that 
conform to the prototypes they access). The prototypes at each level also tend to reinforce the prototypes 
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at other levels (i.e., stereotypical beliefs will tend to influence the formation of subconscious schemas and 
will also tend to influence the narratives that are created at the distributed level).  
7.10.5 Conditions 
 Enabling Conditions 
o Any narrative to be stored 
 Stimulus Conditions (triggers) 
o Multidimensionality of information 
 Releasing Conditions (remove impediments) 
o Preexisting prototypes 
 
7.11 Integrating the Mechanisms: The Information Cycle Model 
It has previously been noted that each mechanism cannot be understood in isolation from the other 
mechanisms. In order to have full explanatory power the mechanisms must be seen as working together 
as a system. In this section, I describe that system. In concordance with the scope of the thesis, I describe 
the operation of the system at the individual level only.  
Mechanisms are an inherently hierarchical concept (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010), as they both imply 
mechanisms at a lower level, and comprise mechanisms at a higher level. The critical realist assumption of 
emergence means that a description of a mechanism need not include a description of each of its 
component mechanisms. However, to explain creative appropriation from the perspective of the 
mechanisms identified in this study, it is necessary to explain how they function together at a 
superordinate hierarchical level. Bringing the mechanisms together at this level gives a model of creative 
action that I have labeled the Information Cycle Model. It is visualized below: 
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The Information Cycle Model 
 
Figure 25: The Information Cycle Model 
 
This model shows a cycle of information flows and transformations that occur during the conception, 
development and implementation of a creative away of appropriating an IT system. The cycle begins with 
the perception of a need to change the way a system used from the “normal” way of using the system, to a 
novel and useful way that does not yet exist. Information flows into the cognitive system through the 
RCM, which combines signals from the sensory system with prototypes to form a Primary Representation. 
“Normal” or routine methods of using the system are handled by the SAM. However, at some point, the 
need for a novel way of using the system to be developed results in the triggering of the DM. The DM 
creates a copy of the information in the PR — a Secondary Representation — and separates that copy from 
the PR. Within the SR, a process of Simulation takes place: the objects, object properties, and scripts 
within the SR are manipulated by the ASM and RTM until the simulation develops an alternate model of 
how the system can be used that will result in the desired goal-state. This model of the “alternate world” — 
i.e., the new way of using the system — is copied to the PR and translated into a series of concrete goal-
directed actions that will act on the external world to transform it to state of the simulation output by the 
CTM. These actions may be successful, or they may fail; in the case of a complex new way of using a 
system, they may also be partial or exploratory. Information about the effect of the actions will be 
contained in signals from the environment, which will be brought into the system through the RCM; the 
PR will be updated with the new information, and the SR will be updated with the new state of the PR, the 
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simulation will be updated, and the cycle will continue. While the cycle continues, a narrative account of 
the operations of the system is constructed by the RRM. 
The model is called “Information Cycle Model” because creative action requires cycling between ideation 
and enactment. For example, in the Alpha case, the novel way of using Wiki technology was not developed 
in a single step. There were a number of intervening steps, failed attempts, trials and intermediate 
developments before the full new system was developed. The process of development was iterative, and 
did not proceed through a set of planned stages. Like Baer and Kaufman (2005) (amusement parks) and 
Sternberg and Lubart (1991) (investment), I propose a well-known phenomenon to act as a metaphor for 
the way the system works. I propose that this integrative model is like an electrical circuit. The flow of 
information within the system is not a “process” with a set of well-defined events that occur in a causal 
chain, rather it is a continuous cycle of information that “powers” the creative process by performing work 
iteratively. This cycle itself can be seen as cycling between ideation and enactment: an internal 
transformation of the PR through a simulation process (ideation); and an external initiation of a series of 
concrete actions to attempt to implement the outcome of the ideation process (enactment). The cycle 
continues until the attempt to implement a creative idea succeeds, is terminated (e.g., by distraction) or 
fails; with each failure presenting an opportunity to give up, and redirect attention elsewhere, or to retry. 
To terminate the attempt, the “circuit” must be broken. The “circuit breaker” is the DM: if the DM ceases 
to operate, the simulation collapses and the cognitive system goes back to routine SAM operation.  
The cycling of information can also be seen in terms of the cycling of information transformations 
between the “outer” and “inner” environments of the cognitive system. The transformations developed in 
the inner environment — represented by the action within the secondary representation executed by the 
ASM and RTM — are then executed — via the CTM — in the external environment. The results of that 
external manipulation feed back into the system through the RTM and become the basis for further 
simulation. In this way, the “creative” solution to a problem – and the motivation for creative 
appropriation is typically a problem – is developed, tested and deployed iteratively. It should be noted 
that this iterative process very much resembles that which is modeled in Finke et al. (1992)’s model of the 
internal process by which creative products are developed in the individual mind. In this way, the IT 
artifact serves as an interface for the iterative development of ideas between the external world and the 
internal “world” of the simulation within the cognitive system (Simon, 1981, pp. 7-8).  
In the mind we manipulate representations of objects in the world. Technological artifacts are themselves 
representations of task domains (Burton-Jones & Straub, 2006). By appropriating (constitutively using) a 
technology, we transform existing representations into new ones (Burton-Jones & Grange, 2012), 
enacting a cognitive transformation in the world in order to make it a distributed cognitive 
transformation. The Information Cycle Model describes this cognitive transformation, which makes use of 
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affordances provided by the technology itself, as well as elements of the environment, in order to effect 
this transformation.   
The individual mechanisms that make up the Information Cycle Model are summarized in Table 4. The 
implications of each of these mechanisms, and the integrative model itself, will be explored in the 
following chapter. 
Table 8: A Summary of the Individual Mechanisms 
A Summary of the Mechanisms 
Name Acronym Type Logical Operations 
Representation 
Construction 
Mechanism 
RCM AAM Input: Incomplete information about the state of the external 
world  
Input: Prototypical models of state of the world 
Output: Primary Representation (PR) of the world  
Serial 
Associative 
Mechanism 
SAM N/A Input: Current state of PR 
Output: New state of PR 
Decoupling 
Mechanism 
DM N/A Input: Reads state of PR 
Output: Copy of PR – Secondary Representation (SR)                                                                                                 
Output: Maintains Separation of SR and PR 
Representation 
Transformation 
Mechanism 
RTM SSM Input: Reads state of SR 
Output: Updates state of SR with created objects and created 
object attributes 
Attribute 
Substitution 
Mechanism 
ASM AAM Input: Reads state of the SR 
Input: Reads existing representations of objects and attributes 
Output: Updates state of SR with substituted objects and 
substituted object attributes 
Concrete 
Transformation 
Mechanism 
CTM SSM Input: Reads output of simulation process from SR 
Output: Updates PR with simulation output, AND                                                      
Output: Enacts concrete actions to convert external world to 
the state of the simulation output 
Retrospective 
Reframing 
Mechanism 
RRM AAM Input: Incomplete information about creative process                                     
Input: Prototypical models of the idealized creative process 
Output: Constructed representation of the creative process 
 
7.12 Discussion 
It should be noted that the findings in this study conform to what R.K. Sawyer (2012) described as the 
“business-as-usual” creativity hypothesis. There is no “creativity mechanism” which is unique to the 
creative process. The mechanisms identified here are all part of the regular cognitive system — at both the 
individual and collective levels — and can be assumed to be active in many spheres of cognitive activity. 
This is consistent with prior research (Dunbar, 1997), and suggests that the mechanisms may be useful for 
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explaining other phenomena, beside creative appropriation. It should also be reiterated that the 
integrative model presented is in concordance with the scope of the thesis: that is, it explains user 
creativity at the individual level. Although each mechanism is specified at both the individual and 
collective levels, I do not make the claim that the integrative model for collective action may not be 
different from, and perhaps be a superset of, the model for individual action. That is a matter for future 
research. 
A pattern emerges across the operation of all the mechanisms identified here that is consistent with 
previous findings: the tendency toward effort minimization on the part of the cognitive system. People are 
cognitive misers in that the brain is designed to expend as little energy as possible on each cognitive task 
(Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2011). Simon (1956) identified this tendency before we had current models 
of the mind which can explain the mechanisms which underlie it. The general implication of this is that 
people will default to the least cognitively expensive processing option available when responding to any 
stimulus condition. The least cognitively expensive response to any stimulus will always be the System 1 
response, which is generated automatically. Some stimuli, however, such as those which require complex 
processing to be recognized, do not have a System 1 response and will trigger System 2. However, 
different System 2 processes have different levels of expense, and the default option will always be the 
least expensive. 
This tendency to default to the least computationally expensive method of processing can explain many 
specific observations about general behavioral tendencies. It is now widely accepted that many of the 
judgment biases commonly shown in decision-making research are reflections of System 1 tendencies, 
which are drawn on to support complex reasoning processes (Kahneman, 2011). The fact that less-
expensive System 2 reasoning systems are available — and are commonly defaulted to — can help to 
explain the effects of habit and automaticity in utilization studies in IS. For example, Polites and 
Karahanna (2013) cite the effects of habit in describing some actions which do require some conscious 
awareness and cannot be entirely attributed to System 1. The SAM provides a way of modeling the effects 
of these less-effortful-but-still-conscious processes that are at work in the performance of familiar, non-
challenging cognitive tasks that are either inherently uncomplicated or are well supported by tightly 
compiled modules of learned information (TCLI) in System 1. 
The set of mechanisms described here provide the ability to explain the cognitive operations that are 
engaged in by the participants in a creative process during that process. They do not require, but are 
compatible with, many “stage” theories of creativity (see R.K. Sawyer (2012) for one such). At different 
points in the creative process (and creative discovery is always a process, even when it seems 
instantaneous (Fisher & Amabile, 2009)), all the mechanisms will be active, but different mechanisms will 
shape the story. At the beginning, when the problem is first encountered, the RCM might be critical in 
deciding how it will be understood and framed. At a later point the DM might be critical in determining 
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whether the cognitive system attempts to find a solution to the problem. During the simulation process, 
the ASM might be critical in finding a key relationship between the problem at hand and a previous 
problem, which hints at a solution. When an idea has been generated, the skills that are part of the CTM 
might be critical in the attempt to implement that idea. If that attempt fails, the RCM might be critical in 
understanding why it failed, and setting the stage for a second attempt. And so on.  
Of course, the precise sub-mechanisms by which each of these things is accomplished will vary from case 
to case. The benefit of specifying the mechanisms solely at the Computational Theory level (Marr, 1982) is 
that they form a set of general structures that can be used to understand similar processes across cases 
while enabling the analysis of the components of those structures in detail in any case. The mechanisms 
also enable the study of creative action at the conceptual level while abstracting away the details at more 
concrete levels. For example, neuronal structures in the brain and social structures in a society will 
obviously differ, both in the Representation and Algorithms that they use, and the way those are 
implemented physically in Hardware (Marr, 1982). However, despite this difference at the lower levels, 
they can both exhibit the same tendencies in operations at the computational theory level. This can enable 
researchers to make a number of interesting observations, as well as ask interesting questions at both 
levels, and, ultimately, enables us to build an integrated, cumulative body of knowledge about the 
phenomena involved by studying the operations of the mechanism (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999).  
The tendencies of the mechanisms have implications for the study of creative appropriation, and, in 
keeping with the “business-as-usual” hypothesis (R.K. Sawyer, 2012), the study of general creativity and 
other behavioral domains such as problem-solving and decision-making. Some of these implications will 
be explored in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8. Discussion 
The wheel is an extension of the foot, the book is an extension of the eye, clothing, an extension of the 
skin, electric circuitry an extension of the central nervous system.  
McLuhan and Fiore (1967) 
(From the HIT Lab message board) 
8.1 Introduction: Explaining Creative Appropriation 
The theory being presented seeks to describe the mechanisms which are causally-relevant to end user 
creativity. It is Type II theory, according to the typology proposed by Gregor (2006). However, before 
discussing the integrative model’s implications, it may be useful to reiterate what it is not. It is not a 
model of brain function – it describes mechanisms in the Real domain, not physical structures in the 
Actual domain. It is also not a deterministic model – the mechanisms described operate in an open 
system: they can fire, not fire, or be interfered with at any stage in the cycle. Also, the outcome of the 
process, if it completes by generating a successful real-world response, need not be ‘creative’, in that it 
may not be such that appropriate observers would rate it as creative (Amabile, 1982). The model, rather, 
provides a framework for understanding the basic mechanisms involved in creative appropriation and 
shows how they may work together to generate creative responses – if and when creative responses are 
generated. I also do not claim that this is the only way that creative responses may come about: the 
routine processes of the SAM, for example, may generate unexpected novel and valuable responses. 
However, I contend that creative appropriations will tend to be the outcome of a fully decoupled 
simulation process, and the case data supports this contention. 
The model explains the phenomenon of creative appropriation by demonstrating how the identified 
mechanisms lead to the outcome. There are other levels of the phenomenon of creative appropriation — 
the algorithmic and hardware implementation levels (Marr, 1982) — which it does not address. There are 
also particular contextual facts which are part of any creative narrative which no generalized model can 
predict. However, the mechanisms identified in this project provide a foundation for asking better 
questions, and a roadmap for a program of research that can address long-standing questions that can 
illuminate not only creative appropriation, but creativity in general, as well as the study of behavior in a 
number of contexts. In this section I will identify some implications for creativity in general that can be 
inferred from the existing evidence about the mechanisms identified. These can be taken as explanations 
of why some tendencies are expected to be seen in incidents of creative action, given the tendencies 
exhibited by the mechanisms that generate those creative actions.  
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I will proceed as follows. I will look at each specific mechanism, beginning with the individual 
mechanisms, and ending with the integrated Information Cycle Model. For each, I will discuss some 
implications of the specific mechanism. I will then go on to consider more broadly the implications of the 
Information Cycle Model for our understanding of creative actions, the people who carry them out, and 
effects that they have. Finally, I will revisit some of the “open questions” that were introduced in the 
Introduction to this thesis, and discuss how the model addresses them.  
8.2 Implications of the Individual Mechanisms 
I have previously argued that none of the mechanisms identified in the study can be understood in 
isolation. The mechanisms form a system, and explaining creative appropriation requires looking at the 
system as a whole. However, each of the mechanisms has its own tendencies, and therefore has certain 
effects on the operation of the overall system.  
Before discussing the implications of the Information Cycle Model as a whole, I will briefly consider some 
implications of each mechanism and how those may inform an understanding of creative appropriation. 
8.2.1 Implications of the RCM 
The major implication of the Representation Construction Mechanism (RCM) is that cognitive systems 
will have a tendency to systematically misinterpret the nature of the external world. This 
misinterpretation will be guided by the nature of the prototypes used to “fill in the details” of the 
incomplete perceptual information which is received about the state of the external world.  
These prototypes are active at the System 1 and System 2 levels, but they are shared at the distributed 
cognitive level. The shared prototypes conform to Csikszentmihalyi (1999b)’s definition of a “culture” — a 
shared symbol system. This common symbol system conforms with Walsham (1995b, p. 75)’s concept of 
internal realism, an intersubjective construction of reality driven by a shared cognitive apparatus 
(Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997, p. 110). These common symbolic representations of idealized reality are 
shared at the distributed level, but influence beliefs about reality at both the conscious and unconscious 
levels. This may help explain why individuals share cognitive biases and use common heuristics (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). It may also explain common errors of estimation at the collective levels, such as 
Hirschman (1967)’s Hiding Hand principle. It may also provide a mechanistic explanation for how 
disciplinary paradigms shape the work of individual scientists; and how such paradigms do so without 
being visible to those whose thinking they shape (Kuhn, 1996). 
The notion of shared prototypes shaping the subjective picture of reality held by the cognitive system is 
compatible with a large variety of findings in the behavioral sciences. It provides an explanatory 
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framework for analyzing phenomena from social stereotyping to common decision biases. In all, the RCM 
strongly supports the critical realist assumption that human knowledge of reality is limited and fallible.  
8.2.2 Implications of the SAM 
The Serial Associative Mechanism (SAM) implies that in most situations, especially those which involve 
low to moderate degrees of cognitive load, or executing actions which are perceived as routine, individuals 
will tend to default to a low-power type of System 2 processing that is heavily supported by System 1. 
While System 1 processes are involved in all types of cognitive activity, the nature of this processing may 
mean that this mode of operation is more guided by System 1 than fully decoupled cognition. This could 
mean that it is more guided by prototypes at the System 1 level, which may conflict with prototypes held at 
the conscious levels. 
A particularly dramatic example of the effects of this may be seen in the “Linda” conjunction fallacy 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983b). Even subjects who were highly trained in statistics and who knew that it 
was statistically impossible for a conjunction to have a higher probability that its constituents, still felt like 
the conjunction was more probable. The primacy of the “feeling” system over the “knowing” system is 
hidden (even from the individuals themselves) by System 2’s tendency to confabulate associatively 
coherent retrospective explanations for its own behavior.  This suggests that much of an individual’s 
everyday routine behavior is likely far less “rational” than they realize (Evans, 2009).  
The SAM is efficient, and it is highly unlikely that normal cognitive functioning would be possible without 
it. Fully decoupled cognition is highly fatiguing for individuals who are forced to conduct it (Kahneman, 
Tursky, Shapiro, & Crider, 1969). If it were necessary to give full attention to each stimulus, the individual 
cognitive system’s capacity for response would quickly be overwhelmed. There is also abundant evidence 
that SAM-style processing enables individuals to function efficiently in time sensitive environments (G. 
Klein & Crandall, 1996), and that, in some circumstances, SAM-style processing may lead to higher 
quality decisions (T. D. Wilson & Schooler, 1991). However, SAM processing also implies that systematic 
patterns of stimulus response which may be both unexpected and difficult to measure will be a routine 
part of behavior.  
At the collective level, the issues are largely the same from an information-processing standpoint. 
Collectives, be they groups or organizations, have limited attentional resources and use routines to 
optimize the processing of common tasks, in order to preserve resources for the tasks that require them. 
This leads to a certain level of efficiency in terms of resource allocation, and also leads to certain costs, in 
terms of information loss. 
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8.2.3 Implications of the DM 
One primary implication of the Decoupling Mechanism (DM) is that the self-motivated ‘exploration’ 
phase of use predicted by some purely theoretical models of IT implementation (Jasperson et al., 2005; 
Saga & Zmud, 1993), is likely to tend to be rare. This is not the first finding that has challenged the so-
called “stage hypothesis” (Benbasat et al., 1984), but it does take a position on that debate.  
The implication of the DM, as specified, is that decoupling and simulation is triggered to avoid perceived 
losses or under conditions of high motivation. The DM requires ongoing stimulation to maintain the 
Decouple operation. If Decouple is not maintained, the simulation collapses and the cognitive system 
returns to the default (SAM) mode of operation. The full story, however, is complex. The high-cognitive 
load decoupled state is obviously a part of the ideation process, but there is considerable evidence that an 
incubation process, in which the problem is dropped from working memory, but associative processes 
that are part of System 1 continue to search for solutions, is often part of the ideation process. How this 
works in detail is not currently well understood (Abraham & Windmann, 2007, p. 45). 
Another implication of the DM is that caution must be used in directly applying findings from lab studies 
of performance to estimations about real-world performance of actors in naturalistic situations. For 
example, in studies of reasoning and decision-making, following routine, “intuitive” decision-making 
modes is associated with outcomes that are biased, and lead to sub-optimal goal-satisfaction. This can 
lead to an impression that the literature holds that conscious, deliberate processing is inherently superior 
to the kind of routine-based, low-cost processing implemented by the SAM. However, it must be borne in 
mind that these, almost invariably preferable, outcomes due to the kind of deliberate processing that 
would be associated with the activation of the DM, are commonly measured under lab conditions for 
artificial experimental tasks.  
There is considerable evidence that in real-world conditions, especially in conditions when high response 
speed and coordination of multiple and complex stimulus responses are critical, expert actors develop 
automatic, routine responses that are capable of developing highly effective responses to contextual high-
pressure environments with extremely low latency (Calderwood et al., 1987; G. Klein & Crandall, 1996). 
However, the same decision strategies can result in biased and sub-optimal responses under lab 
conditions (Reyna, 2004). The fact that the efficient — and largely effective — interventions of System 1 
can lead to errors in specifically constructed experimental tasks has led to a widespread — and erroneous 
— assumption that System 2 processing is always qualitatively “better” than System 1 processing: a fallacy 
(Evans, 2012a).  
What does follow from this is that to fully evaluate the effectiveness of routine vs. fully decoupled 
processing in a real-world domain requires field investigation of cognition within that domain.  
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8.2.4 Implications of the ASM 
The capacity for relational matching (Holyoak et al., 2001, pp. 2-3) is one major difference between 
humans as a species and other close animals. This means that one implication of the ASM could be that it 
represents a capability that distinguishes human cognitive systems from other information-processing 
systems. Analogical thinking lies under many of the most influential ideas in human society (Abraham & 
Windmann, 2007). For example, perhaps the most critical factor that led to the development of cognitive 
science as a discipline was an analogy: between human information processing and the processing 
performed by a computer (Holyoak et al., 2001, p. 7). 
Analogy appears to function most effectively in naturalistic environments, and less so in artificial 
environments, such as during lab experiments (Dunbar, 2001). This may be related to the dynamics of the 
relationship between SAM and DM operation. Given the intrinsically associative nature of System 1, it 
may be that System 1 is more easily invoked in circumstances where people are not hyper attentive and 
conscious of their surroundings — i.e., when they are doing routine tasks in a “normal” environment, 
rather than unfamiliar tasks in a lab. This implies that findings from lab studies are likely to require 
corresponding work in the field, observing what people do and how they think in normal environments, to 
gain a full understanding of cognitive processes. It supports the idea of iterative “in vivo, in vitro” 
approaches such as that of Dunbar (1997). 
The above hypothesis — that high attention may attenuate analogical thinking ability — may also be 
related to the constraining effects of extrinsic motivation on creativity (Amabile, 1985). 
8.2.5 Implications of the RTM 
The RTM is associated with the cognitive phenomenon of insight. I define insight, as does Weisberg 
(1995), as the cognitive restructuring of a problem that leads to a solution, rather than an affective (aha!) 
experience. The primary implication of the RTM in this thesis is the assertion, on my part, that insight 
exists. Not all theorists are convinced that that is the case. Many cognitive actions can be explained as 
associative processes. Some would even argue that the RTM may not exist at all — that all thought is 
inherently associative. I do not share that position. 
It is true that many actions coded to the RTM in this study could also be modeled as resulting from the 
ASM. This is common in CR research and is consistent with the equifinality and multifinality that results 
from the open-system assumption in CR field research (Wynn & Williams, 2012). That the thesis makes 
this assertion means that further work on testing the nature of the mechanisms involved in the simulation 
process can be useful in assessing competing theories of what happens  in that process. As was said by (K. 
D. Miller & Tsang, 2011, p. 149): “… identifying the mechanism operating in an empirical setting is an 
effective way of assessing competing theories of the same phenomenon.”  
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In this project, I have found support for the existence and operation of the RTM. However, I acknowledge 
that this does not falsify possible alternate accounts of the cognitive processes involved in simulation.  
More work in this area is called for. 
8.2.6 Implications of the CTM 
The CTM is primarily about doing — the exercise of agency by the individuals and collectives that “own” 
cognitive systems. The CTM stands or all those actions, as well as the skills and competencies involved in 
taking action in the world to implement ideas. 
This implies that CTM processes are a significant area in which differences in background, training, and 
exposure can lead to differences in outcomes. An individual may have a novel, useful and surprising idea 
for a software feature, but is unlikely to be able to develop a “creative” product without corresponding 
programming skills. However, CTM processes transcend direct appropriation moves, so the individual 
with the idea may communicate it to a programmer. The strength of the distributed cognitive approach is 
that it allows these collective processes to be viewed through a similar lens to those used to explore the 
marshaling of individual cognitive resources.  
In all, the CTM describes actions. Since an unexpressed idea is unlikely to meet a product definition of 
creativity, it is almost certain that any incident of creative appropriation, using the definition in this study, 
will involve CTM processes. 
8.2.7 Implications of the RRM 
The most profound implication of the RRM is that it creates the possibility of memory and learning. It is 
important to remember the reason why the RRM is necessary. Narrative accounts contain information, 
and narrative accounts of fully decoupled simulation processes will typically contain a lot of information. 
Information is expensive to store, and to index (Taleb, 2007, p. 68). Some research has suggested that 
indexing costs, rather than processing speed decay, may be responsible for the slower performance of 
older adults on some psychometric tests (Ramscar, Hendrix, & Baayen, 2014).  
One way to increase capacity to store information is to reduce the randomness and dimensionality (or 
Kolmogorov complexity (Kolmogorov, 1998; Taleb, 2007)) of that information. That is what is 
represented by tendencies of the RRM such as narrative fallacy (Nafday, 2009, pp. 192-193) (reducing the 
elements of events to preexisting categories), and the peak-end rule (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996) 
(reducing the dimensionality of stored information). The compression strategies for information 
implemented by the RRM make it possible for humans to store and manipulate large quantities of 
information and make use of it.  
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However, those strategies have some systematic effects.  
The memories that are formed of events will tend to conform to preexisting prototypes. Those prototypes 
will be internalized from the cultural symbol system and form part of the RCM. The memories which have 
been shaped by those prototypes will in turn reinforce the same prototypes at the distributed cognitive 
level. This may explain the remarkable longevity of cultural prototypes, even after they have been 
disproved by fact. 
8.3 Implications of the Information Cycle Model 
Perhaps the most profound implication of the Information Cycle Model (ICM) is the role of the web of 
prototypes in guiding and shaping the cognitive process. Prototypical representations at the distributed 
cognitive level are critical inputs to the RCM — which imply that they shape our constructed 
representations of the world, influencing the entire cognitive process. Not only do they shape our 
experience of the world, but by being part of the narrative-forming function of the RRM, they shape how 
we learn from our experiences. These — often implicit and inherently unobservable — shared prototypes 
at the collective level help to shape the stereotypes and schemas that operate at the individual levels of 
cognition. The individual cognitions so guided, feed back into the shared archetypical representations at 
the distributed level. This corresponds with Csikszentmihalyi (1999b)’s conceptualization of a web of 
information flows between a knowledge domain, a creative individual, and a professional field of 
gatekeepers who select creative products for inclusion in the domain. Of course, in some incidents of 
creativity the boundaries of these roles may be less clear than in others. For example, in the domains in 
which Csikszentmihalyi (1999b) conducted his research — well-defined, organized domains such as those 
found in the arts and the sciences — it may be easy to identify a “field” and a “domain”; while in incidents 
of user creativity in appropriation, the test of “creativity” may simply be implicit and based on what 
works. Csikszentmihalyi (1999b) calls a domain a “symbol system” containing information which is part of 
the culture (the complete set of domains). Research on the effects of creative groups and collaborative 
webs (R. K. Sawyer, 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005), can be seen as giving insight into the way in which 
prototypes are shared and influence the creative process. The integrative model provides a visualization of 
how the cultural symbol system interacts with individual and group cognitive systems, and provides a 
platform for future research. 
Another significant implication of the proposed operation of the integrative ICM model has to do with the 
effect of the activational characteristics of the DM on the likelihood of creative appropriation to occur. A 
particularly dramatic example of this occurred in Eta, the medical device manufacturer. Eta had 
developed a structured program that allowed employees to make suggestions and proposals about ways to 
enhance working procedures, optimize processes or in any way improve how the company ran its 
operations. When I discovered this procedure I initially expected it would be a source of good ideas about 
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how the company’s ICT tools might be better used. However, when I did get access to the records of the 
program, I found that most of the ideas were extremely context-specific and related to particular process 
inefficiencies that were related to single individuals. There were no instances of the kinds of user 
innovation that I expected the process would facilitate. It appears that, unlike product innovation — 
where users see developing a creative product as an explicit task goal (e.g., using a programming IDE to 
write software) — users will not engage in process innovation such as appropriating systems creatively; 
unless they feel forced to do so in order to avoid process losses.  
This makes sense in light of the fact that creative appropriation goes against two ingrained tendencies — 
or biases — of the cognitive system: Effort Minimization and Loss Aversion. Appropriating a system 
creatively tends to require significant effort, and tends to create risk while having an uncertain payoff.  
The implication of this is that the DM will tend not to fire. In order to overcome that tendency, most 
instances of creative appropriation are triggered by perceptions of loss - either actual losses due to threat 
(as in the Gamma case, where logistic and security problems with the current systems can cost lives), or 
process losses due to needs that the current system cannot fulfill (as in the Zeta cases, both of which were 
driven by perceived process losses). This may point to a fundamental difference between the kind of 
creativity in which the creative actors’ goal and the medium in which they are creative are symmetrical (a 
pianist plays the piano with the goal of becoming a creative pianist), and the kind in which the actors’ 
goals and the medium of creativity are asymmetrical (an accountant must find a creative way to use a 
system in order to complete his accounts). There is considerable evidence about the way in which positive 
affect about the goal state can motivate the actor in the first condition, but less research exists about the 
second.  
The implications of this for organizations that wish to encourage process innovations are far-reaching. It 
would suggest that such innovations cannot be expected to occur organically as a result of extended time 
using a system. Contrary to what would be expected from stage theories of implementation that suggest 
that use innovations will naturally emerge over time (Jasperson et al., 2005; Saga & Zmud, 1993), this 
suggests use innovations emerge only from specific loss-perception situations. It would suggest that 
deliberate strategies would need to be pursued in order to encourage process innovation to happen. One 
strategy for fostering such innovation might be the creation of deliberate resource constraints in order to 
force users to find strategies for extending the ways in which they appropriate systems. This is the strategy 
that was pursued — albeit, perhaps unintentionally — in Phi, the cloud computing company. Because the 
software tool Process was widely used and under-resourced (one developer), it was widely appropriated in 
unanticipated ways which were novel, and useful for the persons who so appropriated it. On the other 
hand, the heavily-resourced Finance department, who were able to hire outside contractors to perform 
functions that they could not get done through their own system, did not develop ways to appropriate that 
system creatively, despite the mismatch between its properties and their task requirements. Another 
strategy might be to make process creativity an explicit goal of the organization and allocate employee 
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time to it, in much the same way that many technology companies have begun to allocate “innovation 
time” to employees. 
This raises an unanticipated question about creative appropriation by users: is it desirable? Many studies 
of creativity assume it to be a desirable goal that ought to be pursued, and frame increasing creativity as a 
goal state for organizations. However the characteristics of the DM suggest that this may need to be 
considered carefully where creative appropriation is concerned. Given the circumstances under which it 
tends to occur, the question must be asked whether high levels of creative appropriation in a company 
may be a warning of trouble. Among the companies in this study in which no creative appropriation was 
observed, the companies themselves were productive and efficient. Theta, the software company, is highly 
successful in a very competitive industry. Kappa, the mobile surgical company, is likewise highly 
successful, and very innovative in its use of technology. In Phi, it was the more under-resourced internal 
system that was creatively appropriated to a large extent, while the flagship commercial product was not. I 
also noted that the IT professionals who maintained the systems were often at least ambivalent, and at 
times openly critical, of users “innovating” with their systems. The developer of Process at Phi once 
referred to the modifications as “subverting” the system. When pressed on this he explained that his prior 
experience was that frequent changes tended to result in ballooning complexity, and unmanageable 
systems. Also, the production team at Beta, the widget manufacturer, after innovatively coming up with a 
novel way to use Product — the office productivity system they repurposed — have continued to use the 
same system for almost twenty years, making only minor tweaks to improve it. Overall, from a design 
perspective, a tendency for a system to be used creatively may reflect negatively on the design of that 
system if it is not designed for a role that involves reconfiguration. 
8.4 Integration with Existing Knowledge 
There are several decades worth of existing knowledge in the literature regarding creativity and the 
workings of the cognitive system. It is worth reflecting on how the Information Cycle Model (ICM) 
integrates with this existing knowledge, how it extends it, and what it contributes.  
The information cycle model contributes to existing creativity research by proposing plausible 
mechanisms which explain correlational relationships which have been previously observed (Hedström & 
Ylikoski, 2010). It integrates with established models of problem solving (Newell & Simon, 1972) and 
human information processing (Card et al., 1983). For example, Card et al. (1983) proposed that the 
information-processing capabilities of the human mind can be described in terms of three systems: the 
perceptual system, which carries sensations of the external world into internal mental representations; 
the motor system, which actuates musculoskeletal structures to create physical actions in response to 
thoughts; and the cognitive system, which carries out complex information processing actions (Card et al., 
1983, pp. 24-44). In the ICM model, the actions of the RCM could be seen as analogous to those of the 
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perceptual system, the CTM as an analogue to the motor system, and the complex activities within the 
representations as analogous to the contents of the cognitive system. The structurally similar activities are 
analogues, rather than representations. The ICM does not rely on the structures proposed by Card et al. 
(1983) for its formulation, but it can be seen as compatible with those structures. The ICM is therefore 
compatible with, but does not depend on, the model proposed by Card et al. (1983). 
With reference to the components of creativity proposed by (Amabile, 1983, 1996), we can say that the 
Techniques component corresponds to the efficiency of the simulation process within the SR and the 
enactment processes carried out by the CTM. Resources contribute to the creation of affordances by 
enabling the user to make use of action potentials created by the technical object properties: e.g., if an 
user has access to relevant technical skills, she will be able to make use of action potentials offered by a 
complex system that would not be available to a user without those skills.  Finally, Motivation provides 
the triggering stimulus for the DM Copy operation, and the ongoing stimulus for the computationally 
expensive Decouple operation. Without those operations, the simulation process cannot be sustained and 
the system reverts to routine SAM operation. This supports Amabile’s statement that, of the three 
components, the most important is motivation (Amabile, 1996). Overall it can be said that the ICM is 
compatible with, but does not depend on, the componential model.  
In the Geneplore proposed by Finke et al. (1992), the creative process in the mind is modeled, broadly, as 
iterating between a generative phase, in which ideas for creative action are produced through a number of 
ideation processes; and an exploratory phase, in which ideas that are generated are evaluated and 
compared against product constraints. The ICM follows a similar logic in terms of the iterative cycling of 
information between the idea generation processes that are part of the simulation process; and the 
enactment processes which attempt to implement those ideas in the real world. Enactment processes 
which often lead to reevaluation and reformulation of the ideas, just as is modeled in the Geneplore 
model. In one sense, the Geneplore model could be seen as a model of the sub-mechanisms involved in 
the simulation process. The ICM takes the general iterative structure of the Geneplore model, and applies 
that structure to the interaction between mental ideation and physical enactment. However the ICM does 
not specify the precise mechanisms by which ideation takes place except at a high level of abstraction. The 
ICM is therefore compatible with, but is not dependent on, the Geneplore model. 
With regard to Csikszentmihalyi (1999b)’s System Model of creativity, Csikszentmihalyi proposed that 
creativity emerged from a set of information flows between three entities: a domain, an individual and a 
field. In order for creativity to occur, a set of rules is transmitted from the domain to the individual. The 
individual then produces a novel variation to these rules, a novel variation which is evaluated by a field. If 
the field judges the novel variation to be acceptable, it is added to the domain, transforming the domain 
and thus rendering the individual’s action “creative”. The ICM may specify what happens at the individual 
level: how the individual generates the novel variation. At the distributed cognitive level, the ICM may be 
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used to understand the flow of information between field, domain and individual, in the form of 
prototypes. The ICM therefore provides a framework which may be used to better understand the 
underlying processes that enable the overarching processes described by Csikszentmihalyi (1999b). 
However, the ICM does not necessarily describe the unfolding of those processes at the distributed 
cognitive level and does not assume that Csikszentmihalyi (1999b)’s model of those processes is complete. 
The ICM is therefore compatible with, but is not dependent on, Csikszentmihalyi (1999b)’s systems 
model. 
The ICM also enables us to generate better explanations of creative events and patterns through 
knowledge of the activational characteristics of the mechanisms. For example, several theoretical stage 
models of system use predict that novel appropriation patterns will emerge from an ‘exploratory’ stage of 
use after adoption (Jasperson et al., 2005; Saga & Zmud, 1993). This did not happen in any of the cases in 
this study. We can explain why that is by looking at the activational characteristics of the decoupling 
mechanism, which, because of its high computational cost and the effort minimization bias of the 
cognitive system, has a very high threshold for activation in non-hedonic contexts. Despite this fact, 
however, individuals routinely undertake decoupling and simulation activities in the form of play and 
games in hedonic contexts (Leslie, 1987; McGonigal, 2011). Further research on why this is may offer 
interesting clues as to the reasons why use determinants appear to systematically differ between hedonic 
and non-hedonic contexts (Van der Heijden, 2004). 
It can therefore be said that the ICM is broadly compatible with a range of existing models of creativity 
and cognitive function. It is, in general, compatible with those models: it is consistent with what they 
generally say about the functioning of the cognitive system and the creative process. However, it is not 
dependent on those models: by limiting its level of analysis to the Computational Theory level it does not 
require a researcher to pre-select a particular model of creativity or cognition. This maintains a level of 
flexibility, as it allows it to be used by researchers applying different perspectives. It also allows it to be 
used as a platform for comparative work aimed at evaluating which of several available models best 
explains observed findings. This is true both at the level of the specific component mechanisms, and that 
of the overarching model. 
The scope of the ICM is limited to explaining individual level creative appropriation. While the 
mechanisms that are part of the model can explain collective level cognitive operations, it is possible that 
there may be other mechanisms necessary to describe the operations of cognitive systems that span 
multiple individuals and external objects. However, the ICM may give some clues about the nature of 
broader distributed cognitive systems. These clues may offer insights, not only for creative appropriation, 
but creativity and cognition as a whole. I will speculate about this in the following sections. 
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8.5 Creativity and the Hiding Hand 
It has long been suggested that human individuals can be seen as component parts of a larger organism, 
in much the same way that individual human cells are part of the human body (Asch, 1952). It has been 
suggested that the interests of these individual components and those of the host organism can differ, and 
be in conflict (Dawkins, 2006). For example, one explanation that has been advanced for the differing 
tendencies of System 1 and System 2 in the cognitive system, is that System 1 is an evolutionarily old 
system that optimizes for evolutionary fitness, while System 2 is an evolutionarily recent system that 
optimizes for individual goal-seeking (Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2011). Is it possible that the distributed 
cognitive level of human cognition can itself be seen as forming something larger than the individual, 
something which may have interests and priorities that differ from those of its individual components? 
The basis of this speculation is an observation by Hirschman (1967) which has become widely known: the 
principle of the Hiding Hand (Hirschman, 1967). He observed — in the domain of major infrastructure 
development projects in developing economies — that the individual actors involved in those projects 
always systematically underestimated the cost, degree of difficulty, and level of risk involved in those 
projects. The systematic errors were beneficial collectively in the end, because the projects themselves 
became valuable for the community. However they would not have been embarked on by the developers if 
they had accurately predicted the cost and risk that they were assuming. He expresses it like this: 
“We may be dealing here with a general principle of action. Creativity always comes as 
a surprise to us. Therefore we can never count on it until it has happened. In other 
words, we would not consciously engage upon tasks whose success clearly requires that 
creativity be forthcoming. Hence, the only way in which we can bring our creative 
resources fully into play is by misjudging the nature of the task, by presenting it to 
ourselves as more routine, simple, undemanding of genuine creativity than it will turn 
out to be” (Hirschman, 1967, p. 13). 
This tendency — to underestimate the level of creativity that endeavors will require — operates at level of 
societies and national projects (where Hirschman was focused), but may also explain creativity at 
individual level. Creative actors in hedonic or artistic contexts appear to be driven by either intrinsic 
compulsion or affective feedback to continue or maintain the cycle of enactment-ideation. However in the 
case of utilitarian creativity such as the creative appropriation of IT, what appears to drive the cycle is 
loss-perception: a perception that loss will result if the creative action is not engaged in. In other words, it 
is not done for enjoyment, and will be avoided if other options for attaining goals can be employed. That is 
consistent with the negative cases and the outcomes of the natural experiments. It is also consistent with 
systematic errors which tend to be made by individuals — even highly trained individuals — in the 
estimation of risk (Taleb, 2008).  
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Does the way in which shared prototypes at the distributed level guide judgments at the individual level 
serve to push individuals into risky projects that may not suit the individuals’ interests, but will ultimately 
benefit human society by driving innovation and progress? Providing a definitive answer is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The question, however, suggests interesting areas for future work. 
8.6 Creativity and the Individual 
In the Introduction, I raised the issue of those figures, both historical and contemporary, who have been 
part of multiple stories of creative discovery and invention, in science (Merton, 1961) and in multiple 
other areas (Lemley, 2011). There are some individuals who are involved in a series of creative discoveries 
and inventions over their lifetimes. Individuals such as da Vinci, Edison, Tesla, and, more contemporarily, 
Jobs, and Musk; have been involved in transformative innovations in a number of different domains. This 
pattern also played out in the case data, on a smaller scale. While all the cases involved some collective 
action, some individuals such as MP at Gamma and JS at Alpha, had been involved in a number of 
creative incidents, outside of the context of the specific cases investigated in this study. It is statistically 
improbable that this would occur unless there is some distinguishing factor which sets some creative 
actors apart. I asked the question “what are these people good at”? This question can now be addressed in 
light of the findings of this study.  
It appears that multiple discovery happens because of the convergence of two major factors: one which 
works at the individual level, and one at the collective level. One factor derives from the fact that cognitive 
systems are guided in how they perform information processing operations by a shared set of prototypes 
at the distributed cognitive level. The shared prototypes at the DC level feed into the prototypes at the 
conscious (System 2) and intuitive (System 1) levels and guide the processes involved in both idea 
generation and evaluation. However, the prototypes are not all that is shared. There are also common 
mechanisms at work throughout the human cognitive system.  Just as is the case in technological artifacts, 
shared cognitive mechanisms tend to reduce variability in outcomes (see Rogers (2003)’s definition of 
technology). The same mechanisms, working with common prototypes on the same problems is therefore 
proposed to be one underlying explanation for simultaneous multiple discoveries across several domains. 
This suggests that a certain type of person, faced with a certain type of problem in a certain domain, will 
tend to develop a similar, or perhaps identical, type of solution. This gets at one of the most fundamental 
questions in creativity research: what type of person is that? Or, put another way, what are they good at? 
What these people are good at appears to be the process I have identified as Simulation. They appear to 
be good — at least, better than average — at creating models of the world that represent the important 
parts of a problem domain with sufficient accuracy to enable them to make correct judgments about 
evaluating and implementing creative solutions. For the serial inventors that were listed above, many of 
them did not work alone, and may not have been the actual initiators of some of the inventions they are 
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credited with. However, they did have a sense of which problems were solvable and should be allocated 
resources, and that also implies that they understood which ones were not solvable and should be 
dropped. At the individual level, this ability has been labeled “feeling of knowing”: an intuitive sense 
about one’s potential ability to solve a problem (Metcalfe, 1986). Another factor that has been shown to be 
highly correlated with many types of invention is persistence and doggedness, what Duckworth, Peterson, 
Matthews, and Kelly (2007) have labeled “grit”. In the case of creative invention or discovery, the role of 
such doggedness could be modeled as the sustaining of the simulation process (DM operation) until the 
creative solution emerges. 
At the collective level, this, famously, describes the principal role that Steve Jobs appears to have played at 
Apple Computer (Gladwell, 2011). There is also evidence that within Apple itself this is seen as a principal 
source of their ability to innovate. In 2009, Job’s successor, Tim Cook, in a conference call to investors, 
said “… We believe in saying no to thousands of projects, so that we can really focus on the few that are 
truly important and meaningful…” (Isaacson, 2011, p. 488). Complex inventions and difficult problems 
tend to require collaboration (R. K. Sawyer, 2007) as no one person may have all the different abilities 
(CTM competencies) necessary to completely generate creative solutions. The specific narrative of each 
invention, each story, is doubtless different across contexts. However, the simulation process that guides 
the finding of initial ideas, and the continual, iterative refinement of those ideas, seems to be at the center 
of the abilities that make creative individuals “creative”. The ability to maintain these processes across 
multiple individuals in a distributed context is also rare, and attempts to understand and formalize the 
processes involved have had mixed outcomes (DeSanctis et al., 2008). However, the simulation process — 
at both the individual and collective levels — seems to be a key to high levels of creativity. This may 
conflict with some popular conceptions of what leads to high levels of creativity. Often, creativity is 
thought to be associated with high levels of intelligence. However, this study contributes to a growing 
literature that suggests that creativity draws on abilities that may be uncorrelated with, and may not be 
indexed by, conventional tests of intelligence (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Stanovich, 2009).  
However, though this may explain some of the difference in creative output between individuals, it does 
not explain it all. There are also matters of access to Resources (Amabile, 1983, 1988), and other 
opportunities which are part of every story of creativity. In those cases where creative action requires 
special skills, creative individuals also need the time and resources to develop those skills (Ericsson et al., 
1993; Gladwell, 2008). In this case, I would suggest that there is another social mechanism which comes 
into play: the so-called Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968). Looking at the domain of scientific creativity, 
Merton (1968) showed that the reward structure of science ensured that scientists who were well-known 
got more credit for joint discoveries than their less-known collaborators. This greater credit led to greater 
access to resources, enabling them to be more productive, hence get more credit, and so on. This self-
reinforcing cycle meant that single individuals amassed more “inventions” over time than their peers. A 
similar kind of reward cycle seems to occur in the social dynamics of creativity in general. Those who are 
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successful in a creative endeavor become known as “creative”. They then, as a result, get access to more 
resources, enabling them to be “more creative”. This dynamic seems to be at least as important in 
determining the ability to produce creative outputs as any individual difference factors — perhaps more so 
(Gladwell, 2008). 
I propose that the mix of these two factors: simulation efficiency, and the Matthew Effect; can likely 
explain much of the outsize success of “highly creative” individuals. Of course, this is a speculative 
proposition, however it provides much scope for future work. 
8.7 The ICM and the Self-Organizing System 
This thesis set out to develop a theoretical explanation of the creative appropriation of information 
systems. It was established that creative appropriation would be defined as a cognitive process, carried 
out by the human cognitive system. As a matter of scope, this explanation was aimed at the level of 
abstraction that Marr (1982) defines as the computational theory level, which describes what the system 
does, and the logic of the strategy that it uses to do it, without attempting to specify or describe the system 
at the algorithmic or implementation levels. The theory therefore specifies a system of information 
processing mechanisms which describe information transformation processes that are a part of creative 
appropriation at a high level of abstraction.  
The system described by these mechanisms is deeply compatible with existing knowledge in a number of 
domains. However, one particular area of symmetry is the pattern of transforming of direct information 
about the world by the Retrospective Reframing Mechanism into forms which fit preexisting cognitive 
models. At the individual level, this tendency has been well documented (Nafday, 2009) and one 
proposed explanation for it is that it may represent a mechanism for managing information in long-term 
memory (Ramscar et al., 2014). However, how can the same pattern of information processing be 
explained in group, and even societal level systems, for example: the scientific community (Schaffer, 
1994)? 
Fully addressing the question is outside the scope of the thesis, but I wish to propose a speculative answer. 
Is it possible that this pattern of activity in science — a branch of human endeavor aimed at expanding the 
boundaries of knowledge — may be indicative of a kind of chunking at the distributed cognitive level? It 
has been known for some time that individual working memory is limited in capacity, being capable of 
holding up to seven (plus or minus two) units of information at one time (G. A. Miller, 1956). Individuals 
are not usually aware of this limitation because the cognitive system uses a strategy called “chunking” to 
efficiently organize information into structured units that, effectively, raise the capacity of the cognitive 
system (Bellezza & Young, 1989). There is a growing body of research on biological systems which exhibit 
self-organizing behaviors which supersede the intentions and interests of individual entities within those 
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systems (Camazine, 2003). It is now known that the individual cognitive system has a number of 
emergent behaviors which result from its complex architecture, and of which individuals are not 
consciously aware (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) — the behaviors which are 
explained in dual-process accounts of reasoning (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Chunking strategies in the 
mind are among these emergent, unconscious behaviors. It is possible that, in the same way, distributed 
cognitive systems may have emergent behaviors which are a result of the underlying architecture of the 
system, and are thus common to many such systems? These emergent behaviors may be hidden from the 
conscious awareness of the individuals who form parts of the DC system — in much the way that System 1 
guides individual cognition without being consciously perceptible. 
An emergent information chunking behavior in a DC system would have the same functional utility that 
such behaviors have in an individual cognitive system. It would systematically compress large volumes of 
information and make them tractable. I propose that the Information Cycle Model, by making explicit the 
role of shared prototypes in the individual cognitive process of developing creative products, provides a 
possible foundation for looking at deeper questions about the distributed cognitive process. Creativity and 
innovation are fundamental to the development of human society at many levels, and the ways in which 
collective “groups”, “organizations” and “societies”, come to exhibit ‘individual’ properties such as 
“beliefs”, “norms” and “behaviors” is not well understood. Much simpler biological organisms than 
humans exhibit sophisticated self-organizing behaviors (Camazine, 2003), and such behaviors in human 
collectives is an interesting topic for future work. 
The ICM provides a useful possible foundation for such work. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
“Innovation is not a “thing” that comes out of a machine fed the right ingredients. Instead, innovation is 
a shorthand term for a long story.”  
(H. S. Becker, 2013, p. xiv) 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis began by posing a question: why has there been little research done on creativity in the IS 
discipline, given the centrality of creativity as an input to so many of the research domains that have 
received much attention in IS? Further, the extant literature on creativity in IS, in addition to being small 
in volume, has also been quite narrow in scope: largely reflecting a focus on developers and users 
creativity-enhancement systems, and largely neglecting the role of user creativity in how IT is 
appropriated in determining the way systems are used and their resultant effects. In this thesis, I set out 
to address that gap in the literature.  
A review of the IS literature revealed one possible factor in the underrepresentation of creativity in the 
field research output: the fact that over the discipline’s history, certain models for representing how 
systems are used had become dominant, and that each of those models was ill-suited to facilitating 
intensive study of phenomena such as creativity, which have both ostensive and performative aspects. 
One contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a model for analyzing user-system interactions which is 
able to represent ideation events in a meaningful but conceptually abstract manner, and link those events 
to appropriation behaviors through the concept of affordances.  
Another factor which may explain the paucity of creativity research in IS may be the fact that IS has 
lacked a suitable theoretical foundation for such research. Often, a necessary precondition for a 
substantial exploration of a topic is an organizing framework, such as the one that Desanctis and Gallupe 
(1987) provided for the Minnesota GDSS Project (DeSanctis et al., 2008, p. 554). In this thesis I have 
proposed a theoretical model for explaining user creativity in the appropriation of information and 
communication technologies. The approach used to create the model was an embedded multiple-case 
study of incidents in which users in ten diverse participant organizations had developed ways of 
appropriating IT systems that were regarded as “creative” by appropriate observers. The research 
question emerged from a process of iterating between theory and data, as is recommended in inductive 
theory-building research (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 546), however its final form was “What are the cognitive 
mechanisms that explain end user creativity in the appropriation of Information Systems at the 
individual level?” A set of cognitive mechanisms was identified, and these mechanisms were synthesized 
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into a model for explaining individual-level creative appropriation. The resulting explanatory model is 
consistent with both the case data and related literature. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the contributions to knowledge made in the thesis. I will first discuss the 
contributions to theoretical knowledge represented by the models developed, and discuss how those 
contributions may create opportunities for further work on user creativity, creativity studies in general, 
within IS. I will then look at how applying these models to real-world problems may make contributions 
to practice. I will then discuss the limitations of the work, and after that will look at some of the avenues 
for future research opened up by the theory.  
9.2 Contributions to Theory 
This thesis contributes to theoretical knowledge in the discipline in two major ways: proposing a new 
model for representing the appropriation of IT, and presenting a new model of creative appropriation as a 
cognitive process by users. This addresses two key gaps in the IS literature: contributing to the current 
conversation on how to represent user interaction with IT artifacts; and contributing to the sparse 
literature on creativity in the discipline, by creating a model which can serve as a foundation for future 
research. While the two models presented in the thesis are developed to explain creative appropriation, 
neither of them is inherently limited to the exploration of that specific phenomenon. The main 
contributions thus have the potential to serve as contributions to a number of research domains within 
and beyond IS. The thesis also makes a number of contributions to current debates within IS on 
metatheory, theory, and methodology. I will discuss each of those contributions in the following sections. 
9.2.1 Affordance Field Theory 
The first major contribution is Affordance Field Theory (AFT). This theory expands on the work of 
Markus and Silver (2008) by expanding the universe of representations in their updated 
conceptualization of Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) in order to fully represent the components of 
the interaction between a user and a system. It provides a model for analyzing such interactions, and for 
comparative analysis across contexts.  
It also fills a theoretical gap that was left by Markus and Silver (2008) in their reconceptualization of 
DeSanctis and Poole (1994)’s version of Adaptive Structuration Theory. The replacement of some 
concepts from the work of Giddens (1984) in the original version of AST invalidated some conceptual 
categories which were part of that work. It should be noted that in doing so, Markus and Silver (2008) 
moved away from Giddens (1984) and toward Gibson (1979), and AFT is another step in that direction.  
AFT is one major contribution of the thesis. 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
248 
 
9.2.2 The Information Cycle Model 
The second major contribution of the thesis is the cognitive mechanisms and the integrative model that I 
have labeled the Information Cycle Model (ICM). This model provides a comprehensive explanation of the 
information-processing operations involved in end user creativity at the computational theory level (Marr, 
1982). Much of what we know about the structure of the reasoning system and how it leads to behavior is 
based on programs of research that are centered around controlled lab experiments (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wason & Evans, 1975). However, controlled experiments in 
labs have well-documented strengths and weaknesses. Lab experiments are powerful tools for discovering 
and exploring the causal properties of the basic mental processes involved in cognition, but they are not 
optimal for discovering how those basic processes work together in real-world cognition (Dunbar, 1997). 
It is known, for example, that people are less likely to engage in analogical thinking under lab conditions 
that they are in real life (Dunbar, 2001). It has also been demonstrated that heuristic/implicit processes 
which can lead to bias and error in lab experiments can lead to higher quality decision making under real-
life conditions (Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2005).  
This supports the position of Dunbar (1997) that a full understanding of creative behavior requires field 
investigations in real-world environments. Such investigations will require basic conceptual models 
(Miles & Huberman, 1999). The ICM can provide one such model. It is compatible with, but not 
dependent on, a number of existing models of how the creative process works, and adds to the theoretical 
understanding of creativity that is being developed through current work. It also is compatible with, but 
not dependent on, existing models of human information processing. It therefore may provide a tool for 
analysis of behavior beyond the scope of creativity research. It has proven useful for analyzing data across 
a wide range of field situations — i.e., across a theoretical replication of case sites — and is compatible 
with previous findings across a range of literatures on the cognitive processes involved in innovative 
behavior. It is therefore useful both as an analytical tool, and as a framework for future research, as the 
identified mechanisms can be explored and studied.  
There are obvious links between AFT and the ICM. Both are based on models of representations, and 
transformations of those representations. In a word, both are cognitivist models, in that they are based on 
abstract representations of internal mental states and cognitive structures. They both also link cognitive 
states with affordances. AFT does so explicitly through representation of the Affordance Field within 
which users make appropriation moves. The ICM does so implicitly through the activation of the Concrete 
Transformation Mechanism, which represents taking action in the external world, which — in an IS 
appropriation context — will often include making use of affordances offered by a system. It should be 
noted that there are some symmetries between the models which may be misleading if read too literally. 
For example, the operation of the Attribute Substitution Mechanism can be compared to the action of 
Widening the Affordance Field. Likewise, the operation of the Representation Transformation Mechanism 
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can compared to the action of Stretching the Affordance Field. These symmetries are intuitively attractive 
but should not be assumed. The models are compatible, but independent. User-systems interactions are 
complex, and reductionist representations of those interactions should be avoided. 
9.2.3 Other Contributions 
The thesis makes a number of other contributions to theory.  
Culnan (1987) noted that it is important to track the state of the development of IS as an academic 
discipline, given the dynamic state of information technology and the youth of the discipline itself (p. 
342). Slightly more than two decades later, this statement remains valid. This thesis presents an analysis 
of one critical aspect of the discipline: the representation of the interaction between user and system. 
While this analysis merely represents one perspective, it does raise an interesting possibility: that IS is in 
the midst of a transition in terms of its fundamental assumptions. This is a process that is often difficult to 
perceive, given the mechanisms which tend to make scientific revolutions “invisible” (Kuhn, 1996). The 
thesis therefore contributes to the literature within IS that looks at the discipline itself, while contributing 
to the debates which may, indeed be part of a shift in paradigms in the field. 
The thesis also introduces an approach to analyzing user behavior based on Dual Process Theories of 
cognition. While dual-process theories have been mentioned in prior IS research (Avgerou, 2013), they do 
not seem to have penetrated deeply into theorizing within the field (Browne & Parsons, 2012; Davern et 
al., 2012a, 2012b). Dual Process Theories have emerged as an explanatory framework for empirical 
evidence that presents a significant challenge to the assumptions that underlie a great deal of theorizing 
within IS. They are therefore an area of cognitive research that deserves further attention. Dual Process 
Theories have also been successfully introduced as a useful perspective in many other behavioral science 
fields (Haidt, 2001, 2007).  
The thesis also presents a framework for integrating the well—established “roadmap” for inducting theory 
from case study data developed by Eisenhardt (1989a) with the principles for conducting critical realist 
(CR) case studies of Wynn and Williams (2012). Critically, the framework presented in this thesis 
addresses the challenge of structural analysis, the rigors of which Wynn and Williams (2012) suggest will 
tend to restrict critical realist case studies to single-case, or limited-context designs. It is a well-accepted 
truism that multiple-case designs are considered preferable in many contexts (Yin, 2009), and it is 
important that researchers using critical realist assumptions are able to access such designs in order to 
take advantage of their strengths. This thesis provides one model by which CR researchers can conduct 
embedded multiple-case studies. In doing so, it contributes to the still-emerging literature on CR in IS. 
Finally, it is worth noting the parallel between recent developments in the literature on “use” in IS, and 
the move away from behaviorism in the wider behavioral sciences that lead to the development of 
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cognitive science. The IS discipline seems to be experiencing a similar move away from its own form of 
empiricist ideas, at  least in the area of the representation and measurement of system use. It now seems 
to be moving toward more complex and rich representations of IS phenomena, as well as a greater 
awareness of the cognitive processes that underlie user behaviors. Given the apparent structural similarity 
in the underlying issues that have led to each of these moves, perhaps IS researchers can draw some 
inspiration from the history of cognitive science. This thesis provides one model of how this may be 
approached. 
9.3 Contributions to Practice 
The primary contributions of this thesis have been to theory. However, its findings also have the potential 
to make a contribution to practice. While Affordance Field Theory may prove useful in different settings, 
in this section I will focus on the possible contributions of the Information Cycle Model (ICM).  
A deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in the creative appropriation — and 
appropriation in general — of IT systems can be of significant use to the people who design, build, deploy 
and manage those systems. For example, an understanding of the Representation Construction 
Mechanism (RCM) processes by which users make sense of how systems are intended to be used can 
inform the way systems are designed (in a manner similar to that which Norman (2002)’s version of 
“affordances” addresses). The ICM may therefore provide a useful framework for user interaction design. 
The fostering of creativity is an important goal for many who develop IT systems, and for many of those 
who invest in them (Kern, 2010). However, the goal of “creativity on demand” has long been, and will no 
doubt continue to be, an elusive one. Many definitions of what is “creative” either implicitly or explicitly 
include the fact that creativity is always unexpected or surprising (Boden, 1996; Hirschman, 1967). It is 
therefore, by definition, unlikely that creativity can be “predicted” or forced to happen under most 
circumstances. However, while there is no intervention that can guarantee a creative outcome, the ICM 
may suggest levers by which the likelihood of such outcomes may be manipulated. “Levers” may be more 
useful than “triggers” because, contrary to the ‘pro-innovation bias’ in some of the management literature, 
novelty may not always be desirable. Use cases of systems can be designed either trigger the DM (to 
encourage users to discover new ways to use the system) or to encourage SAM operation (to constrain 
unintended use). The former might be useful for a hedonic system (e.g., a game console); while the latter 
might be preferred in contexts where nonstandard use pattern are risky (e.g., the flight control system of 
an aircraft). In domains where accurate recording of use patterns is required, systems can be designed to 
log those aspects of their actuation that are most likely to be distorted by the RRM.  
None of the above possibilities suggest a simple, rule-based model that can be applied blindly to all 
systems. For any specific system, it would likely be necessary to do empirical research to discover, for 
example, which RCM cues are effective in shaping which user behaviors. The ICM cannot provide blanket 
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answers to such questions, but can, rather, provide a useful framework for asking them, and for 
organizing and interpreting the answers. The ICM, as currently specified, is more of a tool for consultants 
than for general use. However, it may prove useful, and may, as such, prove an appropriate tool for 
facilitating the design, implementation and management of IT systems. 
9.4 Limitations 
The critical realist (CR) assumption of mediated knowledge implies that human knowledge of reality is 
transient and imperfect. As such, in CR, findings from any single study are viewed as provisional. This is a 
general limitation of any single-study finding using critical realist assumptions and is a limitation of this 
study.  
The study also has specific limitations. Both the critical realist case study framework of Wynn and 
Williams (2012), and the Eisenhardt (1989a) roadmap, recommend the use of multiple investigators for 
triangulation of assumptions and interpretations. Because of the limitations imposed by the rules of 
dissertation research, this project has been conducted largely by a single investigator, the author. One 
individual has done both the theory development and field work. While I have received feedback from 
supervisors during the process, the preparation, data collection, data analysis and writing have been done 
by me. This represents another limitation of the project. 
Another limitation that must be noted is the universe to which the findings can be generalized. There have 
been a number of philosophical debates on the ability of non-human objects to take action and determine 
the course of events — on whether they can be agents (see (Giddens, 1984), (Latour, 1991)). That debate is 
becoming a lot less philosophical. It is now possible for interacting algorithmic systems to generate and 
exhibit “behavior” which cannot be predicted, controlled, or monitored by the human agents have built, 
programmed and deployed them (N. Johnson et al., 2013). Understanding the behaviors of these new 
machine ecologies is a worthwhile and important project (Lewis, 2014; Popper, 2012), but it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
There is another fundamental limitation in the design of the study, one that is perhaps best illustrated 
with an example:  
9.4.1 Vignette III 
The company had been in business since 1851, and was one of the oldest corporations in the United 
States. Its products had helped the Allies win the Second World War. It was an industry leader in the 
field of glassmaking, employed some of the most highly respected scientists in the world, and had a 
market capitalization of approximately 10 times the book value of its assets. Yet one of its most 
important products to date had come from a malfunctioning thermostat. In 1953, Donald Stookey, a 
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chemist at the company, tried to heat a plate of glass to 600C in a lab furnace. He left the plate in the 
furnace, and while he was away, the thermal controller malfunctioned, and the temperature crept up to 
900C. At that temperature the glass should have melted, but it didn’t. Instead, it transformed into a new 
material: the world’s first glass-ceramic. Its unusual properties were first revealed when Stookey made 
his second mistake of the day. While he was fishing the piece of glass out of the furnace it slipped from 
his tongs and fell to the floor. It should have shattered, but it didn’t. Incredibly strong, light, and nearly 
impervious to huge fluctuations in temperature, the new material was dubbed “Pyroceram”. It proved 
useful for everything from missile nose-cones to commercial cookware.   
In 1959, the company set out, once again, to create a new type of glass, this time on purpose. The (then) 
President of the company told the Research Director, William Armistead: “Glass breaks… Why don’t you 
fix that?” Armistead started a years-long series of experiments aimed at doing just that, investigating 
all known techniques for strengthening glass, and developing new ones. The company eventually 
developed a process that involved adding aluminum oxide to a certain glass composition before dousing 
it in a bath of hot potassium salt. Sodium ions in the glass were exchanged with (larger) potassium ions 
from the salt bath. The potassium ions were pressed together during the cooling process, creating high 
compressive stresses that go deep into the surface of the glass. The procedure resulted in glass that was 
not only extremely hard, but also remarkably flexible. However, the company lacked a ready 
commercial application for it, so they embarked on an expensive marketing campaign to inform 
industry about the properties of their new product. More than 100 magazine and newspaper articles 
about the material were placed by the company’s public relations department. The company received 
thousands of inquiries about the material, and quickly identified over 70 potential uses. It could be used 
to make impact-resistant eyeglasses, unbreakable windows for jails, or vandal-resistant telephone 
booths. One of the most promising potential applications was protective windscreens for automobiles.  
None of the plans worked out as the company hoped they would. Initial tests of various applications 
revealed problems with many of the proposed uses. Though the new glass was much more impact and 
stress resistant than regular glass, when it did break, it did so explosively, making it unsuitable for 
applications such as eyeglasses. Likewise, car manufacturers saw no reason to replace their existing 
laminate windshields with the more expensive high-strength product. Especially since crash tests 
revealed an undesirable side-effect of the much stronger windshields: although the hardened glass did 
reduce the risk of some types of injuries in accidents, it also increased the risk of head injuries when 
occupants were thrown against the windshield. The other possible applications of the new glass also did 
not pan out. In the end, the project was described as one of the company’s “biggest and most expensive 
failures”, and was shut down in 1971.  
The company was then called Corning Glass Works, but is now known as Corning Inc. The strengthened 
glass product was then called Chemcor, but is now known as Gorilla Glass.  
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(Alice, 2013; Dyer & Gross, 2001; Flint, 1968; Gardiner, 2012) 
 
Today, Gorilla Glass is used to make the scratch-resistant displays on the handheld devices produced by 
almost every major smartphone and tablet manufacturer in the world. In 2011, it accounted for 
approximately $700 million in sales for Corning, and it is estimated that it is now part of more than 1 
billion devices worldwide (Etherington, 2012). The story of how Chemcor went from failed product to one 
of the most ubiquitous tech device components in the world has been told many times, and, as would be 
expected from the RRM, has many conflicting versions (see, for example, the very different versions of the 
story in (Isaacson, 2011, pp. 470-472), and (Pogue, 2010)). However, it stands as a classic example of the 
point that creative innovations do not occur in a vacuum. The right idea does not come to fruition if it 
does not come about at the right time, given the right tools, with right team working on the right problem. 
Most successful products of a creative process — whether physical artifacts or novel ideas — are successful 
because of a synergy between the product itself and the zeitgeist of the time and circumstance in which it 
is generated (Flores, 2013).  
S. Johnson (2010) borrowed a concept from Kauffman (2002)’s writing on evolution in biospheres to 
describe the way that the current state of a domain enables and constrains the range of creative products 
that can be created in that domain at any time: the concept of the adjacent possible. The basic idea of the 
concept is that at any moment a finite number of products can be created and succeed, depending on the 
availability of compatible products which can make those products useful. Products which depend on 
undeveloped future products for relevance cannot succeed, regardless of the subjective level of 
“innovativeness” or “quality” that they represent. Products like Babbage’s Difference Engine that are 
simply “ahead of their time” do not get recognized, and so do not get the requisite level of access to 
resources, and so either do not get built, or if they do, do not succeed in making a real impact (Swade & 
Babbage, 2001). Since it is, in practice, very difficult to identify the current boundaries of the adjacent 
possible, this means that “creativity”, defined as the generation of products that are acknowledged as 
creative, is very difficult to recognize at the time, and effectively impossible to predict. This means that 
stories of creative invention and discovery are almost always retrospectively constructed after the fact, 
when the “creativity” of the product has already been recognized. It also means that real-world, in-vivo 
(Dunbar, 1997) creativity narratives are especially susceptible to the distortions of the RRM. 
One implication of this is that a theory that describes the individual-level information-processing 
operations that result in creative appropriation can, by definition, tell only a part of the story of a creative 
incident. Modern creativity research has established that major discoveries and inventions are almost 
always part of a social, rather than individual, story (R. K. Sawyer, 2007). This social story is always 
intertwined with environmental influences, network effects, and societal value judgments. The ICM 
acknowledges the importance of social and environmental context, and provides a tool for future analysis 
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of the effects of those contextual influences through the concept of prototypes, and their role in shaping 
individual information-processing through the RCM and the RRM. However, the current project does not 
attempt to describe how the distributed cognitive system comprised of the web of individuals, prototypes 
and contexts lead to creative outcomes. More comprehensive descriptions of the full system are left for 
future research. 
Today, Donald Stookey is hailed as the “inventor” of Corning Ware (the commercial name given to 
Pyroceram). Little thought is given to the true hero of the story: the malfunctioning thermostat. What 
became of the thermostat? What was its story, and its eventual fate? That detail, like many details in every 
story of creative innovation (Dunbar, 1997, p. 16), is lost. The participants in creation narratives have no 
way of knowing, at the time, which facts are mundane and which will be highly significant. There is often 
no way, apart from speculation, to know what effect small differences may have made to the way that a 
particular story would have ended, if only a detail were different. We know that common contextual, 
social, and individual factors influence the creative process in many cases across many domains (Amabile, 
1996; Dunbar, 1997; R. K. Sawyer, 2007). However, the element of chance also plays a part in determining 
outcomes.  
As such, theories of creativity, such as the one presented in this thesis, can only ever tell part of the story. 
Donald Stookey went on to have a long and productive career at Corning Glass Works. He made many 
multi-million dollar discoveries for the company, and eventually rose to the position of Research Director. 
However, he is best known outside his field as the man who invented Corning Ware (Alice, 2013). And 
rightly so. Another chemist may have breathed a sigh of relief at not having to clean up shards of glowing-
hot glass from the floor, picked up the fragment of Pyroceram and tossed it into a disposal bin. The theory 
presented in this thesis can account for the perceptual and cognitive processes that led Stookey and his 
colleagues to realize that the lump of material from the furnace should be investigated, and, properly 
extended through future work, it can account for the collaborative actions they performed as they 
discovered novel and useful applications for it. However, it cannot account for the actions of the 
malfunctioning thermostat.  
9.5 Future Work 
One test of the usefulness of a theory is the extent to which it opens up, and facilitates the addressing of, 
interesting questions for future research. In this section I briefly consider some areas for future research 
which may be facilitated by the Information Cycle Model (ICM). 
Perhaps the most interesting area opened up for future investigation by the ICM is the conceptualization 
of the social world as an emergent self-organizing system based on interactions between shared 
prototypes and individual cognitive systems (Camazine, 2003). The possibility that the model of 
prototypes interacting with internal representations may in turn produce a model for looking at how 
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patterns of social behavior emerge in human groups through the ICM. Information flows through and 
between multiple entities often produce similar structures in the natural world, and the foundation of the 
ICM may provide a platform for exploring this phenomenon. Extending the model of individual cognitive 
operations into conceptualizations of broader distributed systems, may provide a way of looking at social 
and environmental influences, and how they influence individual and collective behaviors. Understanding 
such emergent collective-level behaviors can contribute to many domains of IS research. For example, one 
of the most important markets in software right now is in social media apps and platforms. Social media 
platforms essentially try to create self-organizing systems — groups of users who use their platform, and 
thus create social systems based around that platform. This is hard to do, as there is currently no 
consensus model of how these group-level behaviors emerge. Recently, major social media companies 
have invested billions of dollars in buying successful platforms rather than building their own, because no 
company has been able to reliably create successful user communities around particular platforms. 
Understanding how self-organizing, collective-level behaviors develop and propagate could provide useful 
clues as to how it can be done.  
The rating exercise which was used to classify the cases that were analyzed in detail as “creative” produced 
interesting, and unexpected, differences in the criteria applied by different raters. In part, this may be a 
result of the divergent backgrounds of the raters. It may be interesting to probe how different individuals 
from different backgrounds assess the creativity of ideas, what kinds of criteria are applied, and what 
kinds of qualities of ideas lead them to make judgments about creativity. These types of questions are of 
interest to venture capital firms, research funding agencies, and almost anybody that must make decisions 
about resource allocation and spending priorities. The answers to those questions can also contribute 
basic insight on ideation processes. While it was beyond the scope of the current study to address these 
issues in detail, they are significant, and the ICM may provide a platform for investigating this process of 
assessment and judgment-making. 
The ICM also provides a platform for future work on creative appropriation. The computational theory 
level, at which the ICM is specified, provides a part of the story, but just a part. There are many interesting 
questions to be asked about how and by what means the mechanisms that form part of the ICM are 
implemented in terms of cognitive representations and logical processes. These questions in turn lead to 
deeper questions about how the observed representations are physically implemented in the neural 
hardware of the physical cognitive system. In other words, questions about how mind emerges from brain. 
In addition to the deeper questions raised by how the ICM emerges from its internal structural 
components, there are also broader questions, alluded to in the thesis, about how emergent collective-
level processes may pursue the interests of collective social entities, rather than individual actors 
(Hirschman, 1967). The ICM also can provide a framework for looking at the structural differences 
between different types of creativity, such as product vs. process creativity. 
G Baker – Creative Appropriation 
256 
 
One aspect of the role of prototypes in guiding thinking is the cultural dependence of knowledge and 
cognitive processes. This is vividly demonstrated in the fact that “common” cognitive phenomena such as 
the effect of common visual illusions are, in fact, culture-specific. This is illustrated in the finding of 
Henrich et al. (2010) that “common” mental phenomena such as visual illusions are actually often 
culturally-specific. It is important to study creativity and find cultural variations in the way that cognitive 
processes are applied in creative incidents across cultures. The ICM can provide a platform for 
enumerating what specifically is it that varies across cultures, vs. what remains constant. This is another 
area in which there is scope for future work. 
The broad scope for work at the collective level should not, however, obscure the tremendous scope for 
questions about individual creative cognition opened up the ICM. There are open questions in the 
literature about the nature of the perceptual systems that form the RCM. How the contents of cognitive 
representational systems are stored mentally, and can be represented themselves. The nature of the skills 
involved in CTM processes, and the mysteries of the processes within the Secondary Representation that 
lead to the development of ideas. The ICM provides a framework for IS researchers who wish to explore 
these questions. 
However, one of the most salient areas for future work lies in the testing and verification of the 
Information Cycle Model itself. The falsification of mechanism-based theories under critical realist 
assumptions is an emerging area of research (K. D. Miller & Tsang, 2011). It is possible to contribute to 
this emerging research area while testing the mechanisms proposed in the ICM for existence, coherence 
and explanatory power.  
9.6 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have undertaken to theoretically explain the creative appropriation of information systems 
by identifying and describing the cognitive mechanisms that are involved in the process. In doing so, I 
have drawn on a number of theoretical lenses from a number of disciplines, and engaged with a number of 
theories about the determinants of creativity and the nature of the creative process.  
The explanation I have proposed addresses the research questions of the thesis. However, this 
explanation, like any explanation of creativity, is only partial. Creativity, as Hirschman (1967) notes, 
always comes as a surprise. What is obvious and unsurprising is not typically defined as creative. Also, in 
many ways, being creative often requires blind faith: creative endeavors frequently require significant 
investments, both in terms of personal and external resources. Yet, that investment offers little certainty 
in terms of return. A great many attempts at being creative fail, and far too often, our attempts to learn 
from both the successes and failures of attempts to be creative are frustrated by systematic distortions of 
our perceptions of the creative process.  
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Like many emergent qualities of human society, this does serve a purpose. With a clear view of the costs of 
failure and the unlikelihood of success, many explorers and inventors would never have embarked on 
great journeys that have led to discoveries and inventions that have improved lives, inspired others, and 
advanced the state of civilization. However, for every discoverer or inventor that has changed the course 
of human history, there are many others who have failed in the attempt, often at great cost.  
An improved understanding of the elements involved in the creative endeavor may give future travelers a 
better chance of success. My hope is that the work described here may in some way contribute to such an 
understanding. 
 
 
 
Gregory Baker 
Human Interface Technology Lab 
May, 2014 
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Appendix I 
Amabile A Priori Constructs – Hierarchical Representation 
MOTIVATION    
MOTIVATION\Motivation to Innovate    
MOTIVATION\Motivation to Innovate\Lack of Org Impediments    
MOTIVATION\Motivation to Innovate\Organizational Encouragement    
MOTIVATION\Task Motivation    
MOTIVATION\Task Motivation\Ability to minimize ext const    
MOTIVATION\Task Motivation\Attitude toward task    
MOTIVATION\Task Motivation\Extrinsic Constraints    
MOTIVATION\Task Motivation\Initial Intrinsic Motivation    
MOTIVATION\Task Motivation\Perceived Motivation    
MOTIVATION\Task Motivation\Risk Orientation    
RESOURCES    
RESOURCES\Domain-Relevant Skills    
RESOURCES\Domain-Relevant Skills\Cognitive abilities    
RESOURCES\Domain-Relevant Skills\Education    
RESOURCES\Domain-Relevant Skills\Knowledge about domain    
RESOURCES\Domain-Relevant Skills\Perceptual and Motor Skills    
RESOURCES\Domain-Relevant Skills\Special Talent    
RESOURCES\Domain-Relevant Skills\Technical Skills    
RESOURCES\Resources in Task Domain    
RESOURCES\Resources in Task Domain\Sufficient Resources    
RESOURCES\Resources in Task Domain\Time Pressure    
RESOURCES\Resources in Task Domain\Work Load Pressure 
 
 
   
TECHNIQUES    
TECHNIQUES\Creativity-Relevant Skills    
TECHNIQUES\Creativity-Relevant Skills\Cognitive Style    
TECHNIQUES\Creativity-Relevant Skills\Generative Heuristics    
TECHNIQUES\Creativity-Relevant Skills\Ideation Experience    
TECHNIQUES\Creativity-Relevant Skills\Personality    
TECHNIQUES\Creativity-Relevant Skills\Training    
TECHNIQUES\Creativity-Relevant Skills\Work Style    
TECHNIQUES\Management Practices    
TECHNIQUES\Management Practices\Challenging work    
TECHNIQUES\Management Practices\Freedom    
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TECHNIQUES\Management Practices\Managerial Encouragement    
TECHNIQUES\Management Practices\Work Group Supports    
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Appendix II 
Critical Decision Method Probes 
Probe Type Probe Content Example  
Cues What were you seeing, hearing, smelling? 
Knowledge What information did you use in making this decision and how as 
it obtained? 
Analogues Were you reminded of any previous experience? 
Standard scenarios Does this case fit a standard of typical scenario? Does it fit a 
scenario were trained to deal with? 
Goals What were your specific goals and objectives at the time? 
Options What other courses of action were considered or were available? 
Basis of choice How was this option selected/other options rejected? What rule 
was being followed? 
Mental modeling  Did you imagine the possible consequences of this action? Did you 
imagine that would unfold? 
Experience What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in 
making this decision? What training, knowledge, or information 
might have helped? 
Decision making How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
How long did it take to actually make this decision? 
Aiding If the decision was not the best, what training, knowledge, or 
information could have helped? 
Situation assessment If you were asked to describe this situation to a relief officer at this 
point, how would you summarize the situation? 
Errors What mistakes are likely at this point? Did you acknowledge of 
your situation assessment or option selection were incorrect? How 
might a novice have behaved differently? 
Hypotheticals If a key feature of the situation had been different, what difference 
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would it have made in your decision? 
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